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Taking as my point of departure the generally accepted version of Victorian sympathy 
predicated on distance, imagination, and vision, I identify within Victorian literature an 
alternative, far more corporeal, version of sympathy predicated on immediacy, sensation, 
and touch.  In discussing representations of bodily sensation and the ways in which such 
sensation functions within Victorian literature, my dissertation addresses the connections 
between sensation, particularly pain, and moral development by examining how 
psychological and emotional experience is represented in physiological terms.  As a 
supplement to recent studies concerning vision, my dissertation focuses on touch in order 
to address the fundamental problems of sensory perception, materiality, and 
psychological experience in the Victorian period.  This connection between physiological 
sensation and ethical development suggests a fundamental connection between 
corporeality and morality, an alignment that resists the totalizing equation of spirituality 
with morality and of materiality with sin present either implicitly or explicitly within 
much of Christian orthodoxy during the nineteenth century. 
 
My first chapter explores the connections and points of resistance between and among 
 
scientific and theological explanations of human existence both physical and emotional.  
My second chapter reinterprets Charlotte Brontë’s Villette as a novel not about vision and 
surveillance but about touch and materiality, one which presents writing as the ideal, 
even sacramental, form of embodiment.  My third chapter, on George Eliot’s “The Lifted 
Veil,” considers Latimer’s mind-reading in relation to the vivid representations of his 
experiences of his own body as well as of the bodies of his companions, suggesting that 
clairvoyance for Latimer consists more accurately of acute sensitivity to his own bodily 
experience.  My fourth chapter explores the consequences of symbolic and realistic 
representations of bodies in poetry by A. C. Swinburne and D. G. Rossetti in connection 
to both Christian orthodoxy and alternative moral systems.  My final chapter, on H. G. 
Wells’s The Island of Dr. Moreau and Gerard Manley Hopkins’s terrible sonnets, argues 
that these texts insist upon material embodiment as a necessary precondition for morality, 
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To be human, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is to be categorically 
different from both animals and the divine.  One is “human” insofar as one demonstrates 
either one’s superiority to animals or one’s inferiority to God.1  Only one comparison is 
at issue at a time: if in a given context “human” indicates superiority to animals, 
inferiority to the divine is not at stake, and the reverse is also true.  Consequently, human-
ness is less a fixed category located at one static point between animal and divine than it 
is a fluid range of locations overlapping more or less with either of the other two 
alternatives depending on circumstance.  Thus, for all of its seemingly straightforward 
meaning, the term “human” remains contested and unstable through its multiple and 
shifting definitions that rely more on what it is not than on what it is.  When “human” 
serves as an articulation of superiority to animals, it generally signifies the presence of 
both intellectual and moral qualities such as rational thought and kindness.  When 
“human” is meant to signify difference from the divine, it generally suggests 
characteristics such as imperfection, finiteness, mortality, bodily temptation, and self-
interestedness.  Yet neither definition suggests a blending of the material with the 
spiritual, moral, or intellectual.  The insistence upon this separation of, on one hand, 
attributes of the divine (spirituality, morality, intellect, etc.) and, on the other, attributes 
of the beast (self-interestedness, amorality, soullessness, intellectual weakness) relies on 
                                                
1 Of the first three definitions of “human,” two are of relevance here.  Definition 1: “Distinguished from 
animals by superior mental development, power of articulate speech, and upright posture.”  Definition 3a: 
“Belonging or relative to human beings as distinguished from God or superhuman beings; pertaining to the 
sphere or faculties of mankind (with implication of limitation or inferiority); mundane; secular.  (Often 
opposed to divine.)”  “Human.”  Oxford English Dictionary Online.  Oxford: Oxford U P, 2005.  Retrieved 
19 April 2005 from <http://www.oed.org>.  
 
2 
the association of corporeal materiality with weakness and the bestial, and of 
noncorporeality with perfection and the divine.  It would seem to follow, then, that the 
degree to which one could purge oneself of the taint of bodily materiality would 
determine one’s position relative to perfection, signified implicitly within this definition 
as complete disembodiment. 
The mid-twentieth-century popular stereotype2 of the Victorians as repressed and 
prudish, individuals who insisted on clothing their piano legs in pantaloons and on 
reading nothing that could bring a blush to the cheek of a young person, is due at least in 
part to the impression that Victorian culture trusted the human soul far more than it did 
the human body and its drives.3  In many of its particulars, as well as more broadly, this 
stereotype has been largely debunked, beginning perhaps with Steven Marcus’s The 
Other Victorians4 in 1966 but continuing today through efforts by scholars and historians 
like Leslie Hall, whose “Victorian Sex Factoids” Web page lists some of the more 
tenacious truisms related to Victorian culture, particularly in matters of sexuality and 
                                                
2 I use the terms “popular” and “stereotype” intentionally here in order to highlight both the vagueness and 
the tenaciousness of the assumptions that underwrite these images and to make clear that, especially in the 
more caricatured forms, these images are not endorsed by scholars of the Victorian period.  My purpose in 
even alluding to these stereotypes, which I follow with much more moderate examples of mainstream 
critical scholarship, is to suggest that the immoderate stereotypes in some cases share a set of foundational 
assumptions about how the Victorian worldview was structured, in particular its valuing of the non-material 
– soul, mind, intellect, spirit – over the material body and its impulses. 
3 The mistrust of the body has been documented by, among others, historians of medicine who note the 
connections between bodily disease, psychic infirmity, and mental or emotional habits.  Jane Wood, 
Passion and Pathology in Victorian Fiction (Oxford: Oxford U P, 2001), for example, argues that physical 
processes seen to affect an individual’s intellectual or emotional experience were viewed as inherently 
pathological.   Claiming that women were seen as “imprisoned by [their] own biological functioning,” 
Wood quotes from Jules Michelet’s L’Amour (1858) to assert that “the mysterious rhythms which 
characterized woman’s nature also ensured a lifelong pathology in which ‘(one could say almost 
perpetually) woman is not only ill but wounded’” (20).  Femininity itself, Wood argues, amounts to a state 
of pathology because it consists of a body that cannot be transcended by a mind. 
4 Steven Marcus, The Other Victorians: A Study of Sexuality and Pornography in Mid-Nineteenth-Century 
England (New York: Basic Books, 1966).   
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sexual behavior.  Hall’s archival and critical scholarship, focusing principally on the 
reputation of Victorians as sexually repressed, attempts to ascertain the accuracy of (or to 
dispel) anecdotal stories related to Victorian morality; in many cases, the image in 
question is either found to be unsourced or to come from a source far removed from the 
Victorians themselves.5   
Nonetheless, scholars continue to discuss the ways in which Victorian culture 
valued the non-material over the material, and there is certainly ample evidence that this 
distinction had currency during the nineteenth century.  George Landow, for example, 
has suggested that evangelical protestants (including evangelical Anglicans, Methodists, 
and others6) emphasized the inherent sinfulness of human beings as a consequence of the 
fall, as well as the importance of a personal conversion experience based on imagination 
and emotion; in this model, human nature that stems from bodily incarnation is “corrupt” 
                                                
5 Regarding piano legs and clothing, for example, Hall writes that the “story originated in Captain 
Frederick Marryat’s 1839 Diary in America as an observation of one of the weird ways of the Americans.  
It was persistently used as an exemplar of Yankee prissiness and over-refinement by the robust British 
Victorians,” but she goes on to note that it still enjoys “perennial[ ]” interest.  Similarly, Hall traces the 
story about Ruskin’s reputed fear of female pubic hair, repeatedly cited as the reason for his separation 
from his wife, to “Mary Lutyens’ speculations as to what Ruskin might have meant by telling Effie that he 
was ‘disgusted with [her] person’, in her works on the Ruskin marriage, Effie in Venice (1965) and Millais 
and the Ruskins (1967).”  Hall notes that “it is by no means a contemporary explanation, and is merely one 
theory out of many as to why he failed to consummate his marriage.  Lutyens herself changed her mind 
(see her 1972 The Ruskins and the Grays), having discovered evidence suggesting that Ruskin would have 
been aware that women normally had pubic hair.  The comment about ‘disgust with [her] person’ was made 
at a stage when their marriage had become full of hatred and bitterness.”  Leslie Hall, “Victorian Sex 
Factoids,” “Victoriana.”  Retrieved 28 May 2007 from <http://www.lesleyahall.net>. 
6 While there is certainly great diversity among various Christian groups (and, in fact, even among 
Protestant sects) in nineteenth-century Britain, and while not all Protestants would have considered 
themselves evangelicals, this category is broad enough to include not simply the more radical Dissenter 
groups but also far more mainstream Anglicans.  The degree to which individuals would have accepted 
these evangelical notions is certainly variable, but these attitudes toward spiritual renewal and moral 
behavior  are far from limited to extreme splinter groups. 
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and “deprav[ed]” and requires direct spiritual intervention.7  Broadly speaking, this 
emphasis on an inward, spiritual religious and moral experience suggests that moral 
actions are those that avoid undue investment in the material world, focusing instead on 
the spiritual rewards that follow a life of virtue led within Christian orthodoxy.  Virtuous 
behavior follows traditional Christian precepts that privilege the soul over the body, 
reinforcing the claim in the definition above that humans are different from – higher than 
– animals because the human will can mitigate and control the desires of the body.  This 
is certainly not an exclusively Victorian conception of morality; Mary Wollstonecraft in 
1797 quotes Francis Bacon on the relative value of body and soul as support for her 
argument in favor of female education: “‘Certainly,’ says Lord Bacon, ‘man is of kin to 
the beasts by his body; and if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, he is a base and 
ignoble creature!’”8  It is, however, an association that can be seen as underlying some of 
the foundational concepts of Victorian culture: even a secular thinker like Matthew 
Arnold relies on the distinction between body and soul or mind in describing 
disinterestedness as a characteristic of moral behavior.9 
                                                
7 George P. Landow, “The Doctrines of Evangelical Protestantism.”  Retrieved 30 May 2007 from the 
Victorian Web <http://www.victorianweb.org>. 
8 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: With Strictures on Political and Moral 
Subjects ([1797]; New York: A. J. Mattsell, 1833), 19.  Wollstonecraft bases her argument more generally 
on an insistence that it is the refusal to educate and shape women’s intellect that leads to female 
debasement and immorality, particularly because it encourages – sometimes forces – women to rely on 
sexual seduction and other overtly material tactics to manipulate men and to survive. 
9 Matthew Arnold’s insistence on disinterestedness is a prime example of the association between morality 
and distance (associated with intellect rather than with bodily sensation).  Amanda Anderson, The Powers 
of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment (Princeton: Princeton U P, 2001), 
discusses at length the association Arnold makes between the cultivation of distance and the cultivation of 
moral behavior, noting his “defense of the distanced viewpoint as a positive achievement of character and 
culture” (91).  Anderson goes on to claim that Arnold “represent[s] as moral character the very form of 
detachment he is advocating,” that he “tr[ies] to make detachment ultimately indistinguishable from moral 
stance or ethos” (113).  While Anderson’s study pays close attention to Arnold and his project of self-
 
5 
Similarly, while the Victorian stereotype as evidenced in perennially popular (and 
easily refutable) anecdotes such as the ones Hall focuses on no longer has critical 
currency, current scholarship continues to associate Victorian morality with a privileging 
of the mind over the body.  Amanda Anderson’s discussion of Matthew Arnold’s 
disinterestedness associates Victorian morality with the distance of disinterest; similarly, 
her earlier work on the rhetoric surrounding the “fallen” woman explicitly addresses the 
conflict between materialism and spirituality through an analysis of Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning’s Aurora Leigh, regarding which Anderson argues that “Philanthropy, in its 
attendance merely on the physical and external, remains impotent to work any real 
change: the cultivation of spirit, not the rearrangement of matter, elevates a degraded 
humanity.”10  Further, Anderson claims that Barrett Browning “apprehends the negative 
effects of modern industrial society in fundamentally Christian and romantic terms.  
Ideally, she would like to see the soul released from, transformed out of, its material 
fetters.”11  This is not to suggest that Anderson and other critics attend too simplistically 
to Victorian culture; rather, it is to suggest that the tendency they identify to equate 
                                                                                                                                            
development through intellectual disinterestedness, she attends as well to other Victorian thinkers and 
writers, including among others Charles Dickens, George Eliot, Charlotte Bronte, John Stuart Mill, and 
Oscar Wilde, ultimately concluding that “the Victorians themselves seemed intent upon imagining forms of 
detachment as intimately connected to the moral project of self-cultivation” (178).  Anderson’s study does 
not refer explicitly to the Cartesian split between mind and body, but it nevertheless suggests implicitly that 
the distance of intellect, which offers the possibility of disinterested reflection, is ultimately more morally 
sound than the immediacy of bodily sensation.  This is very similar to Immanuel Kant’s insistence on 
disinterestedness as a necessary aesthetic stance, which I discuss in Chapter 1, and it relies on similar 
beliefs about the necessarily interested nature of bodily sensation. 
10 Amanda Anderson, Tainted Souls and Painted Faces: The Rhetoric of Fallenness in Victorian Culture 
(Ithaca: Cornell U P, 1993), 172.   
11 Anderson, Tainted Souls, 176.  Anderson’s discussion of Barrett Browning specifically concerns the role 
of the artist in effecting a transition from materialism to spirituality; while my argument does not concern 
this focus in particular, Anderson’s argument illustrates a more general critical acceptance of the Victorian 
valuing of the spiritual over the material.   
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morality with spirituality is easily discernable within Victorian thought.  Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning is not alone in suggesting, in Anderson’s words, that “cultivation of spirit . . . 
elevates a degraded humanity,” and Anderson is certainly not alone in making note of 
this general alignment. 
Yet within this project I examine texts – literary, philosophical, scientific, 
theological – that trouble the opposition between disembodied morality and amoral 
materiality, and I argue that a supplementary current within Victorian literature and 
culture predicates morality on materiality, and on the sensation that results from 
corporeal experience.  In making this assertion, I do not mean to suggest that the 
traditional conception, which I outlined above, of Victorian morality as disembodied, 
spiritual, intellectual, and emotional is inaccurate, but rather that it is incomplete.  In 
addition to the broad array of texts that align morality with spirituality and intellect, other 
Victorian texts and authors acknowledge an inherent value in physical matter; in some 
texts, which I focus on in this dissertation, those eruptions of materialism actually 
correlate with morality rather than oppose it.  That is, far from signifying degeneracy or 
the absence of morality, embodiment and materiality in these texts signify humaneness 




The Victorian period’s paradigmatically human – and humane – emotional 
experience, it could be argued, is that of sympathy.  Generally understood as the 
imaginative extension of an individual into the emotional experiences of another, 
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Victorian sympathy in its usual form reinforces the connection between disembodiment 
and morality established in the definition above.12  Overlapping at times with both pity 
and sentimentality, Victorian sympathy’s hallmark characteristic, at least according to 
many current scholars, is the ability to experience emotion.13  Consequently, within the 
framework of this usual conception of sympathy, one’s morality is measured – and 
demonstrated – by the kind and quality of one’s emotional experience.  Dickens’s Amy 
Dorrit, for example, is marked as morally virtuous because of her ability to sympathize 
with – to experience imaginatively – her father’s suffering: “She took the place of eldest 
of all three [children], in all things but precedence; was the head of the fallen family; and 
bore, in her own heart, its anxieties and shames.”14  That her father’s suffering is perhaps 
self-inflicted does nothing to mitigate her experience; nor does it undermine her virtue.  
Instead, it is her very ability to suffer the pains of another that constitutes virtue in this 
sympathetic economy.  Similarly, Arthur Clennam’s first visit to the Marshalsea affects 
him nearly to the point of sympathetic tears, marking him as a virtuous character. 
                                                
12 The definition of sympathy is actually far more complex than this, and has particular connections to 
physiology as well as emotion, which I discuss at greater length below and in Chapter 1.  However, my 
contention is that the popular Victorian conception of sympathy is, generally speaking and with some 
exceptions, emotional and imaginative rather than immediate or physiological. 
13 Many scholars discuss Victorian sympathy at length; many others have produced article-length studies on 
sympathy and its workings in Victorian literature and culture.  As a brief list of some of the most important 
critical studies of Victorian sympathy, see, for example, Ellen Argyros, Without any Check of Proud 
Reserve: Sympathy and its Limits in George Eliot’s Novels (New York: Peter Lang, 1999); Ann 
Cvetkovitch, Mixed Feelings: Feminism, Mass Culture, and Victorian Sensationalism (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers U P, 1992); Laura Hinton, The Perverse Gaze of Sympathy: Sadomasochistic Sentiments from 
Clarissa to Rescue 911 (Albany: SUNY P, 1999); Audrey Jaffe, Scenes of Sympathy: Identity and 
Representation in Victorian Fiction (Ithaca: Cornell U P, 2000); Mary Lenard, Preaching Pity: Dickens, 
Gaskell, and Sentimentalism in Victorian Culture (New York: Peter Lang, 1999); David Marshall, The 
Surprising Effects of Sympathy (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1988); Adela Pinch, Strange Fits of Passion: 
Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen (Stanford: Stanford U P, 1996); and Nancy Roberts, Schools of 
Sympathy: Gender and Identification Through the Novel (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s U P, 1997). 
14 Charles Dickens, Little Dorrit (1857), chapter VII, “The Child of the Marshalsea.” 
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Far from being a new creation of the Victorian period, this conception of morality 
comes directly from eighteenth-century (and earlier) philosophies of sensibility and 
human nature, particularly those of Adam Smith.  Smith, in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759), presents sympathy as an imaginative experience that connects humans 
to each other in ways that potentially allow moral action.  Smith’s sympathy, which he 
defines as a sort of fellow feeling, is entirely imaginative:  
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no 
idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we 
ourselves should feel in the like situation.  Though our brother is upon the 
rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us 
of what he suffers.  They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own 
person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of 
what are his sensations.  Neither can that faculty help us to this any other 
way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his 
case.  It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our 
imaginations copy.  By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, 
we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were 
into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and 
thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, 
though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.  His agonies, when 
they are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and 
made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and 
shudder at the thought of what he feels.15 
 
Because one’s experience of sensation is limited to one’s own situation and body, 
imagination is the only way to experience even part of another’s situation; further, 
though, Smith insists that one’s imaginative experience of another’s situation is actually 
an imagination of what one would feel if one were in the other’s place.  Sympathy is thus 
a double replacement.16   
                                                
15 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments [1759] (London: Henry G. Bond, 1853), 3-4.   
16 Audrey Jaffe, Scenes of Sympathy, writes of this conception of sympathy that, in it, “the sufferer is 
effectively replaced by the spectator’s image of him or herself” (2). 
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Adam Smith’s important contribution to the concept of sympathy is to detach it 
from the body, to make it an essentially imaginative experience.  Other versions of 
sympathy in the eighteenth century blend the emotional and imaginative with the 
physiological and the immediate.  For example, in the culture of sensibility, sympathy is 
largely a physiological experience – one’s body responds to the observed suffering of 
others through mirroring the effects of the suffering body.  One’s humanity is similarly 
documented (and measured) by one’s physiologically sympathetic responses: failure to 
produce tears at the sight or description of suffering marks one as being unsympathetic 
and consequently insufficiently humane and compassionate.  Importantly, sympathy 
within the culture of sensibility links bodily sensation with morality by making one’s 
moral responses visible and demonstrable through the physiological responses of one’s 
body.  For theorists of sensibility, humans have a moral sense that works analogously to 
the physical senses; Alexander Gerard, for example, in An Essay on Taste (1759), writes 
of “a sensibility of heart, as fits a man for being easily moved and for readily catching, as 
by infection, any passion that a work is fitted to excite.”17  Nearly two centuries earlier, 
Michel de Montaigne wrote of imagination in terms strikingly similar to how sympathy 
was imagined in the culture of sensibility:  
I am one of those who are most sensible of the power of imagination: every 
one is jostled by it, but some are overthrown by it.  It has a very piercing 
impression upon me; and I make it my business to avoid, wanting force to 
resist it . . . [T]he very sight of another's pain materially pains me, and I often 
usurp the sensations of another person.  A perpetual cough in another tickles 
my lungs and throat. . . .  I take possession of the disease I am concerned at, 
and take it to myself.  I do not at all wonder that fancy should give fevers and 
sometimes kill such as to allow it too much scope, and are too willing to 
                                                






Montaigne’s description connects body and mind in a way that Smith’s conception of 
sympathy disallows: there is so little distance here between perceiving subject and 
perceived object that imagination enacts identification rather than compassion.  That is, 
unlike in Smith’s version, Montaigne does not imagine what he would feel like if he were 
in the suffering individual’s place; instead, he actually feels the same pains and other 
sensations, through the force of his imagination, in his own body.  Rather than imagine 
what he would feel like if he were in the same situation, Montaigne becomes the suffering 
body and experiences the sensations of illness directly and immediately, actually taking 
into his own body the “possession of the disease.”  Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third 
Earl of Shaftesbury, similarly likens sympathy to contagion in his “A Letter concerning 
Enthusiasm,” saying that “One may with good reason call every Passion Panick which is 
rais’d in a Multitude, and convey’d by aspect, or as it were by Contact or Sympathy.”19  
Sympathy here is a mode of transmission; enthusiasm among crowds can be transmitted 
through vision (“aspect”) or contact, each of which suggests for Shaftesbury a 
sympathetic communication of feeling.20  
                                                
18 Michel de Montaigne, “Of the Force of Imagination” (Essays [1575], trans. Charles Cotton; ed. William 
Carew Hazlitt; 4 vols.; London: Reeves and Turner, 1902), 1:94. 
19 Anthony Ashley Cooper (Third Earl of Shaftesbury), Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times 
(3 vols.), ed. Douglas den Uyl (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 1:10. 
20 Later, nineteenth-century physiologists and other scientists made a similar connection between sympathy 
and issues of contagion and disorder, both individual and social, as well.  Alexander Bain, for example, 
argued in The Emotions and the Will (1859) that actors have particular power to convey emotions (even 
false ones) to their audience, who receive those emotions sympathetically and without apparent resistance.  
Daniel Hack Tuke, Illustrations of the Influence of the Mind Upon the Body in Health and Disease (1872), 
argued that witnessing suffering (either by medical professionals or, more dangerously, by lay caretakers) 
would blur the boundary between patient and caretaker, causing disruptions to reason, to the perception of 
reality, even to the self-concept and self-control of the observer.  American neurologist Simon Weir 
Mitchell, Lectures on Diseases of the Nervous System, Especially in Women (1885), equated medical 
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Although sympathy may be contagious (and, consequently, potentially 
dangerous), Shaftesbury, like Smith, envisions sympathy as socially productive.  For 
Shaftesbury, sympathy is the foundation of social life, and he calls “these Pleasures of 
sympathy” – that is, the “lively Affection of Love, Gratitude, Bounty, Generosity, Pity, 
Succour, or whatever else is of a social or friendly sort” – “so insinuating . . . and so 
widely diffus’d thro’ our whole Lives, that there is hardly such a thing as Satisfaction or 
Contentment, of which they make not an essential part.”21  While David Hume 
approaches sympathy less as a particular emotion or feeling and more as a mechanism by 
which one apprehends what another feels or experiences, it still enacts an important 
social and affective function: “no qualities are more intitled to the general good-will and 
approbation of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friendship and gratitude, natural 
affection and public spirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender sympathy with others, and 
a generous concern for our kind and species.  These wherever they appear, seem to 
transfuse themselves, in a manner, into each beholder, and to call forth, in their own 
behalf, the same favourable and affectionate sentiments, which they exert on all 
around.”22  This understanding of sympathy as a mechanism allows Hume to connect his 
moral theory to his aesthetic theory, suggesting that because readers or viewers of art 
                                                                                                                                            
treatment to a battle of wills between the doctor and the patient, suggesting that the doctor-observer must 
guard against sympathetic incursion of the patient’s symptoms while simultaneously overpowering the 
patient’s illness through the doctor’s power of sympathetic communication.  For a discussion of the 
implications of these and other medical understandings of the communicability of nervous disorders, 
particularly on conceptions of the dangers of reading, see Athena Vrettos, Somatic Fictions: Imagining 
Illness in Victorian Culture (Stanford: Stanford U P, 1995), especially chapter 3.  Vrettos discusses Bain, 
Tuke, Mitchell, and others in connection to their views on the potential danger of sympathetic contagion. 
21 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 2: 62, 59. 
22 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) in The Philosophical Works of 
David Hume (4 vols.) (Edinburgh: Adam Black and William Tait, 1826), 4: 247. 
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understand or anticipate the pleasure the art will bring to others, they experience a 
sympathetic pleasure based on the expected pleasure of other viewers in addition to their 
own immediate and direct pleasure in the art itself.23 
In all of these cases, sympathy is understood as primarily emotional and 
imaginative.  There is another strand of nineteenth-century thinking, however, that 
connects sympathy to more physiological processes, even going so far as to root the 
emotional experience of sympathy in the physiological processes of the body.  Although 
not social in focus, the concept of sympathy within the developing fields of biological 
and physiological science suggests a communication among the parts of an organism or 
even between an organism and its environment, such as the automatic physiological 
process of reflex and the workings of the sympathetic nervous system.24  George Henry 
Lewes, for example, in discussing the effects of hunger and starvation on the nervous 
system, notes a sympathetic correspondence between emotional conditions and 
physiological processes that locates the processes of sympathy within the body itself: 
“Deep thought, or anxiety, disturbs the digestion and circulation.”25  The physiological 
psychologist Henry Maudsley claimed that in a healthy organism the “sympathy between 
all the organic functions” of the body – in which category he explicitly included mind – 
                                                
23 Hume also suggests that, since the pleasure in a work of art does not come (or at least, does not come 
solely) from any utilitarian usefulness, at least some pleasure stems simply from an appreciation of the 
formal characteristics of the art: the shape, sound, balance, line, etc.  Consequently, aesthetic pleasure for 
Hume derives from a concept of taste that works as a kind of sympathetic perception of the whole work of 
art, a synthesis of perceptions both sensual and intellectual. 
24 See, for example, Charles Bell’s work in the anatomy and physiology of the brain and of the peripheral 
(and sympathetic) nerves. 
25 George Henry Lewes, The Physiology of Common Life (2 vols.), Collection of British Authors vol. 518 
(Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1860), 1: 15. 
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was “[s]o intimate and essential” that one function could not be discussed in the absence 
of the others.26  Lewes and Maudsley, and many other amateur and professional scientists 
like them, provide a version of sympathy – and the language to discuss it – that connects 
explicitly the emotional and affective experiences outlined by Adam Smith with a more 
current Victorian interest in the physiological processes of material bodies.   
 
Pain 
Adam Smith explicitly claims that sympathy is broader than either pity or 
compassion (“words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of 
others”), suggesting that, even if at one time sympathy and compassion were 
synonymous, sympathy “may now . . . be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with 
any passion whatever.”27  Nonetheless, the role of sympathy in medicine highlights 
sympathy’s connection with pain, and the connection between sympathy and pain 
emphasizes the links between bodily experience and emotion or imagination that are 
fundamental to this project.  Elaine Scarry has written persuasively about the theoretical 
effects of pain, arguing that pain can serve to dissolve the sufferer’s sense of bodily and 
psychic integrity, or, paradoxically, that pain can emphasize the sufferer’s material 
existence to the point of undeniability.28  In a historical study of the nineteenth century, 
Lucy Bending identifies a fundamental shift in the conception of physiological pain: prior 
                                                
26 Henry Maudsley, Body and Mind: An Inquiry into their Connection and Mutual Influence, Specially in 
Reference to Mental Disorders, Being the Gulstonian Lectures for 1870, Delivered before the Royal 
College of Physicians.  With Appendix (London: Macmillan and Co., 1870), 24. 
27 Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, 5. 




to the mid-nineteenth century, she argues, pain is imagined to be by turns reformative and 
punitive, but always an instructive and inescapable part of the justice dispensed by an 
omniscient and inscrutable deity.  By the end of the century, however, pain is understood 
as both unnecessary and even unnatural and therefore a condition to be eliminated so far 
as possible.  She attributes this shift to the simultaneous decrease in the influence of 
Christianity and its narratives of justice and the afterlife and the increase in knowledge 
surrounding the physiological causes of pain and the increasing ability to control pain 
through anesthesia.29   
Charles Bell and Francois Magendie were two early nineteenth-century 
physiologists whose work on the nervous system contributed significantly to a shift in the 
understanding of pain.  Through the experimental physiology of these and other 
scientists, pain came to be seen more and more as connected to the body rather than to the 
mind; that is, as pain became objectively verifiable and measurable through laboratory 
experiments, it consequently ceased to be a purely or even moderately subjective 
experience, one understood to be as significantly mental as physical.  When later 
physiological psychologists insisted that all mental processes were at their foundation 
physiological processes of the brain, even subjectively experienced pain came to be 
understood as a physiological experience.  Although pain was now envisioned as 
physiological, connected to the material nerves, nineteenth-century doctors and scientists 
lacked a clear understanding of the actual processes of the transmission and perception of 
                                                
29 Lucy Bending, The Representation of Bodily Pain in Late-Nineteenth-Century English Culture (Oxford: 
Oxford U P, 2000).  Bending’s study, particularly as it relates to the medicalization of pain, has been 




pain.  Some hypothesized that specialized nerves existed solely for the transmission of 
pain, nerves that were distinct from those that transmitted sensations of heat or cold.  
Even after the advent of general anesthesia (in the form of ether) in 1846, physicians 
were unsure of how anesthetic chemicals actually worked physiologically.   
If physical pain by mid-century was something to be controlled, mitigated as far 
as possible, the concept of pain had not lost its earlier connections to morality and 
religious belief.  Religious writers, especially Evangelicals and Catholics, from the 1820s 
on had insisted that pain served the purposes of atonement, physical chastisement, and 
warning of damnation.  Pain in this conception was valuable as evidence of the fallenness 
of humanity, as a precursor and warning of the eternal tortures in store for sinners in hell, 
and as the just punishment by God for sins committed individually and socially; 
Evangelical clergyman J. C. Ryle wrote in 1866 of the hand of God at work in the cholera 
epidemic, claiming that “cholera, like every other pestilence, is a direct visitation from 
God.”30  While certainly not alone in maintaining the severity of the pain inflicted by God 
both on earth and in the afterlife, Ryle was unusual in holding these ideas so late in the 
century.  Bending notes that “James Young Simpson, largely responsible for popularizing 
anesthetic childbirth in the late 1840s, laughed at religious injunctions that parturitional 
suffering was the curse of Eve and as such should not be tampered with.”31  A number of 
mid-century writers rejected the religious dogma of eternal torment on ethical grounds, 
arguing that the concept of hell implied a God “less rather than more compassionate than 
                                                
30 J. C. Ryle, “The Hand of the Lord!” Being Thoughts on Cholera. 2 Sam. xxiv. 14 (London and Ipswich: 
William Hunt, 1866), 5.  Quoted in Bending, Representation of Bodily Pain, 19.  Italics in original. 
31 Bending, Representation of Bodily Pain, 21. 
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his creation.”32  
Instead of a reminder or foretaste of the literal pains of hell, pain came more and 
more to be seen either as part of an instructive program of ethical advance (through the 
development of sympathy) or as evidence of evolutionary ascendance (through the 
refinement of nervous tissue).  In the first version, the insistence on the sufferings of 
Jesus makes him a model of sympathy as well as the agent of redemption: “Not only, as 
J. Thain Davidson claims, is it the case that ‘Jesus knows the dart of every pain’ for he 
has suffered himself and can sympathize through personal experience, but these very 
sufferings are the means through which redemption is effected.”33  Further, through the 
association of Jesus’s sufferings with the everyday experience of pain, religious 
reformers sought to make individuals participants in an analogous kind of holiness.  In 
the second conception of pain, an individual’s sensitivity to his or her own pain, 
combined with a heightened sympathetic awareness of the pain of others, even of 
animals, suggested a greater degree of refinement.  G. H. Lewes wrote that “Pain is only 
a specialisation of that Sensibility which is common to all animals.  It is a specialisation 
resulting from a high degree of differentiation of the nervous system, consequently found 
only in the more complex animals, and in them increasing as we ascend the scale.”34  He 
noted his own inability to witness the suffering of animals unanaesthetized during 
                                                
32 Bending, Representation of Bodily Pain, 25. 
33 Bending, Representation of Bodily Pain, 48.  The quoted material is from J. Thain Davidson, “Jesus 
Christ, the Healer of the Body.  A Sermon” (revised and printed in Catholic Sermons No. V., June 1873.  
Preached in Islington Presbyterian Church, London, On Sunday Evening, April 20, 1873 [Edward Curtice 
and F. Pitman, 1873]), 54. 
34 George Henry Lewes, Sea-side Studies at Ilfracombe, Tenby, the Scilly Isles, & Jersey (Edinburgh and 
London: William Blackwood, 1858), 334.  Italics in original.  
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vivisection, suggesting his own high degree of moral sensitivity and contrasting that 
implicitly with those scientists who were able to inflict pain without experiencing it 
themselves.   
All of these writers appropriated the language of biological research rather than of 
religious orthodoxy: the material pains of the body, produced and experienced through 
the action of nerves in response to stimuli, helped to teach the individual about dangers to 
avoid, provoked the ability to sympathize with others based on first-hand experience of 
pain, and evidenced the relative refinement or vulgarity of an individual in relation to 
others’ ability to experience and/or withstand pain.  As a result, improvement – whether 
in terms of morality or of increased physiological refinement of an organism – links the 
language and concepts of religion with those of science, thereby setting up an implicit 
connection between bodily experience and morality.  That is, while the immediate 
connection here is between the experience of pain and the development of morality, I 
argue in this project that more general sensory and bodily experience comes to assume 
this function of pain in the development of morality.  Pain, I argue, is the paradigmatic 
sense experience: as Scarry claims, pain, for the one who experiences it, can be neither 
denied nor ignored.  The Victorian writers I discuss in this project, however, both imply 
and directly articulate a connection between pain and other sensory, somatic 
experiences.35  I pay it such close attention here because the experience and the 
                                                
35 It is also useful to consider pain as an excess of physiological sensation rather than a categorically 
different kind of somatic experience.  In such a model, pain is located at one end of a sensation continuum 
rather than in its own discrete category.  Several of the writers I discuss, in particular George Eliot and 
Algernon Swinburne, present images of painful experience in ways that suggest sensation as a continuum, 
with pain and pleasure markedly similar – even, at times, indistinguishable – rather than categorically 
different.  If we consider pain as an excess of somatic experience, which, I will argue in later chapters, a 
number of Victorian writers do, then other somatic sensations become available in relation to the process of 
moral development.     
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interpretation of pain lie at the center of this project.  Etymologically, pain is the root of 
both sympathy and compassion, Adam Smith’s assertion to the contrary not withstanding.  
The shifting conceptions of pain – from a punitive or reformative dispensation of divine 
wrath, to the redemptive suffering of Christ as a model for human sympathy, to the mark 
of increased organization and refinement in an organism – insist upon the primacy and 
value of bodily experience.  Of particular importance for this project is the instructive 
purpose of painful experience, particularly insofar as it was thought to lead to increased 
sympathy, and consequently to increased morality.  In this conception of painful 
sympathy, sympathetic experience relies on immediacy, sensation, and tactility rather 
than on distance, vision, and imagination.  Given Smith’s insistence on sympathy’s 
confinement to the imagination,36 this shift away from imagination toward bodily 
experience is an important challenge to the more traditional notions of Victorian morality 
I discuss above.   
In an 1859 letter to Charles Bray, Marian Evans wrote that her goal as a writer 
was to maker her readers “better able to imagine and to feel the pains and joys of those 
who differ from themselves in everything but the broad fact of being struggling erring 
human creatures.”37  In most discussions of Victorian sympathy, critics emphasize 
George Eliot’s initial injunction “to imagine” the situations and experiences of others, 
                                                
36 This is the general consensus of modern critics of sympathy in the Victorian period as well.  Writing 
about Smith’s concept of sympathy, Jaffe notes that “Smith depicts sympathy not as a direct response to a 
sufferer but rather as a response to a sufferer’s representation in a spectator’s mind . . . The result is the 
transformation of sympathy with the other into sympathy with the self – a self already figured as 
representation. . . . The scene of sympathy in effect effaces both its participants, substituting for them 
images, or fantasies, of social and cultural identity” (Jaffe, Scenes of Sympathy, 4).  On the connection 
between vision and sympathy in the context of medicine, see also Vrettos, Somatic Fictions. 
37 Letter to Charles Bray, 5 July 1859, in Gordon S. Haight (ed.), The George Eliot Letters, 9 vols. (New 
Haven: Yale U P, 1954-78), 3:111. 
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even as her subsequent direction, “to feel,” remains largely unaddressed.   As a 
supplement and partial corrective to the critical insistence on the first version of 
sympathy, which is predicated on distance, vision, and imagination, this dissertation 
locates an alternative, far more corporeal version of sympathy predicated on immediacy, 
touch, and physiological sensation.  Such bodily sensation, I argue, forces the attention of 
the feeling subject to return to the body rather than to a disembodied idea, consequently 
emphasizing corporeality over intellect or emotion.  Further, this emphasis on the 
materiality of the body and of sensory perception works to return the one who 
experiences particular sensory perceptions to his or her own body, producing a tension 
between individual and relational experience, between isolation and sympathy.  This 
paradox is at the heart of my project since it highlights two distinct trajectories that 
embodied sensation takes within Victorian literature.  Finally, the connection I posit 
between physiological feeling and ethical experience suggests a fundamental connection 
between corporeality and morality, a connection that resists the totalizing equation of 
spirituality with morality and of materiality with sin that is present either implicitly or 
explicitly within much of Christian orthodoxy during the nineteenth century. 
 
Critical Contexts 
While there have been a number of recent studies of particular kinds of sensory 
experience in Victorian literature, especially concerning vision, little has been written 
about tactility and touch, about sensations located on the surface of the body.38  Those 
                                                
38 On vision in the nineteenth century, see for example Carol Christ and John Jordan (eds.), Victorian 
Literature and the Victorian Visual Imagination (Berkeley: U California P, 1995); Nancy Armstrong, 
Fiction in the Age of Photography: The Legacy of British Realism (Cambridge: Harvard U P, 1999); 
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studies that do focus on embodiment and other sensory experience often link embodied 
senses, particularly the reliance on them, to pathology and disease.39  This dissertation 
does not suggest that either visual or auditory experience was not central to the way 
Victorians understood their world or experienced and processed information; nor does it 
argue that embodiment is never aligned with pathology.  What it does suggest is that 
paying attention to tactility as a most basic sense, and to pain as the paradigmatic excess 
of this tactile sense, provides a way to reconceptualize and revise discussions of other 
senses as they operate within Victorian literature and culture, particularly since the sense 
of touch is at the basis of several theories of both sight and hearing during the nineteenth 
century; further, focusing on touch allows me to address the fundamental problems of 
sensory perception, materiality, and psychological experience at work within the 
Victorian period and demonstrated throughout Victorian literature.   
In working through this critical space, I draw heavily on contemporary accounts of 
the physics of sensation and the physiology of perception, including both the peripheral 
nervous system and various conceptions of the connections and separations between the 
brain (i.e., the sense organ that registers the perceptions of the nerves and spinal cord) 
and the mind (i.e., the interpreting, thinking, “human” organ sometimes conceived of as 
within, but separable from, the rest of the brain matter).  These contemporary theories 
reflect a growing conception of sense perceptions as physiological and material rather 
                                                                                                                                            
Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century 
(Cambridge: MIT P, 1990); and Martin Jay and Teresa Brennan (eds.), Vision in Context: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives on Sight (New York: Routledge, 1996); on sound and hearing, see John M. 
Picker, Victorian Soundscapes (New York: Oxford U P, 2003). 
39 See, for example, Fay Bound Alberti (ed.), Medicine, Emotion and Disease, 1700-1950 (New York: 
Palgrave, 2006); Jane Wood, Passion and Pathology in Victorian Fiction; and Kirstie Blair, Victorian 
Poetry and the Culture of the Heart (Oxford: Clarendon P, 2006). 
 
21 
than philosophical, spiritual, or unlocatable within a particular bodily organ.  In addition 
to contemporary scientific sources, I draw on current theories of touch, perception, and 
sensation, in particular the concept of haptic perception and visuality, which Laura Marks 
traces from early twentieth-century art historian Alois Riegl through Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari; Marks’s definitions of haptic perception – “the combination of tactile, 
kinesthetic, and proprioceptive functions, the way we experience touch both on the 
surface of and inside our bodies” – and haptic vision, in which “the eyes themselves 
function like organs of touch,” usefully connect tactility to other senses, in this case 
vision, while at the same time suggesting possible philosophical consequences of 
particular kinds of tactile sensation, including sympathy, that support the definitions I 
offer above.40  This combination of contemporary and current theories allows me to 
approach and read Victorian literature from and through a variety of theoretical 
perspectives; it also allows the works of poetry and fiction themselves to be read as 
theoretical statements in their own right.  That is, it is not my intention to read Victorian 
literature in terms of “truths” that are also present in twenty-first century critical theory; 
rather, by triangulating this analysis I hope to elucidate the contextual ideological 
underpinnings of the period in which the texts I examine were written.     
 
Chapters 
My dissertation’s opening chapter, “Body, Mind, and Soul,” explores the 
                                                
40 Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media (Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 2002), 
2.  While the concept of haptic vision is useful for making sense of how vision might work as tactile 
contact within a given piece of literature, it also connects the act of reading – both the representation of 
how characters “read” each other’s bodies and, crucially, one’s own experience of reading these literary 
texts themselves – to a sort of visual touch, to both contact and separation, and it helps to clarify some of 
the issues at stake in chapter discussions of narrative sympathy and representation. 
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connections and points of resistance between and among scientific and theological 
explanations of human existence both physical and emotional or intellectual.  It traces the 
points of conflict and agreement in four major discursive areas – biology, psychology, 
religion, and aesthetics – over the relationships between mind or soul and body.  In 
paying attention to each discursive thread, I argue that while the ideal conception of what 
is human or humane often depends on the construction of the human as primarily 
spiritual, there are in each case supplementary strands of thought that insist upon 
materiality as a fundamental – and morally positive – constituent factor of humanity.  By 
reading newspaper and magazine editorials, book and art reviews, biological and 
psychological treatises, letters to the editor, and sermons, I chart the contestation between 
alternative conceptions of humanity throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, 
and identify not only points of resistance between the theological and the scientific but 
also unexpected connections between materialism and morality.   
My second chapter, “Sensation, Sympathy, and Sacramental Writing in Villette,” 
addresses the connections between sensation and narrative, and reinterprets Villette as a 
novel not about vision and surveillance but about touch and materiality.  Specifically, I 
argue that Lucy Snowe’s self-presentation as cold and unfeeling, in combination with her 
(also self-described) passionate interior life, provides the ground for the production of her 
narrative.  Writing, both the action and the textual product, springs from Lucy’s intensely 
responsive physiological sensitivity passed through layers of icy control; the resulting 
exteriorization of interior experience presents writing as the ideal, even sacramental, form 
of embodiment.  This conclusion is supported, I argue, by the degree to which the 
physical bodies of both Dr. John and M. Paul are displaced by their own letters, by 
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textual productions that provide nearly sacramental sustenance to Lucy. 
My third chapter, “Reading Minds, Reading Bodies in George Eliot’s ‘The Lifted 
Veil’,” also discusses the relationship between sensation and narrative, but approaches 
the connection from the perspective of reading – minds, bodies, and narratives.  In this 
chapter, I consider the vivid representations of Latimer’s experiences of his own body as 
well as of the bodies of his companions, suggesting that clairvoyance for Latimer consists 
more accurately in acute sensitivity to his own bodily experience.  By connecting the 
seeming anomalousness of this Gothic novella’s insistence on bodily experience to 
Eliot’s more canonical fiction, such as Middlemarch, I argue that while Eliot’s sympathy 
results in emotional connection, it begins at the intersection of sensation and imagination 
and relies on materiality for its existence.   
My fourth chapter, “The Ethics and Aesthetics of Materiality in D. G. Rossetti 
and A. C. Swinburne,” examines representations of Pre-Raphaelite bodies in a number of 
poems by Rossetti and Swinburne.  In particular, this chapter discusses the tensions 
between symbolic and realistic depictions of bodies in poems such as “Jenny,” “The 
Blessed Damozel,” “Laus Veneris,” and “Anactoria,” and explores the consequences of 
both kinds of representations in connection to both Christian orthodoxy and alternative 
moral systems.  I argue in this chapter that humaneness is inextricably linked to 
materiality for these two poets, suggesting an insistence not only on the aesthetics of 
embodiment but also on its ethical necessity.   
My final chapter, “Corporeal Sympathy and Divine Amorality in Gerard Manley 
Hopkins’s ‘Terrible’ Sonnets and H. G. Wells’s The Island of Dr. Moreau,” considers the 
humanizing and dehumanizing effects of pain in these works.  By analyzing these two 
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very different authors in connection to each other, I argue that pain acts as a transcendent 
force that both connects and separates the human and the non-human, and I suggest that 
the textual representations of bodily anguish effectively erase the line each author 
attempts to draw between the material and the non-material.  Further, this chapter argues 
that these texts insist upon material embodiment as a necessary precondition for moral 
action, and equate the complete non-materiality of a purely spiritual existence with 
amorality.   
This project does not aim to displace the conception of imaginative, disinterested 
sympathy so firmly associated with Victorian morality.  Instead, it provides a necessary 
supplement that makes more complete our critical understanding of Victorian morality by 
identifying even within non-sensational forms of nineteenth-century literature instances 
of intense physiological and affective sensitivity and by linking that sensitivity to humane 
sympathy.  Eliot’s insistence on the importance of feeling in the development of 
sympathetic connections between individuals suggests a long-standing if little-noticed 
thread within Victorian culture linking both physiological and affective sensitivity to 





Body, Mind, and Soul 
 
 
To say that Victorian science, especially the emerging fields of evolutionary 
biology and physiological psychology, made claims for the importance, even primacy, of 
the body is to state nothing new.  Because experimental biology and related fields take as 
both their subject and their medium material bodies and their functions (both healthy and 
diseased, normal and pathological), the importance they place on material existence – the 
workings of tissues, organs, cells, organisms – seems self-evident.1  What remain far less 
well attended to are the ways in which other areas of Victorian thought also encounter 
and address similar issues related to materialism, particularly in relation to questions of 
human behavior, identity, and – most importantly – morality.   
Both a paradigmatic ethical stance and a site of conflict over embodiment and the 
sensory experience that comes along with the materiality of the  body, the concept of 
sympathy lies at the heart of this chapter, which examines the nineteenth-century extra-
literary context within which issues of morality and embodiment are developed.  More 
particularly, I discuss in this chapter four distinct discursive areas in which the 
relationships between and among materiality, imagination, intellect, emotion, sensation, 
and morality diverge from the association of the nonmaterial or spiritual with the moral 
                                                
1 This is not to say that within individual scientific communities, much less within the field of science as a 
whole, materialism (by which I mean positions ranging from those that assert the importance of the body 
and its processes to the life of an organism, to those that claim that all life processes are entirely material, 
and that no non-material principles exist) was accepted without conflict.  I discuss at length later in this 
chapter some of the internal conflicts over the role and importance of the body, particularly in terms of 
human existence, within the field of Victorian science.  At this point, my purpose is simply to suggest that, 
of all areas of nineteenth-century intellectual discourse, science is the arena in which one might reasonably 
expect to find greater acceptance of the inherent importance of material life. 
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and ethical, which I outlined in the introduction.  I do so in order to suggest the degree to 
which multiple discursive and proto-disciplinary communities identify, either explicitly 
or implicitly, material embodiment as a (potential) requisite of moral action or 
experience.  My contention in this chapter is not that materiality is the dominant 
foundation for morality within Victorian literature and culture; neither is it to suggest a 
trajectory of increasing investment in materiality within particular discourse groups.  That 
is, I do not suggest that there is an evolution or development from one discourse thread to 
another, that somehow biology leads to psychology, which leads ultimately to aesthetics 
over the course of the nineteenth century.  Rather, I examine these four discursive areas – 
biology, theology, psychology, and aesthetics – as distinct yet overlapping fields in which 
the tension between the material and the nonmaterial suggests the possible alignment of 
morality with material existence.2   
There are necessarily different connections between and among these discursive 
areas, and this makes the question of order a difficult one.  For example, there are clear 
connections between biology and psychology, between biology and theology, and 
                                                
2 I focus on these four discursive areas not because they are inherently more important than any number of 
other areas but because of their immediate relevance to the authors and literary texts I discuss in this 
project: science, including both biological materialism per se as well as scientific concerns and processes 
more generally, is intensely relevant to George Eliot’s writing and intellectual outlook more broadly, while 
it shapes in obvious ways H. G. Wells’s novel; theological concerns, especially as they relate to the relative 
importance of the body and the soul, underlie Charlotte Brontë’s approach to morality in Villette, and they 
clearly structure Gerard Manley Hopkins’s individual poems as well as his system of poetics as a whole; 
psychological concerns related to interiority, the location of identity, and the relationship between body and 
mind inform George Eliot’s depiction of clairvoyance and prevision as well as Brontë’s characterization of 
Lucy Snowe; and questions of artistic merit shape Eliot’s novella as well as, of course, the poems of 
Rossetti and Swinburne.  While the science of George Eliot may look quite different from the science of H. 
G. Wells, I suggest that it – and the other discursive areas I discuss here – maintains a fundamental 
connection to questions over the value of materiality; similarly, Brontë’s mid-century Protestantism clearly 
differs from Hopkins’s late-century Catholicism, but, as I will show throughout this project, both 
theological systems depend at least in part on a tension between materiality and spirituality.  My point in 
discussing these intellectual areas in their own chapter is not to suggest that other discursive topics (such as 
political economy) are irrelevant, but rather to enable later chapters to make connections to this material, 
which is of central concern to this body of literature, while avoiding redundancy. 
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between theology and aesthetics; just as clearly, however, linear organization does not 
facilitate the kind of branching connections that can be made between these areas.  As a 
result, the transitions between discussions of the four areas are, at times, more abrupt than 
is ideal.  Because of its centrality to questions of materiality, I begin with a discussion of 
Victorian science, particularly biological science as it is expounded by John Tyndall in 
his 1874 Presidential Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science.  
The vehemence of religious response to Tyndall’s address makes religion the logical 
discursive area with which to follow science, and I discuss at some length both the 
hostility to questions of scientific materialism and the perhaps unexpected opportunities 
within religious discourse for connections to be made between materiality and morality.  
In the third section, I turn to the emerging field of psychology, paying particular attention 
to questions regarding the relationship between the brain and the mind.  I end this chapter 
with a discussion of aesthetics, both in terms of experience and in terms of judgment.  
Because it relies explicitly and implicitly on many of the assumptions and accepted ideas 
of nineteenth-century aesthetics, I pay more extended attention to Robert Buchanan’s 
notorious “Fleshly School” review as a paradigmatic piece of art criticism in order to 
illustrate the vexed relationship within Victorian aesthetics between the material and the 
ideal.  
That the connection between bodies and morality is developed in multiple 
discourses suggests that, while it is not the dominant conception of morality in the 
nineteenth century, it is certainly not an insignificant one.  I approach these discourses as 
eruptions along a horizontal axis: as examples of an association between physiological, 
somatic experience and moral and ethical behavior, simmering – usually but not always – 
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just below the surface of Victorian thought.  
 
Victorian Biology and Materialism 
In 1870, Henry Maudsley wrote in the preface to Body and Mind, “Neither 
materialism nor spiritualism are scientific terms, and one need have no concern with them 
in a scientific inquiry, which, if it be true to its spirit, is bound to have regard only to 
what lies within its powers and to the truth of its results.”3  Maudsley suggests here that 
engagement in the debate over materialism distracts from the work of both philosophy 
and science, two fields he envisioned as having distinct spheres of activity, but he 
nevertheless acknowledges in this preface that the debate is taking place, suggesting the 
importance to him of distancing himself from the more rancorous portion of the argument 
by seeking to push the terms aside altogether.  Maudsley’s position on questions of 
materialism should suggest two points: first, in spite of the fact that biological science, 
including Maudsley’s physiological psychology, took as its area of study the operations 
of material bodies, there is a clear reluctance, even among mid- and late-century 
scientists, to claim for materiality any dominance over non-material powers of mind, 
soul, or spirit; second, that the conflict over questions of materialism versus spirituality 
was both significant and divisive.  Maudsley’s disinclination to involve himself in the 
controversy notwithstanding, many other professional and lay practitioners of disciplines 
as diverse as biology, chemistry, mathematics, physiology, theology, sociology, and 
philosophy did contribute, often vitriolically, and the public debate over both the terms 
                                                
3 Henry Maudsley, Body and Mind: An Inquiry into their Connection and Mutual Influence, Specially in 
Reference to Mental Disorders, Being the Gulstonian Lectures for 1870, Delivered before the Royal 
College of Physicians.  With Appendix (London: Macmillan and Co., 1870), iv. 
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and the concepts continued without clear resolution for several decades.  In this section, I 
discuss this conflict over the term “materialism” by examining some of the ways in which 
one particular Victorian scientist, John Tyndall, found a resolution through an argument 
in favor of disciplinary distinction between science and philosophy. 
Any conversation concerning materiality and spirituality in the late-Victorian 
period was fraught with conflict and division.  In the years following the publication of 
articles and lectures by such scientists as Herbert Spencer, Charles Darwin, Thomas 
Henry Huxley, and John Tyndall, the term “materialism” carried connotations of atheism 
as well as of moral, intellectual, and national degeneracy.  Drawing on a study by Gowan 
Dawson,4 Bernard Lightman notes that scientists were sometimes depicted “as advocates 
of the immoral sensualism which hastened the downfall of pagan antiquity.”5  Writing 
about John Tyndall’s Belfast Address, Lightman continues, “Even in the 1870s, the 
charge of materialism was a serious one.  It grouped Tyndall together with lower-class 
atheists, casting aspersions on his status as a member of the intellectual elite.”6  That 
Tyndall relied heavily, and sympathetically, on Greek (that is to say, non-Christian) 
philosophers in his address provided an opportunity to his opponents to link his ideas 
concerning the proper sphere of scientific inquiry to the imagined immorality and impiety 
of non-Christian antiquity.  Edward S. Reed similarly notes the extravagance with which 
charges of materialism were leveled, often without apparent concern for accuracy: 
                                                
4 Gowan Dawson, “Walter Pater, Aestheticism, and Victorian Science.”  PhD Dissertation.  University of 
Sheffield, 1998. 
5 Bernard Lightman, “Scientists as Materialists in the Periodical Press: Tyndall’s Belfast Address.”  (In 
Geoffrey Cantor and Sally Shuttleworth [eds.], Science Serialized: Representations of the Sciences in 
Nineteenth-Century Periodicals [Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004], 199-238), 202.   
6 Lightman, “Scientists as Materialists,” 202. 
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“Although thinkers like Spencer were labeled materialists and even atheists by their 
enemies, this was nothing more than name-calling.  Many of the so-called materialists 
were in fact Berkeleians who denied the existence of matter.”7  Reed goes on to note that 
T. H. Huxley, whom he identifies as one such “Berkeleian,” “was widely attacked for his 
‘materialism,’”8 indicating that the charge was used less as an accurate label for a precise 
philosophical stance than it was as an ad hominem attack.9   
The presidential address that John Tyndall delivered to the British Association for 
the Advancement of Science at the Belfast meeting in 1874 was closely associated with 
both the terms of the debate over materialism and with the contentiousness that 
surrounded the debate and its participants.  In it, Tyndall, like Maudsley, attempted to 
establish a disciplinary distinction between science and religion at least as much as he 
engaged in the discourse of materialism per se.  Nevertheless, the Belfast Address made 
Tyndall an object of open and personal attack.10  Because Tyndall’s speech lays out quite 
clearly the basic premises of materialism and outlines the conflicts between science and 
                                                
7 Edward S. Reed, From Soul to Mind: The Emergence of Psychology from Erasmus Darwin to William 
James (New Haven: Yale U P, 1997), 9.  
8 Reed, From Soul to Mind, 33. 
9 Interestingly, Huxley includes a statement of his own resistance to materialism in a “Prefatory Letter” to 
John Tyndall that opens his Lay Sermons (1871): “[T]he Essay ‘On the Physical Basis of Life’ was 
intended to contain a plain and untechnical statement of one of the great tendencies of modern biological 
thought, accompanied by a protest, from the philosophical side, against what is commonly called 
Materialism.  The result of my well-meant efforts I find to be, that I am generally credited with having 
invented ‘protoplasm’ in the interests of ‘materialism.’  My unlucky ‘Lay Sermon’ has been attacked by 
microscopists, ignorant alike of Biology and Philosophy; by philosophers, not very learned in either 
Biology or Microscopy; by clergymen of several denominations; and by some few writers who have taken 
the trouble to understand the subject.”  T. H. Huxley, Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews (New York: D. 
Appleton and Co., 1871), vii. 
10 Lightman, “Scientists as Materialists,” provides detailed information on the response within the 
periodical press to Tyndall’s address. 
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religion, and because its reception, particularly in the periodical press, painted Tyndall as 
an immoral atheist, the Address serves as a paradigmatic text regarding the major issues 
in the Victorian conflict between scientific materialism and Christian orthodoxy. 
Organized as a survey of the history of science from the earliest “impulse inherent 
in primeval man” (BA 1),11 Tyndall’s speech traces attitudes toward the foundation of life 
and existence from Democritus’s discussion of atoms and molecules in the fifth century 
BCE through the work of Tyndall’s contemporaries, including Darwin.12  In the course of 
his address, Tyndall repeatedly asserts his claim that it is only through the pursuit of 
science and of scientifically derived answers to the questions of existence that the world 
begins to make sense independent of the caprice of the gods:  
[T]he science of ancient Greece had already cleared the world of the fantastic 
images of divinities operating capriciously through natural phenomena.  It had 
shaken itself free from that fruitless scrutiny ‘by the internal light of the mind 
alone,’ which had vainly sought to transcend experience and reach a 
knowledge of ultimate causes.  Instead of accidental observation, it had 
introduced observation with a purpose; instruments were employed to aid the 
senses; and scientific method was rendered in a great measure complete by the 
union of Induction and Experiment.  (BA 11)   
 
During much of the two millennia between the ancient Greeks and the rise of modern 
science, Tyndall claims, scientific exploration gave way to Christian insistence on 
spiritual needs: the early Christians, according to Tyndall, “scorned the earth, in view of 
                                                
11 John Tyndall, “Address Delivered Before the British Association Assembled at Belfast, With Additions” 
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1874), 1.  Additional references to this address are to this edition and 
will be cited parenthetically in the text as BA. 
12 Tyndall’s references to Darwin and Darwin’s work on natural selection seem intended less to promote 
natural selection as a theory in its own right and more to emphasize the characteristics of Darwin’s work 
that make it, for Tyndall, paradigmatic of good science: it is careful, thoroughly researched, drawn from 
observed phenomena, and developed through conversation and communication with other scientists who 
provide challenges and point out problems.  While T. H. Huxley may have helped to make Darwin’s ideas 
accessible to a larger public, Tyndall argues, “there is one impression made by the book itself which no 
exposition of it, however luminous, can convey; and that is the impression of the vast amount of labour, 
both of observation and of thought, implied in its production” (BA 39). 
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that ‘building of God, that house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.’  The 
Scriptures which ministered to their spiritual needs were also the measure of their 
Science” (BA 11-12).  Here Tyndall connects the practices of deduction—of starting with 
an idea (“that fruitless scrutiny ‘by the internal light of the mind alone’”) – to the 
irreconcilable binary opposition within Christianity between earthly material concerns, 
which they scorned, and heavenly spiritual concerns, which they exalted. 
According to Tyndall’s assessment, Christianity encouraged its followers to look 
for spiritual rather than physical causes for events and situations; consequently, faith in 
the unseen took precedence over the material world, which was thereby devalued and 
rendered untrustworthy.  Later in the address, Tyndall takes more direct issue with what 
he presents as Christian refusal to use one’s senses to learn about the material world:  
Believing as I do in the continuity of Nature, I cannot stop abruptly where our 
microscopes cease to be of use.  Here the vision of the mind authoritatively 
supplements the vision of the eye.  By an intellectual necessity I cross the 
boundary of the experimental evidence, and discern in that Matter which we, in 
our ignorance of its latent powers, and notwithstanding our professed 
reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise 
and potency of all terrestrial Life.  (BA 55) 
 
By moving from the specific to the general, from the example to the theory, and from the 
senses to the intellect, Tyndall both asserts the importance of induction as a scientific 
method and critiques what he identifies as a Christian scorn for the material world in 
spite of professions of reverence for the creator of that material, constitutive as it is of life 
on earth.  In condemning the “mysticism of the Middle Ages . . . which caused men to 
look with shame upon their own bodies as hindrances to the absorption of the creature in 
the blessedness of the Creator” (BA 12), Tyndall connects the shame of the body (and by 
extension of the physical world) to a reluctance to analyze the world by means of 
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observation and empiricism.  Unifying the whole address is this repeated insistence on 
experimentation, observation, and specificity as necessary replacements within the 
discipline of science for deduction and generality.  Tyndall’s opposition of induction and 
deduction aligns neatly with other sets of binaries: individual and generic, concrete and 
abstract, real and ideal, material and ethereal.  Tyndall’s repeated insistence on the 
specific over the general suggests a similar insistence on the importance of the material 
world. 
Although Tyndall’s Belfast Address focused attention on him as a materialist, the 
address itself suggests a less clear-cut, and certainly less extreme, attitude toward 
materialism.  He makes repeated and sympathetic use of writers whom he identifies as 
nonmaterialists (for example, Bishop Butler, of whom Tyndall says, “I hold the Bishop's 
reasoning to be unanswerable, and his liberality to be worthy of imitation” [BA 34]), 
seeming to make a point of defending both their personal integrity and the validity of at 
least some of their objections.13  Further, at the end of the address he asserts the 
complexity of human experience and claims that it cannot be reduced to mere scientific 
knowledge: “For science, however, no exclusive claim is here made; you are not urged to 
erect it into an idol” (BA 65).  Noting that “[t]he world embraces not only a Newton, but 
a Shakespeare – not only a Boyle, but a Raphael – not only a Kant, but a Beethoven – not 
only a Darwin, but a Carlyle” (BA 65), Tyndall asserts the importance of having multiple 
– and distinct – modes of knowledge.  However, while rhetorically this section may have 
been intended as a concession to those favoring a traditional Christian epistemology, it is 
                                                
13 It is worth noting, however, that in calling Bishop Butler’s “reasoning” “unanswerable” Tyndall was not 




also possible to read it as a determined defense of the legitimacy of the scientific method: 
Tyndall does not want his listeners to erect an idol to science, because doing so would 
convert a method predicated on skepticism into dogmatic insistence on conformity of 
belief, and as a scientist he values the scientific method precisely because it takes as its 
first premise the reality and usefulness of the particular, of what can be observed and 
documented through sensory exploration.14  Tyndall’s conclusion makes use of similar 
rhetoric to a similar end: to offer an implicit defense of the scientific method, even as it 
suggests the complementarity and, indeed, necessity of both “the knowing faculties” and 
what “may be called the creative faculties of man” (BA 65, emphasis in original).  Yet 
buried in this concession is the insistence that “ultimate fixity of conception is . . . 
unattainable” (BA 65), that faith will never provide final answers.  More than merely a 
statement of mutual respect and equal access to truth, Tyndall’s address conceives of 
knowledge as being subject to development and new discovery, not static and accessible 
through either revelation or scriptural description: the epistemology of science insists on 
the value of material particularity, since it is attention to the specific characteristics of 
any particular phenomenon that leads to scientifically valid conclusions. 
Excoriated as a manifesto of an extreme and dangerous form of ungodly 
materialism by many of Tyndall’s contemporaries, the address reads more as a call for 
rational consideration of the scientific method itself.  Near the end of the address, Tyndall 
succinctly identifies the fundamental opposition he sees at work within contemporary 
discussions of the origins of life:  
                                                
14 There is, however, a certain amount of disingenuousness in Tyndall’s discussion of idols and science: in 
Tyndall’s system, science can never be an idol – something static to be worshipped as a principle – because 
it is, fundamentally, a method of observation rather than a principle, a set of actions rather than a concept.   
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On the one side we have a theory . . . derived . . . not from the study of Nature, 
but from the observation of men—a theory which converts the Power whose 
garment is seen in the visible universe into an Artificer, fashioned after the 
human model, and acting by broken efforts, as man is seen to act.  On the other 
side, we have the conception that all we see around us, and all we feel within 
us . . . have their unsearchable roots in a cosmical life, if I dare apply the term, 
an infinitesimal span of which is offered to the investigation of man.  (BA 58-
59) 
 
Either the power behind the universe is anthropomorphic and acts “by broken efforts, as 
man is seen to act,” or that power is inherent in existing matter of the cosmos and is 
unexplainable given the limits of human investigative power.  Admitting explicitly that 
the theory of evolution cannot explain, for example, the connection between the existence 
of the nervous system and “the parallel phenomena of sensation and thought” (BA 59) 
any more than a person could conceivably “lift himself by his own waist band” (BA 59), 
Tyndall claims that the entire address “is to be taken in connexion with this fundamental 
truth” (BA 59).  Rather than a blanket claim for materialism per se, the address appears to 
be a more nuanced call for reason to be the guide in all matters of knowledge rather than 
either faith, blind dogmatism, or prejudice.  As much as anything else, the Belfast 
Address calls for the separation of the methods of science and religion: rather than 
claiming that there can be no divine responsibility for the existence of the universe, 
Tyndall simply argues that there can be no scientific evidence for such a claim. 
Although his version of materialism is more nuanced than some of the ad 
hominem attacks against him would suggest, Tyndall’s address still makes a strong claim 
for materialism:  
Two courses and two only, are possible.  Either let us open our doors freely to 
the conception of creative acts, or, abandoning them, let us radically change 
our notions of Matter. . . . Let us reverently, but honestly, look the question in 
the face.  Divorced from matter, where is life to be found?  Whatever our faith 
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may say, our knowledge shows them to be indissolubly joined.  Every meal we 
eat, and every cup we drink, illustrates the mysterious control of Mind by 
Matter.  (BA 54)  
 
Relying on the methods of science, Tyndall postulates a variety of materialism that 
extends from the observable characteristics of nature, rather than a faith based solely on 
intuited or received truths: “[T]here is in the true man of science a wish stronger than the 
wish to have his beliefs upheld; namely, the wish to have them true.  And this stronger 
wish causes him to reject the most plausible support if he has reason to suspect that it is 
vitiated by error” (BA 56).  Throughout his address, Tyndall both anticipated and 
attempted to defuse the charges of atheism and materialism he would be opening himself 
to, even as he articulated a nuanced argument for a particular kind of materialism. 
Tyndall’s argument in favor of the scientific method, and his implicit insistence 
on scientific materialism, makes essentially no mention of questions related to morality 
or ethical human behavior, and this is an opening his religious opponents in particular 
made great use of.  Nevertheless, while I do not intend to make Tyndall’s Belfast Address 
into an argument for the morality of materialism, I think it is worth pointing out some of 
the potential moral consequences of his insistence on specificity and the individual.  In 
many ways, Tyndall’s version of the scientific method echoes George Eliot’s 1866 
description of the moral value of the “picture” over that of the “diagram.”15  The 
specificity and detail which Tyndall values so deeply open possibilities for individual 
connection through immediate sense rather than through mediated concept, for a 
                                                
15 George Eliot, letter to Frederic Harrison, 15 August 1866, in Gordon S. Haight (ed.), The George Eliot 
Letters (9 vols.; New Haven: Yale U P, 1954-78), 4:300.  I discuss Eliot’s aesthetic argument in connection 
to her version of morality at great length in Chapter 3, but want to note here the surprising extent to which 
Tyndall’s concept of the particular, and the enormous value he places on it, echoes Eliot’s moral ideology.   
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scientific method that operates analogously to the moral sympathy George Eliot hints at 
in her 1866 letter. 
Tyndall was not the only prominent scientist to address the concept of 
materialism.  Edward Reed notes that of all the so-called materialists of mid- and late-
century Britain, only Darwin could properly be called a materialist rather than a positivist 
in that he relentlessly sought an ultimate cause rather than simply a chain of events.  In 
addition, though, T. H. Huxley was associated strongly with materialism, particularly 
after his 1860 President’s Address to the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science at Oxford in which he debated with Samuel Wilberforce and earned for himself 
the nickname of “Darwin’s bulldog.”  Even outside the formal public debate about 
science and materialism per se, mid- and late-Victorian science, particularly psychology, 
was focused extensively on ascertaining the relationship between body and mind or soul.  
Victorian science, and what would now be called “pseudo” science – mesmerism, animal 
magnetism, and phrenology, among other fields – attempted to delineate the precise 
boundaries between the material world and the spiritual world.  Clearly, then, what it 
meant to be human – particularly the borders between body and mind, or between the 
material and spiritual worlds, as well as those that separated the human from the animal – 
was a topic that generated intense, passionate interest throughout the nineteenth century, 
both in the popular and scientific periodical presses and in more private discourse as 
reflected in letters and journals from the period.  Throughout the second half of the 
nineteenth century, then, charges of materialism – as well as the actual conversation 
about issues of materiality, science, and religion – were a common way of reasserting the 




Questions of Materiality within Victorian Religion 
As might be expected, the annual meeting of the British Association provoked 
extensive religious commentary, much of it hostile, particularly in regard to the concept 
of materialism.  Yet within Victorian religious communities, more diversity of thought 
about materialism – both actual scientific materialism and a more moderate valuing of 
material existence – existed than might be expected.  I begin this section with attention to 
the religious responses to Tyndall’s Belfast Address, most of it focused with great 
hostility on Tyndall’s argument in favor of material causes.  Given the extensive religious 
hostility to Tyndall and to his ideas, it may be surprising, then, that even within religious 
discourse an argument in favor of the value of material embodiment can be found, and I 
conclude this section with a discussion of some of the ways in which a perhaps surprising 
amount Victorian religious thinking relied implicitly or explicitly on the moral value of 
material existence.   
Each year following the Presidential Address of the British Association ministers 
responded from pulpits throughout Britain either by decrying the immorality and atheism 
they saw running rampant within science as a discipline and the British Association as a 
body, or by calling on science to maintain its appointed place as “handmaid”16 to religion, 
and not to overstep its disciplinary bounds into questions of creation, first causes, and the 
purpose of life.  A few even preached of the value of science, usually by an invocation of 
the doctrine of separate spheres, suggesting that a properly regulated science would 
                                                
16 G. Deane, The Relations of Christianity and Science.  A Sermon Preached (During the Visit of ‘The 
British Association’ to Bristol, in August, 1875.) (Bristol: W. Whereat; Birmingham: Hudson & Son; and 
London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1875), 6. 
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function as the complement, rather than the antagonist, to theology.  In this vein, in 1850 
the Rev. W. Scoresby argued that all advances in knowledge lead to greater glory of God: 
“Whatever advances we make in well-known fields of scientific inquiry, in respect to the 
Divine handiwork, we disclose additional grounds of admiration.”  Scoresby notes “two 
records of the Divine works,” one discernable to sense and the other available through 
revelation, that cannot contradict one another since both stem from the same ultimate 
being; instead, he argues, each should confine itself to its own sphere in order to make its 
contributions most useful.17  The Rev. C. Pritchard spoke of the “revelation of Spectrum 
Analysis” presented at the 1869 meeting of the British Association, interpreting this 
scientific discovery as confirmation of “the most ancient prophecy of the Divine 
Mindfulness for Man.”18  While noting that some irresponsible scientists had promoted 
“inchoate theories” and that some irresponsible religious people had wrongly tried to 
repress the expansion of scientific knowledge, the Rev. G. Deane (a Congregational 
minister as well as a professor of Hebrew and science) argued that science and religion 
should not be imagined in opposition to each other: “It were a folly to array the one 
against the other.  Both have been, both are great benefactors to our race.”19  In Deane’s 
conception, as in that of so many other generally sympathetic religious people, “The 
crowning glory of Science is that she may become the handmaid of Religion – an 
                                                
17 W. Scoresby, Jehovah Glorified in His Works.  A Sermon Preached in St. James’ Episcopal Chapel, on 
Sunday, August 4, 1850: On Occasion of the Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science, in Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black; and London: Longman, Brown, Green, and 
Longmans, 1850), 8, 15. 
18 C. Pritchard, The Testimony of Science to the Continuity of the Divine Thought for man.  A Sermon 
Preached by Request in the Church of St. Mary Major, Exeter at the Meeting of the British Association for 
1869 (London: Strahan & Co., 1869), 3. 
19 Deane, The Relations of Christianity and Science, 5. 
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effective means of enabling us rightly to understand the teachings of the Scriptures.”20  
The Rev. T. G. Bonney, speaking to a student Christian Association in 1883, went so far 
as to say that science has the power to purify religion, not to destroy it; because science 
and religion properly occupy different fields of inquiry, conflicts between them always 
end with religion stronger than it had been: “The fire [of the challenges of science to 
religion] has indeed tried the structures raised by theologians, it has burnt up whatsoever 
they had built of ‘wood, hay, and stubble,’ and of this, even in the best and purest of 
Churches, there has always been something; but that which was of God’s building has 
remained uninjured, nay has been the brighter from being purged from the incrustation of 
centuries.”21  Since “All truth, as time goes on, will be seen to flow from one source,” 
religion need not fear science, but should rather welcome its contributions.22   
Others, not directly hostile to science but less welcoming of its contributions, 
argue that true science could never undermine religion or religious belief, suggesting 
implicitly that the truth of science can be recognized by the degree to which it either 
challenges or confirms Christian orthodoxy.  William Gaskell began an 1861 sermon by 
claiming that a science that “disconnect[ed] the idea of God from the study or observation 
of his works, though done by many of the professedly religious, is essentially irreligious” 
because “[a]ll the works of God come within its province; they are his witnesses, 
                                                
20 Deane, The Relations of Christianity and Science, 6. 
21 T. G. Bonney, The Conflict of Science and Theology.  A Paper Read at the Opening Meeting of the 
University College Students’ Christian Association, on October 12, 1883 (London: ‘Church of England 
Pulpit’ Office, 1883), 1. 
22 Bonney, The Conflict of Science and Theology, 7. 
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testifying continually to his majesty and goodness.”23  After noting that some modern 
Christian apologists “despise and disparage the testimony of nature to the character of 
God,” Gaskell argues against any danger that science could pose to religion: “True 
science, we may rest assured, can never say a thing which true religion contradicts.  It 
works in God’s domains, with powers which God has given, and penetrating and keen-
sighted as it may be, it will never come upon aught which betrays the least sign of 
weakness or variableness in Him . . . The whole wide creation, when rightly viewed, is 
one vast school of divine instruction.”24  “The two spheres are perfectly distinct, but they 
are mutually indispensable,” argues another sermon; taking George Henry Lewes, 
Huxley, and Tyndall as examples of proponents of anti-Christian sentiment, the speaker 
distinguishes “true” science from their “false” science, which leads to atheism: “We are 
well aware that those who are most highly qualified to speak for science would reject 
with pain and indignation the atheistic tendencies which have sometimes brought 
discredit on their cause, as not less monstrous for their anomaly than heinous for their 
sin.”25 
More usual, however, were condemnatory responses.  An 1842 essay by William 
Allen explicitly linked science, particularly the materialism inherent in scientific ideas, to 
dangerous atheism: “[O]ur men of science who have [considered the immaterial nature of 
                                                
23 William Gaskell, God’s Witness to Himself in the World.  A Sermon Preached at Cross Street Chapel, 
Manchester, September 8th, 1861, During the Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science (London: E. T. Whitfield, 1861), 3. 
24 Gaskell, God’s Witness, 10, 11. 
25 J. Hannah, A Plea for Theology as the Completion of Science.  A Sermon Preached in St. Paul’s Church, 
Dundee, on Sunday, September 8, 1867 during the Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1867), 8, 9. 
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the soul], have either confessed they know nothing about the matter . . . or that it is 
something semi-material, because incorporated with feelings of body – or else they have 
so speculated upon it, independent of its legitimate evidence, as to lead them into the wild 
and heterodox notions of Atheism, Scepticism, Materialism, and what not: For when the 
mind is once led astray upon this subject, we cannot tell where it will wander into 
devious errors, truly awful and satanic.”26  Allen continues by linking “that awful error, 
Materialism” with “still more destructive errors, Scepticism and Infidelity,” which would 
lead, if unchecked by religion, to “nothing but anarchy and immorality of the most 
abominable and atrocious character.”27 
Reactions to Tyndall’s Belfast Address are even more extreme.  One writer, who 
identified himself only as “A London Merchant,” was so outraged by Tyndall’s address 
that he wrote to the Home Secretary suggesting that charges be brought against Tyndall 
for abuse of his office as President of the British Association and for posing “if not a 
great danger, at least a great scandal, which, I respectfully submit, requires action on the 
part of the Minister who is the guardian of social propriety.”28  Tyndall “merits universal 
detestation” for his “wicked” attempts to “pervert or destroy the conscience of mankind,” 
                                                
26 William Allen, An Essay on Spirit and Matter: Or, A Metaphysical Discovery Relating to that 
Philosophy.  Viz.: Feelings of Body are not Incipient Perceptions of Mind; Nor, in Consequence, are 
Perceptions of Mind Feelings of a Human Body.  A Remedy for Materialism (Stamford: R. Bagley, 1842), 
v. 
27 Allen, An Essay, 81, 82. 
28 Anonymous [“A London Merchant”], An Inquiry of the Home Secretary as to whether Professor Tyndall 
has not Subjected Himself to the ‘Penalty on Persons Expressing Blasphemous Opinions, 9 & 10 Will. III., 
Chap. 32’ (London: Published by the Author, 1874), 1.  In calling for Tyndall’s punishment, the author 
compares him unfavorably with the unjustly punished Galileo, noting that “if Galileo, not content with a 
simple statement of the truth, had argued that the Bible was full of lies, and quite unworthy of respect, and 
Authority had marked its displeasure of such unseemly conduct by some light punishment – very, very far 
short of death – the world would have approved the sentence, and Galileo would have been very properly 
condemned by posterity, great discoverer though he may have been” (2). 
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to undermine the religious convictions of lay people unable to judge the viability of his 
scientific theories.29  Most responses to Tyndall’s address focus on its bad science as well 
as its religious heterodoxy, arguing either implicitly or explicitly that good science 
confirms rather than challenges Christian orthodoxy and that it stays within particular 
bounds, not encroaching on the purview of religion.  “Materialism I hold to be 
unscientific,” claims one writer, “a grave philosophical error, and utterly subversive of 
religious truth.”  Tyndall’s Address is “calculated to promote scepticism, encourage 
unbelief, support atheism, destroy the highest and noblest instincts of man’s nature, and 
crush the great heart of humanity.”30  Tyndall’s science is deeply flawed because the 
“business” of science “is to explain nature’s laws, not to hide from human eyes the Law-
giver; to unfold the wonders of creation, not to attempt to prove there is no Creator.”31  
Tyndall has “step[ped] out of [his] domain to tell us that matter is the only existence, 
because [his] science and [his] experience have comprehended nothing else.”32  “Our 
precious time was occupied with wild theories and wilder speculations,” claims J. 
MacNaughton in a sermon responding to Tyndall’s address; “Advantage was taken of the 
position of president of a learned body, and of the high platform to which it raised a man 
untaught in the religion of the Bible, to ventilate his anti-scriptural notions, and throw 
                                                
29 An Inquiry, 3. 
30 George Sexton, Scientific Materialism Calmly Considered: Being a Reply to the Address Delivered 
Before the British Association, at Belfast, on August 19th, 1874, by Professor Tyndall, LL.D., D.C.Ll, 
F.R.S., President.  A Discourse Delivered in London, on Sunday Evening, August 23, 1874 (London: J. 
Burns, 1874), iv. 
31 Sexton, Scientific Materialism, 47. 
32 Sexton, Scientific Materialism, 47. 
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discredit on the faith of the great mass of his associates.”33  Noting Tyndall’s reliance on 
“the irrational ravings of an old Greek,” MacNaughton argues that Tyndall’s science is 
“miserable, childish guess-work of the most unlikely kind,” rather than the true science 
that would “proclaim the praises of the Invisible and Eternal first cause, of all things.”34  
His sermon ends with a warning to science to stay within its limited sphere: “Science and 
Christianity have separate and distinct fields to cultivate . . . [and] there is a broad line of 
separation between them – they are kingdoms with laws peculiar to each, and ought to 
live in unbroken amity and friendship.  But if war breaks out between them, and Science 
invades the territory of Christianity, ‘the weaker must go to the wall.’”35  This sort of 
warning – to Tyndall personally and to science, particularly the materialism of science, 
more generally – is a common element in religious responses to Tyndall’s Belfast 
Address.  While many responses to the annual British Association meetings were 
cautious about the truth value of science, and while many insisted that science keep 
within its appointed bounds, Tyndall’s Address provoked almost unanimously hostile 
responses that attacked materialism as a scientifically invalid concept, linking it to the 
unwarranted encroachment of science into other fields and to the intentional overthrow of 
morality and of social order.  Thus, scientific materialism is equated through Tyndall’s 
Address with immorality in general and with anti-Christian sentiment in particular. 
Interestingly, though, given the near unanimity of responses to the materialism 
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34 MacNaughton, The Address of Professor Tyndall, 17. 
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implicit in Tyndall’s address (and in much of nineteenth-century science as a whole), 
religion during the nineteenth century was far from incorporeal.  In particular, the 
doctrines of the incarnation of Christ and of the Eucharist necessitated on some level an 
explicit value of embodiment and materiality.36  For Anglicans, the Thirty-Nine Articles 
acknowledge the doctrine of the hypostatic union – which claims that two natures, human 
and divine, exist within the singular person of Christ – saying that “two whole and perfect 
Natures, that is to say, the Godhead and Manhood, were joined together in one Person, 
never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God, and very Man.”37  The doctrine of 
the incarnation also underlies the sacrament of communion, although it is understood 
differently by the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Church; the Catholic 
doctrine of transubstantiation insists upon the literal conversion of the substance of the 
bread and wine into body and blood, while the Anglican doctrine claims that Christ is 
present in the bread and wine “only after an heavenly and spiritual manner.”38   
                                                
36 While these doctrines are perhaps most closely associated with Catholicism, in fact both are statements 
of faith in all mainstream Protestant denominations, including Anglicanism and Methodism.  For all, the 
incarnation of Christ is an article of faith (Article II for Anglicans).  The relationship between embodiment 
and the Eucharist is more complicated, although, again, Anglicans and Methodists agree that the bread and 
wine are in some way, or after some manner, the body and blood of Christ.   
37 Article II, “Of the Word or Son of God, who was made very man.”   
38 Article XXVIII, “Of the Lord’s Supper”: “Transubstantiation (or the change of the substance of Bread 
and Wine) in the Supper of the Lord, cannot be proved by holy Writ; but is repugnant to the plain words of 
Scripture, overthroweth the nature of a Sacrament, and hath given occasion to many superstitions.  The 
Body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten, in the Supper, only after an heavenly and spiritual manner.  And 
the mean whereby the Body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is Faith.”  According to the 
Catholic Encyclopedia, transubstantiation is “the conversion in the Eucharist of the whole substance of the 
bread into the body and of the wine into the blood of Christ, only the appearances (and other ‘accidents’) of 
bread and wine remaining” (Catholic Encyclopedia, “Transubstantiation”).  Finally, the “Real Presence” of 
Christ consists of the body, blood, soul, and divinity, inseparably united in each particle of the bread and 
the wine: “In order to forestall at the very outset, the unworthy notion, that in the Eucharist we receive 
merely the Body and merely the Blood of Christ but not Christ in His entirety, the Council of Trent defined 
the Real Presence to be such as to include with Christ’s Body and His Soul and Divinity as well” (Catholic 
Encyclopedia, “Real Presence”). 
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The doctrine of the incarnation of Christ was an implicit, and sometimes explicit, 
foundation for social reform movements within religious organizations.   For example, 
the Church of England Purity Society (CEPS) focused on the incarnation of Christ as a 
model for the purity of nineteenth-century masculinity: Sue Morgan writes, “The 
theology of the incarnation provided the CEPS with a sound doctrinal basis for their 
affirmative approach to male embodiment.  As the Word made flesh, Christ’s physicality 
contested the innate sinfulness of the human form divinizing the pure male body.  
Reclaiming the human form as a locus for divine experience meant a perception of the 
body both in its concrete materiality and as signifier of a wider religio-national identity . . 
. Anglican readings of bodily chastity were shaped less by punitive intentions to 
subjugate the flesh than by the desire to revere human corporeality.”39  In this model, 
masculine purity – particularly sexual purity – is founded on the principle of the value of 
embodiment rather than on its sinfulness.  Morgan goes on to note that “CEPS members 
rejected much of the traditional dualism of Christian thought and . . . advocated a new 
respect and veneration for human physicality.  Late nineteenth-century spiritual 
discourses on manliness were saturated with metaphors of the body, producing what 
could be described as a ‘theology of embodiment’.”40  The Purity Society, and similar 
movements, may not have been the voice of mainstream Anglican religious belief, but it 
is important to note that even mainstream religious groups had available to them, through 
their own articles of faith, a sense of the inherent value of material embodiment.   
                                                
39 Sue Morgan, “‘Writing the Male Body’: Sexual Purity and Masculinity in The Vanguard, 1884-94” in 
Andrew Bradstock, Sean Gill, Anne Hogan, and Sue Morgan [eds.], Masculinity and Spirituality in 
Victorian Culture [New York: St. Martin’s, 2000], 179-93), 181-2. 
40 Morgan, “‘Writing the Male Body,’” 190.  
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While mainstream Anglicanism and even Evangelicalism acknowledged the 
potentially moral value of at least some aspects of material embodiment through its 
implicit connection to the doctrine of the incarnation of Christ, it is not surprising that the 
Oxford Movement and Anglo-Catholicism did so both more heavily and more explicitly.  
In 1869-70, the First Vatican Council reaffirmed the centrality of the doctrine of the 
incarnation, putting at the forefront of Catholic orthodoxy the insistence on the full 
humanity of Christ.  In the centuries since it was adopted at the Council of Nicaea in 325, 
the doctrine of the hypostatic union came under attack multiple times by positions that 
attempted to minimize Christ’s humanity: some claimed that Christ was wholly divine, 
with only the shape of humanity (monophysite heresy), while others argued that the 
divine and purely spiritual Christ somehow became joined to the fully human (and thus 
material) body of Jesus (the Nestorian heresy).  Both of these heresies were raised during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and both were denied by Vatican I and its 
insistence on the full humanity of Christ through the doctrines of incarnation and the 
hypostatic union.   
Thomas Harper, one of Gerard Manley Hopkins’s superiors at Stonyhurst, 
connected the doctrine of the incarnation to the representational value of both art and 
nature.  Tom Zaniello notes that, “As a result of the Apostle John’s having actually seen 
and written about the Incarnate Word as Christ, the apostolic record has had a ‘vital 
influence on Esthetic, because it rendered God visible to the human senses.’  The material 
world ‘has become one vast symbol, and a vehicle for sacramental grace.’ . . .  By giving 
‘a marvellous [sic] testimony’ on behalf of the eternal truths that matter symbolizes, art 
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shares in ‘this universal regeneration of matter.’”41  In this view, matter is valuable 
because it points to something beyond itself rather than because it has inherent value as 
matter per se; however, this view clearly does not denigrate the material world, nor does 
it pose it in direct opposition to spiritual truths available only through revelation.  
Aesthetic appreciation may be the most reasonable vehicle for religious approval of 
matter, in that, as Hilary Fraser has suggested, “Natural affinities between religion and art 
have conventionally been perceived in their common endeavour to express and embody 
non-material ideal truths in physical form through a common language of myth and 
symbol.”42  Fraser goes on to note that John Keble proposes a symbolic system in which 
“the Blessed Sacraments of the Church were a concentration and intensification of the 
general sacramental significance of nature.”43 
Given the vehemence, as well as the sheer volume, of religious responses to (real 
or perceived) advocates of scientific materialism, it would be inaccurate and misleading 
to suggest that Victorian religious thought found the kind of value within material 
embodiment that biological science did; when the diversity of nineteenth-century 
religious belief, even within mainstream Christianity, is taken into account, it becomes 
even more difficult to make an argument for any kind of univocal endorsement of 
embodiment as a potential ground of moral or ethical behavior.  Instead of making such 
an argument, my intention here is simply to point out that, at the same time religious 
                                                
41 Tom Zaniello, Hopkins in the Age of Darwin (Iowa City: U Iowa P, 1988); quoted passages are from 
Thomas Harper’s sermon at the Farm Street Church of the Immaculate Conception during the summer of 
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42 Hilary Fraser, Beauty and Belief: Aesthetics and Religion in Victorian Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
U P, 1986), 1. 
43 Fraser, Beauty and Belief, 38. 
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speakers were publicly and vociferously taking issue with the claims of scientists like 
John Tyndall, individuals within those religious communities had available to them 
images that clearly implied the value of materiality.  If, as I discuss in the introduction, 
the human figure of Jesus was held as a model of kind, moral behavior (in addition to 
being an agent of redemption), this was true largely because of the insistence within all 
branches of mainstream Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant, on the importance of 
the incarnation of Christ.  The image of Christ’s humanity, at issue in Vatican I and 
acknowledged explicitly in the Anglican articles of faith, provided a model of humane 
morality predicated on material embodiment.  I discuss in more detail the connections 
between human embodiment and theology in Chapter 5, but want here simply to note the 
presence within the mainstream of both Anglicanism and Catholicism of a more 
complicated stance on materiality than might be expected, particularly given the 
responses to scientific thought.  While it would be inaccurate to say that Victorian 
religion valued embodiment or materiality per se, it is fair to suggest their valued 
presence in terms of both symbol and sacrament.   
 
The Mind-Brain Debate in Victorian Psychology 
If religion asks questions concerning the relationship between the material body 
and the non-material soul, psychology asks similar questions of the invisible processes of 
the mind.  Mid-Victorian psychology developed in large part from physiology, and this 
foundation in the study of bodily processes is clearly identifiable in much physiological 
psychology throughout the nineteenth century.  In this section, I address nineteenth-
century attitudes toward the mind and its processes, and examine the relationship 
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between body and (non-material) mind.   
While nineteenth-century solutions to the seemingly ever-present problem of 
psychologically unbalanced behavior varied widely, both over time and among individual 
practitioners, there was a general consensus that so-called “nervous” disorders had 
physical causes.44  George Cheyne, an eighteenth-century “nerve doctor,” claimed that 
nervous illnesses actually resided in the nerves themselves, and this general claim 
underlay, in one form or another, most approaches to psychology and psychiatry for the 
next 150 years.45  Benedict-Auguste Morel, a French psychologist, famously declared 
that the brain was the organ of the soul, while Jean-Martin Charcot, a pathologist, 
claimed that hysteria was an organic nervous disease.46  In stating that “Mental disorders 
are neither more nor less than nervous diseases in which mental symptoms predominate,” 
Henry Maudsley articulated the position of essentially all nineteenth-century 
practitioners, who agreed in general on the physical basis of mental illness.47  Insanity, 
according to Maudsley, used to be a special study because of “the habit of viewing mind 
as an intangible entity or incorporeal essence, which science inherited from theology . . . 
                                                
44 For an overview of developments within the field of psychology, see Edward Shorter, A History of 
Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997).  In 
particular, chapters 1-4 offer useful summaries of mental illnesses as they were conceived before and 
through the nineteenth century. 
45 See, for example, George Cheyne, The English Malady: Or, A Treatise of Nervous Diseases of All Kinds 
(1733) (London: Scholars’ Facsimiles, 1976).  For a discussion of George Cheyne and of the many 
conditions that were attributed to “nervous” diseases, see Peter Logan, Nerves and Narratives: A Culture 
History of Hysteria in Nineteenth-Century British Prose (Berkeley: U California P, 1997).  Rick Rylance, 
Victorian Psychology and British Culture, 1850-1880 (Oxford: Oxford U P, 2000), discusses the major 
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psychology over the relationship between body and mind. 
46 Benedict-Auguste Morel, Traite des degenerescences physiques, intellectuelles et morales de l’espece 
humaine (1857). 
47 Maudsley, Body and Mind, 41. 
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[I]ts disorders were thought to be an incomprehensible affliction, and, in accordance with 
the theological notion, due to the presence of an evil spirit in the sufferer, or to the 
enslavement of the soul to sin, or to anything but their true cause – bodily disease.”48   
Because of the overwhelming amount written on psychology during the 
nineteenth century, I will confine myself here to two aspects of the field that have 
particular importance to this study given their association with the tensions between the 
material and the non-material: association psychology and phrenology.  Association 
psychology, predicated as it is on the idea that mental associations happen spontaneously, 
may seem at first to be directly opposed to such a materialist “science” as phrenology, yet 
both integrate the material and the non-material by imagining the body as the site on 
which a record of the non-material – whether conceived as the personality, experience, or 
the psyche – is written.49   
Associationism, as it was articulated by David Hartley, suggests that repeated 
experiences leave physical traces on the nerves and brain, from which the mind then 
makes its own new associations, thereby building knowledge.  Later associationists built 
on this basis and discussed the unconscious operations of the mind as important elements 
in forming mental associations.  John Abercrombie notes that facts can be recalled either 
voluntarily or spontaneously, but links both kinds of memory to the operation of the will, 
suggesting that even spontaneous recall is controllable except in cases of mental 
                                                
48 Maudsley, Body and Mind, 2-3. 
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ways predates association psychology.  Although I discuss association psychology first, I do not mean to 
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derangement: “In the healthy state of the mind, we can give way to this spontaneous 
succession of thoughts; or we can check it at our pleasure, and direct the mind into some 
new train connected with the same subject, or arising out of it; or we can dismiss it 
altogether.”50  Abercrombie notes, though, that this voluntary control of thoughts can be 
lost in dreams and in states of insanity.   
Other associationists reinforced this claim of the unconscious or unintentional 
mental processes, often claiming that it was only in periods of physical sickness that 
these hidden points of knowledge could be revealed: William Hamilton, for example, 
argued that “The evidence on this point shows that the mind frequently contains whole 
systems of knowledge, which, though in our normal state they have faded into absolute 
oblivion, may, in certain abnormal states, as madness, febrile delerium, somnambulism, 
catalepsy, &c., flash out into luminous consciousness.”51  Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s 
description of the woman who, during fits of nervous fever, recalled perfectly the Latin, 
Greek, and Hebrew she had unknowingly picked up as a child living in her uncle’s home 
as he talked to himself in these languages was retold in ways that suggested both the 
unconscious workings of the mind and the physical basis of memory.  Later scientists, 
like Herbert Spencer and G. H. Lewes, expanded the concepts of unconscious memory 
into more explicitly biological models, suggesting that evolution of the organism leads to 
mental associations as the organism adapts to its particular environment.  Lewes also 
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envisioned the development of new ideas in terms that not only suggested the organicism 
of learning but also insisted upon the materiality of mental processes.  Writing that 
“Habits, Fixed Ideas, and what are called Automatic Actions, all depend on the tendency 
which a sensation has to discharge itself through the readiest channel,” Lewes envisions 
mind as thoroughly material: learning new information is difficult “because the channels 
through which each sensation has to pass have not become established; but no sooner has 
frequent repetition cut a pathway, than this difficulty vanishes.”52  The undirected 
associations of the mind, acting independently of the will, in early association 
psychology, here take the shape of a thoroughly material mark left on the brain itself; 
although perhaps still (at least potentially) undirected by the conscious will, this kind of 
association bridges the gap between the non-material (ideas) and the material (brain) by 
envisioning the non-material leaving a written record on the material. 
Phrenology, on the other hand, operates on the principle that the brain itself 
controls an individual’s strengths and weaknesses both moral and intellectual, as well as 
his or her faculties, propensities, likes, and dislikes.  Although occasionally confused 
with physiognomy, in which the face and body reveal hidden or masked mental or 
psychological characteristics, phrenology is distinctly different.  That is, rather than 
seeing the external body as a mirror of the otherwise inaccessible soul, phrenology 
imagines all personal characteristics to have their foundation and source in the brain 
itself; consequently, the organs of the brain, readable by the shapes they make on the 
surface of the skull, reveal to a trained reader the potentialities of personality even before 
                                                
52 George Henry Lewes, The Physiology of Common Life, 2 vols. (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 
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they are instantiated in behavior.  A child’s skull could be read in order to determine his 
or her strengths and weaknesses and to devise an educational plan to promote strengths 
and mitigate defects.  Consequently, phrenology, in direct contrast to association 
psychology, sees the brain not as the slate upon which experience writes but rather as the 
innate set of organs that determine future experience.   
For Franz Joseph Gall, phrenology provided the answer to the most fundamental 
questions of identity:  
Study the different developments of our cerebral parts, and you will no longer 
be deceived as to the prime motives which determine your tastes, and your 
actions; you will judge exactly of your merit and your demerit; you will know 
the reason, why it does not depend on yourself, that you have such and such a 
predominant propensity or talent, to become a mathematician, a mechanic, a 
musician, a poet, or an orator; you will comprehend why you excel, without 
effort, so to speak, in one thing, whilst in another you are inevitably doomed 
to mediocrity.53 
 
Ultimately, Gall suggests, the distinction between “the internal man and his external 
products, between things and their expressions,” will be erased, leaving a world without 
signs or referents but only things themselves.54  The principles of phrenology are a large 
step toward that goal, since they recognize the ultimate unity between cerebral 
characteristics and the human faculties and preferences.  Because phrenology proves 
“that the brain is exclusively the organ of the soul,” the skull is the only accessible part of 
the body that can reveal anything about an individual’s qualities; physiognomy, in other 
words, is useless since it assigns various parts of the body and of the face to particular 
human characteristics and reads them by analogy rather than, as phrenology does with the 
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skull, as evidence of direct cause.   
John Caspar Lavater’s physiognomical system read the visible surface of the body 
as a means of revealing the nonmaterial traits of the individual, but unlike phrenology 
divided human characteristics into three kinds of life and associated each with a section 
of the body.  The highest form of life, the intellectual, was associated with the head; the 
moral life, which was the middle form, was associated with the heart; and the lowest 
form of life, the animal, was associated with the genitalia.  The whole body, in Lavater’s 
system, could be read for evidence of hidden or masked characteristics.  Those 
characteristics were readable in miniature form as well, as the face came to signify a 
compressed record of the whole body.  The forehead was the image of the intellect; the 
nose and cheeks that of the moral life; and the chin that of the animal life.  If Lavater’s 
system worked by analogy and mirroring, by representation, Gall’s system worked 
through direct evidence: the shape of the skull does not reflect or represent particular 
characteristics, but rather is the external evidence of the development of particular organs 
within the brain.  If the body represents identity of character for Lavater, for Gall it is 
identity. 
 
Sensation and Reason in the Aesthetic Tradition 
The field of aesthetics blends many of the concerns about the relationship 
between body and mind that I have discussed throughout this chapter.  Because art – 
whether literary, pictorial, or other – presents sometimes abstract ideas in necessarily 
concrete form, aesthetics takes as a central question the relative value of the material and 
the non-material.  More particularly, I end this chapter with a discussion of Victorian 
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aesthetics because it addresses issues at stake in the other disciplines I have discussed so 
far: Victorian psychologists and biologists considered the physiological and 
psychological foundations of individual aesthetic response, while religious groups and 
leaders argued about the potential moral effects, both positive and negative, of particular 
works of art.  As I note above, Hilary Fraser has pointed out the “natural affinities 
between religion and art,” which exist because both share a “common endeavour to 
express and embody non-material ideal truths in physical form.”55  In this section, I 
discuss the relationship between form and content, between material and ideal, within the 
field of Victorian aesthetics, and in doing so attempt to connect concerns from biology, 
psychology, and theology with concerns specific to aesthetics in order to demonstrate the 
degree to which Victorian aesthetics privileged the non-material over the material, while 
simultaneously (and perhaps surprisingly) making room for embodiment.  
The nineteenth century inherited its aesthetic assumptions in large part from 
eighteenth-century English and German philosophy, in particular from Shaftesbury and, 
later, from Kant, although other philosophers, including Locke, Hutcheson, Hume, 
Burke, and Hegel, also influenced Victorian theories of art and beauty.  These theorists of 
the aesthetic, although varying significantly from each other in their details, tend to have 
overlapping central concerns: the relationship between and the relative value of idea and 
form in aesthetic objects; the role of the senses in recognizing and responding to the 
aesthetic, and in making aesthetic judgments; the extent to which aesthetic judgments 
involve reason or other cognitive processes; and questions of whether aesthetic 
judgments are immediate (sensory) or mediated (rational).   
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The etymology of the term “aesthetics” reveals its roots in sensation and 
materiality: “things perceptible by the senses, things material.”56  The term was first used 
by Alexander Baumgarten in 1735 to refer to the knowledge gained through the senses 
rather than to the systematic study of art and beauty,57 but quite quickly gained its current 
meaning when Kant objected to what he considered a mistranslation and refocused the 
term to signify the study of sense perception as it relates to judgment.  In any case, 
however, the study of aesthetics assumes the value of the senses in a way that challenged, 
particularly at the discipline’s beginnings, the assumptions of Descartes regarding the 
relative poverty of sensory perception as a mode of epistemology.58  Baumgarten’s use of 
the term can be seen to extend the ideas of philosophical empiricists, such as Locke,59 
against those of the rationalists who maintained, in the Cartesian and Neo-Platonist 
tradition, that the mind alone constitutes the only reliable means of knowing.   
Although the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century aesthetic philosophers accord 
different value to the senses, most acknowledge their involvement to some degree in 
aesthetic experience and judgment.  For example, Hume claims that “particular forms or 
qualities [of objects] . . . are calculated to please, and others to displease,”60 suggesting 
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that these “forms” might be perceptible through the senses.  He also associates the quality 
of beauty with “a mutual relation and correspondence of parts,”61 again suggesting that 
beauty can be determined through formal characteristics that appeal to the senses.  
Edmund Burke similarly claims that beauty lies in the formal characteristics of an object; 
associating characteristics such as smallness, smoothness, line, delicacy, and color with 
beauty, he writes, “I do not now recollect any thing beautiful that is not smooth,” and 
asserts that beautiful objects exhibit a gradual variation of line, neither completely 
straight nor abruptly angled; a delicacy of stature (“An appearance of delicacy, and even 
of fragility, is almost essential” to beauty); and colors that are “clean and fair,” never 
“dusky or muddy.”62  Interestingly, Burke clearly distinguishes between the form of an 
object (its smoothness, roundness, etc.) and a sense of formal order, which he says is not 
a requisite characteristic of beauty; this insistence on form rather than order allows him to 
conclude that aesthetic perception is largely sensory rather than reflective: “It is not by 
the force of long attention and enquiry that we find any object to be beautiful; beauty 
demands not assistance from our reasoning.”63  Finally, one of Hegel’s three defining 
principles of art is that art is made “to be more or less borrowed from the sensuous and 
addressed to man’s sense;”64 that is, art by definition uses materials that are visible or 
audible, and appeals to (and through) the senses. 
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Yet in the midst of this acknowledgement of the role of the senses and of sensory 
perception in the aesthetic, these philosophers almost universally assert the inadequacy of 
sensation and of sensory perception in forming aesthetic judgments.  The Earl of 
Shaftesbury attributes beauty to perfection of form, but the form he identifies is a wholly 
rational, rather than sensuous, one: linking concepts of order, proportion, balance, and 
harmony (which constitute beauty) to mathematics, Shaftesbury identifies the constituent 
feature of art as “that consummate Grace, that Beauty of Nature, and that Perfection of 
Numbers, which the rest of Mankind, feeling only by the Effect, whilst ignorant of the 
Cause, term the Je-ne-scay-quoy, the unintelligible, or the I know not what . . .”65  While 
the characteristics he identifies are based in formal attributes, they are so mediated by 
rationality as to be almost entirely dependent on cognition rather than on immediate 
somatic or affective experience.  Similarly, Shaftesbury identifies two internal senses – 
the sense of beauty and the moral sense – and describes them as if they were physical 
sense organs: “No sooner the Eye opens upon Figures, the Ear to Sounds, than straight the 
Beautiful results, and Grace and Harmony are known and acknowledg’d.  No sooner are 
ACTIONS view’d, no sooner the human Affections and Passions discern’d (and they are 
most of ’em as soon discern’d as felt) than straight an inward EYE distinguishes, and 
sees the Fair and Shapely, the Amiable and Admirable, apart from the Deform’d, the 
Foul, the Odious, or the Despicable.”66  Further, the perception and knowledge of beauty 
depend on the subject’s ascent from sense to intellectual perception, much as the artist 
                                                
65 Anthony Ashley Cooper (Third Earl of Shaftesbury), Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times 
(3 vols.), ed. Douglas den Uyl (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 1: 204. 
66 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 2: 231. 
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requires “the Idea of PERFECTION to give him Aim.”67  While recognition of beauty 
seems instantaneous in Shaftesbury’s formulation (“straight the Beautiful results”), that 
recognition actually moves from pleasure at the immediate object (a beautiful painting; a 
beautiful person) to recognition of a category (art, which is beautiful by definition; an 
object animated by the mind, which is the inward and unchanging essence of the person).  
The recognition of the category is itself an act of reflection and cognition, and in each 
case the category itself is theoretical rather than sensuous.   
Like Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson asserts that it is the reflective act of the 
perceiving subject that determines the concept of beauty.  After claiming that there is no 
“quality supposed to be in the object which should of itself be beautiful, without relation 
to any mind which perceives it,” Hutcheson insists that the concept of beauty necessarily 
“denotes the perception of some mind.”68  Because beauty is the perception of a mind, it 
requires both an object that one perceives through one’s senses and the action of a mind 
that interprets and recognizes particular qualities.  Like Burke, Hutcheson asserts the 
importance of senses and sensation in the aesthetic experience; however, he differentiates 
between the external senses and the inward senses, asserting that while the external 
senses can induce pleasure, the pleasure brought about by the inward senses (such as the 
sense of beauty) is higher because these senses (which are cognitive, intellectual, and 
reflective) can process multiple external perceptions at once, thereby compounding the 
pleasure.  
                                                
67 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1: 204. 
68 Francis H. Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, In Two Treatises 
[1726] (ed. Wolfgang Leidhold [Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004]), 1: 16. 
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Similarly, Hume argues that beauty is not a quality in an object but a faculty of 
the mind: “Beauty is not a quality of the circle.  It lies not in any part of the line whose 
parts are all equally distant from a common center.  It is only the effect, which that figure 
produces upon the mind, whose particular fabric or structure renders it susceptible of 
such sentiments.  In vain would you look for it in the circle, or seek it, either by your 
senses, or by mathematical reasonings, in all the properties of that figure.”69  Hume 
seems to suggest that, like physical taste, aesthetic taste can be developed and made more 
sensitive so that a person might accurately perceive the minutest sensual details of an 
object, and in this sense the aesthetic experience is clearly sensory and somatic; he 
continues, however, to note that it is no more possible to define absolute beauty than to 
determine absolute sweetness, suggesting that the evaluative element, which is cognitive 
and reflective rather than somatic or sensory, is the deciding factor in making aesthetic 
judgments.70  For Hume, beauty causes pleasure while ugliness or deformity causes pain, 
confirming that aesthetic experiences cause sensations in the perceiving subject.  
However, he simultaneously argues that “Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It 
exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different 
beauty.”71  Finally, Hume argues that, while beauty does not inhere in objects, objects 
appear designed to provoke particular responses, including beauty: “Though it be certain, 
that beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in objects, but 
belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed, that there are 
                                                
69 Hume, Essays, 165. 
70 Hume, Essays, 230. 
71 Hume, Essays, 230. 
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certain qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce these particular 
feelings.”72  It is thus the interaction between object and subject that produces the 
experience of beauty. 
Like Hume’s, Hegel’s aesthetic theory insists on art’s mediating position between, 
on one hand, that which is external and sensuous, and, on the other, that which is internal, 
reflective, and rational or spiritual.  For Hegel, the production of art is neither merely 
sensuous nor merely cognitive: “the spiritual and the sensuous side must in artistic 
production be as one.”73  Likewise, the experience of beauty is a dialectic between sense 
perception and rational reflection: “it [the art object] represents even the highest ideas in 
sensuous forms, thereby bringing them nearer to the character of natural phenomena, to 
the senses, and to feeling.”74  However, if the production of art requires union between 
the spiritual and the sensual, aesthetic judgment requires a greater proportion of mind: 
“Mind, and mind only, is capable of truth, and comprehends in itself all that is, so that 
whatever is beautiful can only be really and truly beautiful as partaking in this higher 
element and as created thereby.”75  Artistic beauty is higher than natural beauty for Hegel 
because mind (reason, rationality, cognition) is higher than nature, as the human is higher 
than the animal: “artistic beauty stands higher than nature.  For the beauty of art is the 
beauty that is born – born again, that is – of the mind. . . [E]ven a silly fancy such as may 
pass through a man’s head is higher than any product of nature; for such a fancy must at 
                                                
72 Hume, Essays, 235. 
73 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, 44. 
74 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, 9. 
75 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, 4. 
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least be characterized by intellectual being and by freedom.”76  For Hegel, art always 
gestures beyond itself, beyond its sensuous forms, toward an idea that can be grasped 
only by the mind: “The artistic semblance has the advantage that in itself it points beyond 
itself, and refers us away from itself to something spiritual which it is meant to bring 
before the mind’s eye.”77  Because for Hegel “the lowest mode of apprehension . .. is 
purely sensuous apprehension,”78 the sensuousness of art is justified only insofar as that 
sensuousness ultimately addresses itself to the mind: “[T]he work of art is not only for 
the sensuous apprehension as sensuous object, but its position is of such a kind that as 
sensuous it is at the same time essentially addressed to the mind, that the mind is meant to 
be affected by it, and to find some sort of satisfaction in it. . . . For the sensuous aspect of 
the work of art has a right to existence only in so far as it exists for man’s mind, but not 
in as far as qua sensuous thing it has separate existence by itself.”79  Clearly, then, while 
Hegel asserts the foundations of the aesthetic in sense, its value lies exclusively in the 
extent to which that sensuousness points to intellectual processes beyond itself. 
It is Kant, however, whose influence is most strongly felt in this area.  In arguing 
that aesthetic judgment is by definition disinterested, Kant insists that the concept of the 
aesthetic is determined by reflection rather than the senses.  Because aesthetic pleasure is 
disinterested, and because other pleasures are not, Kant is able finally to separate the 
aesthetic from the sensual.  Bodily or sensory pleasure leads to gratification, which 
                                                
76 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, 4. 
77 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, 11. 
78 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, 41. 
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always (and by definition) involves interest.  (So too do moral judgments, which means 
that aesthetic judgment must always be separate from whether an object is good.)  For 
Kant, we take pleasure in an aesthetic object because it is beautiful; we do not judge 
something to be beautiful because we take pleasure in it.  Interest can involve the 
agreeable (sensations) or the good (concepts), while art and aesthetic judgment must be 
free from both.  In contrast to the agreeable and the good, the beautiful is independent of 
any desire for the object possessing the beauty: “All interest presupposes a want, and, as 
the determining ground of assent, it leaves the judgment about the object no longer 
free.”80  It is when the perceiving subject is disinterested that his or her faculties are 
allowed to play.  Like Hume, Kant claims that beautiful objects seem to exist with the 
purpose of exciting our aesthetic judgment; however, given Kant’s insistence on the 
separation of interest from the aesthetic experience, objects cannot in fact have such a 
purpose, or else observers would have an interest in them, thereby removing them from 
the category of the aesthetic.81  Such objects that seem designed to excite aesthetic 
judgment encourage the senses and reflection to work harmoniously, thereby producing 
the feeling of beauty.   
Kant goes even farther, however, claiming that aesthetic judgment must be 
universal as well as disinterested; consequently, aesthetic judgment contains an ethical 
component as well.  Because all humans have the same basic capacities (senses, 
reflection, reason, imagination), individual aesthetic judgment presumes universal 
                                                
80 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner P, 1951), 43-44. 
81 This of course is Kant’s understanding of purposiveness without purpose, one of the three constitutive 
characteristics of the aesthetic. 
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agreement.  If someone with a free, fair, and disinterested judgment judges an object 
beautiful, he or she believes legitimately that all other impartial and disinterested people 
will also see the beauty in the object in question: since the judgment “does not rest on any 
inclination of the subject . . . but since the person who judges feels himself quite free as 
regards the satisfaction which he attaches to the object, he cannot find the ground of this 
satisfaction in any private conditions connected with his own subject, and hence it must 
be regarded as grounded on what he can presuppose in every other person.”82  The 
(potential) universality of aesthetic judgment transforms an individual aesthetic 
experience into a public one; aesthetic pleasure is thus made potentially accessible to all, 
and allows (or forces) people to escape their individual and limited perspectives.  
Because for Kant aesthetic pleasure comes from reflection that can be communicated and 
thus experienced universally, the experience of beauty is both public and socially 
beneficial: it converts the inward sensations of the perceiving subject outward and makes 
them, through the intellectual process of reflection, publicly and universally accessible.   
Several decades later, Matthew Arnold expands on Kant’s notions of the public 
and ethical value of the aesthetic experience, claiming that “it is demanded [of poetry], 
not only that it shall interest, but also that it shall inspirit and rejoice the reader; that it 
should convey a charm, and infuse delight . . . and it is not enough that the poet should 
add to the knowledge of men, it is required of him that he should also add to their 
happiness.”83  For Arnold, art and literature must communicate culture, as he writes in 
                                                
82 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 46. 
83 Matthew Arnold, “Essays in Criticism: Second Series” (in Selected Prose, ed. P. J. Keating [London: 
Penguin, 1970]), 42.   
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“Culture and Anarchy”: “Now, then, is the moment for culture to be of service, culture 
which believes in making reason and the will of God prevail, believes in perfection . . .”84  
Clearly, Kant’s insistence on the absence of purpose and interest in the aesthetic object 
and judgment, respectively, has been left behind; but Arnold’s belief in the ethical effect 
of art and beauty connects to Kant’s insistence on the publicness of aesthetic experience 
and on the possibility of art to generate the turning outward of the subject away from his 
or her private and inward sensations toward other individuals. 
Mid- and late-Victorian art criticism often turns on the kinds of moral judgments 
Arnold makes here, especially in terms of the public effects of art and the power of art to 
affect both the individual who attends to a particular piece of art and to the broader 
culture.  Robert Buchanan’s “The Fleshly School of Poetry: Mr. D. G. Rossetti” falls well 
within the mainstream of Victorian aesthetic criticism and demonstrates many of the 
concerns I address in this project.  In Chapter 4, I connect Buchanan’s article to its 
objects – that is, to Rossetti and Swinburne; here I want simply to use it as a paradigmatic 
example of the key concerns within Victorian aesthetics, and to note that Buchanan’s 
review ties together issues related to scientific materialism and theology as well as 
aesthetics.  Although Buchanan’s review is extreme, and although he eventually retracted 
most of its most vitriolic charges, the review is still worth modern critical attention 
because it illustrates the degree to which the conflicts between reason and sensation, 
intellect and materiality, mind and body structured Victorian thought.   
Buchanan’s attack on Rossetti, and on the Pre-Raphaelites more generally, relies 
almost exclusively on the language of embodiment, and reveals a vexed relationship 
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between soul and body, or in poetic terms between idea and form.85  “The fleshly 
gentlemen,” writes Buchanan, “have bound themselves by solemn league and covenant to 
extol fleshliness as the distinct and supreme end of poetic and pictorial art; to aver that 
poetic expression is greater than poetic thought, and by inference that the body is greater 
than the soul, and sound superior to sense.”86  After stating explicitly that “We are no 
purists in such matters.  We hold the sensual part of our nature to be as holy as the 
spiritual or intellectual part, and we believe that such things must find their equivalent in 
all,” Buchanan moves on to his actual point: “but it is neither poetic, nor manly, nor even 
human, to obtrude such things [i.e., the subject matter of “Jenny”] as the themes of whole 
poems.  It is simply nasty” (FSP 338).  This descending hierarchy of value – poetic, 
manly, human, nasty – structures all of Buchanan’s critique, and each element of this 
hierarchy corresponds to a declining ratio of soul to body.  If, as he makes clear at the end 
of his review, poetry’s defining quality is the “great Idea” (FSP 347), to which poetic 
                                                
85 The Dictionary of the History of Ideas traces several meanings of the term “form” in aesthetic 
philosophy: that which is “equivalent to the disposition, arrangement, or order of parts,” “what is directly 
given to the senses,” and “the boundary or contour of an object.”  Aristotle used the term to mean “the 
conceptual essence of an object,” which he also called “entelechy.”  Finally, Kant used the term to mean 
the “contribution of the mind to the perceived object.”  This suggests what a complicated aesthetic term 
“form” is.  As a term used by Buchanan and other Victorian artists and critics, “form” as it relates to poetry 
seems most closely tied to the first three definitions above: that is, it suggests the ordering and arrangement 
of the parts of poems as well as the sensory and sensual appeal of the language, rhyme, and meter; in order 
to make clear both the interconnection and the distinction between these ideas, I have used the term 
“textuality” to supplement “form” at various places in my argument.  It is interesting to note that, in spite of 
the degree to which Kantian aesthetics inform and underpin much of the objection to Rossetti’s and 
Swinburne’s poetry, Kant’s understanding of the term “form” does not seem to be what Buchanan has in 
mind in his critique.  “Form in the History of Aesthetics” in Philip P. Wiener (ed.), The Dictionary of the 
History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973-74); accessed 
14 March 2007 from the University of Virginia Electronic Text Center 
<http://etext.virginia.edu/DicHist/dict.html>.   
86 Thomas Maitland [Robert Buchanan], “The Fleshly School of Poetry: Mr. D. G. Rossetti” (The 
Contemporary Review 18 [August-November 1871], 334-350), 335 (in Jerome J. McGann [ed.], The 
Rossetti Archive: The Complete Writings and Pictures of Dante Gabriel Rossetti).  Retrieved 22 February 
2006 from <http://www.rossettiarchive.org/docs/ap4.c7.18.rad.html>.  All quotations from this essay are 
from the Web version and will be noted parenthetically in the text as FSP. 
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form is always and necessarily subordinated, then the “nasty” is defined implicitly by its 
insistence on the physical to the exclusion of that idea.  The Oxford English Dictionary’s 
primary definition of “nasty” emphasizes its connection to filth and offensiveness, while 
a later definition explicitly connects nastiness to obscenity.  In all of the definitions, 
however, even those that focus solely on general unpleasantness or annoyance, there is an 
implicit suggestion of illicit materiality.87  Earlier, in an unsigned 1866 review of 
Swinburne’s Poems and Ballads, Buchanan had connected an insistence on materiality in 
Swinburne’s poems to sexual pathology and to filth: in connecting Poems and Ballads to 
Swinburne’s earlier Chastelard, Buchanan identifies “that garish land beyond the region 
of pure thinking” with “the land where Atys became a raving and sexless maniac” (SCH 
30).88  By making the mythical Attis’s castration a consequence of excessive investment 
in the pleasures of materiality, Buchanan underscores both the abnormality and the 
danger inherent in sensation.   
The nastiness of Rossetti’s subject matter reinforces the pathology Buchanan 
attributes to the entire group of poets: “[T]he fleshly school of verse-writers are, so to 
speak, public offenders, because they are diligently spreading the seeds of disease 
                                                
87 “1.  Filthy, dirty; esp. offensive through filth or dirt.”  Subsequent definitions suggest milder criticism: 
“offensive, annoying; contemptible”; “ill-tempered, spiteful, unkind”; “an unpleasant, contemptible, or 
cruel person” (definition 2c of “nasty piece [also bit] of work”).  Yet in spite of the insistence within these 
first several definitions that nastiness denotes unkindness or annoyance, the quotations themselves suggest 
a more fundamental objectionableness related to moral looseness, specifically to illicit sexuality and 
generalized degeneracy: “A nasty slommicking bit of goods, with her things all hanging about her anyhow” 
(Henry Mayhew and A. S. Mayhew, Good Genius xvi, c. 1850).  This connotation is borne out suggestively 
in the third, and explicitly in the fourth, definitions, which make plain the connection between nastiness and 
physical repulsiveness and degeneracy: “Offensive to smell or taste; nauseating” and “Morally corrupt; 
indecent, obscene, lewd.”  “Nasty.”  Oxford English Dictionary Online.  Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006.  
Accessed 2 March 2007. 
88 Athenaeum, 4 August 1866 (in Clyde K. Hyder [ed.], Swinburne: The Critical Heritage [London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970]).  Subsequent references to this text will be noted parenthetically as SCH. 
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broadcast wherever they are read and understood. Their complaint too is catching, and 
carries off many young persons” (FSP 336).  The poets’ insistence on representing 
fleshliness in their subject matter and in the forms of their poetry, itself evidence of their 
excessive investment in materiality, manifests itself a second time in the form of a 
contagious malady whose “seeds of disease” travel on the currents of language to infect 
the public at large.  Rossetti’s poetry, like that of Swinburne, is both obscene and 
pathological, and dangerous on both counts. 
The descending list of values – poetic, manly, human – also carries with it 
consequences for gender.  By subordinating “human” to “manly,” Buchanan 
simultaneously emphasizes the gender system at work in his review and implies that 
“womanly” falls someplace lower, and this resonates with other terms of his critique.  By 
terming Swinburne’s appreciation of Rossetti’s poems a “hysteria of admiration,” 
Buchanan feminizes Swinburne and as a consequence makes laughable Swinburne’s 
aesthetic judgment: hysteria, the province of overly-nervous women, is at best something 
to be condescended to and at worst a medical condition in need of professional treatment, 
but it is certainly not a credential for astute judgment, aesthetic or otherwise.  Buchanan 
similarly feminizes Rossetti by identifying him with the female subjects of his poems: 
“He is the Blessed Damozel” and “he is ‘heaven-born Helen, Sparta’s queen’. . . he is 
Lilith . . . he is the rosy Virgin of the poem called Ave, and the Queen in the Staff and 
Scrip; he is ‘Sister Helen’ melting her waxen man; he is all these, just as surely as he is 
Mr. Rossetti soliloquizing over Jenny in her London lodging . . .” (FSP 339).  The 
apparent ease with which Rossetti enters the mindset of his female subjects reinforces for 
Buchanan his fleshliness, his insistence upon the precedence of textuality and poetic form 
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over idea.  Just as significantly, even as Rossetti “is” these women, he is also only 
himself, “a fleshly person”: “In petticoats or pantaloons, in modern times or in the middle 
ages, he is just Mr. Rossetti, a fleshly person, with nothing particular to tell us or teach 
us, with extreme self-control, a strong sense of colour, and a careful choice of diction” 
(FSP 339).  We might set up an explicit series of equations consequent to Buchanan’s 
formula as follows: Rossetti = the Damozel/Helen/Lilith; therefore, Rossetti = female; 
Rossetti = fleshly; fleshly = nasty; female = fleshly.  This circular series of equations 
means that to impugn Rossetti’s masculinity, his art, or his virtue is simultaneously to 
impugn the other two categories as well.89  Similarly, Rossetti’s poems evidence “nothing 
virile, nothing tender, nothing completely sane” and “a superfluity of extreme sensibility” 
(FSP 337).90  For Buchanan, art is so closely related to virtue as to be nearly inseparable, 
as is masculinity: one is first a poet, then a man, then a human being.  In the language of 
                                                
89 Thais Morgan, “Victorian Effeminacies” (Richard Dellamora [ed.], Victorian Sexual Dissidence 
[Chicago: U Chicago P, 1999], 109-126), connects masculinity to the concept of virtue: “‘Effeminacy’ in 
Buchanan’s infamous attack on the Fleshly School carries a complex cultural weight.  Its main force does 
not yet depend on the criterion of sexuality which will emerge so strikingly toward the end of the Victorian 
period.  Rather, Buchanan’s diatribe seeks to revive the traditional politico-moral ideology of civic 
masculinity” (109). 
90 The connections between gender, sanity, and economics are explored by Sally Shuttleworth in her studies 
of nineteenth-century psychology and medicine.  Shuttleworth notes that systems of male bodily economy 
emphasize (self)control, thriftiness, and withholding as necessary elements of bodily and psychological 
health, while female systems require regular purges to maintain health: “While male health was believed to 
be based on self-control, woman’s heath depended on her very inability to control her body” (Sally 
Shuttleworth, Charlotte Bronte and Victorian Psychology [Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1996]), 88.  As 
Shuttleworth notes, bodily control is closely associated with sexuality, so that psychological health, moral 
health, and bodily health can all be monitored and measured through attention to the processes of the sexual 
organs and systems: “Whereas the primary categories of male sexual dysfunction in the Victorian era, 
masturbation and spermatorrhea, focused on the male need to retain vital force, to expend capital only in 
productive fashion, the primary form of female pathology was that of the retention of internal secretions” 
(88).  The connection Buchanan makes here, implicit as it is, between Rossetti’s lack of sanity and his 
“superfluity of . . . sensibility” suggests that Rossetti is mired in the material, controlled by his bodily 
systems and at their mercy in much the same way women were imagined to be.  He misspends his capital 
both in kind (his “extreme sensibility”) and in degree (his spending is superfluous and excessive), and in so 
doing calls into question both his sanity and his masculinity. 
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this review, by associating Rossetti with the fleshliness more commonly attributed to 
women, Buchanan calls into question Rossetti’s art, masculinity, and virtue in one move. 
Buchanan’s attack relies on a conception of poetry that he articulates only at the 
very end of this article, one in which idea doesn’t simply precede but rather all but 
eliminates form in terms of relative value in poetry:  
The great poet is Dante, full of the thunder of a great Idea; and Milton, 
unapproachable in the serene white light of thought and sumptuous wealth 
of style; and Shakspere [sic], all poets by turns, and all men in succession; 
and Goethe, always innovating, and ever indifferent to innovation for its 
own sake; and Wordsworth, clear as crystal and deep as the sea; and 
Tennyson, with his vivid range, far-piercing sight, and perfect speech; and 
Browning, great, not by virtue of his eccentricities, but because of his 
close intellectual grasp.91 (FSP 347) 
 
For Buchanan, it is intellect – the “great Idea,” “the serene white light of thought,” “far-
piercing sight” – that marks the greatest poetry, and it is an absence of this that he marks 
in the poetry of the fleshly writers.  Insofar as textuality and form matter at all, they do so 
as the vehicles for thought: Wordsworth’s language is “clear as crystal,” a means rather 
than an end in itself, transparent lens rather than opaque object.  If “[a] poem is a poem, 
first as to the soul, next as to the form” (FSP 348), that “next” for Buchanan is far down 
the relative scale of value.  Milton commands “a sumptuous wealth of style” but it is the 
“serene white light of thought” that makes him a great poet.  The medium of poetry – 
language – ought to be “perfect human speech . . . The soul’s speech and the heart’s 
speech are clear, simple, natural, and beautiful . . .” (FSP 346).  Because the language of 
                                                
91 It is fascinating to note that, even as Buchanan praises the “great Idea” as the only worthy foundation of 
great poetry, his own discussion is riddled with images of sensation, especially tactility, and embodiment 
more generally: noise (“thunder,” “speech”), color (“white light,” “clear as crystal”), and general 
materiality (“sumptuous wealth of style,” “deep as the sea”).  Further, these vivid images of materiality are 
not accidental to his description but instead are fundamental to it: for Buchanan, this suggests, the “great 
Idea” is understandable primarily in material terms. 
 
72 
poetry ought to be transparent, ought not call attention to itself, the “archaisms” of 
Rossetti’s poems “are the mere fiddlededeeing of empty heads and hollow hearts” (FSP 
346).   
While the main concerns of Buchanan’s attack here seem to center on the lack of 
both sincerity and intellect or thought in the fleshly poetry and its almost exclusive 
obsession with textuality and poetic form (and with representations of bodily experience 
and life within the content of the poems), another thread running through this polemic 
suggests a not altogether complementary problem concerning the absence of sympathy in 
these poems, articulated most as an absence of proper feeling.  The “hollow hearts” 
Buchanan associates with the self-consciously archaic language of the Pre-Raphaelite 
Brotherhood may be subordinated syntactically to the “empty heads” he notes first, but 
the lack of feeling that “hollow hearts” implies seems to upset him more.  This is equally 
true regarding his final verdict on Rossetti’s poems, brought about by a reading of 
“Jenny:” “But the whole tone, without being more than usually coarse, seems heartless.  
There is not a drop of piteousness in Mr. Rossetti.  He is just to the outcast, even 
generous; severe to the seducer; sad even at the spectacle of lust in dimity and fine 
ribbons. Notwithstanding all this, and a certain delicacy and refinement of treatment 
unusual with this poet, the poem repels and revolts us, and we like Mr. Rossetti least after 
its perusal” (FSP 344).  Buchanan identifies what might be considered an ethical stance 
in the poem: Rossetti is “just,” “even generous” to Jenny, and he appears “severe” toward 
the speaker.  Yet these presumably laudable moral attitudes are nullified by an absence of 
correct feeling: the tone is “heartless,” and Rossetti is condemned finally because he 
reveals himself as having “not a drop of piteousness.”  Clearly, right feeling is a far better 
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indicator for Buchanan of morality than right action, and the absence of pity outweighs in 
every meaningful way the demonstrated presence of justice or generosity.  Rossetti is 
here convicted not because of what he does or even because of what he thinks but 
because of what he feels.   
Buchanan’s polemic is clearly intended to find greatest fault with Rossetti’s 
poetry because of its excessive valuing of materiality; just as clearly, Buchanan 
associates materiality, especially the materiality of human (particularly female) bodies, 
with dirt and debasement.  In many ways, this association serves as confirmation of the 
stereotype of Victorian morality I outlined in the introduction, a type of morality that 
remains at best skeptical of the ability of material embodiment (in this case poetic form) 
to further morality (the “great Idea”), and at worst determinedly hostile to materiality that 
is conscious of itself: Buchanan’s claim that great poetry should present itself in clear, 
transparent language insists that the vehicle be as invisible as possible.  Simultaneously, 
however, Buchanan’s own language remains anything but transparent, calling attention to 
itself not only through the actual words (nasty, filth, seeds of disease, hysteria, 
intellectual hermaphrodite) but also through the allusions (Attis, Gito and Diogenes), 
which carry his reader both deeper into his argument and outside his text.  Even, that is, 
as Buchanan decries the superficiality and excessive investment in sensation that he finds 
in Rossetti’s poems, his own language serves as inflammatory tool rather than transparent 
window for his ideas.   
My point here is not to deconstruct Buchanan’s review but rather to highlight the 
complexity – one might say confusion – inherent in Victorian attitudes toward materiality 
and morality.  Buchanan’s overt purpose (to criticize Rossetti’s fleshliness) is somewhat 
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at odds with his method (the use of sensationalizing words and images).  Far from 
undermining the essay’s effectiveness as an example, this conflict makes it paradigmatic 
of the tension concerning materiality in Victorian culture more generally.  In the next 
four chapters I examine particular literary texts that, often through references to one or 
more of the discursive areas I discuss in this chapter, suggest surprising possibilities for 
associating materiality with morality.  One of Buchanan’s final criticisms of Rossetti 
might serve as a hint of the kind of moral stance that I locate, throughout the texts I 
examine in this project, within materiality: in Buchanan’s view, Rossetti fails to feel.  The 
poetic speaker’s justness, even his generosity, does not compensate for his lack of 
affective response.  To state this in perhaps overly simple terms, the speaker, in his 
response to Jenny, is all mind and no body.   As will become clear over the next four 
chapters, emotional affect overlaps to a great extent with somatic sensation, to the point 
that in many texts they become almost indistinguishable.  While Buchanan’s great poem 
may ostensibly be all idea, this suggests implicitly that, in order to be sympathetic – to be 





Sensation, Sympathy, and Sacramental Writing in Villette 
 
Early in her tenure at Madame Beck’s Pensionnat de Demoiselles, Lucy Snowe 
finds herself, not for the first time, the object of Madame Beck’s intrusive spying: 
I was not angry, and had no wish in the world to leave her.  I could hardly get 
another employer whose yoke would be so light and so easy of carriage; and 
truly, I liked Madame for her capital sense, whatever I might think of her 
principles: as to her system, it did me no harm; she might work me with it to 
her heart’s content: nothing would come of the operation.  Loverless and 
inexpectant of love, I was as safe from spies in my heart-poverty, as the 
beggar from thieves in his destitution of purse, I turned, then, and fled; 
descending the stairs with progress as swift and soundless as that of the 
spider, which at the same instant ran down the banister.   
How I laughed when I reached the schoolroom.  I knew now she had 
certainly seen Dr. John in the garden; I knew what her thoughts were.  The 
spectacle of a suspicious nature so far misled by its own inventions, tickled 
me much.  Yet as the laugh died, a kind of wrath smote me, and then 
bitterness followed: it was the rock struck, and Meribah’s waters gushing out.  
I never had felt so strange and contradictory an inward tumult as I felt for an 
hour that evening: soreness and laughter, and fire, and grief, shared my heart 
between them.  I cried hot tears; not because Madame mistrusted me – I did 
not care twopence for her mistrust – but for other reasons.  Complicated, 
disquieting thoughts broke up the whole repose of my nature.  However, that 
turmoil subsided: next day I was again Lucy Snowe.1 
 
Before this incident, Madame Beck has surreptitiously observed Lucy with her children, 
spied through key holes as Lucy taught, watched Lucy walk in the garden, gone through 
her pockets, read her memorandum book, and studied her sleeping countenance.  As in 
previous episodes of surveillance, Lucy claims to possess nothing for Madame Beck to 
find, no secrets that can be revealed through her snooping: Lucy cannot be “worked” by 
Madame Beck’s “system.”  Yet this is not to suggest that Lucy has nothing to reveal.  As 
                                                
1 Charlotte Brontë, Villette (New York: Penguin, 1987), 110.  All references to Villette are to this edition, 
unless otherwise marked, and will be noted parenthetically in the text. 
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Sally Shuttleworth has demonstrated, sanity for Brontë and her contemporaries was 
coextensive with the concealment of private identity; one was sane to the extent to which 
one could present an unreadable exterior to the world, maintaining a private identity 
inaccessible to viewers from the outside.2  In this construction, successful socialization – 
in fact, sanity itself – depends on being unreadable.   
The laughter Lucy has at Madame Beck’s expense comes because Lucy sees 
through her “spectacle”: that is, Lucy not only witnesses Madame Beck’s (unsuccessful) 
attempt at stealth, but she also accurately reads her motivation.  In her own desire to 
ferret out information, Madame Beck has made herself transparent and, consequently, 
vulnerable.  Because Lucy is sure that she has nothing to be discovered, she remains safe 
                                                
2 For example, in Charlotte Brontë and Victorian Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1996), 
Shuttleworth notes Esquirol’s insistence on self-control as a constituent feature of sanity: “If we return once 
more to Esquirol’s opening statement, we find the rather disturbing suggestion that the notion of 
psychological normalcy underlying his work is predicated on a condition of concealment.  True selfhood is 
not the naked display of the insane, but rather the artful concealment and dissimulation of the social 
creature.  Although the insane reveal in more vivid outline the real characteristics of man, to become a 
social being the individual must learn to overlay and disguise these impulses.  Indeed, the condition of 
selfhood is dependent on having something to conceal: it is the very disjunction between inner and outer 
form which creates the self . . . Awareness of an audience, and of one’s ability to baffle their penetration, 
constitutes the essential basis of selfhood” (38).  Esquirol himself writes, “What reflections engage the 
mind of the philosopher, who, turning aside from the tumult of the world, makes the circuit of a House for 
the insane!  He finds there the same ideas, the same errors, the same passions, the same misfortunes, that 
elsewhere prevail.  It is the same world; but its distinctive characters are more noticeable, its features more 
marked, its colors more vivid, its effects more striking, because man there displays himself in all his 
nakedness; dissimulating not his thoughts, nor concealing his defects; lending not to his passions seductive 
charms, nor to his vices deceitful appearances.”  He goes on to note that, “In these establishments, the 
social bonds are broken; habits are changed; friendships cease; confidence is destroyed” (Jean Etienne 
Dominique Esquirol, Mental Maladies: A Treatise on Insanity, trans. E. K. Hunt [Philadelphia: Lea and 
Blanchard, 1845], 19, 20).  Critical studies of affective and narrative reticence in Villette have also 
highlighted the novel’s tendency toward self-concealment.  John Kucich, Repression in Victorian Fiction: 
Charlotte Brontë, George Eliot, and Charles Dickens (Berkeley: U California P, 1987), calls repression “a 
nineteenth-century strategy for exalting interiority” (2), and argues in part that “Whenever Brontë exalts 
and admires passion, what fascinates her is its boldness as a diversion, not some kind of privileged 
relationship to interiority made possible by expression, and denied by reticence” (46).  Similarly, Joseph 
Litvak, Caught in the Act: Theatricality in the Nineteenth-Century English Novel (Berkeley: U California 
P, 1992), claims that “Brontë . . . figure[s] authorship in terms of self-‘concealment’ rather than of self-
revelation” (78), and suggests that the use of disguise (including pseudonym as well as more material 
disguises) functions as “theatrical self-concealment” (87), a concept I discuss at more length below. 
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from Madame Beck’s surveillance.  Yet her construction of that sentence – “I cried hot 
tears; not because Madame mistrusted me – I did not care twopence for her mistrust – but 
for other reasons” – not only intimates that she has a secret that Madame Beck will not 
discover, but simultaneously maintains its concealment from her readers.  We are left to 
wonder what the “other reasons” for Lucy’s tears might be.  If Madame Beck discovers 
nothing, we as readers discover only that there is something to discover behind Lucy’s 
façade.  Lucy remains unreadable, even to us as readers of her autobiography.  This issue 
of unreadability, as well as of narrative withholding (such as Lucy’s remark about the 
unnamed “other reasons”), features prominently in critical response to Villette.3  Lucy 
Snowe is unreliable, some readers suggest, exactly because of the difficulty of 
determining what she means in sentences like the one above.  In addition to narrative 
withholding, Lucy has been charged with emotional inconsistency: if she usually 
describes herself as emotionless (as calm and cold as her name would suggest), she 
nevertheless describes periodic episodes of intense, even overwhelming emotion.  The 
changeability of her emotion – “I never had felt so strange and contradictory an inward 
                                                
3 While Shuttleworth, Charlotte Brontë and Victorian Psychology, presents a positive argument concerning 
the function of unreadability in Villette, a number of other critics assess it as a narrative fault.  In an 
extreme example of such fault-finding, Luann McCracken Fletcher, “Manufactured Marvels, Heretic 
Narratives, and the Process of Interpretation in Villette” (Studies in English Literature 32.4 [1992], 723-
46), argues that the narrative fractures are evidence that Lucy has a “sadomasochistic personality with 
strong tendencies toward voyeurism and exhibitionism” (17).  In a similar if more moderate interpretation, 
Michael S. Kearns, Metaphors of Mind in Fiction and Psychology (Lexington: U P of Kentucky, 1987), 
asserts that the tensions and fractures within the narrative are evidence that Lucy “remains fundamentally 
confused about her own nature” (157) and that Brontë was “uncertain[] about the psychological reality she 
want[ed] to portray” (158).  While Heather Glen, Charlotte Brontë: The Imagination in History (Oxford: 
Oxford U P, 2002), is far more positive in her assessment of the novel, she notes that “critics have tended to 
treat this [narrative] recalcitrance not as meaningful, but as symptomatic; as evidence of Brontë’s 
clumsiness in handling those subjects with which they take her to be concerned” (2).  On the other hand, 
Nicholas Dames, Amnesiac Selves: Nostalgia, Forgetting, and British Fiction, 1810-1870 (Oxford: Oxford 
U P, 2001), argues in opposition that Villette relies heavily on reading as epistemologically and 
hermeneutically effective; and Elizabeth Preston, “Relational Reconsiderations: Reliability, 
Heterosexuality, and Narrative Authority in Villette” (Style 30.3 [Fall 1996], 386-408), claims that Brontë 
“bring[s] her narrator to the point where she withholds nothing” (392). 
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tumult . . . soreness and laughter, and fire, and grief, shared my heart between them” – 
makes her story difficult to interpret, particularly as she generally claims emotionlessness 
as her real identity: “next day I was again Lucy Snowe.”   
These difficulties – narrative reticence, affective inconsistency – only pose 
problems, however, if we approach Villette as a novel about successful reading practices 
that produce integrated, fully coherent interpretations.  While images of reading are 
central to the novel’s plot (as well as to most scholarly interpretations),4 their ubiquity 
actually calls into question the hermeneutic project predicated on the distance and 
detachment of vision.  In this chapter, I argue that writing displaces reading as the central 
focus in Villette, and that it does so for two reasons: first, the extraordinarily acute and 
evocative sensation associated with the act of writing bridges the space between body and 
mind, public and private, materiality and interiority; second, the material textual object 
itself is invested with sacramental importance.5  In Villette, writing is neither an arbitrary 
                                                
4 Many critics focus on vision and its relation to reading and interpretation.  See for example Ali Behdad, 
“Visibility, Secrecy, and the Novel: Narrative Power in Brontë and Zola” (Literature, Interpretation, 
Theory: LIT 1.4 [1990], 253-64), who argues that Villette is “not only implicated in the panoptic mode of 
vision” but is itself an example of the “discourse[] of disciplinary power” which works by “remain[ing] 
invisible in its constant attempt to render everything else visible” (253); similarly, Karen Lawrence, “The 
Cypher: Disclosure and Reticence in Villette” (Tradition and the Talents of Women, ed. Florence Howe 
[Chicago: U of Illinois P, 1991], 87-101), argues that “Lucy seems first and foremost a decoder of signs, an 
interpreter of other people and events” (87; italics in original), and Sally Shuttleworth, “‘The Surveillance 
of a Sleepless Eye’: The Constitution of Neurosis in Villette” (One Culture: Essays in Science and 
Literature, ed. George Levine and Alan Rauch [Madison: U Wisconsin P, 1987], 313-35), connects the 
rhetoric of a method of reading that penetrates and unveils interiority to medical models of diagnosis.  
Other prominent readings of the importance of vision and reading in Villette include Heather Glen, 
Charlotte Brontë: The Imagination in History, and Nicholas Dames, Amnesiac Selves.  
5 Broadly speaking, a sacrament is “the sign of something sacred and hidden;” more specifically, it is an 
“external sign or ceremony” that confers grace.  In the sacramental system, material objects signify spiritual 
truths; in particular sacraments, material means are used not because spiritual means are inefficacious but 
because material means constitute “the most appropriate manner of dealing with creatures that are at the 
same time spiritual and corporeal” (“Sacrament,” Catholic Encyclopedia).  Sacraments are often taken to 
be commandments regarding particular ceremonies which Christians are required to fulfill in order to 
maintain a state of grace, but theologically a sacrament is a material means for the dispensation of grace, 
and it is in this sense that writing is sacramental in Villette. 
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set of surface signs that obscures some kind of interior reality, nor a transparent doorway 
providing unmediated access to that reality.  Instead, Villette presents writing as ideal 
embodiment. 
In arguing for the status of writing as ideal embodiment within Villette, this 
chapter moves through four steps.  First, I address the novel’s presentation of the 
insufficiency of vision as the basis of an epistemological system.  Second, I identify the 
presence within Villette of a visuality that combines sight with touch, and argue that the 
novel presents this haptic vision6 as both more reliable and more ethical than vision 
alone.  Third, I connect the importance of touch implicit in the haptic vision the novel 
valorizes to materiality and embodiment, and demonstrate the surprising extent to which 
Brontë’s novel insists upon those characteristics as the bases of moral and ethical 
behavior.  Finally, by identifying the connections between writing and sacramentalism, I 
demonstrate the extent to which the increasing association of writing with the 
sacramental replacement of sacrificed bodies insists upon writing – the action and the 
written text – as ideal embodiment, superceding the value of individual human bodies.    
 
Faulty Epistemology: Vision in Villette 
Vision operates in a particular mode, one that is different from that of the other 
senses.  It relies on distance rather than immediacy; it does not depend on, indeed cannot 
function with, direct contact with its object.  Vision can be entirely uni-directional, in that 
the object of sight need not be aware of its status as seen thing or reciprocate the look, 
                                                
6 My use of the concept of haptic visuality owes much to Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and 
Multisensory Media (Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 2002).   
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and it can be blocked more effectively through the subject’s own agency than most other 
senses: one need simply close one’s eyes or look away in order to refuse to see, while 
other senses, especially touch, hearing, and smell, are more difficult to block effectively.  
Traditionally associated with intellect and cognition rather than with emotion, vision 
consequently seems to have less affinity with either affective or physiological responses 
than other senses; finally, it is less easily dissociated from agency and choice than are 
other senses, in that, due to distance and the sensory control described above, it is more 
difficult for objects of sight to force themselves on the sensing subject than it is for smells 
or sounds.7 
If it is true that Villette is saturated with the visual, it is also true that the visual is 
consistently undermined and questioned.8  The novel continually directs readers (and 
                                                
7 G. F. W. Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics (originally published as The Introduction to Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Fine Arts, 1886; tr. Bernard Bosanquet, ed. Michael Inwood [New York: Penguin, 1993]), 
claims that, of the senses, only vision and hearing are available for aesthetic appeal, since the other senses 
are irremediably and unmixedly material, with no connection to the intellect.  In addition, Julius Bernstein, 
The Five Senses of Man (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1876), connects vision to intellect and reflection 
while suggesting that other senses are less available to the intellect.  For current critical discussions of the 
connections between various bodily senses and affective and cognitive responses, see William Ian Miller, 
The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge: Harvard U P, 1997).  Miller notes the difficulty with which disgust 
can be prompted by visual stimuli, except insofar as what is seen suggests the tactile.  Miller’s argument 
links the senses to affective responses, particularly (although not exclusively) to disgust, and notes that the 
sense most likely to produce disgust is touch, followed closely by smell and then taste.  Vision and hearing, 
in Miller’s analysis, provoke disgust only through their evocation of touch or, perhaps, smell.  Using the 
example of horror movies, which operate only through vision and sound, Miller argues that they produce 
horror and disgust through their presentation of images and, occasionally, sounds that suggest other sensory 
experiences associated with disgust: decomposition, death, dismemberment, hairiness, scaliness, sliminess, 
etc. 
8 Given the ubiquity of representations of vision in Villette, it is perhaps surprising how little critical 
consensus exists regarding its significance.  Issues of vision and reading have spawned widely divergent 
interpretations: some identify Lucy as neurotically unstable or the novel as hopelessly flawed; others assert 
the clean and absolute alignment of vision and knowledge; still others claim that visual cues are always 
misleading.  Jessica Brent, “Held Captive to a Picture: Visual Experience in Nineteenth-Century Texts and 
Early Film” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 2003), notes that much critical attention to Villette 
“tend[s] to focus on modes of vision (spying, voyeurism, surveillance) that produce rather than disrupt 
narrative,” going on to argue instead that a “persistent alternative visuality remains, haunting the text and 
disrupting the program of narrative coherence and subjectivity” (72).  Christina Crosby’s study of Villette 
as a Gothic text, “Charlotte Brontë’s Haunted Text” (Studies in English Literature: 1500-1900 24.4 [1984], 
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characters) to fix their attention on sights within the novel, to approach the world through 
what their eyes perceive.  Yet at the same time, it questions the visual in at least three 
important ways: vision is disrupted and disordered so routinely and to such an extent that 
the line between what is seen and what is imagined is thoroughly unsettled; the 
knowledge gained through vision is generally banal and inconsequential, so that even 
when one’s eyes are not deceived by illusion what one sees reveals little of importance; 
even (or especially) in a system in which vision functions effectively, the result is 
isolation rather than human connection. Vision, that is, is presented as alternately 
disorienting, meaningless, and alienating. 
What one sees (or seems to see) in Villette is notoriously unreliable.9  Lucy’s 
vision is repeatedly disrupted in ways that undermine the association between vision and 
knowledge.  The nun is certainly one of the primary elements of the novel that calls into 
question both Lucy’s reliability as a narrator and the accuracy of her vision.  Interpretable 
                                                                                                                                            
701-15), has been one of the most useful critical approaches regarding the correspondence or discrepancy 
between the visual surfaces in the novel (including that which is visually accessible about people) and 
hidden psychological interiority or meaning in that she argues for the value of the representational object 
itself: Crosby notes the importance of the “moments in the text which compromise these oppositions 
[between “the falseness of surface appearance” and “the truth of hidden depths”] and suggest that 
consciousness, truth, and reality are intimately and irrevocably related to their secondary and debased 
opposites: the unconscious, artifice, and representation” (702).  Additionally, although I disagree with both 
of their conclusions regarding the role of reading in Villette, Sally Shuttleworth, Charlotte Brontë and 
Victorian Psychology, and Athena Vrettos, Somatic Fictions: Imagining Illness in Victorian Culture 
(Stanford: Stanford U P, 1995), are enormously useful in understanding the ways in which vision, 
imagination, reading, and illness were imagined during the nineteenth century.  In particular, 
Shuttleworth’s claims that early- and mid-Victorian science established the importance of vision as a 
hermeneutic tool, and that Dr. John stands as the novel’s chief representative of that kind of knowledge, 
helped me to articulate my own critique of reading.  Vrettos’s argument discusses Herbert Spencer’s 
understanding of women as the best readers of the body’s signs and simultaneously the principal objects of 
that analytical gaze, and connects Spencer’s ideas to Villette’s use of vision in relation to the novel’s 
medical, moral, and social analysis.    
9 Brent, “Held Captive to a Picture,” notes “Villette’s simultaneous preoccupation with and repudiation of 
visual experience,” arguing that Bronte’s “novels often convey a deep – and typically Protestant – mistrust 
of the visible world, and a bias toward the plain-spoken word” (72). 
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as ghost, hallucination, outward manifestation of Lucy’s neurosis, mistaken identity, and 
disguise, the nun can perhaps finally be reduced to none of these categories.  Literally a 
disguise for a man seeking unauthorized access to the female student he is courting, the 
nun is also either associated, confused, or identified with other figures: a personage from 
legend, a former beloved of Paul Emanuel’s, the singular embodiment of the convent-
turned-pensionnat’s past residents, an exteriorized personification of Lucy’s enforced 
solitude and permanent celibacy, a hallucination brought on by Lucy’s traumatic 
confinement to the attic, and a personification of the restrictions placed on women by 
Catholicism.  The novel implies that the nun might be any, all, or none of these before the 
final resolution solves the mystery.  Because the mystery of the nun’s identity is resolved 
in such a banal way – shreds of fabric from the Count de Hamal’s disguise – readers 
consistently interpret the nun as having other, less obvious significance, usually having to 
do with questioning Lucy’s reliability both as observer and as narrator.  In order to put 
the encounters with the nun in the context of my argument concerning vision, 
interpretation, materiality, and embodiment, which I do later in this chapter, I want here 
to examine other instances in which Lucy’s vision is called into question as a reliable 
method by which to gain access to truth or reality.   
The apparitional figure of the nun recalls other assaults on Lucy’s vision by 
spectral images.  After the long vacation with the crétin and her subsequent collapse, 
Lucy regains consciousness but cannot determine her location through vision: “In this 
mirror I saw myself laid, not in bed, but on a sofa.  I looked spectral; my eyes larger and 
more hollow, my hair darker than was natural, by contrast with my thin and ashen face . . 
. Bretton!  Bretton!  And ten years ago shone reflected in the mirror.  And why did 
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Bretton and my fourteenth year haunt me thus?  Why, if they came at all, did they not 
return complete?  Why hovered before my distempered vision the mere furniture, while 
the rooms and the locality were gone?” (156-59).  In her study of nineteenth-century 
technologies of realism, Nancy Armstrong has noted the close association between seeing 
and knowing as a basis for Victorian photographic realism.  She writes that “photography 
was only reproducing a well-established relationship between seeing an object and 
knowing an object,” suggesting a close epistemological reliance on vision.  Yet she goes 
on to note that, as the nineteenth century progressed, “optical science and aesthetics came 
to think of the eye as increasingly embedded in a highly individuated physical body 
subject to mood swings, flagging attentiveness, hallucinations, and a variety of outside 
pressures; it was no longer anything like the sensory receptor that simply saw whatever 
was out there to be seen.”10  In this sense, Lucy’s vision appears embedded in a cultural 
setting that imagines vision to be as straightforward as Armstrong’s description of 
photographic realism, while at the same time she experiences her own vision much more 
ambiguously, certainly not as an objective, neutral recorder of verifiable reality.  In this 
passage, Lucy is spectral, as is her location; her appearance is not “natural,” and even 
time has shifted unaccountably.  Vision here is “distempered,” suggesting a disruption in 
both cognition and affect; along with the reversed images of mirrored reflections, it leads 
to a sense of displacement and alienation from self rather than useful knowledge.  Lucy’s 
later half-recognition of her own reflection at the theater reinforces this sense of 
                                                
10 Nancy Armstrong, Fiction in the Age of Photography: The Legacy of British Realism (Cambridge: 
Harvard U P, 1999), 76-77.  This assessment of the embeddedness of vision echoes what Jonathan Crary, 
Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: MIT P, 
1990), connects to the figure of the “observer,” the one who “sees within a prescribed set of possibilities, 
one who is embedded in a system of conventions and limitations” (6). 
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alienation from self as well as the potential unreliability of vision: if a well-constructed 
exterior can baffle the intrusive, analytical gaze of others, in this case Lucy’s gaze of 
(presumed) recognition is similarly baffled.  The estrangement Lucy experiences here – 
both the unfamiliarity and the strangeness, the oddness, of the reflection – alienates her 
from herself, making vision an obstacle to, rather than an aide for, knowledge.11 
Given Paul Emanuel’s propensity to monitor the goings on at the pensionnat and 
elsewhere, it is not surprising that he is associated so closely with surveillance 
specifically and with the novel’s investment in vision more generally.  However, even 
when Paul is most firmly enmeshed in the register of the visual – when he is thoroughly 
participating in the project of interpretive reading based on detached visual observation – 
his readings call attention to their own insufficiency and, consequently, to the 
insufficiency of a hermeneutic and epistemological enterprise based entirely on vision 
and imagination.   
When Lucy arrives at the Rue Fossette asking for employment, Madame Beck 
calls on Paul to read Lucy’s physiognomy and give advice about hiring her: 
‘Mon cousin,’ began Madame, ‘I want your opinion.  We know your skill in 
physiognomy; use it now.  Read that countenance.’  The little man fixed on 
me his spectacles.  A resolute compression of the lips, and gathering of the 
brow, seemed to say that he meant to see through me, and that a veil would 
be no veil for him.  ‘I read it,’ he pronounced.  ‘Et qu’en dites-vous?’  ‘Mais 
– bien des choses,’ was the oracular answer.  ‘Bad or good?’  ‘Of each kind, 
without doubt,’ pursued the diviner.  ‘May one trust her word?’  ‘Are you 
negotiating a matter of importance?’  ‘She wishes me to engage her as bonne 
                                                
11 Another obvious example of disrupted vision is, of course, the fete at the park, which Lucy experiences 
as hallucination because of Madame Beck’s opiate, but this episode does more than merely provide an 
example of Gothicized sensation.  Lucy’s “distempered” vision at the park is not responsible for the major 
misinterpretation she makes regarding the relationship between Paul Emanuel and Justine Marie, which 
suggests a fundamental error in aligning vision and knowledge in an unproblematic equation.  I discuss this 
scene at more length below, but mention it here as simply another instance in which the epistemological 
value of vision is problematized. 
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or gouvernante; tells a tale full of integrity, but gives no reference.’ . . . He 
gazed steadily.  ‘Do you need her services?’  ‘I could do with them.  You 
know I am disgusted with Madame Svini.’  Still he scrutinized.  The 
judgment, when it at last came, was as indefinite as what had gone before it.  
‘Engage her.  If good predominates in that nature, the action will bring its 
own reward; if evil – eh bien!  Ma cousine, çe sera toujours une bonne 
oeuvre.’  And with a bow and a ‘bon soir,’ this vague arbiter of my destiny 
vanished. (60-61) 
 
If Paul’s face “seem[s] to say he meant to see through” Lucy, some critics have taken this 
to be what actually happens in this scene.  Nicholas Dames has gone so far as to say that 
“Lucy is literally transparent, completely unveiled, by M. Paul’s gaze, and the reading he 
produces is validated by the narrative itself, as it is in almost every case.”12  Yet the 
“reading” Paul makes of Lucy’s face is, as Lucy accurately notes, “indefinite”: he sees 
many things (“bien des choses”) both good and bad, and his advice seems based more on 
Madame Beck’s pragmatic needs than on anything he discovers in Lucy’s physiognomy.  
Lucy, who is narrating a past event that took place before she understood the French that 
is spoken in this scene, describes Paul Emanuel’s reading ironically; in a manner 
consistent with their later interaction, Lucy’s description of him as an “oracular” 
“diviner” satirizes both his intention and his method.  His conclusion has nothing to do 
with whether Lucy is honest, whether her story is true, or whether she will be a good 
employee: instead, he advises Madame Beck to hire her because she might be good and, 
if she proves not to be, Madame Beck will be performing an act of charity.  Hardly 
conclusive, Paul’s reading does not make Lucy “transparent” at all.  Instead, the reading 
itself – and Lucy’s tone of dry, acerbic satire as she describes it retrospectively – makes 
clear just how insubstantial the system is upon which it is based. 
                                                
12 Dames, Amnesiac Selves, 82-83. 
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Because for Brontë sanity requires preserving the inviolability of one’s psychic 
interior, even as social functioning requires one to read others, social interactions 
predicated on vision and reading almost necessarily demand dissimulation and distance, 
eliminating the possibility of intimacy and almost guaranteeing the incompleteness (if not 
the actual inaccuracy) of what is seen.  Lucy repeatedly assumes a role, a public persona, 
which allows her the privacy she would otherwise not have.  In addition to her theatrical 
role as the suitor in the vaudeville de pensionnat, Lucy plays other roles, most notably the 
role of plain, quiet, unprepossessing Lucy Snowe.  By assuming this disguise, Lucy 
guards herself while allowing others to think there is nothing to see.13  The role is self-
perpetuating, however, and removes the possibility of personal connection or affective 
fulfillment.  In the sense that Lucy keeps everyone at a distance, convincing them that she 
is nobody, she successfully participates in the epistemology of vision.  To the extent that 
(successful) participation in it results inevitably in self-isolation, the novel itself critiques 
such an epistemological system.14 
Lucy seems fully immersed, particularly in the first half of the novel, in the 
project of surveillance even as she claims to deplore its intrusiveness and lack of respect 
for privacy and personal interiority.  Amanda Anderson has argued that Villette 
“constitutes both an analysis and a phenomenology of detachment in its use of the 
framework of cosmopolitan comparison to register a range of practices that rely upon 
                                                
13 Litvak, Caught in the Act, discusses the utility of theatricality as a form of strategic self-concealment. 
14 Amanda Anderson, The Powers of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment 
(Princeton: Princeton U P, 2001), argues that “the novel is in fact ruthless in its portrayals of the serious 
emotional and psychological liabilities of Lucy’s conscious cultivation of detachment” (59).  I disagree 
with Anderson’s emphasis on Lucy’s philosophical alignment with the project of detachment, as I argue 
throughout this chapter, but I agree with her assessment of the novel’s “ruthless[ness]” concerning the 
personal consequences of that project. 
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cultivated distance, including professional disinterestedness, surveillance, impersonal 
motherhood, aesthetic observation, and stoicism.”15  As narrator, Lucy establishes the 
association between vision and interpretation at the very beginning of her narrative, as 
well as the association between that stance of detached observation and her professed 
lack of sympathy.  The child Lucy approaches the presence of new furniture in her room 
as “signs and tokens” (4) to be read dispassionately and objectively, rather than 
acknowledging them as hints of impending emotional upheaval, and she distinguishes 
herself from Polly, whom she watches with the same sort of detached, analytical gaze, by 
noting that Polly “endured agony” when her father left a second time, while “I, Lucy 
Snowe, was calm” (19).  Later, Lucy deploys a similar kind of unsympathizing, 
evaluating gaze on Ginevra before Ginevra goes to a dinner party, a gaze that Ginevra not 
only tolerates but seeks out:16  
[O]ne evening, when she was going to a large party, for which particular care 
and elegance of costume were demanded, she could not resist coming to my 
chamber to show herself in all her splendor.  Beautiful she looked: so young, 
so fresh, and with a delicacy of skin and flexibility of shape altogether 
English, and not found in the list of Continental female charms . . . I viewed 
her from top to toe.  She turned airily round that I might survey her on all 
sides . . . I said, ‘Steady!  Let us be steady, and know what we are about, and 
find the meaning of our magnificence’ – and so put her off at arm’s length, to 
undergo cooler inspection.  (80-81) 
 
Ginevra’s desire to be admired is met with Lucy’s silent admiration of her beauty and 
with her spoken evaluation and interpretation: let us be steady, let us know, let us find the 
meaning.  This scene’s distance – literal and figurative – and its tendency toward 
                                                
15 Amanda Anderson, The Powers of Distance, 36. 
16 Brent, “Held Captive to a Picture,” argues of this scene that it reveals only Lucy’s fundamental lack of 
sympathy, along with the novel’s use of the visual to interrupt narrative. 
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interpretation make it a paradigmatic episode of reading, one which highlights Lucy’s 
self-professed lack of emotional responsiveness to others and her lack of warmth and 
sympathy generally.  The relationship that Lucy cultivates with Ginevra is one in which 
Lucy establishes herself as cool and distant to Ginevra’s teasing intimacy.  From the 
beginning of the novel, then, Lucy’s interpretive glances both hold the world at a distance 
(and consequently avoid sympathetic connection to or interest in others) and seek to 
analyze and interpret it.   
Lucy guards herself against the observation of others, successfully preventing 
them from reading her even as she observes them.  During her performance in the 
vaudeville de pensionnat, Lucy finds her position on stage to be a prime location from 
which to observe the audience, particularly Dr. John as he watches Ginevra.  Similarly, 
on her first day of teaching, Lucy performs the role of instructor for the first time and 
finds herself both the object of her audience’s direct and evaluative looks and in prime 
position to evaluate them visually as well: “The first glance informed me that many of the 
pupils were more than girls – quite young women . . . As I mounted the estrade . . . where 
stood the teacher’s chair and desk, I beheld opposite to me a row of eyes and brows that 
threatened stormy weather – eyes full of an insolent light, and brows hard and unblushing 
as marble . . . I never saw such eyes and brows in England” (72).  Lucy’s physiognomical 
reading of her students assesses their character (“insolent”) and nationality (not English) 
through attention to their eyes and brows, which in Lavater’s17 system reflect their 
intellect.  Her students’ insolence seems contained at least partially in the fact that they 
gaze directly back at her: the interpretive, assessing gaze may always be intrusive, but it 
                                                
17 I discuss Johann Caspar Lavater’s system of physiognomy in Chapter 1. 
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is inescapably rude when directed by a subordinate to one in authority.  Equally 
concealed in her vaudeville character’s costume, on the teaching estrade in her 
classroom, and in her daily assumption of the character of “Lucy Snowe,” Lucy shields 
herself from the prying interpretive gaze of those around her, particularly Madame Beck, 
while simultaneously attempting to read others.18  Although Lucy occasionally falls 
victim to intimacy with Ginevra or Polly, her efforts seem consistently aimed at 
interpretation and simultaneous self-concealment.  In her interactions with others, 
whether professional or personal, Lucy employs her reading skills to find the meaning of 
a given situation rather than to experience it directly, and she further distances herself by 
approaching her public identity as a role, a mask that guards her private identity.  In 
Lucy’s self-presentation, as in the novel generally, watching is incompatible with 
participation and interpreting is incompatible with intimacy: reading is opposed 
consistently to developing sympathy. 
 
                                                
18 Ginevra Fanshawe seems to exempt herself from this suspicious system of observation and self-
concealment, and it may be that very refusal (or inability) to participate that marks her as immature.  For 
example, when Lucy attends the concert with Dr. John and Mrs. Bretton, she notices as Ginevra makes the 
mistake that permanently alienates her from Dr. John’s affections: Ginevra, sitting with an acquaintance at 
some distance from the Brettons and Lucy, “raised a glass to examine his mother [Mrs. Bretton]; a minute 
or two afterward she laughingly whispered her neighbor [sic]” (203).  Dr. John is offended on his mother’s 
behalf by Ginevra’s mockery, indicated by both the obviousness of the observation and the laugh, and he 
suggests that had she not created a “spectacle” (203), her glance alone would not have been offensive.  As 
was the case with Madame Beck in the passage with which I opened this chapter, Ginevra’s “spectacle” 
seems to consist of having been caught looking.  Either Ginevra is unable to conceal herself and her 
motivations, or she does not care to do so.  In either case, her transparence places her outside the bounds of 
the respectable within this visual system.  It is not so much that Ginevra is watching Dr. John and his 
mother; rather, it is that she is caught doing so.  Meanwhile, Lucy keeps “rather in the shade and out of 
sight” as she watches Ginevra watch the Brettons; and Mrs. Bretton outplays them all by noticing Ginevra’s 
observation without betraying her awareness either to her son or to Lucy, both of whom are unaware of her 
knowledge until later. 
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His Eyes Hit Right Against My Own: Haptic Visuality 
As this discussion suggests, Villette seems intent, at first glance, on establishing 
and maintaining the straightforward connection between vision and truth, between seeing 
and knowing.  Yet, as I suggested, this connection is consistently undermined throughout 
the novel, and is replaced by a form of vision that is much more tactile, even 
synaesthetic.  Paul Emanuel is generally thought to reside firmly in the realm of the 
visual, and to remain throughout the novel aligned with the analogous projects of 
surveillance and reading.19  Yet, while he is always a participant in an epistemological 
and hermeneutic system predicated on vision, he is far more nuanced than such a 
depiction suggests.  Vision is never displaced from a position of prominence in Paul 
Emanuel’s characterization, but far from instantiating a detached, purely imaginative 
visual program, he instead provides the novel’s most compelling example of fully 
embodied vision that participates in multiple senses at once, vision that might be called 
synaesthetic as well as corporeal.   
From his examination of Lucy’s countenance on her first evening at the 
pensionnat, to his observation from his room at the college next door, to his inspection of 
Lucy’s desk, Paul is an active participant in the system of surveillance and reading 
presented in the novel, and, like Madame Beck and Père Silas, he is often the object of 
Lucy’s criticism because of his intrusiveness and lack of respect for privacy.  As the 
narrative progresses, however, Paul’s vision becomes more complex, and it comes to take 
                                                
19 See, for example, Dames, Amnesiac Selves, and Shuttleworth, “‘The Surveillance of a Sleepless Eye’.” 
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on more of what might be termed tactile: his eyes touch what they see.20  This 
complication of Paul’s vision in many ways follows and develops with Lucy’s attention 
to his eyeglasses.  Shortly after Lucy recognizes Graham’s utter failure to perceive her 
true character, she begins to pay particular attention to Paul’s spectacles, his lunettes.  At 
first, the lunettes appear to keep others at a distance, allow Paul the distance and 
detachment necessary for thorough visual inspection: “[T]hese utensils had in them a 
blank and immutable terror, beyond the mobile wrath of the wearer’s own unglazed eyes” 
(307).  Paul’s glasses characterize him as both unsignifying – his face is an unreadable, 
unmeaning (except insofar as it provokes terror) surface – and unperceptive – sight and 
sound are both reduced.  However, Paul’s lunettes, and his vision more generally, are 
more complicated than this apparently straightforward association with distance and 
detachment would suggest.  First, while the spectacles reinforce Paul’s alignment with a 
program of detached visual surveillance, they also highlight the tactility of his vision: 
Lucy calls them “dart-dealing spectacles” (305), suggesting along with the hostility of 
Paul’s glance a sense of material contact as well.  Further, when Lucy actually meets 
Paul’s gaze in this scene, she experiences that eye-contact tangibly: “Twice did I enjoy 
this side view with impunity, advancing and receding unseen; the third time my eye had 
scarce dawned beyond the obscuration of the desk, when it was caught and transfixed 
                                                
20 Others have noted the possible confluence of the visual and the tactile, both in regards to nineteenth-
century fiction and Villette and more generally in terms of the science of sensory perception.  In discussing 
the kinds of gazes at work in The Professor, Nicholas Dames identifies “the mixture of the tactile and 
visual in phrenological practice, in which visual examination could often be supplemented by the use of 
calipers or direct application of the hands” (Dames, Amnesiac Selves 109).  Yet the tactility of vision I 
ascribe to Paul Emanuel is of a different sort altogether, and it is important to note that his examination of 
Lucy at the beginning is based on physiognomy rather than phrenology, and so is completely visual, 
without even the implication of touch that Dames identifies here.  When Paul’s vision becomes tactile, it 
does so not by connecting eyes and hands but by making the eyes themselves agents of touch. 
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through its very pupil – transfixed by the lunettes” (307).  Still distant, Paul’s eyesight 
here seems as tactile as it is visual.  Second, while the lunettes insist upon distance, they 
are removable, not actually part of Paul’s vision.  Lucy continues, “I now found the 
advantage of proximity: these shortsighted lunettes were useless for the inspection of a 
criminal under Monsieur’s nose; accordingly, he doffed them, and he and I stood on more 
equal terms” (307).  That Paul wears these glasses is suggestive of a character fully 
immersed in the visual program of surveillance and detachment; that he takes them off, 
allowing Lucy to stand “on more equal terms” with him, suggests an ability to shift 
registers away from detached vision and toward tactility.   
Additionally, Lucy detects Paul Emanuel’s benevolence by means of vision and 
its complications.  When Lucy has returned to the pensionnat and is feeling particularly 
bereft of the friendship of the Brettons to which she had become comfortably 
accustomed, she again finds herself the object of Paul’s gaze: 
Piercing the same wall, and close beside the stove, was a window, looking 
also into the carré; as I looked up a cap tassel, a brow, two eyes filled a pane 
of that window; the fixed gaze of those two eyes hit right against my own 
glance: they were watching me.  I had not till that moment known that tears 
were on my cheek, but I felt them now.  This was a strange house, where no 
corner was sacred from intrusion, where not a tear could be shed, nor a 
thought pondered, but a spy was at hand to note and to divine.  And this new, 
this outdoor, this male spy, what business had brought him to the premises at 
this unwonted hour? . . . It was very much his habit to wear eyes before, 
behind, and on each side of him: he had seen me through the little window – 
he now opened the refectory door, and there he stood. (218) 
   
Once again, Lucy is watching someone who is in turn watching someone (else), except 
this time she is seen.  Paul Emanuel’s gaze, while obviously visual, is also tactile – his 
eyes “hit right against” Lucy’s own gaze; the contact makes Lucy aware of other things 
that touch her skin, specifically tears.  Lucy feels Paul’s glance, and that feeling of tactile 
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contact makes her aware of the rest of her skin, and the tears that touch it.  In many ways, 
this passage is emblematic of the intrusiveness of vision: Paul Emanuel is spying on 
Lucy, and his intrusion on her sadness disrupts any sense of privacy she has: “no corner 
was sacred from intrusion, where not a tear could be shed, nor a thought pondered, but a 
spy was at hand to note and divine.”  Yet, although Lucy rejects Paul Emanuel’s attempts 
to talk to her, characterizing his entire involvement as intrusive, his presence here is less 
an attempt to gather information and interpret than it is an observation of the evidence of 
sadness and an attempt to provide comfort.  Lucy mistakes (or claims to have mistaken at 
the time) the “insinuating softness” (219) of his attempts at conversation for the attempts 
of a spy “to note and to divine” potentially revealing information about her, but the kind 
of gaze Paul Emanuel directs at Lucy here – tactile and immediate rather than detached 
and cool – is categorically different from the kind of glance associated with the 
information-gathering, hermeneutic enterprise of spying. 
 
“Donnez-moi la main”: Paul Emanuel’s Tactile Ethics 
Lucy’s attention to Paul Emanuel chronicles the shift in his mode of seeing from 
one that is purely visual (and distant) to one that is complicated and vexed by new 
associations with immediacy and touch.  At the same time, her narrative reveals that 
Paul’s participation in her life – his surveillance, if you will – moves from the purely 
visual and imaginative to the direct and material.  Paul’s inspection of Lucy begins as a 
purely visual exercise, but quite quickly proceeds into the realm of touch.  Shifting from 
a visual examination of Lucy’s face, Paul begins to go through Lucy’s desk routinely:  
Now I knew, and had long known, that the hand of M. Emanuel’s was on 
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intimate terms with my desk; that it raised and lowered the lid, ransacked and 
arranged the contents, almost as familiarly as my own.  The fact was not 
dubious, nor did he wish it to be so: he left signs of each visit palpable and 
unmistakable; hitherto, however, I had never caught him in the act: watch as I 
would, I could not detect the hours and moments of his coming.  I saw the 
brownie’s work, in exercises left overnight full of faults, and found next 
morning carefully corrected: I profited by his capricious goodwill in loans full 
welcome and refreshing.  Between a sallow dictionary and worn-out grammar 
would magically grow a fresh interesting new work, or a classic, mellow and 
sweet in its ripe age.  Out of my work basket would laughingly peep a 
romance, under it would lurk the pamphlet, the magazine, whence last 
evening’s reading had been extracted.  Impossible to doubt the source whence 
these treasures flowed: had there been no other indication, one condemning 
and traitor peculiarity common to them all, settled the question – they smelt of 
cigars. . . (323, italics in original) 
 
It is Paul Emanuel’s hand here that investigates rather than his eyes, suggesting greater 
intrusiveness but simultaneously increased intimacy and familiarity: it is not just Paul’s 
mind, but his body itself that is “on intimate terms” with Lucy’s belongings.  His hands 
open and close the desk, assuming a  right of access to the desk’s interior and contents.  
As intrusive as Paul’s visual examination was, this is far more so: the image of opening, 
rifling, touching private objects inside the desk seems far more disturbing than his visual 
examination of her on her first evening at Madame Beck’s.  Yet, Lucy is far from 
disturbed by Paul’s unseen but felt presence.  She calls him a “brownie,” a diminutive 
and genial if mischievous spirit, but the language is biblical: Lucy cannot “detect the 
hours and moments of his coming,” a phrase that recalls Jesus’s parable about the coming 
of the Son of Man: “No one knows, however, when that day or hour will come” (Mark 
13:32).  Further, the intrusion here, far from being secret, intentionally leaves “palpable” 
traces for Lucy to find and feel; it is important that the “signs” of Paul’s physical 
presence are there for Lucy to feel, to experience somatically through touch and even 
through smell, rather than to read imaginatively or cognitively.  Finally, Lucy benefits 
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materially and psychologically from Paul’s presence: the books he leaves and the 
assistance to her work are “full welcome and refreshing.”  The benefits he tenders are not 
trivial or minor but substantive and substantial.21  The combination of language, 
suggesting on one hand a friendly, diminutive creature who helps Lucy, and, on the other, 
the presence of divinity, underscores the materiality of the help as well as the 
recognizable traces left by Paul’s presence. 
In the relationship between Paul and Lucy, Villette articulates an alternative to the 
distance identified with its system of vision and reading.  Touch – physical contact 
between their bodies – connects Lucy and Paul far more effectively than the visual 
system at work in so much of the novel, and consequently questions the possibility of an 
ethics predicated on the distance of vision even as it presents materiality and touch as 
potentially ethical.  Twice M. Paul says to Lucy, “Donnez-moi la main” (144, 359); both 
instances cement their growing trust.  When Paul accuses Lucy of wanting the acclaim 
that will come from successfully conducting the examination of her students in English, 
Lucy responds that she dislikes even the thought of such attention, and that she cares 
nothing for the goodwill of an audience comprised of strangers.  The resulting tension 
and anger between them is dissipated through touch:  
‘Donnez-moi la main,’ said he, and the spite and jealousy melted out of his 
face, and a generous kindliness shone there instead.  ‘Come, we will not be 
rivals, we will be friends,’ he pursued.  ‘The examination shall take place, 
and I will choose a good moment; and instead of vexing and hindering, as I 
felt half inclined ten minutes ago – for I have my malevolent moods: I always 
                                                
21 These benefits of Paul’s unseen presence echo the comfort Lucy receives from letters: Graham’s first 
letter is like “the wild savory mess of the hunter, nourishing and salubrious meat, forest-fed or desert-
reared, fresh, healthful, and life-sustaining” (225), while those that come from Paul himself “were real food 
that nourished, living water that refreshed” (462).  I discuss the value of letters at length below, but want 
here to draw attention to the overlaps in signification between material bodies and written text, as well as 
the comfort given by both. 
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had, from childhood – I will aid you sincerely.  After all, you are solitary and 
a stranger, and have your way to make and your bread to earn; it may be well 
that you should become known.  We will be friends: do you agree?’” (144). 
 
What Lucy perceives in Paul’s face before this exchange is arrogance and pride; after 
they clasp hands, she sees “generous kindliness.”  How Lucy reads Paul changes 
immediately upon the contact of their hands, suggesting that touch not only fosters a 
changed, and improved, relationship, but that it also affects what and how one reads.  
Later, at the picnic for his birthday, Paul again takes Lucy’s hand in a gesture that both 
demonstrates and builds their connection to one another: “Indeed, at the worst, it was 
only his nerves that were irritable, not his temper that was radically bad; soothe, 
comprehend, comfort him, and he was a lamb; he would not harm a fly.  Only to the very 
stupid, perverse, or unsympathizing, was he in the slightest degree dangerous. . . his eyes 
met my smile; he just stretched out his kind hand, saying, ‘Donnez-moi la main!  I see we 
worship the same God, in the same spirit, though by different rites’” (359). 
Additionally, the “affinity” Paul recognizes with Lucy is apparent to him through 
multiple senses; although one of those senses is vision, it operates synaesthetically with 
touch, hearing, and a generalized somatic perception:  
‘I was conscious of rapport between you and myself.  You are patient, and I 
am choleric; you are quiet and place, and I am tanned and fiery; you are a 
strict Protestant, and I am a sort of lay Jesuit: but we are alike – there is 
affinity.  Do you see it, mademoiselle, when you look in the glass?  Do you 
observe that your forehead is shaped like mine – that your eyes are cut like 
mine?  Do you hear that you have some of my tones of voice?  Do you know 
that you have many of my looks?  I perceive all this, and believe that you 
were born under my star.  Yes, you were born under my star!  Tremble!  For 
where that is the case with mortals, the threads of their destinies are difficult 
to disentangle; knottings and catchings occur – sudden breaks leave damage 
in the web.’  (345) 
 
The first means of detecting “affinity” is visual: “‘Do you see it, mademoiselle, when you 
 
97 
look in the glass?  Do you observe that your forehead is shaped like mine – that your eyes 
are cut like mine?’”  Quickly, however, the connections move to other senses, such as 
tone of voice, ending with highly suggestive images of connection through touch: the 
threads of their lives are intertwined, “difficult to disentangle” and full of “knottings and 
catchings.”  The affinity between these two is made apparent essentially without the use 
of vision, and it is enacted through the material contact of touch, both the touch of their 
hands and the tangle of the “threads of their destinies.”  Touch also signifies the shift in 
their relationship: “But through his touch, and with his words, a new feeling and a strange 
thought found a course.  Could it be that he was becoming more than friend or brother?  
Did his look speak a kindness beyond fraternity or amity?  His eloquent look had more to 
say, his hand drew me forward, his interpreting lips stirred.  No.  Not now.  Here into the 
twilight alley broke an interruption . . .” (414-15).  Lucy notes here that Paul’s “look” 
may be communicative, but it is his hand that “dr[aws her] forward.” 
Further, Lucy recognizes Paul nonvisually – through sound and through touch – 
and this recognition provides the basis for an alternative method of reading.  Although 
Lucy is not expecting M. Paul – thinks, in fact, that he has sailed for Basseterre without 
having had the opportunity to say goodbye – she registers the sound of his shoes as well 
as an inexplicable and generalized “thrill:” 
While tying on my bonnet, which had hitherto hung by its ribbons from my 
idle hand, I vaguely and momentarily wondered to hear the stop of but one 
ouvrier.  I noted, too – as captives in dungeons find sometimes dreary leisure 
to note the merest trifles – that this man wore shoes, and not sabots: I 
concluded that it must be the master carpenter, coming to inspect, before he 
sent his journeymen.  I threw round me my scarf.  He advanced; he opened the 
door; my back was toward it; I felt a little thrill – a curious sensation, too quick 
and transient to be analyzed.  I turned, I stood in the supposed master artisan’s 
presence: looking toward the doorway, I saw it filled with a figure, and my 
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eyes printed upon my brain the picture of M. Paul.”  (449) 
 
When she hears footsteps outside, Lucy initially expects that they belong to returning 
workmen.  Quickly, though, her sensitive hearing registers the fact that the steps belong 
to only one person, and that he is wearing shoes rather than workboots, and so she 
expects that the visitor is the master carpenter.22  Dependent upon Lucy’s bodily 
sensitivity, this passage also highlights the degree to which Lucy and Paul have a 
sympathetic connection to each other that excludes the field of the visual: before she 
turns and finds M. Paul, she feels a “thrill” of connection, or anticipation, or premonition.  
This thrill is “too quick and transient to be analyzed”: Lucy can only feel it, not reflect 
upon it cognitively.23  There is nothing to be read in or deduced from that thrill; it can 
only be experienced somatically.  Finally, even when Lucy and Paul meet, in this 
passage, visually, that vision is tactile: Lucy’s “eyes printed upon [her] brain” an image 
of Paul.  Neither distant nor cognitive, this scene of recognition and experience depends 
upon proximity, bodily sensitivity, and immediacy. 
The shift from vision to touch happens most significantly, and to greatest ethical 
effect, in the context of the relationship between Lucy and Paul.  But the importance of 
touch and materiality is not limited to Lucy and Paul’s interaction.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
                                                
22 This reference to the “master carpenter” is one of many instances in which Paul Emanuel is implicitly 
compared to Christ.  Other instances include references to the harrowing of hell (Paul’s travels to 
Basseterre) as well as, of course, his name.  Several critics have noted this association, including Kathryn 
Bond Stockton, God Between Their Lips: Desire Between Women in Irigaray, Brontë, and Eliot (Stanford: 
Stanford U P, 1994). 
23 “Thrill” also recalls the experiments of physiological psychologists, which sought to identify the effects 
of electrical impulses on muscles and nerves.  See, for example, George Henry Lewes, The Physiology of 
Common Life (2 vols.), Collection of British Authors vol. 518 (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1860), and 
Sea-side Studies at Ilfracombe, Tenby, the Scilly Isles, & Jersey (Edinburgh and London: William 
Blackwood, 1858).  This association with biological experiments solidifies the materiality implicit in this 
passage, emphasizing the degree to which the emotional relationship between Lucy and Paul is predicated 
on materiality rather than vision or imagination. 
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the figure of the nun is connected to the system of touch I identify in this novel as the 
foundation of an ethics of materiality.  In fact, the nun embodies the epistemological 
progression of the novel: the nun begins as a spectral image that both depends on and 
paradoxically undermines the truth-value of sight; through material contact, the nun is 
discovered to be nothing more than a pile of rags, scraps that can be torn apart, which 
eliminates some of the eeriness of the image of the nun but does nothing to explain its 
presence; finally, the solution to the nun’s identity and the reason for her presence are 
made known only through text, by means of a letter from Ginevra to Lucy.  This 
transition from visual specter, to tangible material contact, to textual solution presents the 
trajectory of Lucy’s narrative writ small. 
The nun first appears as a spectral image that calls into question both Lucy’s 
sanity and the reliability of vision: “I saw in the middle of that ghostly chamber a figure 
all black or white; the skirts straight, narrow, black; the head bandaged, veiled, white.  
Say what you will, reader . . . this I vow – I saw there – in that room – on that night – an 
image like – a NUN!” (231).  By the second encounter, the nun has assumed a more 
substantial presence and looks back at Lucy:  
[T]he moon, so dim hitherto, seemed to shine out somewhat brighter: a ray 
even gleamed white before me, and a shadow became distinct and marked.  I 
looked more narrowly, to make out the cause of this well-defined contrast 
appearing a little suddenly in the obscure alley: whiter and blacker it grew on 
my eye: it took shape with instantaneous transformation.  I stood about three 
yards from a tall, sable-robed, snowy-veiled woman.  Five minutes passed.  I 
neither fled nor shrieked.  She was there still.  I spoke.  ‘Who are you? and 
why do you come to me?’  She stood mute.  She had no face – no features: all 
below her brow was masked with a white cloth; but she had eyes, and they 
viewed me. (279) 
 
The nun is not yet fully embodied, but she is less spectral, less ephemeral, than she was in 
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the first encounter, and she is far more material: instead of a poorly defined “image,” a 
vague “figure” with a black skirt, white veil, and “bandaged” head, this appearance 
reveals a “tall, sable-robed, snowy-veiled woman” whose face and features are “masked” 
and who moves away when Lucy tries to touch her.  In the third encounter, the nun has 
substance and materiality:  
Dark as it was, it seemed to me that something more solid than either night 
shadow, or branch shadow, blackened out of the boles.  At last the struggle 
ceased.  What birth succeeded this travail?  What Dryad was born of these 
throes?  We watched fixedly.  A sudden bell rang in the house – the prayer 
bell.  Instantly into our alley there came, out of the berceau, an apparition, all 
black and white.  With a sort of angry rush – close, close past our faces – swept 
swiftly the very NUN herself!  Never had I seen her so clearly.  She looked tall 
of stature, and fierce off gesture.  As she went, the wind rose sobbing; the rain 
poured wild and cold; the whole night seemed to feel her.  (346)   
 
The nun is birthed by the storm and the enormous tree under which Lucy and Paul stand 
and beneath whose roots Lucy has buried the letters from John Graham Bretton.  She 
appears at the sound of the prayer bell, as if driven from the garden by its ringing; her 
most emphatic characteristic here is of motion – not static vision, but rushing, angry 
movement.  She is again an “apparition,” but her presence is now invested with affect – 
an “angry rush” – and with bodily substance: she is “tall of stature, and fierce of gesture.”  
She is material enough in this encounter to be felt as she moves past their faces: material 
enough, in fact, to be felt by “the whole night.”  Lucy’s vision of the nun is clearer here 
than previously, but her perception of the nun is also in multiple senses simultaneously, 
suggesting the increasing materiality of the nun.   
Lucy’s final encounter with the nun reduces that specter to simple materiality, 
completely divested of either supernatural power or even life:  
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On mine – the twentieth couch – nothing ought to have lain: I had left it void, 
and void should also have found it.  What, then, do I see between the half-
drawn curtains?  What dark, usurping shape, supine, long, and strange?  Is it a 
robber who has made his way through the open streetdoor, and lies there in 
wait?  It looks very black, I think it looks – not human.  Can it be a wandering 
dog that has come in from the street and crept and nestled hither?  Will it 
spring, will it leap out if I approach?  Approach I must.  Courage!  One step!  
My head reeled, for by the faint night lamp, I saw stretched on my bed the old 
phantom – the NUN.  (440)   
 
Lucy proceeds to dismember the nun’s remains, identified now as the “shreds and 
fragments” (440) of a nun’s robe and habit.  Simultaneously reduced and materialized – it 
is neither ghost nor human, neither specter nor intruder nor, even, “a wandering dog” 
looking for a warm place to sleep – the nun here shifts completely and permanently from 
the realm of the supernatural to the realm of the thoroughly banal, and is at the same time 
experienced not through vision but through touch.  Yet the material remains, although 
they provide proof that the nun is not a specter, do nothing to explain the reasons for her 
existence or the identity of the person under the disguise.  It is not until Lucy receives a 
letter from the recently eloped Ginevra that the mystery comes to a close: “Do you begin 
to comprehend by this time that M. le Comte de Hamal was the nun of the attic, and that 
he came to see your humble servant?” (444).  The fright caused by the nun’s sudden and 
unexplained appearance may dissipate as the figure shifts from ghostly specter to material 
figure to shreds of fabric, but it is only when the nun is textualized that Lucy can make 
any sense of what has happened. 
 
Sacrificial Bodies, Sacramental Writing 
As the episode with the nun suggests, it is only through images of writing that 
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Villette provides adequate answers to lingering questions.  In presenting episodes of 
Lucy’s writing the novel demonstrates both the origin of writing in intensely felt 
physiological sensation and its existence as an ideal form of embodiment of the writing 
self, a variety of embodiment that is simultaneously immediate and mediated, private and 
public.  Lucy wrestles with allegorical figures in nearly every episode of writing; in doing 
so, she demonstrates both her own intense sensitivity to emotional influences and the 
degree to which she experiences all sensory and affective input physiologically.  In the 
first instance of Lucy’s writing, she presents her task as constrained by a personified 
Reason who seeks to prevent Lucy’s written communication with John Graham Bretton 
and to mute her experience of affect.  Even earlier, when she is contemplating the 
possibility of receiving and perhaps responding to a letter from John Graham Bretton, 
Lucy describes the cold, stern injunctions of Reason against any enjoyment she might 
derive from either Graham’s letters themselves or from responding to them in writing: 
“Reason still whispered me [sic], laying on my shoulder a withered hand, and frostily 
touching my ear with the chill blue lips of eld.  ‘If,’ muttered she, ‘if he should write, 
what then?  Do you meditate pleasure in replying?  Ah, fool!  I warn you!  Brief be your 
answer.  Hope no delight of heart – no indulgence of intellect: grant no expansion to 
feeling – give holiday to no single faculty: dally with no friendly exchange: foster no 
genial intercommunion’” (215).  Even in this injunction against affect – hope, delight, 
expansion, friendliness – the personified Reason appears to Lucy in terms of embodied 
senses and sensation, even of a bizarre kind of eroticism in which a whisper in Lucy’s ear 
could as well be a death-like kiss.  The subsequent contrast between the cruelty of Reason 
and the kindness of Imagination highlights the intensely sensual nature of Lucy’s 
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emotional life: Reason treats Lucy with starvation, privation, coldness, and pain – “her 
stint, her chill, her barren board, her icy bed, her savage, ceaseless blows” (216) – while 
Imagination brings “a ray sympathetic” (217) from heaven, along with the perfume and 
warmth of “eternal summer” (217); Imagination satisfies Lucy's hunger, assuages her 
weariness, and comforts her sorrows, while Reason’s bed is cold and her table bare of 
sustenance.  Not only are these psychic states embodied in allegorical personages; just as 
significant is that these personifications are associated with Lucy’s experience of her own 
body, with physical manifestations and effects: Lucy experiences her emotions 
physically.  This physical experience is presented not simply as analogous to bodily 
experience, and not as mere metaphor, but as literal bodily sensation. 
When Lucy actually sits down to write her response to Graham’s letter, she again 
contends with two allegorical personifications, a conflict that again highlights her bodily 
and emotional sensitivity.  Lucy first writes a letter prompted by Feeling, and she 
describes the experience of writing itself in highly sensual language: “To begin with: 
Feeling and I turned Reason out of doors, drew against her bar and bolt, then we sat 
down, spread our paper, dipped in the ink an eager pen, and, with deep enjoyment, 
poured out our sincere heart” (238-39).  Continuing immediately to deny any “warmer 
feelings” than “a strongly adherent affection, a rooted and active gratitude” (239) toward 
John, Lucy nevertheless allies herself in this passage with the allegorical Feeling, and 
indeed demonstrates a certain warmth toward John.  This sentence, which could have 
been phrased much more directly (“Feeling and I overcame Reason, and wrote sincerely 
of our emotions” might be one possible alternative), contains instead a prolonged 
 
104 
description of the apparently very sensual act of writing.24  The letter prompted by 
Feeling is written “for [Lucy’s] own relief” (238), and the act itself brings Lucy pleasure: 
She and Feeling spread their paper, touching its surface; their pen is “eager” and seems to 
welcome its immersion in the pot of ink.  Both an act of expression and communication 
and an episode of sensual experience, this literal putting of pen to paper brings Lucy 
“deep enjoyment.”  The layers of eroticism in this letter multiply: it is an 
unacknowledged love letter to Graham (Lucy’s protestations to the contrary 
notwithstanding), written at the prompting and with the full participation of Feeling; in 
the process of writing this love letter to the man whose attention she would welcome, she 
engages in the eroticized act of writing itself with a sensitive, responsive female Feeling.  
Steeped in sexual innuendo, this description of the act of writing once again illustrates 
Lucy’s sensitivity to sensation.  More importantly, it highlights the convergence of 
sensation with the act of writing as well as with the written product.   
An allegorical personification accompanies Lucy’s other major writing task, the 
writing examination for which she must produce an essay on a theme of her examiners’ 
choosing.  Her examiners – Messieurs Boissec and Rochemorte – assign “Human 
Justice” as the theme.  Like her examiners themselves, whose names – dry wood and 
dead rock – indicate that they are personifications of abstractions as much as they are 
living human beings, Human Justice appears first as a “blank, cold abstraction” (377).  
                                                
24 In discussing Lucy’s treatment of her letter from Dr. John, Ivan Kreilkamp, “Unuttered: Withheld Speech 
and Female Authorship in Jane Eyre and Villette” (Novel: A Forum on Fiction 32.3 [June 1999], 331-54), 
notes that “Lucy describes her letters not merely as secondary vehicles for the presence of speech, but as 
themselves the foundational source of real value.  Lucy cathects the writing surface with voluptuous, 
sensual desire” (340).  While Kreilkamp is discussing the letters Lucy receives, a topic I will discuss at 
length below, his analysis of the written page is important in the writing process as well, as, in my reading, 
it accurately describes Lucy’s treatment of her own process of putting pen to paper. 
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Lucy’s contemplation of her examiners’ hypocrisy – “‘If ‘Human Justice’ were what she 
ought to be, you two would scarce hold your present post, or enjoy your present credit’” 
(377) – leads to an idea, which she pursues:  
An idea once seized, I fell to work.  ‘Human Justice’ rushed before me in 
novel guise, a red, random beldame with arms akimbo.  I saw her in her 
house, the den of confusion: servants called to her for orders or help which 
she did not give; beggars stood at her door waiting and starving unnoticed; a 
swarm of children, sick and quarrelsome, crawled round her feet and yelled 
in her ears appeals for notice, sympathy, cure, redress.  The honest woman 
cared for none of these things.  She had a warm seat of her own by the fire, 
she had her own solace in a short black pipe, and a bottle of Mrs. Sweeny’s 
soothing syrup; she smoked and she sipped and she enjoyed her paradise, and 
whenever a cry of the suffering souls about her pierced her ears too keenly – 
my jolly dame seized the poker or the hearth brush: if the offender was weak, 
wronged, and sickly, she effectually settled him; if he was strong, lively, and 
violent, she only menaced, then plunged her hand in her deep pouch, and 
flung a liberal shower of sugarplums.  Such was the sketch of ‘Human 
Justice,’ scratched hurriedly on paper, and placed at the service of Messrs. 
Boissec and Rochemorte. (377-78) 
 
Not a description of the pen, ink, and paper like her letter-writing to Graham was, this 
passage instead documents the process of composition along with its constituent elements 
of creativity, visualization, and the channeling of emotion.  In doing so, it highlights the 
sharp sensitivity that enables Lucy’s writing as well as the form of embodiment that 
writing allows: the transformation of a “blank, cold abstraction” into a “jolly dame” with 
a “warm seat of her own by the fire,” “a short black pipe, and a bottle of Mrs. Sweeny’s 
soothing syrup.”  Lucy’s composition in this case grows out of her mortification related 
to her ignorance in the examination and to her expression of emotion to her examiners: 
“Beholding the judges cast on M. Emanuel a hard look of triumph, and hearing the 
distressed tremor of my own voice, out I burst in a fit of choking tears.  The emotion was 
far more of anger than grief; had I been a man and strong, I could have challenged that 
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pair on the spot – but it was emotion, and I would rather have been scourged, than 
betrayed it” (376).  If expressing her anger in tears is humiliating and unacceptable, 
turning that anger into text is its ideal manifestation; in this case, the textual form it takes 
is of yet another body, of an abstraction-become-flesh.   
As these episodes demonstrate, the process of creating text is both 
psychologically and somatically intense, and it involves Lucy’s entire body.  It should 
come as no surprise, then, that the process of becoming text should be similarly intense.  
Lucy’s observation of the King of Labassecour at the concert initiates the connection that 
will become so important between writing, embodiment, and sympathetic connection 
through a version of reading based on tactility.  
I had never read, never been told anything of [the King’s] nature or his habits; 
and at first the strong hieroglyphics graven as with iron stylet on his brow, 
round his eyes, beside his mouth, puzzled and baffled instinct.  Ere long, 
however, if I did not know, at least I felt, the meaning of those characters 
written without hand . . . Full mournful and significant was that spectacle!  Not 
the less so because, both for the aristocracy and the honest bourgeoisie of 
Labassecour, its peculiarity seemed to be wholly invisible: I could not discover 
that one soul present was either struck or touched.  (201-202)   
 
Lucy, seemingly alone in the audience, reads the King’s face.  However, her reading here 
does not depend on the detached vision implied in the kind of physiognomical reading 
performed by M. Paul that first night at the pensionnat.  Instead, what Lucy reads in the 
king’s face consists of textual marks engraved “as with iron stylet.”  These are not purely 
visual images that rest on the surface of the king’s face, but are instead marks that can be 
perceived tactilely because they exist in three dimensions – they are in the king’s face, 
not on the king’s face.   
The characters that are engraved into the king’s countenance suggest both the 
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written signs of language, the arbitrary signifiers of meaning that are created through 
contact between writing or carving implement and surface, and the essential identity of an 
individual.  In this case (and, I will argue, in every important instance in this novel), that 
correspondence makes the written character and the individual character of the same 
substance: that is, the king’s character consists of, grows from, and is embodied most 
eloquently in, the written characters, the written text on his face.  Lucy “reads” the king, 
but not in a way that suggests the detachment of the novel’s usual deployment of 
surveillance.  Instead, she reads the king’s character(s), the king’s text, and thus, the king 
himself, and her reading suggests not only the potential tactility of vision (she feels the 
meaning of the character(s) rather than simply seeing them) but also the vital connection 
between character and text, between existence and embodiment, between identity and 
writing.   
Lucy’s description bears striking resemblance to the description of a method of 
writing taught to the blind at L’Institution Royales des Jeunes Aveugles, the Royal 
Institution for Blind Youth in Paris.  Valentin Häuy, the founder of the school, devised a 
method by which he could teach his blind students to write: “Paper was placed on a fairly 
soft surface, such as leather or sheets of newspaper, and, ‘using a pen of iron, the top of 
which was not split, and with which writing without ink, and supported with a strong 
paper, they produce upon it a character in relievo which they can afterwards read, in 
passing their fingers long the elevated lines on the back of the page.”25  This was neither 
                                                
25 M. Galliod, Notice Historique sur l’Etablissement des Jeunes Aveugles (1828), 10; quoted in Pamela 
Lorimer, “A Critical Evaluation of the Development of the Tactile Modes of Reading and an Analysis and 
Evaluation of Researches Carried Out in Endeavours to Make the Braille Code Easier to Read and Write” 
(Ph.D. Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1996), chapter 1.  Archived at the International Braille Research 
Center at <www.braille.org>.   
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the first nor the last system of writing that produced tactile characters that could be read 
by touch.  Earlier attempts included the carving of letters into wooden tablets and the 
creation of moveable letters cast in lead that could be pressed into the back of paper.26  In 
1784, a young blind musician, Mlle. Maria von Paradis, was announced in the Journal de 
Paris; the article both noted that she was to play in the capital, and described her system 
of copying her music “by means of pricks on paper rested on a soft surface.”27  Two years 
later, in 1786, Häuy developed a tactile version of the alphabet and published the first 
embossed book; his method of printing was to press letters made from wire into heavy 
paper so that the raised outlines of the letters could be felt on the front of the paper.  In 
1809, Charles Barbier, an army officer, wrote a pamphlet including a description of a 
kind of cutout writing produced by knife rather than by pen or pencil; although he 
intended it for use in the army as a kind of shorthand code, the Academy of Sciences 
recommended its use for the blind; in 1823, he visited the Institute for the Blind in Paris 
and demonstrated his method to students, among whom was Louis Braille.  Braille used 
Barbier’s system as a foundation for his own system of writing, a description of which 
was published in 1829.28   
                                                
26 Lorimer describes these earlier attempts: “[D. R.] Guillie [An Essay on the Instruction and Amusements 
of the Blind (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1819) . . . described how in the sixteenth century 
letters cut in wood were ‘sunk or made hollow, on which account the fingers were unable to trace the forms 
of the letters unless they were very large.’ . . . In 1575, Rampazetto of Rome taught people to read by 
letters carved in relief on thin wooden tablets .”  She also notes that in 1617, Father Lana devised what 
seems to be the first version of punctiform writing, which was never put into practice but which may have 
been known to Charles Barbier (discussed below in the text) because of his interest in codes.  All of this 
information about the history of reading and writing methods for the blind comes from chapters 1 and 2 of 
Lorimer’s study. 
27 Lorimer, “A Critical Evaluation,” chapter 1. 
28 While Braille’s method was used at the Institute for the Blind from 1832 on, it was not officially 
recognized for use in France until 1854, two years after Braille’s death, and it did not catch on in the rest of 
Europe or in the United States until decades later: Britain accepted braille in 1870, while a number of other 
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Additionally, the connection Lucy identifies between writing and identity recalls 
graphology’s analysis of both identity and character as revealed through an individual’s 
handwriting.  Although the term “graphology” was not coined until 1868 by Jean-
Hippolyte Michon, correspondences between a person’s handwriting and identity were 
made for centuries before that.  In 1609, Francois Demelle wrote a book on identifying 
forgeries, suggesting that identity could be confirmed by a signature.  Later in the 
century, Camillo Baldi wrote about the correspondence between handwriting and 
personal characteristics.  Lavater also wrote about handwriting in his essays on 
physiognomy, observing that “with the same ink, with the same pen, and on the same 
paper” the same person might produce different writing at different times, suggesting that 
mood and psychological state could affect handwriting.29  Lavater goes on to ask, “Isn’t it 
true . . . that the exterior form of a letter often leads us to make judgments about whether 
it was written in a calm or anxious state, in a hurry, or in a relaxed frame of mind?”30  
The connections that graphology and its immediate precursors made between individual, 
bodily identity and handwriting were quite different from the ideal of enlightenment 
writing practices, the goal of which seems to have been the complete disembodiment of 
writing.  For example, Diderot’s Encyclopedie identifies the first essential steps of 
                                                                                                                                            
countries did not adopt it until after an international congress on the education of the blind was held in Paris 
in 1878.  It seems unlikely, then, that Charlotte Brontë would have been familiar with braille as a means of 
tactile reading.  It is very possible, however, that she would have known about the earlier methods of tactile 
reading and writing, particularly given the correspondence of her image of the King’s face to the 
description of writing by the blind. 
29 Johann Caspar Lavater, L'art de connaître les hommes par la physionomie  (quoted in Roxanne Panchasi, 
“Graphology and the Science of Individual Identity in Modern France” (Configurations 4.1 [1996], 1-31), 
3.) 
30 Lavater, L’art, in Panchasi, 4. 
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writing as “trimming the quill, positioning the body, and mastering movement.  The point 
of such mastery was to produce a handwriting so legible that it left no trace of the 
body.”31 
Numerous instances build upon the associations between the act of writing, 
intense sensation, and ideal embodiment.  In particular, faces become text through the 
engraving of characters into their surface, thereby furthering the association between 
sensation (especially pain), writing, and embodiment.  The face of the King of 
Labassecour is marked with readable text, with engraved marks that suggest more than 
that the King suffers from melancholy.  While they are the visible (and, as I note above, 
potentially tactile) signs of a particular condition, they are also the literal effects of the 
presence of suffering: that is, suffering – or, perhaps, Hypochondria – conceived as a 
personified abstraction, is the inscribing agent that makes marks on the king’s face.  The 
marks are not simply an effect of sickness, a consequence that remains after sickness 
leaves; rather, the ailment is endowed with agency in this conception, empowered to 
make literal, physical contact with the king’s body and to leave marks in three 
dimensions on his face.   
Not all faces are as easily marked, however, and this difference suggests different 
degrees of investment in the materiality of embodiment.  For example, although Lucy is 
deeply moved by the performance of Vashti, Graham remains sedate and unruffled, 
demonstrating that he belongs to the world of action rather than of thought or of 
enthusiasm.  This passage does more, though, than simply distinguish Graham from 
                                                




Vashti.  Graham’s natural emotional and physical equilibrium suggests that he moves 
through the world untouched by enthusiasm32 or, presumably, other overwhelming 
psychological experience.  Graham lacks the strong affect so closely connected to the 
process of writing for Lucy; this passage highlights, therefore, not only Graham’s 
resilience to deep feeling but also the novel’s insistence upon the connections between 
that deeply experienced feeling, writing, and embodiment through the image of 
impressibility: 
His [John’s] natural attitude was not the meditative, nor his natural mood the 
sentimental; impressionable he was as dimpling water, but, almost as water, 
unimpressible: the breeze, the sun, moved him – metal could not grave, nor fire 
brand.  Dr. John could think, and think well, but he was rather a man of action 
than of thought; he could feel, and feel vividly in his way, but his heart had no 
chord for enthusiasm: to bright, soft, sweet influences his eyes and lips gave 
bright, soft, sweet welcome, beautiful to see as dyes of rose and silver, pearl 
and purple, embuing summer clouds; for what belonged to storm, what was 
wild and intense, dangerous, sudden, and flaming, he had no sympathy, and 
held with it no communion. (244, italics in original) 
 
Lucy says that Graham is as “impressionable” “as dimpling water” – his surface ripples, 
perhaps, with passing contact.  However, also like water, Graham cannot be marked 
permanently by anything – he is “unimpressible”: “metal could not grave, nor fire brand.”  
Any impressions made on Graham will quickly slip away, leaving him unscathed without 
                                                
32 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “enthusiasm” as “Possession by a god, supernatural inspiration, 
prophetic or poetic frenzy”; “Poetical fervour, impassioned mood or tone”; “Fancied inspiration”; and 
“Rapturous intensity of feeling in favour of a person, principle, cause, etc.; passionate eagerness in any 
pursuit, proceeding from an intense conviction of the worthiness of the object.”  “Enthusiasm.”  Oxford 
English Dictionary.  Def. 1a, 1b, 2, and 3a.  Interestingly, a reference from 1620 connects enthusiasm to the 
Bacchanal; Vashti also has implied connections to the Bacchanal, described as she is as a maenad, one of 
the women who, when under the influence of Bacchus during his festival, would literally tear apart any 
man unlucky enough to come into contact with them.  Most of the definitions of enthusiasm are negative, 
suggestive of either dangerous possession or excessive and misdirected religious feeling.  Yet Lucy’s use 
suggests that she views it differently, in spite of the connotations it clearly carries within this novel of just 
the sort of excess articulated in the OED’s definitions.  Instead, Lucy’s use suggests that such 
overwhelming affect, although it may be dangerous, is not necessarily something to be avoided.  See note 
34 below regarding Lucy and the sublime, another instance of overwhelming affect. 
 
112 
permanent mark.  In contrast, Lucy contends that he cannot be impressed, or, perhaps, 
that nothing can be impressed onto or into him.  Although Ginevra thinks Dr. John “a 
serious, impassioned man, too grave and too impressible” (244), Lucy recognizes the 
reality of his identity, which is one of stable, nearly disembodied rationality.  Unlike the 
King of Labassecour, whose character(s) and body are synonymous, and unlike Lucy 
herself, Graham’s material self cannot be marked by his experiences; his face and body 
are likely to remain the bland, attractive, thoroughly English (if tinted by some past 
connection to the Irish, as evidenced by the reddish hair) versions they are from the 
beginning to the end of the novel.  If the king’s face has been “graven as with iron stylet,” 
Graham cannot be marked by iron or fire.  Always calm and even, Graham will 
consistently gravitate toward the moderate: “to bright, soft, sweet influences his eyes and 
lips gave bright, soft, sweet welcome.”  Graham “ha[s] no sympathy” for the extreme, 
“for what belonged to storm, what was wild and intense, dangerous, sudden, and 
flaming,” unlike Lucy, who seems to bear an extraordinary affinity toward, and respond 
strongly to, just such wild, intense, dangerous storms.  Graham cannot be written on; it 
makes sense, consequently, that Lucy’s narrative dismisses him and his romance with 
Polly well before the end of her own story.  Polly and John are a match in this way: both 
are nearly without body.  Graham is purely rational and Polly is generally emotional, 
although her experience of emotion, at least as an adult, is far less affective than is 
Lucy’s, and it does not leave the bodily traces that Lucy’s experience of emotion – or 
anything else – does.   
Like the king, whose face is marked by his suffering with engraved characters, 
Lucy is also marked by suffering.  Her face bears engraved marks, which Paul can read: 
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“‘Well,’ said he, after some seconds’ scrutiny, ‘there is no denying that signature: 
Constancy wrote it; her pen is of iron.  Was the record painful?’  ‘Severely painful,’ I 
said, with truth.  ‘Withdraw her hand, monsieur; I can bear its inscribing force no more’” 
(452).  As with previous scenes of writing, this involves a personified abstraction, 
Constancy; also as previously, the act of writing simultaneously emerges from intense 
affective and physiological sensation and ends in a version of embodiment that both 
reveals and camouflages.  Lucy is not the writer here, but the text; nevertheless, the 
process of writing, of the inscription on her face, both emerges from her pain at Paul 
Emanuel’s departure and results in the continued pain of loneliness.   
Writing a letter to Graham involved Lucy’s entire body, both directly and through 
the physiological experience of affective sensations; it should come as no surprise, then, 
that becoming text should be as intensely sensory an experience as producing text.  While 
Lucy is the only character who speaks directly of the process by which she became text, 
by which she was written on, she is not the only character to become textualized in some 
way.  Instead, both Graham and Paul are transformed at different points – Graham 
temporarily and unsuccessfully, and Paul permanently and perfectly – into text through 
the letters they send to Lucy.  From the moment Lucy sees the letter in Rosine’s hand – 
“the letter whose face of enamelled white and single Cyclops-eye of vermilion-red had 
printed themselves so clear and perfect on the retina33 of an inward vision” (225) – she 
                                                
33 Again, references to vision multiply: the letter is sealed with wax that looks like a “single Cyclops-eye,” 
while the starkness of the white and red leave marks – print – on Lucy’s eyeball.  Vision in this reference is 
both dispersed – nonvisual objects are invested with elements of the visual – and complicated – actual 
vision is accomplished through the immediacy of physical contact (the colors that “printed themselves so 
clear and perfectly on the retina of an inward vision”) rather than the distance usually required by sight.  
Sight in this passage becomes both tactile and reciprocal in that the seen object marks the viewer.  The 
reference to the imprinting of an image on the retina both reflects contemporary theories about vision and 
anticipates a similar reference in George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1872), in which Dorothea finds her retinas 
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hopes that it is the promised letter from Graham, which it is: 
For once a hope was realized.  I held in my hand a morsel of real solid joy: 
not a dream, not an image of the brain, not one of those shadowy chances 
imagination pictures, and on which humanity starves but cannot live . . . it 
was neither sweet hail, nor small coriander seed – neither slight wafer, nor 
luscious honey, I had lighted on; it was the wild savory mess of the hunter, 
nourishing and salubrious meat, forest-fed or desert-reared, fresh, healthful, 
and life-sustaining.  It was what the old dying patriarch demanded of his son 
Esau, promising him in requital the blessing of his last breath.  It was a 
godsend; and I inwardly thanked the God who had vouchsafed it. (225) 
 
This letter is material, “not a dream, not an image of the brain,” not a hallucination.  Lucy 
characterizes Graham’s letter not only as sustenance but, far more materially, as “the wild 
savory mess of the hunter, nourishing and salubrious meat, forest-fed or desert-reared, 
fresh, healthful, and life-sustaining.”  Text has literally become flesh.  Further, this 
version of text is not neat, not tidy – it is a “wild” “mess,” presumably bloodied from the 
kill, very recently alive, still bearing traces of the life it so recently had and which it can 
still impart to the one who consumes it.  Interestingly, some of the language used here to 
describe what this letter of John’s is not – “sweet,” “slight,” “luscious honey” – predicts 
Lucy’s implicit criticism of his moderation at Vashti’s performance: “bright,” “soft,” 
“sweet,” “beautiful.”  This might suggest that Lucy’s impression here of John’s worth 
changes as she knows him better; however, considering that her criticism comes barely 
twenty pages later, I would argue instead that it is John’s letter, the written text itself, that 
is nourishing, not his person, which remains, as Lucy notes, un(re)markable.    
That value inheres in the written text rather than in its connection to the supposed 
original, Dr. John himself, is borne out by Lucy’s reaction when she misplaces the letter 
                                                                                                                                            
similarly marked by the red draperies of Rome at Christmas, an image and concept I discuss at more length 
in Chapter 3. 
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in the attic.  Upon first realizing she has left the letter in the attic after running 
downstairs, frightened by the first sighting of the nun, Lucy runs back to the attic, feeling 
that “Flesh or spirit must be defied for its sake” (231).  Yet even when she realizes that 
Graham is there in person, she insists upon the importance of the letter (which she has 
read once): “‘Was it my letter, Lucy?’  ‘Your own: yours – the letter you wrote to me.  I 
had come here to read it quietly.  I could not find another spot where it was possible to 
have it to myself.  I had saved it all day – never opened it till this evening.  It was 
scarcely glanced over: I cannot bear to lose it.  Oh, my letter!’” (232).  When confronted 
with the real person, Lucy prefers the written text: “He asked me, smiling, why I cared 
for his letter so very much.  I thought, but did not say, that I prized it like the blood in my 
veins.  I only answered that I had so few letters to care for” (232).  The connections 
between text and embodiment multiply here: Graham’s body is replaced by text; the text 
becomes “nourishing and salubrious meat,” and is as valuable to Lucy as her own blood 
is.  Lucy prizes Graham’s letter34 as she prizes her own blood, connecting in that 
comparison three bodies, one textual and two human, and emphasizing the connections 
between embodiment and writing.  If text becomes flesh for Lucy, John Graham’s flesh 
becomes – and is replaced by – text in his letter. 
                                                
34 Polly similarly invests Graham’s letters to her with enormous value, although the value is far more 
controlled and more moderate than Lucy’s language suggests.  If to Lucy, the letter is a “wild savory mess” 
of freshly killed meat, to Polly it is “full, solid, steady,” “clear, firm, and rounded – no slovenly splash of 
wax,” “a clean, mellow, pleasant manuscript that soothes you as you read.”  If Lucy’s letter is wild and 
invigorating, Polly’s is balanced and soothing (351-52).  The difference between Lucy’s and Polly’s 
perception of the respective letters suggests the distinction Burke makes between the beautiful and the 
sublime: the beautiful is even, balanced, smooth, with curved lines and predictable surfaces, while the 
sublime is unpredictable, overwhelming, terrifying, and rough.  Lucy is consistently associated with the 
sublime, as is Paul Emanuel, while Polly and John are associated with the pleasant.  As becomes clearer 
through this reading of the ethics of materiality, the sublime insists upon materiality even as it transcends it.  
The description also recalls Lavater’s description of the correspondences between handwriting and mood 
(see note 31 above). 
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If Graham is temporarily turned into text through this letter, Paul Emanuel 
becomes permanently, and perfectly, textualized upon his departure to Basseterre.  A hint 
of this arrives to Lucy shortly before Paul is scheduled to depart on his ship.  Although he 
has made a visit to the pensionnat to take leave of the students and teachers, Lucy has 
been unable to have a moment with him and fears now that he has left the school and that 
she has missed her last chance.  As she despairs, a child brings her a note from Paul, 
which states his intention of finding her before he leaves and his promise not to leave 
without seeing her one last time: “What I should have done, I know not, when a little 
child – the least child in the school – broke with its simplicity and its unconsciousness 
into the raging yet silent center of that inward conflict.  ‘Mademoiselle,’ lisped the treble 
voice, ‘I am to give you that.  Monsieur Paul said I was to seek you all over the house, 
from the grenier to the cellar, and when I found you, to give you that.’  And the child 
delivered a note; the little dove dropped on my knee its olive leaf plucked off’” (417).  
Paul’s brief note provides Lucy the same sense of rescue that the olive leaf must have 
provided to Noah and his family, the promise of dry land within a bird’s flying range of 
the ark, the promise of escape from seemingly endless confinement.  Further, not only 
does this dry land stand as a metaphor of escape, in this case it also stands as a distinctly 
solid and material refuge from the instability of the waters threatening to swamp Lucy.  
The actual letters Paul sends to Lucy after his departure bear out this comparison:  
Do not think that this genial flame sustained itself, or lived wholly on a 
bequeathed hope or a parting promise.  A generous provider supplied 
bounteous fuel.  I was spared all chill, all stint; I was not suffered to fear 
penury; I was not tried with suspense.  By every vessel he wrote; he wrote as 
he gave and as he loved, in full-handed, full-hearted plenitude.  He wrote 
because he liked to write; he did not abridge, because he cared not to abridge.  
He sat down, he took pen and paper, because he loved Lucy and had much to 
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say to her; because he was faithful and thoughtful, because he was tender and 
true.  There was no sham and no cheat, and no hollow unreal in him.  
Apology never dropped her slippery oil on his lips – never proffered, by his 
pen, her coward feints and paltry nullities: he would give neither a stone, nor 
an excuse – neither a scorpion, nor a disappointment; his letters were real 
food that nourished, living water that refreshed. (462) 
 
In contrast to Reason’s “stint” and “chill,” “her barren board” (216), Paul spares Lucy all 
such suffering and want, and he does so apparently through letters since his financial 
contribution consisted of setting up Lucy’s school for the first year before leaving, after 
which time Lucy would be responsible for finances.  Instead, it is Paul’s letters here that 
“spare[]” Lucy “all chill, all stint.”  The infusion of Paul’s love in these letters to Lucy 
echoes (if in a milder way) Lucy’s pleasure in writing to Graham; like Lucy, Paul sits 
down with pen and paper because he loves someone.   
Although it is made necessarily permanent with his death, Paul’s association with 
writing occurs only when he leaves Villette; throughout the novel, Paul is characterized 
as a fine speaker but not as a writer, as one whose voice carries both his ideas and his 
feelings but who avoids the labor of writing.  In particular, Paul is a storyteller: he both 
edits the material he reads to Madame Beck’s students to make it appropriate for his 
audience of girls and women, and he creates his own stories to entertain them.  In both 
cases, Lucy stands in awe of Paul’s “impromptu faculty” and his ability to connect so 
thoroughly to his audience through speech:  
It was his occasional custom – and a very laudable, acceptable custom, too – to 
arrive of an evening, always a l’improviste, unannounced, burst in on the silent 
hour of study, establish a sudden despotism over us and our occupations . . . 
and, drawing forth a single thick volume, or a handful of pamphlets, substitute 
for the besotted ‘lecture pieuse,’  drawled by a sleepy pupil, some tragedy 
made grand by grand reading, ardent by fiery action – some drama, whereof, 
for my part, I rarely studied the intrinsic merit; for M. Emanuel made it a 
vessel for an outpouring, and filled it with his native verve and passion like a 
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cup with a vital brewage. . . . I noticed more than once that where retrenchment 
without substitute would have left unmeaning vacancy, or introduced 
weakness, he could, and did, improvise whole paragraphs, no less vigorous 
than irreproachable: the dialogue – the description – he engrafted was often far 
better than that he pruned away. (309) 
 
Officially a reading intended to replace “the besotted ‘lecture pieuse,’” Paul’s 
performance is more storytelling than reading.  According to Lucy, he manages to take 
the story – “some drama” that does not particularly interest Lucy – and make “it a vessel 
for an outpouring,” to “fill[] it with his native verve and passion like a cup with a vital 
brewage.”  Paul’s improvisations, made when his cuts would have damaged the narrative, 
were “often far better than that he pruned away.”  Paul’s reading is creative rather than 
interpretive, and it generates new text rather than foreclosing it.  Such is also true of 
Paul’s other episode of storytelling, done during the picnic in honor of his birthday: 
He began to tell us a story.  Well could he narrate . . . .  There were beautiful 
touches in that little tale; sweet glimpses of feeling and hues of description 
that, while I listened, sunk into my mind, and since have never faded. . . .  M. 
Emanuel was not a man to write books; but I have heard him lavish, with 
careless, unconscious prodigality, such mental wealth as books can seldom 
boast; his mind was indeed my library, and whenever it was opened to me, I 
entered bliss.  Intellectually imperfect as I was, I could read little; there were 
few bound and printed volumes that did not weary me – whose perusal did not 
fag and blind – but his tomes of thought were collyrium to the spirit’s eyes; 
over their contents, inward sight grew clear and strong.  I used to think what a 
delight it would be for one who loved him better than he loved himself to 
gather and store up those handfuls of gold dust, so recklessly flung to heaven’s 
reckless winds. (357-58) 
 
Although “M. Emanuel was not a man to write books,” nevertheless Lucy understands 
him as text even before he produces his first note to her: “his mind was indeed my 
library.”  Figured here explicitly as a storyteller, Paul Emanuel is nevertheless already 
textualized, already becoming written text.  Paul even offers Lucy the opportunity to help 
him become text, asking her to become his amanuensis: “‘I could dictate it, though, with 
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pleasure to an amanuensis who suited me.  Would Mademoiselle Lucy write for me if I 
asked her?’” (358). 
In clear opposition, Lucy is consistently associated with writing rather than with 
speech, and she insists upon the irreconcilability between the two modes.  On one hand, 
Lucy derives relief and comfort from speech.  On the other, however, she claims to be 
unable to express even simple thoughts while speaking.  She “cannot put the case into 
words” (173) when Dr. John asks why she went to the confessional.  She refuses to speak 
when Dr. John chastises her for watching him too closely: “I might have cleared myself 
on the spot, but would not.  I did not speak.  I was not in the habit of speaking to him.  
Suffering him, then, to think what he chose, and accuse me of what he would, I resumed 
some work I had dropped, and kept my head bent over it during the remainder of his 
stay” (91).  Lucy’s refusal to speak is certainly connected to her general revulsion toward 
self-revelation, but it is also important that she characterizes her refusal explicitly in 
terms of withheld speech; Lucy’s ability to hold her speech in, even in those 
circumstances when she might wish to communicate, suggests her problematic 
relationship with speech itself as much as with self-revelation more broadly.  She 
characterizes herself as either unable or unwilling to speak in answer to the questions 
posed by Messrs. Boissec and Rochemorte: “Though answers to the questions surged up 
fast, my mind filling like a rising well, ideas were there, but not words.  I either could 
not, or would not speak – I am not sure which: partly, I think, my nerves had got wrong, 
and partly my humor was crossed” (376).   
If spoken language is inadequate or intractable as a means for the communication 
of information, it is equally unsatisfactory as a method of expressing or communicating 
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feeling.  Even when she might be able to use spontaneous speech to express intensely felt 
emotion, Lucy refuses such indulgence: “I clasped my hands very hard, and I drew my 
breath very deep; I held in the cry, I devoured the ejaculation, I forbade the start, I spoke 
and I stirred no more than a stone; but I knew what I looked on; through the dimness left 
in my eyes by many nights’ weeping, I knew him” (435-36).  When Paul takes Lucy to 
her new school, spoken language again fails, and is consequently shown to be both 
inadequate and unnecessary: “I can no more remember the thoughts or the words of the 
ten minutes succeeding this disclosure than I can retrace the experience of my earliest 
year of life: and yet the first thing distinct to me is the consciousness that I was speaking 
very fast, repeating over and over again: “‘Did you do this, M. Paul?  Is this your house?  
Did you furnish it?  . . . Do you mean me?  Am I the directress?  Is there another Lucy 
Snowe?  Tell me: say something.’  But he would not speak.  His pleased silence, his 
laughing down-look, his attitude, are visible to me now” (455).  When Lucy finally 
understands that the school is hers, that M. Paul has done this work for her, speech is 
displaced altogether: 
I hardly knew what to do.  I first caressed the soft velvet on his cuff, and then 
I stroked the hand it surrounded.  It was his foresight, his goodness, his silent, 
strong, effective goodness, that overpowered me by their proved reality.  It 
was the assurance of his sleepless interest which broke on me like a light 
from heaven; it was his (I will dare to say it) his fond, tender look, which 
now shook me indescribably. (455) 
 
Paul Emanuel’s “sleepless interest” displaces the earlier “sleepless eye” of surveillance, 
even as material contact displaces both the distant, detached vision of surveillance and 
the requirement of speech: “In such inadequate language my feelings struggled for 
expression: they could not get it; speech, brittle and unmalleable, and cold as ice; 
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dissolved or shivered in the effort.  He watched me still: he gently raised his hand to 
stroke my hair; it touched my lips in passing; I pressed it close, I paid it tribute.  He was 
my king; royal for me had been that hand’s bounty; to offer homage was both a joy and a 
duty” (456).  Lucy’s “caress” of the velvet cuff is returned by Paul’s hand on her face and 
lips, providing through silent material contact both evidence and an example of 
sympathetic connection and the reciprocity of feeling.35 
Speaking is contrasted with writing at nearly every point in Lucy’s life, and Lucy 
is consistently aligned with writing.  The allegorical Reason, who tears up the first letter 
Lucy writes in response to Graham’s letter, encourages her to talk to Graham rather than 
write because of the evident poverty in her speech:  
‘But I have talked to Graham and you did not chide,’ I pleaded.  ‘No,’ said she, 
‘I needed not.  Talk for you is good discipline.  You converse imperfectly.  
While you speak, there can be no oblivion of inferiority – no encouragement of 
delusion: pain, privation, penury stamp your language . . .’  ‘But,’ I again 
broke in, ‘where the bodily presence is weak and the speech contemptible, sure 
there cannot be error in making written language the medium of better 
utterance than faltering lips can achieve?’  Reason only answered, ‘At your 
peril you cherish that idea, or suffer its influence to animate any writing of 
yours!’  ‘But if I feel, may I never express?’  ‘Never!’ declared Reason.  I 
groaned under her bitter sternness. (215-216) 
 
                                                
35 While Lucy does speak fluently once, when Paul asks her to take Justine Marie as one of her students, 
that fluency is made possible only by the material presence of Paul Emanuel, by both his physical 
proximity and direct contact: “He drew his chair nearer. . . . His chair touched mine; his hand, quietly 
advanced, turned me towards him. . . . Near me as he now sat, strongly and closely as he had long twined 
his life in mine – far as had progressed, and near as was achieved our minds’ and affections’ assimilation – 
the very suggestion of interference, of heart-separation, could be heard only with a fermenting excitement, 
an impetuous throe, a disdainful resolve, an ire, a resistance of which no human eye or cheek could hide the 
flame, nor any truth-accustomed tongue curb the cry.  ‘I want to tell you something,’ I said; ‘I want to tell 
you all.’ . . . I spoke.  All leaped from my lips.  I lacked not words now; fast  I narrated; fluent I told my 
tale; it streamed on my tongue . . . All I had encountered I detailed, all I had recognized, heard, and seen; 
how I had beheld and watched himself; how I listened, how much heard, what conjectured; the whole 
history, in brief, summoned to his confidence, rushed thither truthful, literal, ardent, bitter” (457-58).  
Lucy’s outpouring of feeling takes place not only as a result of Paul’s encouragement but as a response to 
his physical presence, and I suggest that it reveals far more about the generative and ethical power of 
tactility than it does about Lucy’s comfort with speech. 
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Reason knows Lucy’s spoken language to be imperfect, inferior, marked with the 
“stamp” of “pain, privation, penury.”36  Reason is not the only personage in Villette, 
however, to encourage Lucy to speak, and this is not the only episode in which speaking 
and writing are presented as mutually exclusive activities (that is, in which speaking 
would prevent writing).  
The most significant passage in which speech is opposed to writing is also the 
passage in which the comforts offered by spoken communication are most alluring.  
When Lucy goes to confession, she finds that “the mere relief of communication in an ear 
which was human and sentient, yet consecrated – the mere pouring out of some portion of 
long accumulating, long pent-up pain into a vessel whence it could not be again diffused 
– had done me good.  I was already solaced” (150).  Later, she tells Dr. John that she 
went to the church because “a cruel sense of desolation pained my mind: a feeling that 
would make its way, rush out, or kill me – like . . . the current which passes through the 
heart, and which, if aneurism or any other morbid cause obstructs its natural channels, 
impetuously seeks abnormal outlet.  I wanted companionship, I wanted friendship, I 
wanted counsel.  I could find none of these in closet, or chamber, so I went and sought 
them in church and confessional” (173).  Lucy describes the solace she gets from 
confession as analogous to the relief felt when physical pressure is released, when a 
“current” that is blocked from its usual path is released to flow naturally.  Here Lucy 
                                                
36 In passages like this one, Villette presents writing as more accurately reflective of an individual’s 
thoughts, even identity, than speech.  In spite of the usual understanding of speech as both more embodied 
(because spoken by a present, and living, body) and more immediate (again, because of the presence of a 
speaking body) than writing, in this novel writing supercedes speech both in immediacy and in value.  For 
Lucy, speech offers comfort but not fulfillment, and it is only through the material text that Paul (and, to a 
lesser extent, Dr. John) is ideally present to Lucy. 
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describes a physical system37 that requires particular remedies, but suggests that in this 
case, the remedy – seeking solace through confession – was an “abnormal outlet.”  The 
suggestion here is that it is the Catholic aspect of confession that is abnormal; after all, 
this conversation with Dr. John begins when he asks if she is now a Catholic.  Yet Lucy’s 
reaction almost immediately after she leaves the confessional insists that what is 
“abnormal” about the episode is its insistence on speech: 
Did I, do you suppose, reader, contemplate venturing again within that 
worthy priest’s reach?  As soon should I have thought of walking into a 
Babylonish furnace.  That priest had arms which could influence me; he was 
naturally kind, with a sentimental French kindness, to whose softness I knew 
myself not wholly impervious.  Without respecting some sorts of affection, 
there was hardly any sort, having a fiber of root in reality, which I could rely 
on my force wholly to withstand.  Had I gone to him, he would have shown 
me all that was tender, and comforting, and gentle, in the honest popish 
superstition.  Then he would have tried to kindle, blow and stir up in me the 
zeal of good works.  I know not how it would all have ended.  We all think 
ourselves strong in some points; we all know ourselves weak in many; the 
probabilities are that had I visited Numero 3, Rue des Mages, at the hour and 
day appointed, I might just now, instead of writing this heretic narrative, be 
counting my beads in the cell of a certain Carmelite convent on the 
Boulevard of Crecy in Villette. (151)   
 
The danger Lucy associates with “that worthy priest” seems initially simply a matter of 
her dislike of Catholicism: the priest is as dangerous as “a Babylonish furnace.”  Yet the 
real danger to Lucy here is from kindness and affection.  In spite of her usual self-
presentation as cold and unfeeling, this visit to the confessional reveals to Lucy her own 
emotional susceptibility to kindness from others.  Lucy does not go back to visit Père 
Silas because, if she had, her “heretic narrative” – her autobiography – would have been 
                                                
37 Sally Shuttleworth, Charlotte Brontë and Victorian Psychology, notes that nineteenth-century medicine 
held that women’s bodily economy was maintained in a state of health only when nothing was obstructed; 
in particular, she discusses the belief that obstructions to menstruation could lead to permanent infertility, 
insanity, and other mental and physical maladies.  Shuttleworth notes that this belief about female bodily 




replaced by speech: “counting [her] beads” in prayer, going to confession.  The solace of 
direct human speech would have eliminated the possibility of writing.  If the kindness of 
others is nearly enough to make Lucy retreat from the public world, this suggests, it is 
speech itself that fosters such an all-consuming, self-effacing relationship.  That she goes 
on to write her “heretic” autobiography, her novel, indicates Lucy’s preference for the 
different kind of materiality and embodiment enacted through writing; she prefers the 
materiality of the written text as the medium – the incarnation, perhaps – of the writer’s 
subjectivity and presence.  Lucy’s desire to “mak[e] written language the medium of 
better utterance than faltering lips can achieve” (216) is finally enacted in the form of the 
novel. 
Protestant Lucy is in fact happiest when Paul Emanuel is away in Basseterre 
because he is with her in the ideal form: his letters, imbued with himself in a way that not 
only allows but encourages the intimate contact of touch without bodies.  While 
Kreilkamp has claimed that Villette uses text to displace and erase speaking and 
perceiving bodies from the world of the novel,38 I argue that, far from being pure, 
disembodied spirit immanent in the written text of these letters, the letters themselves are 
the full embodiments of the desired person.  That is, human bodies are not replaced by 
disembodied texts; rather, they become ideally embodied through their transformation 
into text.  The textual body that remains of Paul requires of Lucy the same kind of 
introspective faith that Protestant Christianity requires of its adherents.  Paul Emanuel’s 
                                                
38 Ivan Kreilkamp, “Unuttered,” 346.   
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name underscores his connection to the embodiment of text.  As Paul,39 he is the 
namesake of the most prolific author of the New Testament: the letters from Paul to the 
new churches at Galicia, Rome, Corinth, and elsewhere form the basis, particularly for 
Protestants, of the most important doctrines of Christianity.40  Paul (the apostle) was an 
active letter writer and a proponent of the doctrine of grace; Paul (the literature 
professor), already a dispenser of grace, becomes a writer of letters as well.  As Emanuel, 
M. Paul is named for the embodiment of God, suggesting that physical materiality, literal 
embodiment, must be in this novel an important characteristic for full humanity.  The 
combination of these names suggests that ideal embodiment in a Protestant world comes 
in the form of written text.41 
To make this unambiguous: Villette makes writing sacramental.  Consider 
Graham’s letter to Lucy.  Not only does Lucy invest it with more importance than she 
does Graham himself; in addition, the letter enacts so many connections between various 
bodies and the written text that it results in a confusion of relationships and 
identifications and invests embodiment itself with hypersignificance.  Graham is 
identified with the letter, which simultaneously erases and replaces his body as a material 
object; the letter in turn comes to signify meat that transmits sustenance when eaten; in 
                                                
39 When he is blinded on the road to Damascus, Saul the persecutor becomes Paul the apostle, suggesting 
an analogous turning away from vision by Paul Emanuel. 
40 This is in distinction to Catholics, who traditionally view Peter and his writings as the foundation of 
Christian doctrine, a view that stems from a traditional interpretation of Jesus’s naming Peter the first Pope. 
41 Stockton, God Between Their Lips, argues that Paul Emanuel’s identification with Christ makes the ideal 
beloved one who is absent; while I find Stockton’s argument very helpful in understanding the role of loss 
and desire in Villette, I read Paul’s letters as too important to constitute total loss.  Instead, I argue that the 
letters are an ideal form of embodied presence, not simply the remains of a lost lover.  For Stockton’s 
discussion of Paul Emanuel-as-Christ-as-absent lover, see in particular chapter 4. 
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this process of transference, Graham’s body is divested of its individuality and turned 
into “life-sustaining” food, which Lucy ingests but which she can never exhaust (her 
despair at losing the letter is not because she has not read it, but because she had read it 
only once and had hoped to read it repeatedly); the letter is as valuable to her as her own 
blood (synecdochically her body, her life, her identity).  In this series of exchanges, 
bodies become written language, which in turn becomes a different kind of body, which 
can then be ingested to sustain life.  In the Protestant system Brontë establishes in 
Villette, writing – particularly the written product – takes the place of the Catholic 
sacraments of confession and communion.42  In Catholicism, the bread and wine of 
communion become the body and blood of Christ through the doctrine of 
transubstantiation.  That is, the bread and wine are not simply invested with a likeness of 
Christ, nor are they analogous to the body and blood; instead, they become the “whole 
substance” of Christ.43  The exchanges and substitutions associated with Graham’s letter 
to Lucy parallel the transformation in the sacrament of communion.  If the bread and 
                                                
42 Protestants also view communion as a sacrament, one of only two (as opposed to the seven in 
Catholicism), but view it differently than do Catholics.  According to the Thirty-Nine Articles of Faith, the 
Church of England’s original statement of faith, “The Supper of the Lord is not only a sign of the love that 
Christians ought to have among themselves one to another; but rather it is a Sacrament of our Redemption 
by Christ’s death: insomuch that to such as rightly, worthily, and with faith, receive the same, the Bread 
which we break is a partaking of the Body of Christ; and likewise the Cup of Blessing is a partaking of the 
Blood of Christ.  Transubstantiation (or the change of the substance of Bread and Wine) in the Supper of 
the Lord, cannot be proved by holy Writ; but is repugnant to the plain words of Scripture, overthroweth the 
nature of a Sacrament, and hath given occasion to many superstitions.  The Body of Christ is given, taken, 
and eaten, in the Supper, only after an heavenly and spiritual manner.  And the mean [sic] whereby the 
Body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is Faith . . .”  (“Article XXVIII: Of the Lord’s Supper.”  
Retrieved 17 February 2006 from The Victorian Web <http://www.victorianweb.org>).  
43 According to the Catholic Encyclopedia, transubstantiation is “the conversion in the Eucharist of the 
whole substance of the bread into the body and of the wine into the blood of Christ, only the appearances 
(and other ‘accidents’) of bread and wine remaining” (Catholic Encyclopedia, “Transubstantiation.”  
Retrieved from <http://newadvent.org/cathen.htm>). 
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wine of communion are the Real Presence44 of Christ, the written text of Graham’s letter 
is an analogous kind of presence; further, Villette’s conception of writing insists on 
embodiment in terms that strongly parallel the actual, literal embodiment of Christ in the 
elements of communion.   
 
Conclusion: Embodied Writers and Sympathetic Readers 
I began this chapter by arguing that Villette should be read as a novel about 
writing, not as a novel about reading, noting that, given all of the episodes of reading the 
novel presents, there is a remarkable and ironic absence of examples presenting reading 
as an effective hermeneutic practice.  In an additional layer of irony, this novel that 
presents an almost endless parade of partial or inaccurate readings seems to encourage, 
even demand to be read and interpreted itself.  As an object of critical attention, Villette 
has provoked seemingly endless readings, all of which attempt to find the key to make 
sense of the novel, and most (again, ironically) attempt to find this key through a focus on 
vision, reading, and interpretation.  To state this more directly, Villette is a novel that 
presents reading practices that do not work, one that suggests, I argue, that all such 
interpretive projects ultimately fail to identify anything of importance or value; it is 
simultaneously a novel that begs to be made the object of such interpretive attention.  It 
presents episode after episode in which the hermeneutics of reading (and vision) fail, and 
then teases and cajoles its readers into offering all-incorporating interpretations of their 
                                                
44 The “Real Presence” of Christ consists of the body, blood, soul, and divinity, inseparably united in each 
particle of the bread and the wine: “In order to forestall at the very outset, the unworthy notion, that in the 
Eucharist we receive merely the Body and merely the Blood of Christ but not Christ in His entirety, the 
Council of Trent defined the Real Presence to be such as to include with Christ’s Body and His Soul and 




own.   
Heather Glen notes that vision in Villette tends to categorize and evaluate, but 
fails to provide actual connections between the seeing subject and the seen object: “The 
gaze that objectifies rather than recognizes – judging, evaluating, categorizing – is 
prominent in Lucy’s narrative.”45  She goes on to point out that such vision is rarely 
particularly successful: the novel, she claims, is full of “images of partially occluded, 
bewildered vision, of the viewer as powerless in the face of an impinging phenomenal 
world.  The perspective of Villette’s narrator is not one of authoritative distance, but 
located within the world which she seeks to describe.”46  When one takes these two 
observations together, the resulting vision fails both in motive (that is, it seeks to separate 
rather than to sympathize, to take apart rather than to connect) and in technique (it is 
“partially occluded” and “bewildered” rather than clear and effective).  
To consider writing sacramental is both to require and to enact a new kind of 
reading.  The bread of communion cannot be divided into bread and body, and the 
presence of Christ cannot be divided into the constituent parts of body, blood, soul, and 
divinity; instead, in the Catholic sacrament the communicant ingests the entirety of the 
presence simultaneously.  I suggest that Villette calls for a similar method of reading, a 
method that aims not to analyze, dissect, evaluate, and interpret in order to locate the 
definitive meaning but rather to experience and recognize.  This reading-by-faith shifts 
the focus from the distance of vision to the proximity of touch, from the detachment of 
intellect to the immediacy of affect.  In this method of reading, the boundaries between 
                                                
45 Heather Glen, Charlotte Brontë, 258. 
46 Heather Glen, Charlotte Brontë, 259. 
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texts and bodies – writing bodies, represented bodies, reading bodies – are blurred, and 
identifications proliferate. 
Lucy Snowe presents herself as cold and unfeeling, utterly unsympathetic to those 
around her, yet her private life is intensely, perhaps overly passionate, as well as keenly 
felt physiologically; she experiences her own interiority in terms of her body, and she 
explains those sensations materially.  Lucy creates herself as a text, which Paul reads 
through his body as much as through his eyes.  In this production of writing-as-
embodiment and reading-as-touch, Villette both instantiates a form of the exteriorization 
and materialization of interior experience and teaches a way to read texts/bodies through 





Reading Minds, Reading Bodies in George Eliot’s “The Lifted Veil” 
 
In Chapter 2, I argued that Villette insists upon the materiality of writing, both the 
textual product and the action, and that the novel ultimately presents written text as the 
ideal form of embodied presence.  Like Villette, George Eliot’s 1859 novella “The Lifted 
Veil” connects narrative to sensation and embodiment, but it does so through attention to 
reading rather than to writing.1  Reading, in “The Lifted Veil,” is tied thoroughly and 
inescapably to materiality and to embodiment.  All acts of reading are performed by, and 
through attention to, material bodies.  This is true even given the fact that “The Lifted 
Veil” turns on the ability of the narrator, Latimer, to read minds.  From the beginning of 
the narrative, Latimer’s own clairvoyant reading practices are anything but 
straightforward: rather than indicating his unmediated access to the minds and thoughts 
of those who surround him, they reveal instead Latimer’s intense sensitivity to and 
focused attention on his own body and on the bodies of those whose minds he reads.  
                                                
1 While in some ways this similarity is coincidental, in others it is quite significant.  One important 
consequence of the writing/reading distinction is the relative emphasis each activity places on experience 
and interpretation.  In Chapter 2, I argued that Villette is a novel that is more productively experienced than 
interpreted, and that this difference in reading technique is matched by an analogous narrative style within 
the novel itself.  Depictions of the experience of writing, of the production and consumption of text, 
suggest not only, as I argued above, that the novel presents writing as the ideal form of embodied presence, 
but also that the novel emphasizes the value of experience over that of interpretation.  The act of reading is 
interpretive rather than generative, analytical rather than creative, and it tends to value (especially in 
Villette) distance rather than involvement.  For all of these reasons, I argue that Villette – which has 
typically been read as a novel about surveillance, interpretation, and analysis – can and should be read as a 
novel about creativity, generation, and experience, all of which correspond much more comfortably to the 
productivity of writing than they do to the suspicious hermeneutics of reading.  “The Lifted Veil,” on the 
other hand, focuses both in its method and in its content on the act of reading.  Yet, as I will argue 
throughout this chapter, it consistently presents reading as a somatic activity as much as, or more than, an 
imaginative or intellectual activity.  While I will discuss this method of reading, along with its 
consequences, at length throughout this chapter, I want to note here that reading for Eliot is a 
fundamentally different project than it seems to be for Brontë, in that, for Eliot, reading is a necessary 
precursor to the development of morality: far from teaching suspicion, reading for Eliot teaches sympathy. 
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Acts of reading in “The Lifted Veil” are coextensive with attention to bodies, both the 
sensitive body of the reader and the perceptible body that is read.  Such physiologically 
attuned reading is, for Eliot, an ethical imperative, and it provides a model for the kind of 
sympathy she advocates throughout her writing. 
In many ways, Eliot is the archetypal advocate of sympathy: her insistence, both 
in her fiction and in her letters and essays, that art’s moral purpose is to expand the 
sympathies of its audience, is almost universally acknowledged.  Generally figured as 
emotional connection, sympathy in Eliot’s conception instead involves a more 
complicated set of actions: Eliot’s sympathy results in emotional connection, but begins 
at the intersection of sensation and imagination.  That is, Eliot’s sympathetic and 
sympathizing characters rely on acute and generally physiological perception in addition 
to the desire and ability to extend themselves emotionally into the experience of others.  
This version of sympathy involves both somatic perceptiveness and cognitive analysis: it 
involves, that is, the ability to read carefully.  “The Lifted Veil” seems to present a 
radical challenge to Eliot’s notion of sympathy in that its clairvoyant – and thus, 
presumably, ideally sympathetic – first-person narrator rejects his companions in favor of 
near total egoism.  Yet this apparently anomalous text shares similarities with Eliot’s 
larger body of writing: the issues of materiality and embodiedness within this novella are 
also present in the more canonical novels, and attention to this, the least typical of her 
fictional works, will shed light on the mechanisms underlying the development and 
deployment of sensation and sympathy throughout her oeuvre.   
“The Lifted Veil” presents the first-person narrative of Latimer, a supersensitive 
young man who as a young adult discovers his ability to read the thoughts of others.  
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Beginning life as the second son of a wealthy businessman, Latimer becomes aware of 
his predilection for the beautiful over the practical at an early age; based upon a 
phrenologist’s reading of his face and head, Latimer’s educational program seeks to 
remedy this situation by focusing on science and math rather than literature and 
philosophy.  As a university student, Latimer discovers his sensitivity to nature, but 
likens it to a diseased faculty, claiming that he is a being almost uniquely designed to 
experience pain.  Later, while recuperating from a prolonged illness, Latimer finds that he 
can anticipate future events and see images of unfamiliar locations.  The first instance of 
this “prevision” occurs when his father visits his sickroom and promises him a journey 
through Europe, including Prague, after his recovery.  When he hears his father say the 
word, “Prague,” Latimer has a vision of the city, which he has never visited.  (Although 
the details of the city, when he sees them on his eventual visit to Prague, do not match 
those of his vision, Latimer finds in the atmosphere a confirmation of the essential 
accuracy of his prevision.)  Some days later, alone in his room, Latimer sees his father 
enter his room accompanied by a neighbor from home and an unknown young woman; 
moments later, his father actually does enter his room, accompanied by both women from 
Latimer’s vision.  In both of these instances, Latimer’s reaction to the uncanniness of the 
vision is loss of consciousness.   
In addition to the prevision, Latimer discovers that he can read the thoughts of the 
people around him.  Latimer’s own isolation and growing misanthropy are confirmed 
when he finds, through reading his companions’ minds, only pettiness and tawdriness in 
their thoughts and internal lives.  Only Bertha, the young woman from his vision, remains 
unreadable to him; because she alone remains mysterious, Latimer pursues her in spite of 
 
133 
her self-professed heartlessness and her engagement to Latimer’s brother, marrying her 
after his brother’s sudden and unexpected death.  Upon their marriage, Latimer’s 
clairvoyance is extended to Bertha, and he reads in her mind the coldness and emptiness 
she had insisted from the beginning were there.  The remainder of his life passes in 
psychological alienation and isolation, broken by only one (early) instance of emotional 
connection and sympathy with his father, who was grieving over his lost son, Latimer’s 
brother.  Latimer gradually loses his clairvoyance, particularly regarding his wife, but 
continues to experience disorienting visions of distant places, as well as of his own future 
death, the vision of which is the impetus for the narrative itself.   
The climax of the tale begins when Bertha’s maid, Mrs. Archer, becomes 
critically ill.  Latimer’s school friend, a doctor named Charles Meunier, is visiting at the 
time of Mrs. Archer’s death; with Latimer’s permission, he performs an experiment on 
Mrs. Archer’s corpse immediately upon her death, in which he transfuses his own blood 
directly from his arm into Mrs. Archer’s neck, whereupon Mrs. Archer’s body becomes 
temporarily reanimated long enough to sit up and speak, accusing Bertha of plotting 
Latimer’s murder by poisoning.  After speaking, Mrs. Archer dies again.  Latimer and 
Bertha remain married, but Latimer begins wandering, leaving each place before he can 
form any attachments out of fear that his clairvoyance will re-emerge and he will 
rediscover the emptiness, shallowness, and banality that he expects exists within those he 
lives near.  The novella ends with Latimer narrating the beginning stages of his own 
death as he had foreseen, of angina pectoris, re-reading the narrative he has written, 
ending finally in an ellipsis as he (presumably) passes from consciousness. 
Since its initial publication in 1859, “The Lifted Veil” has excited mixed critical 
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responses.  Recognizing the apparent disjunction between “The Lifted Veil” and her 
previous writing, Eliot herself called it “a slight story of an outré kind – not a jeu d’esprit, 
but a jeu de melancolie.”2  Her publisher, John Blackwood, had reservations about it, 
particularly about the revivification scene at the end; although he published it, without 
Eliot’s name, in the July 1859 issue of Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, he declined to 
republish it, along with “Brother Jacob,” in an edition of her novels in 1866, saying, 
“They are both as clever as can be, but there is a painful want of light about them.”3  
Sally Shuttleworth has pointed out how deeply ambivalent Blackwood must have been 
about the novella to have published it anonymously and consequently to have foregone 
the cachet (and likely financial benefit) her pseudonym would have brought the magazine 
given her recent success with Scenes from Clerical Life.4  More recent criticism has 
tended to focus on one of two main themes: the anomalousness of the text to the rest of 
Eliot’s writing, or the text’s connection to the extra-literary world in which George Eliot 
lived.  More particularly, critics have focused largely on its perceived failures and lacks: 
the misogyny visible in the portrait of Bertha, the unrelenting hopelessness of its world, 
the apparent failure of both knowledge and sympathy, a sense of authorial anxiety, and 
failed experimentation.5  Those who have read the novella in a more positive light tend to 
                                                
2 Letter to John Blackwood, 31 March 1859, in Gordon S. Haight (ed.), The George Eliot Letters, 9 vols. 
(New Haven and London, 1954-78), 3:41. 
3 Letter from John Blackwood to George Eliot, 21 December 1866 (Haight, George Eliot Letters, 5:380). 
4 Sally Shuttleworth, “Introduction” to “The Lifted Veil” (“The Lifted Veil” and “Brother Jacob” [New 
York: Penguin, 2001] xi-l), xii-xiii. 
5 “The Lifted Veil” has been called variously a “failure” of aesthetic and philosophical synthesis (Carroll 
Viera, “‘The Lifted Veil’ and George Eliot’s Early Aesthetic” [SEL 24 (1984), 749-67], 750), a 
demonstration of Eliot’s “fear of disinterested, unrestricted knowledge, commonly taken as the 
intellectual’s chief characteristic” (Edward Hurley, “‘The Lifted Veil’: George Eliot as Anti-Intellectual” 
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focus on its connections to contemporary science, including the work done by George 
Henry Lewes. 
On one hand, “The Lifted Veil” appears in many ways fundamentally different 
from Eliot’s other writing; in particular, its first-person narrator, who refuses or is unable 
to sympathize with the characters whose situations he presents, seems diametrically 
opposed to the more familiar, sympathetic narrator from her other novels, such as The 
Mill on the Floss (1860), Middlemarch (1872), and Daniel Deronda (1876).  
Nevertheless, it shares with these novels a preoccupation with the necessary means and 
consequences of human connection.  Told as it is by an almost entirely egoistic narrator, 
“The Lifted Veil” clearly meditates on the ideas of sympathy and egoism.  Eliot herself 
indicated the importance of sympathy in relation to the story in the epigram that 
accompanied the republication of “The Lifted Veil” in 1878:  
Give me no light, great heaven, but such as turns 
To energy of human fellowship, 
No powers save the growing heritage  
                                                                                                                                            
[Studies in Short Fiction 5.3 (1968), 257-62], 257), an example of Eliot’s anxiety over female authorship 
and her masculine pseudonym (Deanna Kreisel, “Incognito, Intervention, and Dismemberment in Adam 
Bede” [ELH 70.2 (2003), 541-74], 543), “a dramatization of the folly of pursuing Woman on the grounds 
that she represents  a mysterious Other” (Kate Flint, “Blood, Bodies, and the Lifted Veil” [Nineteenth-
Century Literature 51.4 (1997), 455-73], 456), and an outgrowth of the “now debunked, intrinsically 
Victorian phenomena of phrenology, mesmerism, and clairvoyance” (Beryl Gray, “Pseudoscience and 
George Eliot’s ‘The Lifted Veil’” [Nineteenth-Century Fiction 36.4 (1982), 407-23], 409).  Other less 
negative critical responses have identified “The Lifted Veil” as an example of writing as vivisection 
(Richard Menke, “Fiction as Vivisection: G. H. Lewes and George Eliot” [ELH 67 (2000), 617-53], 618), 
“an intervention in this [i.e. mainstream] scientific arena” (Flint, “Blood, Bodies, and the Lifted Veil,” 
457), an exploration of the inherent tension between knowledge and mystery in Eliot’s conception of 
sympathy (Ellen Argyros, Without Any Check of Proud Reserve: Sympathy and its Limits in George Eliot's 
Novels [New York: Peter Lang, 1999], 97), and “a meditation on the role of art in relation to the new 
definitions of life and death offered by a materialist science of body and mind” (Sally Shuttleworth, 
“Introduction,” xiv).  In a very recent study, Jill Galvan, “The Narrator as Medium in George Eliot’s ‘The 
Lifted Veil’” (Victorian Studies [Winter 2006], 240-48), discusses Latimer as a mediating figure, a position 
she claims was fraught with significance for the mid-Victorians given the potential power figures such as 
telegraph operators and spirit mediums possessed not only to transmit but also to shape (or distort) 
information.  All of these critics have focused either on the tale’s reliance on contemporary science or on its 
overall strangeness (or both). 
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That makes completer manhood.6   
 
The epigram draws attention to the importance of sympathy both to her secular morality 
and to this tale: Eliot sent these lines along with a letter to Blackwood in which she 
wrote, “I care for the idea which it [“The Lifted Veil”] embodies and which justifies its 
painfulness.  A motto which I wrote on it yesterday perhaps is sufficient indication of that 
idea.”7  Like The Mill on the Floss, the writing of which Eliot suspended in order to draft 
“The Lifted Veil,” the novella portrays vividly the necessity of sympathetic connection 
between humans, although, unlike The Mill on the Floss and her other novels, this 
narrative presents a world in which such sympathetic connection appears impossible. 
On the other hand, it is true that Eliot was strongly influenced by the scientific 
research undertaken by George Henry Lewes that roughly coincided with her writing of 
“The Lifted Veil” in 1859.  Critics such as Richard Menke, Sally Shuttleworth, Kate 
Flint, and Beryl Gray have demonstrated convincingly that George Eliot was thoroughly 
steeped in the scientific discourse of the mid-nineteenth century, and this connection to 
the scientific background helps to ground some of the tale’s Gothic extravagances in the 
material world.8  However, as helpful as this information about Eliot’s participation in 
                                                
6 After her request to have “The Lifted Veil” and “Brother Jacob” included in the 1866 republication of her 
fiction was denied by John Blackwood, Eliot refused Blackwood’s request in 1873 to include “The Lifted 
Veil” in a collection of her Blackwood’s publications; however, at the same time that she refused his 
request, she sent these lines in a letter.  When “The Lifted Veil” was republished in the Cabinet edition in 
1878, the motto was included as an epigraph. 
7 Letter to John Blackwood (Haight, The George Eliot Letters, 5:380).  Quoted in Judith Siford, “‘Dismal 
Loneliness’: George Eliot, Auguste Comte and ‘The Lifted Veil’” (The George Eliot Review: The Journal 
of the George Eliot Fellowship 26 [1995], 46-52).  Siford identifies “the main thrust of the narrative, the 
‘idea’ which ‘justifies its painfulness’” as “its exposure of the catastrophe which accompanies the egoistic 
rejection of humanity” (46). 
8 See, for example, Richard Menke, “Fiction as Vivisection”; Sally Shuttleworth, “Introduction” and 
George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Science: The Make-believe of a Beginning (Cambridge: Cambridge 
 
137 
contemporary scientific conversations is, explicit references within the novella to 
scientific explorations do not account for either its anomalousness within Eliot’s canon or 
for the narrative power of the story.  Knowing the extent to which Eliot was aware of and 
relied on contemporary scientific knowledge makes some of Eliot’s references clearer, 
but it does not erase the central issues of narrative reliability or ethics, both of which the 
novella seems intent on examining.   
In this chapter, I argue that “The Lifted Veil” does more than either replicate in 
fictional form the contemporary science Eliot saw around her or replay an inverted 
version of her proverbial sympathy.  While the concept of the body as mediating entity 
clearly owes much to contemporary science, the novella should not be reduced to a 
restatement of scientific thought.  Instead, Eliot relies on contemporary science for the 
language of materiality, but then puts that concept to work in making explicit the 
theoretical grounding of her paradigmatic sympathy.  The hostility that Latimer bears 
toward those around him is certainly markedly different than the tone most of Eliot’s 
other narrators take in presenting their characters; yet while Latimer’s approach might 
appear as the opposite of Eliot’s usual sympathy, I argue that it relies on the same 
foundation of material embodiment.9  
In order to make this argument, I begin with a discussion of Eliot’s sympathy and 
its connections to narrative.  From that foundation, the chapter moves to a brief 
discussion of the science upon which Eliot drew regarding the materiality of mind and 
                                                                                                                                            
U P, 1984); Kate Flint, “Blood, Bodies, and The Lifted Veil”; and Beryl Gray, “Pseudoscience and George 
Eliot’s ‘The Lifted Veil’.”   
9 Consequently, while somatic sensitivity and awareness of materiality do not guarantee the presence of 
sympathy, the emphasis Eliot places on them is in clear distinction to the more usual conception of 
sympathy as non-material and imaginative, which I discussed in the Introduction. 
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being.  It then connects the physicality of all of Latimer’s experience and its consequent 
insistence on material embodiment both to the contemporary scientific concerns and to 
theories of reading and representation.  Finally, I discuss the implications that this 
seemingly anomalous novella has regarding the way we make sense of sensation, bodies, 
and sympathetic reading practices in Eliot’s more canonical novels. 
 
Teaching Sympathy 
Eliot’s belief in the value of sympathy is proverbial: her narrators appeal to the 
sympathies of the reader on behalf of flawed characters; her characters chart their ethical 
development by learning sympathy for each other; and in her personal letters, Marian 
Evans explained the goal of her art as the desire that her readers “should be better able to 
imagine and to feel the pains and joys of those who differ from themselves in everything 
but the broad fact of being struggling erring human creatures.”10  To say that Eliot’s 
fiction insists upon the value of sympathy has become simply a critical commonplace.11 
Yet if Eliot’s demand for sympathy is clear, the methods by which it is developed, 
and the means by which it is exercised, are quite complex.  Knowledge is one important 
                                                
10 Letter to Charles Bray, 5 July 1859 (Haight, The George Eliot Letters, 3:111). 
11 This does not, however, mean that all current critics are equally positive in their assessments of Eliot’s 
sympathy.  For example, Audrey Jaffe, Scenes of Sympathy: Identity and Representation in Victorian 
Fiction (Ithaca: Cornell U P, 2000), connects the kind of sympathy Eliot advocates to a version of 
appropriative mimesis in which the sympathizing subject has the luxury of imagining the pain of another 
without actually being threatened with the experience of pain.  Sympathy, for Jaffe, is essentially visual, a 
characteristic that emphasizes both its connection to intellect rather than to materiality and its distance from 
the point of actual experience.  Hina Nazar, “Philosophy in the Bedroom: Middlemarch and the Scandal of 
Sympathy” (Yale Journal of Criticism 15.2 [2002], 293-314), on the other hand, argues that sympathy 
depends not on clear, accurate vision but rather on “the myopia of love, the conjugal bed” (310), suggesting 
that Eliot’s sympathy depends more on the affective experience of love than it does on the intellectual 
experience of seeing-as-knowing that Jaffe describes.  For a more extended discussion of sympathy, see 
Chapter 1, above. 
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component of Eliot’s ethical sympathy, a characteristic made evident through the 
mediating presence of omniscient narrators in most of her fiction.  These third-person 
narrators have access to the cognitive and affective lives of each novel’s characters and, 
through this position of omniscient mediation, function as teachers of sympathy.  They 
implicitly suggest that knowledge of another’s situation should lead to a sympathetic 
extension between individuals, and they model that practice by presenting the interior 
conditions of characters to readers.  Even unappealing characters in Eliot’s novels tend to 
receive at least some narrative sympathy.12  In suggesting that knowledge of another’s 
situation should lead to the cultivation of sympathy, Eliot’s narrators also serve as models 
of good readers.  Through their omniscience, they perceive the actual situations of each 
character, as well as the reasons for each character’s behavior.  Knowledge allows for fair 
assessment; and, because for Eliot nearly all bad behavior – behavior that acts against the 
social impulse, that isolates rather than connects – comes from either painful experience 
or particular, uncontrollable, weaknesses, that assessment almost always leads to 
sympathy.  This is not to say that Eliot’s sympathy erases errors or indulges the egoistic 
tendencies of her imperfect characters.  However, it is to say that Eliot’s sympathy nearly 
always outweighs her criticism.   
Knowledge alone, however, is insufficient for the development of sympathy, a 
fact that Latimer’s antipathy should make clear.  If knowledge were the sole requirement, 
Latimer’s clairvoyance would guarantee his sympathetic stance, a situation numerous 
                                                
12 Casaubon, in Middlemarch, is a good example of this tendency.  When, in chapter 20, the narrator asks 
why Casaubon’s disappointed expectations are of less concern to the reader than are Dorothea’s, the effect 
is, at least briefly, to imagine Casaubon’s situation sympathetically.  Neil Hertz, “Recognizing Casaubon” 
(Glyph 6 [1979]), notes this production of narrative sympathy for Casaubon. 
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critics have identified.13  For fiction to enlarge the sympathies of its readers, a writer must 
represent the details of a situation in order to instruct readers in the development of 
ethical sympathy, and reading becomes just such an instructional figure for the 
sympathetic relations between individuals.  In order to present fictional characters, 
narrators must first “read” them: they identify relevant aspects of the fictional character, 
and then analyze and assess the value or significance of that character given the context 
of the fictional situation, often guiding their readers’ assessment as well.  Readers of 
fiction, guided by the narrator’s representations, follow the same set of actions.   
For Eliot, it is only through a detailed representation of a scene, event, individual, 
or situation that a reader’s sympathies can be expanded: consequently, attention to the 
details is a necessary component of ethical development.14  In her 1856 essay “A Natural 
History of German Life,” Eliot explicitly connects the need for close attention to 
specificity and materiality to the development of ethical sympathy.  In that essay’s well 
known description of the ethical function of realist fiction, Eliot writes, “The greatest 
benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or novelist, is the extension of our 
sympathies.  Appeals founded on generalizations and statistics require a sympathy ready-
made, a moral sentiment already in activity; but a picture of human life such as a great 
artist can give, surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that attention to what is apart 
                                                
13 See, for example, Edward Hurley, “‘The Lifted Veil’: George Eliot as Anti-Intellectual.”   
14 Naomi Schor, Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine (New York: Methuen, 1987), identifies the 
historical association between detail and the feminine in the western aesthetic tradition.  While many of 
Eliot’s most successfully sympathizing characters are female, it is not entirely clear that femaleness is a 
necessary constitutent characteristic of sympathetic relations.  Daniel Deronda, for example, provides one 
of the clearest and most successful models of the act of sympathy. 
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from themselves, which may be called the raw material of moral sentiment.”15  Although 
her immediate subject is the representation of “the people” – of laborers, rural farm 
workers, peasants – her comments insist upon a particular role of art in developing the 
ethical sympathies of its viewers.  Generalities, according to Eliot, cannot be successful 
either in teaching or even in eliciting sympathy; only a viewer or reader predisposed to 
sympathy – whose sympathy is “ready-made” – might respond sympathetically to a scene 
composed of such images.  In a letter describing the function of literature and aesthetic 
education, Eliot wrote that she valued “aesthetic teaching” as the highest kind of 
teaching, “because it deals with life in its highest complexity.”  She goes on to note, 
however, that if aesthetic teaching “lapses from the picture to the diagram,” it becomes 
the worst, “most offensive,” kind of teaching.16  Eliot’s own fiction might be considered a 
kind of aesthetic teaching, in that it connects somatic perception to ethical reflection, 
insisting all the while on specificity over generality, on the picture over the diagram.  In 
addition, Eliot’s letter makes clear the degree to which she understands specificity to be 
bound up with issues of corporeality and material experience: noting the difficulties of 
representation, Eliot asserts that she has “gone through again and again the severe effort 
of trying to make certain ideas thoroughly incarnate, as if they had revealed themselves to 
me first in the flesh and not in the spirit.”17  Ideas, for Eliot, are representable only in 
terms of embodiment and specificity; consequently, readerly sympathy, developed 
                                                
15 [Marian Evans], “A Natural History of German Life,” Westminster Review 66 (July 1856), 51-79.  
Reprinted in Nathan Sheppard (ed. and introd.), The Essays of “George Eliot.” Complete (New York: Funk 
& Wagnalls, 1883), 141-77.  145. 
16 Letter to Frederic Harrison, 15 August 1866 (Haight, The George Eliot Letters, 4:300). 
17 Letter to Frederic Harrison, 15 August 1866 (Haight, The George Eliot Letters, 4:300). 
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through close attention to the specifics of representation, is always connected to material 
and sensory experience.   
In a particularly useful reading of Eliot’s sympathy, Hina Nazar argues that 
sympathy for Eliot not only depends upon knowledge of the other for its development but 
also enables a particular kind of knowledge by the sympathizing subject.  She traces the 
epistemological value of sympathy for Eliot to the conjunction of terms like “ideas” and 
“feelings” in Eliot’s descriptions of sympathy, claiming that Eliot’s sympathy offers a 
“critique of the disembodied and disembedded cogito of Cartesian epistemology.”18  As 
Nazar reads it, Eliot’s sympathy encourages the understanding and acceptance of 
particular ideas through its attention to affective experiences, and then turns that affective 
experience into a social impulse.  While Nazar’s focus is on the importance of affect, 
particularly love, to Eliot’s epistemology of sympathy, I focus here on the presence of 
somatic feeling in that epistemology.  Eliot’s injunction “to imagine and to feel the pains 
and joys” of others incorporates not only cognition and affect but also – as is made clear 
not only by Latimer and his somatic reading practices but also by Eliot’s more 
successfully sympathetic characters like Maggie Tulliver and Dorothea Brooke – somatic 
sensation.  
 
George Eliot and Science 
“The Lifted Veil” presents a particular theory of the body that connects Eliot’s 
                                                
18 Hina Nazar, “Philosophy in the Bedroom,” 294.  Nazar identifies the connection between Eliot’s 
understanding of sympathy and the ways in which ideas and feeling are connected in the field of aesthetics, 
noting that Eliot shifts the aesthetic from feeling per se to “feeling for social others” (294; italics in 
original).  Nazar argues that Eliot’s sympathy, which combines knowledge with love, “signals a 
distinctively ‘social’ understanding of representation” (294). 
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moral sympathy with scientific materialism: the body as mediating entity not only 
between individuals but also as the sole medium through which one’s mind or soul or 
psyche – one’s self, if you will – recognizes and experiences itself in the world.  “The 
Lifted Veil” explicitly examines the necessity for sympathy in terms of understanding 
and connecting to other individuals, but it implicitly suggests that as nonmaterial as 
emotional, moral, or psychological sympathy appears to be, it is ultimately inseparable 
from material embodiment, both the body of the object of sympathy and the body of the 
sympathizing subject.  Far from being simply the housing of the psyche, that is, the body 
is the substance that shapes one’s experience of the world and of oneself, one’s own 
identity.19 
While “The Lifted Veil” does not, I argue, exist primarily as a fictionalization of 
Victorian science, it is thoroughly saturated with the images, concerns, and language of 
that science.  Richard Menke has drawn close parallels between the processes George 
Henry Lewes (and, to a lesser extent, Eliot herself) used in his laboratory experiments 
and the conditions of fictional creation itself.20  At the same time that Eliot was drafting 
“The Lifted Veil,” Lewes was researching and conducting experiments for The 
                                                
19 This accords well with what Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (trans. Colin Smith; 
London: Routledge, 1962), asserts concerning the impossibility of separating the mind from the body, and 
the perceiving body from the object being perceived. 
20 Richard Menke, “Fiction as Vivisection.” argues that “the analogy between fiction and vivisection is 
fundamental for Lewes, a veteran amateur physiologist known in the last years of his life as a defender of 
vivisection during widespread antivivisectionist agitation in Britain . . . [and that] Eliot’s evolving theory of 
the novel, developed in collaboration with Lewes and articulated in both the literary essays she wrote 
before she became a novelist and in her fiction itself, takes her close to Lewes’s theory of ecriture as 
vivisection” (618).  He goes on to connect “The Lifted Veil” to the gruesomeness and brutality of 
vivisection itself: “Latimer’s supernormal perception flays the figures around him alive, in order to reveal 
their inmost thoughts and passions ‘in all their naked skinless complication’; with the acuity of the 
microscope, his narrated perceptions piece apart their inner lives even as they live them.  His very 
consciousness, which is coextensive with the narrative itself, vivisects their minds” (629-30). 
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Physiology of Common Life (1859-60) and Sea-Side Studies at Ilfracombe, Tenby, the 
Scilly Isles, & Jersey (1858).  Menke connects Lewes’s vivisection experiments, the goal 
of which was to ascertain precisely the internal workings of various bodily systems, 
particularly the nervous system and the brain, to the goal of realist fiction to lay bare the 
inner workings of the human psyche.  In The Physiology of Common Life, Lewes 
concluded that “the brain is only one organ of the Mind, and not by any means the 
exclusive centre of Consciousness . . . Psychical Life has no special centre, any more than 
Physical Life has one special centre; it belongs to the whole, and animates the whole.”21  
This conclusion grew out of his work to determine the connections between pain and 
consciousness, both of which, Lewes came to believe, were rooted in the materiality of 
the body. 
In addition to this general sense of correspondence between science and fiction, 
Lewes’s scientific investigations are connected in two other specific instances to events 
in “The Lifted Veil.”  In particular, Lewes’s interest in the functions and processes of 
circulation and respiration appear in fictional form in Eliot’s story.  In an unsigned 
Blackwood’s article from 1858, Lewes presented preliminary research on blood and the 
circulatory system.  As part of this article, he traces the history of blood transfusions, 
noting that one of the first human experiments was done on “a madman [who] arrived in 
Paris quite naked” and “was daringly seized . . . as the fitting subject for the new 
experiment.”  After a transfusion of eight ounces of calf’s blood, followed by a good 
night’s sleep and a similar transfusion the next day, the madman awoke sane, although he 
later relapsed into madness and died after a second treatment by transfusion.  Lewes 
                                                
21 G. H. Lewes, Physiology of Common Life II, 5.   
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notes that after a series of other deaths following transfusions, “in April 1668 the 
Parliament of Paris made it criminal to attempt transfusion,”  but goes on to say that it has 
been “revived again in our own day . . . to be placed at last on a scientific basis.”  Lewes 
recognizes the current knowledge that transfusions on humans must be done with human 
blood, but claims that “the practice is in some urgent cases not only safe, but forms the 
sole remedy.”22  In The Physiology of Common Life, published two years later, Lewes 
elaborates on this discussion of blood and circulation.  For Lewes, the circulatory system, 
like the nervous system, works differently in lower animals: claiming first that constant 
blood circulation to the nerves is necessary for life, he clarifies this by saying, “This is 
only true, however, of warm-blooded animals.  Frogs may have the aorta tied, and still 
possess the power of hopping about for some hours.  They will even do this for an hour, 
when the heart and all the viscera are taken away.”23  For higher animals and humans, 
blood is enormously powerful: Lewes relates claims by medical authorities that dog’s 
blood injected into a dead rabbit temporarily revived it, and that a heart that has stopped 
beating will begin beating again if arterial blood is injected into it.  Latimer’s vision of 
his own death is similarly grounded in Lewes’s scientific knowledge.  Lewes records the 
story of a man named Déal, living in France, who wanted to produce a “sensation” and 
was planning to commit suicide.  He lit a charcoal fire in his closed room, and began to 
write a description of his sensations as the toxic fumes filled the room.  The man’s 
suicide note, and his dead body, were found later, and his note, much like Latimer’s, 
                                                
22 [G. H. Lewes], “Blood” (Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine v. 83 [June 1858], 687-702), 698. 
23 G. H. Lewes, The Physiology of Common Life I:193. 
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simply trails off, preceded by illegible handwriting.24  It seems clear from this that both 
Latimer’s own death and the reanimation scene at the end of “The Lifted Veil” are drawn 
directly from the most contemporary scientific and medical practice and experience.  
Latimer’s painful suffocation, and Mrs. Archer’s revivification, may be intended to 
provoke horror, but they do so through deliberately scientific means.25 
 
“A being finely organized for pain”: Materiality and Sensation in “The Lifted Veil” 
Latimer’s clairvoyance would seem to indicate an emphasis of value on the non-
material, on what cannot be gained through the material, embodied senses.  After all, the 
unspoken thoughts of those around him impinge on Latimer’s own consciousness in a 
way that seems to bypass sensory perception altogether.  The ability to read minds 
suggests the existence of a private, interior identity and experience separate from the 
presence of the body: if private mental processes were commonly accessible through the 
senses, they would be external and public rather than private, and without the existence of 
such mental processes there would be nothing for a clairvoyant to read.  A vital, if 
implicit, distinction between clairvoyance and other technologies of reading identity, 
such as physiognomy, lies in the complete separation between the perceptible material 
identity and the hidden mental processes.  Physiognomy asserts that the body is 
                                                
24 Lewes, The Physiology of Common Life, 1:240-241.  Peter Garratt, “‘A Dizzy Sense of Unreality’: 
Science, Realism, and George Eliot’s The Lifted Veil (Ecloga Online Journal [Autumn 2003), n.p.; Scottish 
Graduate Research Conference; 
<http://www.strath.ac.uk/ecloga/documents/A%20Dizzy%20Sense%2of%20Unreality.doc>), pays 
extended attention to Lewes’s interest in this event, connecting it to what he identifies as an “unnarratable 
moment [Latimer’s own death] which highlights the inadequacy of representational language.”  
25 Sally Shuttleworth, in her “Introduction” to “The Lifted Veil,” makes the point that, “although Eliot’s 
tale seems to brush with the supernatural, its language throughout belongs firmly to the world of 
contemporary science” (xiv).  
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analogous to the character, that the two – being parts of the same whole – must reflect 
each other.  Thus, for physiognomists, facial expressions, mannerisms, vocal intonations, 
gestures, or other bodily signifiers serve as illustrative evidence of unseen mental 
processes and characteristics.  This is not how Latimer’s clairvoyance is characterized.  
Because clairvoyance works with unmediated access to another’s thoughts, it implicitly 
denies any reliance on clues that are perceptible by the senses.   
Nevertheless, I argue in this chapter that Latimer’s mind-reading is more attentive 
to his sensory experience of his own body than it is to the private processes of his 
companions’ minds.  One consequence of this argument may be that Latimer is thus an 
unreliable narrator.  While this may be true, and while several critics have made just this 
argument, Latimer’s reliability is not my focus here, nor do I believe it was Eliot’s.  The 
truth-value of Latimer’s narrative is not what the text prioritizes, even though it may be 
readers’ initial concern.  Instead, it is Latimer’s insistence on his own bodily sensitivity 
as a technology of reading that is highlighted.  In this section, I examine the somatic 
foundation of Latimer’s experience of and interaction with the material world in order to 
argue that, whatever else Latimer may claim to be reading, he is always paying primary 
and most significant attention to the sensations and processes of his own body.26 
Latimer opens his narrative with a description of the scene of his own death, 
                                                
26 Nicholas Dames, “Wave-Theories and Affective Physiologies: The Cognitive Strain in Victorian Novel 
Theories” (Victorian Studies 46.2 [Winter 2004], 206-16), argues that Victorian theories of the novel 
emphasize the affective and physiological responses of readers far more than they focus on epistemology, 
which Dames associates with the novel theories of Henry James and later theorists.  Dames argues that 
early genre theory combined “a positivist physiological psychology” and “aesthetic inquiry” along with “a 
sociology of a mass reading public” in order to produce a theory of the “novel-as-mode-of-consumption” 
(209).  Latimer’s reading processes, directed as they are at the people around him while simultaneously 
referring so clearly to his own somatic experiences, provide a telling example of such an affective and 
physiological model of reading. 
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followed immediately by an invocation pleading for sympathy from his readers.  In this 
request for sympathy, as is common throughout the tale, it is the body, atomized into its 
disarticulated parts, that acts as agent, not either the individual subjectivity nor even the 
intact body itself: 
While the heart beats, bruise it – it is your only opportunity; while the eye 
can still turn towards you with moist timid entreaty, freeze it with an icy 
unanswering gaze; while the ear, that delicate messenger to the inmost 
sanctuary of the soul, can still take in the tones of kindness, put it off with 
hard civility, or sneering compliment, or envious affectation of indifference; 
while the creative brain can still throb with the sense of injustice, with the 
yearning for brotherly recognition – make haste – oppress it with your ill-
considered judgments, your trivial comparisons, your careless 
misrepresentation.  The heart will by-and-by be still . . . ; the eye will cease to 
entreat; the ear will be deaf; the brain will have ceased from all wants as well 
as from all work.27 
 
Explicitly a request for readerly sympathy and a statement of despair at its impossibility, 
this passage is remarkable for its insistence on the materiality both of that request and of 
the evidence of sympathy and alienation.  It is the beating heart, the “entreat[ing]” eye, 
the receptive ear that plead for and register the presence and absence of sympathy.  The 
opportunity to bruise the heart ends with the recipient’s death, as does the chance to 
“freeze” the hopeful eye and “put off” the receptive ear.  Latimer’s conception of the 
interaction between narrator and reader seems both hostile and surprisingly somatic: the 
direct, second-person address places the absence of sympathy squarely in his reader’s 
field of (failed) obligation, while simultaneously making the request for, and denial of, 
readerly sympathy a matter of the desire of distinct, disconnected organs.  It is the 
yearning eye, the hopeful ear, the “creative” brain that desire the reader’s response and 
                                                
27 George Eliot, “The Lifted Veil” in Sally Shuttleworth (ed.), “The Lifted Veil” and “Brother Jacob” 
(London: Penguin Books, 2001), 4.  All subsequent citations will be made to this edition and will be cited 
parenthetically as LV. 
 
149 
that sustain injury through the reader’s rejection.  This passage effectively accentuates the 
fundamental somaticism of Latimer’s world and the degree to which he imagines human 
interaction, whether successful or thwarted, to be effected by means of the body. 
As Latimer’s introduction indicates, material sensation, particularly tactility, is the 
means through which he experiences every aspect of his existence.  Latimer describes the 
experience of alienation and rejection in terms of crushing, bruising, and pressure, and his 
prevision of his death from angina pectoris connects issues of tactility, materiality, 
alienation, and lack of voice:  
Just as I am watching a tongue of blue flame rising in the fire, and my 
lamp is burning low, the horrible contraction will begin at my chest.  I shall 
only have time to reach the bell, and pull it violently, before the sense of 
suffocation will come.  No one will answer my bell.  I know why.  My two 
servants are lovers, and will have quarreled.  My housekeeper will have 
rushed out of the house in a fury, two hours before, hoping that Perry will 
believe she has gone to drown herself.  Perry is alarmed at last, and is gone 
out after her.  The little scullery-maid is asleep on a bench: she never answers 
the bell; it does not wake her.  The sense of suffocation increases: my lamp 
goes out with a horrible stench: I make a great effort, and snatch at the bell 
again.  I long for life, and there is no help.  I thirsted for the unknown: the 
thirst is gone.  O God, let me stay with the known, and be weary of it: I am 
content.  Agony of pain and suffocation – and all the while the earth, the 
fields, the pebbly brook at the bottom of the rookery, the fresh scent after the 
rain, the light of the morning through my chamber-window, the warmth of 
the hearth after the frosty air – will darkness close over them for ever? 
Darkness – darkness – no pain – nothing but darkness: but I am passing 
on and on through the darkness: my thought stays in the darkness, but always 
with a sense of moving onward. . . .  (LV 3-4; ellipsis in original) 
 
Sally Shuttleworth has identified the nineteenth-century association of fear and 
strangulation28 with angina pectoris, suggesting as a consequence that “this is a highly 
                                                
28 Etymologically, “angina” comes from the Greek word meaning “strangling.”  “Angina.”  Oxford English 
Dictionary Online (Oxford: Oxford U P, 2006). 
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appropriate disease for Latimer.”29  The 1833 Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine 
describes it as producing “something peculiar in its pain, whatever be its degree . . . as if 
it were combined with something of a mental quality.  There is a feeling and a fear of 
impending death; and the primary symptoms of corporeal disorder are speedily modified 
by the consequences of mental impressions conveyed through the nervous system.”30   
In addition to having a solid grounding in nineteenth-century medicine, Latimer’s 
condition again highlights the degree to which his experience of the world around him, 
including his experience of his own subjectivity, stems from his body.  His figurative 
voicelessness is given literal shape in the strangulation experienced in angina: the 
“horrible contraction” in his chest, the “agony of pain and suffocation” toward the end.  
Further, while Latimer here explicitly names his desire for mystery as something he 
might have wished for in death, the list of things he will miss is entirely material and 
sensory: he will miss the texture of the brook, the smell of rain, the sun’s light, the 
hearth’s warmth.  Of these, only one – the sun’s light – is visual, while the others are 
immediate and tactile: texture and heat are experienced through the skin, through direct 
contact with another object, while smell can operate at a distance but nevertheless 
behaves in a material (rather than imaginative) way.  Latimer experiences the fear 
associated with his condition somatically, as a sense of bodily strangulation; he also 
articulates his to-be-unfulfilled desire for life in terms of sensory experience, particularly 
touch.  Materiality thus undergirds every aspect of Latimer’s experience of the world and 
                                                
29 Sally Shuttleworth, “Introduction,” footnote 1 (84-85). 
30 John Forbes, “Angina Pectoris,” in John Forbes, Alexander Tweedie, and John Conolly (eds.), 
Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine, 4 vols. (London: Sherwood, Gilbert, and Piper, 1833), I:82; quoted in 
Shuttleworth, “Introduction,” footnote 1, 84. 
 
151 
of himself in it: feelings in and on his body mediate all of Latimer’s experience of 
connection and alienation, including his clairvoyance and prevision.   
That he is prompted to relate his narrative by a vision of the scene of his own 
painful death is only one of many instances in which Latimer repeatedly draws attention 
to his own physical sensations.  While Latimer’s prevision and clairvoyance might seem 
to suggest vision as his primary mode of interaction, it is in fact tactility that structures 
his encounters with the world to a far greater extent than does vision: even within his 
prevision, the sensations Latimer reports are direct and material rather than distant and 
visual.  His “vision” has the characteristics of direct experience rather than observation.  
Even as a child, Latimer experiences the world through his body, in particular 
through touch rather than vision, a tendency accentuated by the fact that in childhood he 
“had a complaint of the eyes that made me blind for a little while” (LV 5).  Latimer’s 
childhood blindness makes him both more reliant on, and more susceptible to, tactile (and 
otherwise non-visual) interaction with his surroundings, with other people, and with 
himself.  The immediacy, proximity, and reciprocity of touch insist upon materiality in a 
way that vision does not.  Instead of describing his childhood in terms of vision, then, 
Latimer describes it in strikingly tactile terms: a lasting memory is of his mother’s 
“caress as she held me on her knee – her arms round my little body, her cheek pressed on 
mine” (LV 5).  The whole world becomes material and tactile to Latimer, with sound in 
particular a sense he experiences as intense, even overwhelming, bodily contact:  
I remember still the trepidation and delicious excitement with which I was 
affected by the tramping of the horses on the pavement in the echoing stables, 
by the loud resonance of the grooms’ voices, by the booming bark of the dogs 
as my father’s carriage thundered under the archway of the courtyard, by the 
din of the gong as it gave notice of luncheon and dinner.  The measured 
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tramp of soldiery which I sometimes heard – for my father’s house lay near a 
county town where there were large barracks – made me sob and tremble; 
and yet when they were gone past, I longed for them to come back again.  
(LV 5)   
 
Tramping, echoing, resonance, booming, thundered, din, gong, tramp: the clarity and 
precision, to say nothing of the intensity, with which these sounds are rendered indicate 
their importance in Latimer’s experience.  Further, the language strongly suggests 
impact; all sound is produced through the contact of sound waves on the surface of the 
eardrum, but these sounds make especially clear their foundation in touch, friction, 
impact: horses’ hooves and carriage wheels on pavement, a gong being struck, soldiers’ 
boots on the road.   
The narrative does not explain when Latimer’s blindness disappeared, so it is not 
clear whether the intensity of his sense experience may be due to his lack of vision; in 
any case, however, Latimer here represents a past sense experience in graphically tactile 
terms, making explicit as he does so the emotion produced through that contact.  In fact, 
even the memory of his mother’s touch produces “sensation”: “even now, after the dreary 
lapse of long years, a slight trace of sensation accompanies the remembrance of her 
caress as she held me on her knee” (LV 5).  The “trace of sensation” suggests that her 
touch creates a lasting impression on his skin, making tactility inescapably material, even 
permanent.  That “trace” also suggests that Latimer bears the marks of the world on his 
body, that his interaction with others has always been mediated by his own somatic 
experience.  His blindness simply emphasizes the thorough materiality of Latimer’s 
sensation: he cannot keep the world at a distance but is instead held close by it, and is in 
many cases the acted-upon object rather than the agent.  The degree to which Latimer is 
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marked by his contact with the world recalls the King of Labassacoeur, into whose face 
written characters are engraved.  The tone of Latimer’s situation is not the high 
seriousness of the king’s, but Latimer’s sense of markedness is similar and suggests a 
similar imposition of the material world upon his body and his consciousness. 
An important component of Latimer’s early sensory experience, one mirrored in 
his later clairvoyance, is the intrusiveness with which sensory phenomena impinge on his 
bodily boundaries.  The “trepidation and delicious excitement” produced by sounds that 
made him “sob and tremble” literally invade his space, force themselves on his ear, on his 
physical body, although Latimer’s reaction to the invasiveness of sensory experience is 
far from simple, in that if the intrusiveness of the sounds is painful, Latimer also longs for 
it to recur.  Later, the touch of Mr. Letherall, the phrenologist, is figured as an explicitly 
invasive one, which provokes unmixed feelings of resentment at the intrusion as he uses 
his hands to read and interpret Latimer’s face and skull: he “took my small head between 
his large hands, and pressed it here and there in an exploratory, suspicious manner – then 
placed each of his great thumbs on my temples, and pushed me a little way from him, and 
stared at me with glittering spectacles” (LV 6).  The phrenologist’s touch produces in 
Latimer “a state of tremor” and “the agitation of my first hatred” at the commodification 
of his body by “this big, spectacled man, who pulled my head about as if he wanted to 
buy and cheapen it” (LV 6).  Here, touch is the means not by which Latimer actively 
experiences his world but rather the means by which he is understood, read, measured as 
a passive object, evaluated, commodified by one in a hierarchical position of authority 
over him.  Touch, then, is not simply a means of interaction with the world: it is also an 
invasion of Latimer’s subjectivity, a material attack against which he must protect 
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himself.   The educational program that grows out of the phrenological reading is also 
presented in acutely physiological terms: “I was hungry for human deeds and human 
emotions, so I was to be plentifully crammed with the mechanical powers, the elementary 
bodies, and the phenomena of electricity and magnetism” (LV 6).  Turning to the 
sublimity of nature during his time in Geneva, Latimer finds himself not removed from 
the realm of embodied senses to disembodied intellect but rather, ironically, anchored 
even more firmly in his body: his sensitivity to “Nature in all her awful loveliness” (LV 
7) gives his life in Switzerland “a perpetual state of exaltation” (LV 7), indicating that his 
experience of the sublime both takes him out of and paradoxically embeds him more 
firmly in his own body and its sensations. 
All of this should make clear the degree to which Latimer encounters the world 
through his senses, particularly through the sense of touch.  For Latimer, even his visions 
take place in the register of the somatic and tactile rather than the purely visual, 
suggesting the importance of materiality and immediacy in any encounter with the world 
or with other individuals.  Even more significantly, though, Latimer’s experience of his 
own body and its sensations structures his perception of the world: that is, it is not simply 
that the phenomenal world impinges on his bodily boundaries in an inescapable way but 
that Latimer is constantly aware of and attuned to his sense of his bodily self.  Latimer’s 
experience of his own body is generally that of pathology, and it shapes his perception of 
everything else.  In particular, the physical and intellectual inadequacy that the 
phrenological reading reveals also highlights his insufficient masculinity and his belief 
that his physical inadequacy is necessarily connected to his poetic sensibility.   
While the phrenological reading is designed to provide guidance to Latimer’s 
 
155 
educational program in order to capitalize on strengths and make up for weaknesses, its 
lasting impact on Latimer is to connect explicitly, for the first time, Latimer’s body and 
his mind.  Latimer represents himself as a child who was both emotionally and physically 
sensitive, but the phrenological reading locates all of Latimer’s emotional and 
psychological experiences firmly in his body.  His emotional sensitivity, according to 
phrenology, is preceded by and grounded in particular material characteristics of his 
body.  This reading teaches Latimer that his mental and emotional experiences are 
formed and controlled by his body; this inseparability of mental and bodily existence and 
experience means that for Latimer, every cognitive or affective experience or response is 
already predetermined by his body.  If Latimer represents his childhood experiences 
before the reading largely in terms of physiological sensation, after the reading it is the 
thorough saturation of the mental with the somatic that receives strongest emphasis.  
Phrenology locates all emotional, imaginative, and psychic experience in the body; 
likewise, Latimer experiences and knows his mind only insofar as he knows and 
experiences his own body.   
Further, the phrenological reading convinces him that his body itself, in fact his 
entire constitution, is irremediably flawed: “A better-constituted boy would certainly 
have profited under my intelligent tutors” (LV 6).  Latimer learns from the phrenologist 
that he is deficient through Mr. Letherall’s “suspicious” examination of Latimer’s skull, 
which leads to a conclusion of inadequacy: “The contemplation appeared to displease 
him, for he frowned sternly, and said to my father, drawing his thumbs across my 
eyebrows – ‘The deficiency is there, sir – there; and here,’ he added, touching the upper 
sides of my head, ‘here is the excess.  That must be brought out, sir, and this must be laid 
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to sleep’” (LV 6).31  Latimer’s inadequacy relates explicitly to his intellectual capacity; 
yet the connections that phrenology makes between intellect and body make clear that an 
intellectual defect is coextensive with a physical defect.  The physical evidence of the 
phrenologist’s judgment only reinforces Latimer’s own sense of his physical 
defectiveness: he is an organism “in an uncongenial medium” (LV 7), “a human being 
whose nature is not adjusted to simple human conditions” (LV 12).32  He describes 
himself as “fragile, nervous, ineffectual” (LV 14), with a face that bears “the stamp of a 
morbid organization, framed for passive suffering” (LV 14).  Further, he characterizes his 
visions as “a disease – a sort of intermittent delirium, concentrating [his] energy of brain 
into moments of unhealthy activity” (LV 12), suggesting that the visions are a form of 
“diseased participation in other people’s consciousness” (LV 18).  These descriptions 
underscore Latimer’s alienation from the social body around him and highlight the degree 
to which the somatic and psychic are interpenetrative.   
 
                                                
31 Based on this description, it is not entirely clear which organs Mr. Letherall identifies as deficient or 
excessive.  However, George Combe’s phrenological chart suggests that the eyebrows are associated with 
size, weight, number, and order.  This makes sense given Latimer’s later description of the educational 
program instituted for him, with its emphasis on mathematics and science.  The upper head is more difficult 
to determine, but it could be associated with the organ of ideality, which Combe describes thus: “Uses: 
Love of the beautiful and splendid, desire of excellence, poetic feeling. – Abuses: Extravagance and absurd 
enthusiasm, preference of the showy and glaring to the solid and useful, a tendency to dwell in the region of 
fancy and to neglect the duties of life.”  (George Combe, The Constitution of Man Considered in Relation 
to External Objects [1828], 5th edn. [Edinburgh: John Anderson, 1835]; reprinted in Jenny Bourne Taylor 
and Sally Shuttleworth [eds.], Embodied Selves: An Anthology of Psychological Texts 1830-1890 [Oxford: 
Clarendon P, 1998], 34). 
32 According to physiologists like G. H. Lewes, the medium was generally understood as the social or 
environmental situation in which an organism lived.  In this novella, it seems likely that Latimer’s 
“medium” was his own body, which does in fact prove “uncongenial.”  This seems particularly possible 
when we consider Latimer’s assertion  that he had a “poet’s sensibility” without the poet’s “voice”: Latimer 




Latimer’s excessive sensitivity and impracticality, given bodily substance through 
the phrenological reading, also establish the association Latimer maintains through the 
end of his narrative between his own physical inadequacy and his poetic sensibility: “I 
thoroughly disliked my own physique, and nothing but the belief that it was a condition 
of poetic genius would have reconciled me to it” (LV 14).  Latimer suggests that his 
physical weakness is a necessary corollary of his artistic gifts, an association that 
simultaneously implies that his brother’s strong and healthy body houses a mediocre 
mind.  If Latimer is “fragile, nervous, ineffectual,” with a “half-womanish, half-ghostly 
beauty” (LV 14), his brother is “now a handsome self-confident man of six-and-twenty” 
(LV 14); underneath that handsome exterior, however, Latimer’s clairvoyance detects 
only “petty promptings of his conceit and his love of patronage,” along with “self-
complacent belief in Bertha Grant’s passion for him” and “half-pitying contempt” for 
Latimer himself (LV 14-15).  Latimer associates his own physical weakness and 
unattractiveness with heightened emotional sensitivity and poetic potential, and equates 
Alfred’s physical attractiveness with, at best, banality and, at worst, selfishness and 
contempt. 
Alfred soon becomes the primary focus of Latimer’s clairvoyance and, 
consequently, of his animosity:  
Alfred . . . was bent on being extremely friendly and brother-like to me.  He 
had the superficial kindness of a good-humoured, self-satisfied nature, that 
fears no rivalry, and has encountered no contrarities.  I am not sure that my 
disposition was good enough for me to have been quite free from envy 
towards him, even if our desires had not clashed, and if I had been in the 
healthy human condition which admits of generous confidence and charitable 
construction.  There must always have been an antipathy between our 
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natures.  As it was, he became in a few weeks an object of intense hatred to 
me; and when he entered the room, still more when he spoke, it was as if a 
sensation of grating metal had set my teeth on edge.  My diseased 
consciousness was more intensely and continually occupied with his thoughts 
and emotions, than with those of any other person who came in my way.  I 
was perpetually exasperated with the petty promptings of his conceit and his 
love of patronage, with his self-complacent belief in Bertha Grant’s passion 
for him, with his half-pitying contempt for me – seen not in the ordinary 
indications of intonation and phrase and slight action, which an acute and 
suspicious mind is on the watch for, but in all their naked skinless 
complication.  (LV 14-15) 
 
That Latimer claims to be reading Alfred’s mind in making these determinations is not 
clear until almost two-thirds of the way through the passage when his “diseased 
consciousness” is first mentioned; prior to this, the insights Latimer is developing about 
Alfred’s character seem based on inferences he is making rather than on direct 
knowledge.  At some point, Latimer’s horror at the deceptively attractive and average 
appearance of those around him gives way to an assumption that such average people 
must harbor nastiness inside them.  That is, his brother looks healthy, is reasonably 
attractive, and seems generally kind enough to Latimer, yet Latimer believes his brother 
to be stupid and condescending; he bases this premise on the idea that healthy, average 
people like his brother must feel sorry for and condescend toward invalids like Latimer.  
Since he also believes that strong bodies cannot house strong intellects, Latimer reaches 
the reasonable conclusion that his brother must be dull.  According to Latimer, Alfred 
was “florid, broad-chested, and self-complacent, feeling what a good-natured fellow he 
was not to behave insolently to us all on the strength of his great advantages;” “the good 
of this world falls” to people like his brother, who possess “ready dullness, healthy 
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selfishness, good-tempered conceit – these are the keys to happiness” (LV 25).33 
Further, in those instances in which Latimer has no particular clairvoyant access 
to the thoughts or intentions of another, his ability to read by the usual signs appears 
weak.  For example, Latimer depicts Bertha as narrator and himself as helpless reader in 
their interactions before Alfred’s death: 
And she made me believe that she loved me. . . . It costs a woman so little 
effort to besot us in this way!  A half-repressed word, a moment’s unexpected 
silence, even an easy fit of petulance on our account, will serve us as hashish 
for a long while.  Out of the subtlest web of scarcely perceptible signs, she set 
me weaving the fancy that she had always unconsciously loved me better 
than Alfred, but that, with the ignorant fluttered sensibility of a young girl, 
she had been imposed on by the charm that lay for her in the distinction of 
being admired and chosen by a man who made so brilliant a figure in the 
world as my brother.  (LV 30) 
 
Although he says here that he was the weaver of the fancy, Latimer depicts Bertha as the 
one clearly in control of this particular narrative, while he is left helplessly to read the 
story.  He notes “the subtlest looks and phrases – feminine nothings which could never be 
quoted against her” (LV 16), the “words or slight actions” (LV 17) she uses to convince 
him that she preferred him over his brother.  Even given this narrative control of 
Bertha’s, however, Latimer appears not to read the signs he relates to his own readers, not 
                                                
33 For a helpful analysis of nineteenth-century associations between strong intellects and healthy bodies, see 
Tamara Wagner, “‘Overpowering Vitality’: Nostalgia and Men of Sensibility in the Fiction of Wilkie 
Collins” (Modern Language Quarterly 63.4 [Dec. 2002], 471-500), who suggests that Collins, along with 
some other mid- and late-Victorian writers, challenged the growing association between health and 
morality or intellect developed at least partly by the “muscular Christianity” movement.  Wagner connects 
Collins’s atypical male characters, who “eschew Victorian fashions of muscular masculinity,” to “the 
sentimental heroes of the late-eighteenth-century novel of sentiment or sensibility” (471).  Latimer seems to 
be a similar masculine anti-hero, particularly given his self-identification as an artist and poet.  A similar 
inversion of the usual association between beauty and goodness can be seen in other nineteenth-century 
fiction, including, for example, Jane Eyre, in which the conventionally unattractive Jane possesses not only 
acute intelligence but a strong sense of morality and justice, in contrast to the beautiful but selfish 
Georgiana.  And Eliot’s Maggie Tulliver is the clear moral force of The Mill on the Floss, not her beautiful 




even to believe Bertha’s own statements concerning her coldness and cruelness.  His first 
vision of Bertha (confirmed later by the actual meeting) is of a person whose “face had 
not a girlish expression: the features were sharp, the pale grey eyes at once acute, restless, 
and sarcastic.  They were fixed on me in half-smiling curiosity, and I felt a painful 
sensation as if a sharp wind were cutting me” (LV 12).  Nothing in her appearance 
suggests warmth or affection, and nothing in her self-presentation suggests a different 
character: “She was keen, sarcastic, unimaginative, prematurely cynical, remaining 
critical and unmoved in the most impressive scenes, inclined to dissect all my favourite 
poems” (LV 15).  Nothing in the behavior that he reports about her confirms his claim 
that “Bertha’s behaviour towards me was such as to encourage all my illusions” (LV 16).  
In fact, Latimer interprets even her direct statements of her coldness as evidence of her 
(unstated) feelings toward him:  
‘Tasso!’ she said, seizing my wrist, and peeping round into my face, ‘are you 
really beginning to discern what a heartless girl I am?  Why, you are not half 
the poet I thought you were; you are actually capable of believing the truth 
about me.’  The shadow passed from between us, and was no longer the 
object nearest to me.  The girl whose light fingers grasped me, whose elfish 
charming face looked into mine – who, I thought, was betraying an interest in 
my feelings that she would not have directly avowed, -- this warm-breathing 
presence again possessed my senses and imagination like a returning siren 
melody which had been overpowered for an instant by the roar of threatening 
waves.  (LV 26-27) 
 
Bertha’s touch, her “warm-breathing presence,” override the very words she says, the 
truth she speaks about herself.  Latimer misreads those signs, particularly her touch, as 
marks of affection from her instead of the literal statements of truth they are.  As with his 
clairvoyance, Latimer’s perception of Bertha is mediated by his own body and its 
sensations.  In the absence of unmediated knowledge about Bertha, Latimer relies on his 
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own senses and sensations, grounded in his understanding of his own body, and imagines 
that what he desires actually exists. 
That Latimer’s insight reveals the internal lives of others to be congruous with 
their external appearance indicates one of three possibilities: 1) Appearance and 
interiority, surface and depth, actually coincide, and Latimer’s clairvoyance provides an 
accurate reading of the thoughts and minds of other characters; 2) Latimer’s insight is 
actually simply a method of close reading, and stems from very careful attention to 
external signifiers rather than a supernatural awareness of internal, mental activities; or 3) 
Latimer’s insight is a projection of his own self-awareness, shaped by his experience of 
alienation, and relies neither on careful attention to visible signifiers nor on direct, 
unmediated access to other characters’ internal lives.  All three cases have implications 
for reading the connections between surface and depth, physiology and affective 
experience, bodies and interiority.  Although the narrative encourages us as its readers to 
believe that Latimer’s mind-reading ability exists literally, that narrative is Latimer’s own 
production, without any critical distance or other verification.34  Latimer’s narrative 
makes clear not that he has unmediated access to the thoughts – the internal life, the 
meaning if you will – of others, but rather just how entirely mediated any act of reading is 
and how many layers exist between any reader and the meaning of any text: it calls into 
question, in fact, the degree to which such static and absolute meaning can even be said 
to exist in the absence of one able to decipher it. 
Whether Latimer’s assessment of his brother and, later, of Bertha, is correct is less 
                                                
34 As I noted above, it is not my purpose to establish Latimer’s lack of credibility as a narrator; instead of 
credibility, what the lack of verification regarding Latimer’s narrative suggests is that the content itself may 
not be at issue but rather his process of reading. 
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important than is establishing the foundation of that assessment.  Latimer’s insistence on 
his brother’s banality and shallowness of character, always presented in implicit or 
explicit opposition to Latimer’s own depth of affective experience, begins to suggest 
simply a new formula for assessment rather than actual unmediated access to Alfred’s 
thoughts.  Latimer’s hyperawareness of his own (inadequate, unhealthy, insufficiently 
masculine) body seems to be at least as significant a factor in Latimer’s evaluation of his 
brother as is clairvoyant access to Alfred’s mind.  My point here is not to suggest that 
Eliot’s novella is not really about clairvoyance and prevision, nor is it to impugn 
Latimer’s credibility as a narrator, although that may be a consequence.  Instead, what 
becomes clear through attention to the presence of material embodiment and sensory 
experience is that all reading and interpretive practices, including Latimer’s clairvoyance, 
take place by means of material sensitivity rather than through imagination or even 
cognition.35  All acts of reading, in “The Lifted Veil,” are performed by, and through 
close attention to, bodies.  Latimer’s sense of his own body, and his means of 
encountering the world somatically, through bodily senses, structures all of his 
interactions with other people, whether he encounters them clairvoyantly or more 
conventionally.   
Even as a child, Latimer’s senses interrupt his analysis: for Latimer, strong 
affective and somatic feeling prevents good reading.  Contrary to what his education is 
intended to teach him, Latimer’s focus throughout his youth is on immediacy and 
experience, often sense experience, rather than interpretation or understanding, and this 
                                                
35 As I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, reading is a necessary part of the development and 
deployment of sympathy for Eliot.  That reading practices in “The Lifted Veil” are based so strongly in 
somatic experience suggests that sympathy (also, for Eliot, a kind of reading practice) is similarly somatic. 
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emphasis on the immediacy of bodily, sensory experience over interpretation and analysis 
is consistent throughout Latimer’s narrative.  Lacking the desire to be “an improved man 
. . . who knew the reason why water ran down-hill,” Latimer is “glad of the running 
water”: “I did not want to know why it ran; I had perfect confidence that there were good 
reasons for what was so very beautiful” (LV 7).  This emphasis on aesthetic experience36 
over interpretation has important consequences for how Latimer later engages with the 
people around him and calls into question what exactly Latimer is reading concerning his 
companions.   
I have argued that all acts of reading in “The Lifted Veil” are necessarily material 
and involve the body of the reader.  Within this system of reading, Latimer is both a 
typical and a careful reader in that he is somatically sensitive and responsive.  The actual 
reliability of Latimer’s mind-reading ability may be less important ultimately than the 
fact that the narrative itself invites doubt: what Latimer discovers in his companions’ 
minds is ultimately too predictable for his readings to be accepted at face value as 
products of clairvoyance.  Because my purpose is not simply to question Latimer’s 
reliability, I instead want to draw attention to the foundation of reading that Eliot presents 
in this novella.  This story does not, I think, simply represent the disastrous effects of a 
narrator who knows everything but still fails to sympathize.  Instead, it demonstrates 
what happens when reading, which is always somatically sensitive, becomes self-
referential and circular.  That is to say, I argue that if Latimer is unreliable as a narrator, it 
is not because he lies and misleads regarding what he finds in the minds and psyches of 
                                                
36 Again, this emphasis on experience rather than interpretation echoes Nicholas Dames’s argument 
regarding Victorian theories of novel-reading. 
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those around him, but because he is always simply reading himself: when he reads 
Alfred’s banality, he is more accurately reading his own inadequate, unhealthy body.  
Good readers, for Eliot, begin with somatic sensitivity.  Latimer is a bad reader not 
because he attends excessively to the somatic instead of to the psychic texts around him, 
but because (and to the extent that) he is always, endlessly, reading himself; his readings 
are always self-referential, never other-directed; they exhibit the “ineffable ennui of 
hermeneutic narcissism”37 in that every reading Latimer produces is always really a 
reading of himself.   
A story first and foremost about reading, “The Lifted Veil” provides us with 
multiple examples of bad readers, as well as of bad (indecipherable) texts against which 
readers must wield their skills.  The literal act of reading supposes that textual marks 
connect in meaningful ways with referents beyond themselves; that is, it assumes 
congruence between surface (the words on the page) and depth (some “real” “truth” or 
meaning whose existence is both referred to and represented in the words).  
Correspondence between surface and depth supposes that what is seen connects exactly 
and unproblematically with what is meant: the words one chooses express one’s ideas, 
and symbols (such as red octagonal signs) indicate only one clear meaning (stop).  We 
might understand the surface of a person as that which is visible or otherwise 
immediately accessible: appearance, including skin, body parts, clothing; facial 
expressions; gestures; even spoken words.  Depth, on the other hand, is a less 
straightforward concept: it can be imagined materially, psychologically, even ethically.  
                                                
37 Thomas M. Greene, “On the Category of the Literary” (Canadian Review of Comparative Literature 13.2 
[June 1986], 217-24), 218. 
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When imagined materially or spatially, depth suggests that what is hidden by one’s 
visible surface is simply more body, internal organs, tissue, blood.  When imagined 
psychologically or spiritually, depth suggests that the visible surface conceals the 
thinking, perceiving mind, the Cartesian “self.”  Physiognomy and phrenology as 
Victorian methods of reading suggest a correspondence between what is materially 
perceptible on the body’s surface and what constitutes the individual’s sense of self; for 
physiognomy, that relationship is one of analogy while for phrenology it is direct and 
causal, but in both cases, the surface-depth relationship is one of signifier-signified, and 
both pairs of terms correspond closely.38   
In all of these instances, “surface” is understood to be material while “depth” is 
understood as non-material; yet this opposition is not necessarily constant.  As Christina 
Crosby and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick have pointed out, this very relationship between 
surface and depth, a relationship predicated on both a distinction between the two and a 
closeness of identification between them, is often called into question in Gothic texts.39  
That is, within Gothic literature, the surface itself – the location of the visible signifiers – 
maintains its significance without any necessary correlation between that surface and a 
                                                
38 Metaphorically, surface and depth are expected to align closely (if not exactly) in terms of an individual’s 
self-presentation: one indicates who one is – one’s stable identity or character – by one’s appearance and 
choice of visible signifiers (clothing, appearance, even facial expressions).  While such visible signifiers are 
often said to be misleading, even deliberately so, the immediate expectation still appears to be that one’s 
appearance and manner function as reliable indicators of one’s character and identity, and demonstrated 
disjunctions between appearance and character consequently lead to charges of hypocrisy or falseness; 
reactions can range from feelings of betrayal to violence, depending upon the type of information withheld 
or misrepresented.  In this model, human “depth” or “interiority” is figured as psychological, emotional, or 
moral: that is, as thoroughly non-material, in distinct contrast to the outside, the visible surface of the body. 
39 Christina Crosby, “Charlotte Bronte’s Haunted Text” (SEL 24 [Autumn 1984], 701-15); Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, The Coherence of Gothic Conventions (New York: Methuen, 1986) and “The Character in the 
Veil: Imagery of the Surface in the Gothic Novel” (PMLA 96.2 [Mar 1981], 255-70). 
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supposed depth of meaning below it.40  The Gothic, according to Crosby and Sedgwick, 
privileges the surface in distinct contrast to most non-Gothic literature.  In this most 
Gothic of Eliot’s narratives, a similar disconnection between surface and depth appears; 
in this case, however, it is both a privileging of surface as repository for meaning and a 
reflection of the difficulties – even the impossibility – both of reading that surface and of 
thereby knowing the meaning it reflects.   
 
Embodied Sympathy in Middlemarch 
Latimer’s complete egoism and failure to sympathize place him outside Eliot’s 
ethical pale.  Nevertheless, while Latimer fails as a sympathetic narrator and reader, his 
emphasis on somatic experience is not the reason for his failure.  In fact, such an 
insistence on material and sensory experience is at the heart of Eliot’s successfully 
sympathizing characters’ ability to form sympathetic connections.  Far from interrupting 
or derailing the processes of sympathy, acute sensitivity to embodied sensation actually 
forms the basis of Eliot’s hermeneutic and epistemological sympathy.  Many of Eliot’s 
protagonists, including Maggie Tulliver, Dorothea Brooke, and Daniel Deronda, exhibit a 
similar level of somatic sensitivity in the context of, and in service to, sympathetic 
                                                
40 The nun in Villette can serve as an example of this phenomenon of dislocation between sign and referent.  
As I discussed in Chapter 2, the figure of the nun can be connected to multiple “meanings”: it is a ghost, a 
hallucination, the personification of the restrictions Catholicism places on women, among many others.  
The indeterminacy of the nun’s identity until late in the novel may make its epistemological status unclear, 
but it in no way disrupts or cancels the uncanniness the figure provokes.  Similarly, Bram Stoker’s Dracula 
is riddled with inconsistencies: for example, vampires must rest in hallowed ground, but Dracula takes 
refuge in the distinctly un-hallowed ground of a suicide’s grave, while Van Helsing’s “hallowing” of the 
boxes of earth by sprinkling holy water on them makes them uninhabitable for the vampire.  As in much 
Gothic fiction, the general feeling of horror or unease in these novels is unaffected by textual 
inconsistencies, because the images themselves – the nun, the juxtaposition of the holy and the unholy – 
produce that horror or uneasiness absent any actual connection to a referent.  Because the symbols are 
allowed significance on their own, they function to increase the novel’s depiction of horror or uncanniness 
and need not, consequently, carry any significance beyond their own existence in the text. 
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connection.  Because Middlemarch presents some of Eliot’s clearest articulations of the 
importance and the process of sympathy, and because passages from Middlemarch eerily 
echo passages from “The Lifted Veil,” I take it here as a point of comparison.  Eliot’s 
proverbial sympathy may be turned radically on its head in Latimer’s narrative, but its 
traces are apparent; by connecting this seemingly anomalous text to her other more 
canonical writing, the foundations of her secular morality can be understood as 
principally material.   
Eliot’s intensely sympathetic protagonist, Dorothea Brooke, illustrates the 
intersection of the material and the emotional in this conception of sympathy: she 
experiences all emotion physically.  From the beginning of the novel, Dorothea's 
perception, both sensory and emotional, is an object of narrative comment, which 
highlights its importance both to her character and to the mode of its textual 
representation: both sensual and emotional experience is represented textually as somatic 
sensation, suggesting that Dorothea physically experiences and embodies her emotions.  
Instances of Dorothea’s experience of and responsiveness to physiological sensation 
abound, and she revels in sensory experience, much of which is presented in terms that 
emphasize immediacy and tactility over distance and vision.  For example, when Celia 
first mentions their mother’s jewelry, Dorothea’s religious scruples prevent her from 
admiring their beauty.  But when Dorothea sees one of the pieces, “a fine emerald with 
diamonds,” just as the sun, emerging from behind a cloud, lights it up, she is transfixed 
by the gem’s beauty: “‘How very beautiful these gems are!’ said Dorothea, under a new 
current of feeling, as sudden as the gleam.  ‘It is strange how the colours seem to 
penetrate one, like scent.  I suppose that is the reason why gems are used as spiritual 
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emblems in the Revelation of St John.41  They look like fragments of heaven’” (M 6).42  
While Dorothea connects the gems to their emblematic religious significance, her 
pleasure in them is thoroughly material: the “new current of feeling” suggests an 
electrical thrill, an involuntary somatic response to a powerful impulse, a suggestion 
furthered by the penetration of the gems’ colors.  Even visual experience operates 
materially and tactilely: colors penetrate and operate like scent; the light from the sun 
transforms the gems into “fragments of heaven” that Dorothea experiences as an 
electrical thrill.  In spite of her religious objections to self-ornamentation, Dorothea wears 
the emerald ring and bracelet and “thought of often having them by her, to feed her eye at 
these little fountains of pure colour” (M 7).  Dorothea’s aesthetic pleasure in the jewelry 
operates synaesthetically, in multiple senses at once, and is represented as simultaneously 
active and passive: the emerald’s color “penetrate[s]” Dorothea’s senses even as she 
imagines “feed[ing]” on it.  If Celia’s response is enthusiastic about the beauty of the 
gems and excited about the possibility of wearing what flatters her appearance, 
Dorothea’s response is both quieter and more significant, in that it moves beyond simple 
appreciation of appearance and involves her whole body. 
Dorothea’s love of horseback riding similarly illustrates her fundamental 
                                                
41 Revelation 4 and 21 contain passages about gems: “At once I was in the Spirit, and there before me was a 
throne in heaven with someone sitting on it.  And the one who sat there had the appearance of jasper and 
carnelian.  A rainbow, resembling an emerald, encircled the throne” (Revelation 4:2-3); the New Jerusalem 
is also described in terms of the gems used to construct it: “The wall was made of jasper, and the city of 
pure gold, as pure as glass.  The foundations of the city walls were decorated with every kind of precious 
stone.  The first foundation was jasper, the second sapphire, the third chalcedony, the fourth emerald, the 
fifth sardonyx, the sixth carnelian, the seventh chrysolite, the eighth beryl, the ninth topaz, the tenth 
chrysoprase, the eleventh jacinth, and the twelfth amethyst.  The twelve gates were twelve pearls, each gate 
made of a single pearl.  The great street of the city was of pure gold, like transparent glass” (Revelation 21: 
18-21). 
42 George Eliot, Middlemarch (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977).  Subsequent references to this novel are to 
this edition, and will be cited parenthetically in the text as M.   
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alignment with the pleasures of somatic sensation.  Even in her conflict over the fitness of 
the pleasure she takes in material objects and physical activity, Dorothea remains firmly 
(if not unproblematically) embedded in material, sensory experience: “Most men thought 
her bewitching when she was on horseback.  She loved the fresh air and the various 
aspects of the country, and when her eyes and cheeks glowed with mingled pleasure she 
looked very little like a devotee” (M 3).  While part of Dorothea’s pleasure in riding 
consists, the narrator tells us somewhat sarcastically, in “looking forward to renouncing 
it,” Dorothea nonetheless enjoys riding “in a pagan sensuous way” (M 3).  Dorothea’s 
eyes glow after riding, but not in the way of a religious devotee; her enjoyment is 
presented as purely sensual, “pagan,” without spiritually redeeming significance attached 
to it.  Again, though, Dorothea’s thoroughly material enjoyment of sensory pleasure is 
presented in terms that suggest the transformation of the sublime: while the narrator 
explicitly claims that Dorothea’s post-riding glow is not that of a “devotee,” her 
appearance actually suggests that she is such a person: if her eyes at other times glow 
with religious fervor, here they glow with dedication to the transformation associated 
with somatic pleasure.43 
The Casaubons’ disappointing honeymoon trip to Rome provides another instance 
in which Dorothea’s physiological perceptiveness is figured as so sensitive as to be 
overwhelmed by the material world around her.   
The weight of unintelligible Rome might lie easily on bright nymphs to 
whom it formed a background for the brilliant picnic of Anglo-foreign 
                                                
43 While these passages can be read as a contradiction of Dorothea’s declared dedication to spirituality, I 
read them as evidence that, for Eliot, the distinction between the spiritual and the material is very narrow; 
further, I argue throughout this chapter that materiality and somatic experience actually lead, in Eliot’s 
novels, to spiritual and moral development. 
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society; but Dorothea had no such defence against deep impressions.  Ruins 
and basilicas, palaces and colossi, set in the midst of a sordid present, where 
all that was living and warm-blooded seemed sunk in the deep degeneracy of 
a superstition divorced from reverence . . . all this vast wreck of ambitious 
ideals, sensuous and spiritual, mixed confusedly with the signs of breathing 
forgetfulness and degradation, at first jarred her as with an electric shock, and 
then urged themselves on her with that ache belonging to a glut of confused 
ideas which check the flow of emotion.  Forms both pale and glowing took 
possession of her young sense, and fixed themselves in her memory even 
when she was not thinking of them, preparing strange associations which 
remained through her after-years. . . . [I]n certain states of dull forlornness 
Dorothea all her life continued to see the vastness of St Peter’s, the huge 
bronze canopy, the excited intention in the attitudes and garments of the 
prophets and evangelists in the mosaics above, and the red drapery which was 
being hung for Christmas spreading itself everywhere like a disesase of the 
retina. (M 134-135) 
 
Rome is both “unintelligible” – inaccessible to Dorothea’s intellect – and heavy, a weight 
against which Dorothea cannot defend herself.  What Dorothea sees in Rome marks her 
with “deep impressions.”  Like Lucy Snowe, Dorothea bears the marks on her body of 
her encounter with the world’s disappointments and difficulties.  This passage illustrates 
both Dorothea’s fundamental susceptibility to sensory experience and the degree to 
which the senses operate collectively rather than individually: that is, what Dorothea sees 
“jar[s] her as with an electric shock,” causes her body to ache, takes “possession of her 
young sense,” etch themselves permanently in her memory.  Even when vision operates 
solely as vision, it is a vision that is touched by what it sees.  In an inverse process of 
haptics, Dorothea’s eyes are touched, marked by what they see: the red drapery, a kind of 
after-image burned on Dorothea’s eyes, has effectively shifted Dorothea from the 
position of perceiving subject into the position of marked object.  Like Latimer, who as 
an adult still feels the sensation of his mother’s arms, Dorothea continues to experience 
the draperies as a kind of psychological and physical scar.  If, as I have discussed in 
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previous chapters, vision is generally identified with distance and detachment, vision for 
Dorothea is a fully embodied sense, one that has material impact on her other senses 
simultaneously.   
Although Rome affects Dorothea primarily in psychologically painful ways, 
mixed with this pain is a certain sense of pleasure in the excess of sensation: the “vast 
wreck” that “at first jarred her as with an electric shock” later produces an “ache” in 
Dorothea; the painfulness of an electric shock gives way to an “ache” that suggests not 
only a less straightforward pain but also a sense of pleasure, even an eroticization of the 
painful excess.  Similarly, the sense of possession offered in this passage suggests less a 
sense of pain per se than a sense of the loss of individuality, of subjecthood, a sensation 
implicated in both the emphasis on pain and in the suggestions of eroticism. 
Connecting all of these instances of intense affective and somatic sensation is an 
insistence that all such sensation is, at its root, physiological; further, the emphasis on 
tactility, on contact between the surface of the body and outside objects, makes the 
fundamental materiality of all sensory experience inescapable.  The penetration of the 
emeralds’ color, the sensuousness of fresh air and outdoor activity, the weight of Rome, 
the electric shock of Italian culture, the disease of the retina: all suggest not only that 
affective states are manifested somatically, but that Dorothea experiences everything 
through her body. 
If Dorothea is as fully embedded in sensory experience as Latimer is, she relies in 
similar ways upon attention to bodies in her sympathetic reading.  Dorothea’s 
conversation with Rosamond Lydgate, a turning point in the novel, not only reinforces 
the degree to which Dorothea’s experience is connected to her body but also provides a 
 
172 
clear example of somatic reading that works sympathetically.  This suggests that 
Latimer’s failed reading and failed sympathy are due less to the primacy of somatic 
experience and more to the endless self-referentiality of his reading practices.  Dorothea, 
as an ethically attuned reader, begins her sympathetic reading of Rosamond with acute 
physiological sensation, but instead of confusing her own physiological experience with 
that of her correspondent, Dorothea focuses her perceptive acuity on Rosamond, allowing 
her to turn physiological sensitivity into sympathetic reading. 
Dorothea has come to Rosamond in an attempt to save the Lydgates’ marriage 
and Will Ladislaw’s character.  Having come to deliver a message for Mr. Lydgate the 
day before, Dorothea sees Will and Rosamond in a compromising situation, alone 
together in Rosamond’s house when Rosamond’s husband is out: “she saw, in the terrible 
illumination of a certainty which filled up all outlines, something which made her pause 
motionless, without self-possession enough to speak” (M 534).  What Dorothea sees is a 
tearful Rosamond, with Will “leaning towards her,” clasping “both her hands in his” and 
speaking “with low-toned fervour” (M 534).  In spite of her catastrophic disappointment 
in Will’s apparent (and inappropriate) attention to Rosamond, Dorothea, attempting to 
avert a “crisis . . . in three lives whose contact with hers laid an obligation on her as if 
they had been suppliants bearing the sacred branch” (M 544), goes to Rosamond again to 
try to convince her not to betray her husband’s trust and, consequently, her own best self.  
Dorothea, acting on “simple inspiration” (M 547), finds herself unable to speak at first 
because of intense emotion and can only sit close to Rosamond until she composes 
herself enough to speak to Rosamond of Lydgate’s goodness: “Dorothea, completely 
swayed by the feeling that she was uttering, forgot everything but that she was speaking 
 
173 
from out the heart of her own trial to Rosamond’s.  The emotion had wrought itself more 
and more into her utterance, till the tones might have gone to one’s very marrow, like a 
low cry from some suffering creature in the darkness.  And she had unconsciously laid 
her hand again on the little hand that she had pressed before” (M 548). 
Dorothea’s ability to sympathize here may in fact be as much a misreading of 
Rosamond as any that prompts Latimer’s misanthropy; as the narrator makes clear, 
Rosamond’s own ethical development, which happens during the course of this 
conversation, takes place only through Dorothea’s actions.  In other words, Dorothea is 
not reading and responding to an ethical impulse in Rosamond, but is rather feeding a 
transformative sympathetic impulse to Rosamond.  Rosamond is “taken hold of by an 
emotion stronger than her own” (M 550), suggesting that Dorothea’s sympathy relies less 
on the kind of reading I identified earlier in this chapter than it does on sheer power of 
personality: Dorothea wills Rosamond to become the ethical person Dorothea wants to 
read, and so Rosamond becomes that person, at least temporarily.  Nevertheless, 
Dorothea’s interaction with Rosamond, while explicitly affective and sympathetic, is 
represented in the register of bodily experience: Dorothea takes Rosamond’s hand; they 
sit close together; Rosamond kisses Dorothea’s forehead when words fail her.   More 
importantly, though, Dorothea experiences her own sympathy for Rosamond in her body: 
“The revulsion of feeling in Dorothea was too strong to be called joy.  It was a tumult in 
which the terrible strain of the night and morning made a resistant pain: -- she could only 
perceive that this would be joy when she had recovered her power of feeling it.  Her 
immediate consciousness was one of immense sympathy without check; she cared for 
Rosamond without struggle now, and responded earnestly to her last words” (M 551).  In 
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her somatic experience of sympathy, Dorothea recognizes the ethical process of 
sympathetic reading (or, perhaps, misreading) by means of her bodily sensations. 
The coincidence of pleasure and pain in this highly important and emotionally 
charged episode suggests that Dorothea (along with Eliot) values physiological sensation 
and perceptiveness per se: pain brings pleasure because it makes one feel, because it both 
increases and marks one’s sensitivity.  As I will argue in the next chapter, there appears 
to be a basic valuing of sensation as such rather than particular kinds of (useful or 
practical or moderate) sensations; in the context of this chapter, I would suggest simply 
that the “resistant pain” that Dorothea experiences will be transformed into pleasure – joy 
– once Dorothea regains her ability to feel.  Functioning as a reinforcement to this 
mixture of pleasure and pain is Dorothea’s desire for ascetic renunciation, which 
manifests itself as both a lack, an absence of what gives pleasure, and as a desire for 
sensation.  The gems whose color affects Dorothea so deeply simultaneously offer her 
something to renounce, as does her pleasure in riding horses: “Riding was an indulgence 
which she allowed herself in spite of conscientious qualms; she felt that she enjoyed it in 
a pagan sensuous way, and always looked forward to renouncing it” (M 3).  In addition to 
these opportunities to give up a pleasure, Dorothea’s decision to marry Casaubon links 
her to another sort of asceticism and renunciation; equating the marriage to a “hair shirt” 
(M 40), Mrs. Cadwallader calls attention to the extravagance of Dorothea’s religious 
sense through the image of Dorothea’s conscious penitence in marrying Casaubon.  
Although Dorothea believes herself to be marrying Casaubon for reasons largely 
unrelated to asceticism, the image of the hair shirt connects Dorothea to a particular form 
of penitence that revels in the intentional mortification of the senses.  Yet the punitive 
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intent of such a garment disguises the fact that it would be productive of sensation: 
donning a hair shirt would not only not eliminate sensation but would rather increase and 
emphasize sensation.  Dorothea’s asceticism is often of the sort that produces ecstasy of 
sensation; this ecstasy ties the “pain” of renunciation to pleasure, while it simultaneously 
invokes an echo of the mixture of pain and pleasure brought on through her conversation 
with Rosamond. 
Kathryn Bond Stockton situates Eliot’s conception of sympathy in connection to 
Ludwig Feuerbach’s philosophy, noting that “Feuerbach conceived his work as ‘a frankly 
sensuous philosophy’ [in which] he strove to unite spiritual existence with bodily 
existence.”44  “Inasmuch as human feeling is God,” writes Stockton, “sympathy touches 
upon the sensuousness that for Feuerbach ‘unites’ spiritual and material, inner and 
outer.”45  Sympathy in Middlemarch (and, perhaps surprisingly, antipathy in “The Lifted 
Veil”) bears clear similarity to such a Feuerbachian construction that connects bodily and 
psychological sensation. 
In Dorothea, Eliot insists upon the value – epistemological and ethical – of 
sensation, particularly physiological sensation.  Like Latimer, Dorothea is acutely 
perceptive somatically; while her vision may be less than acute, her sense of touch is 
highly sensitive.  Clearly, then, Latimer’s antipathy and misanthropy cannot be attributed 
to his overinvestment in bodily sensation; paying close attention to material existence is 
not the primary reason Latimer is a bad and unsympathetic reader.  Instead, it is the 
                                                
44 Kathryn Bond Stockton, God Between Their Lips: Desire Between Women in Irigaray, Brontë, and Eliot 
(Stanford: Stanford U P, 1994), 185. 
45 Stockton, God Between Their Lips, 189. 
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direction of one’s attention that determines one’s ethical development: while Latimer’s 
attention is turned morbidly upon itself, making all of his readings by definition self-
referential and anti-sympathetic, Dorothea’s attention is turned toward others, toward 
social engagement.46  A recent critic has argued that Dorothea has a “frail connection 
with her own bodily and instinctive self.”47  Yet, as this brief discussion should illustrate, 
Dorothea’s connection to her own body, and the connection between that somatic 
experience and her ethical stance, is clear.  In making Dorothea’s somatic experience so 
very clear, Eliot suggests that Dorothea’s ethical strength lies in her bodily susceptibility, 
her sensitive permeability: without it, the novel suggests, Dorothea’s philanthropic 
impulse would remain at best ineffective and undirected.  While, as Latimer makes 
abundantly clear, somatic sensitivity alone does not guarantee the development of 
sympathy, it is the characteristic that allows Dorothea to connect successfully with other 
people and thus to put into practice her philanthropic urge.  Dorothea’s connection to her 
body is what constitutes Dorothea’s moral self.   
As a perverse version of an omniscient narrator, Latimer uses as evidence of his 
clairvoyance the discontinuity between the attractive outer forms of those around him and 
the ugliness, emptiness, and banality of their psychic, spiritual, and emotional lives.  And 
                                                
46 What is most striking about the comparison between Latimer and Dorothea is not that Latimer’s 
antipathy has its roots in egoism, but rather that Dorothea’s sympathy has its roots in materiality.  If we 
return to Amanda Anderson’s analysis of Elizabeth Barrett Browning, which I discussed in the 
Introduction, and her assertion that, for Barrett Browning, it is only the “cultivation of spirit . . . [that] 
elevates a fallen humanity” (Amanda Anderson, Tainted Souls and Painted Faces: The Rhetoric of 
Fallenness in Victorian Culture [Ithaca: Cornell U P, 1993], 172), Dorothea’s reliance on somatic 
experience assumes a much greater importance through its contrast with Anderson’s (and Barrett 
Browning’s) insistence on non-materiality.  While Dorothea is certainly ethical, in a way that Latimer fails 
to be, because she turns her attention outward, I argue that the foundation of her turning outward is material 
and immediate rather than imaginative and detached, which suggests that, for Dorothea (and for Eliot), 
embodiment is as necessary to the development of sympathy as the philanthropic social impulse is. 
47 Sarah Wintle, “George Eliot’s Peculiar Passion” (Essays in Criticism 50 [2000], 23-43), 28. 
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yet, as I have argued in this chapter, the discontinuity he asserts does not really act as 
evidence of his clairvoyance.  Instead, this novella presents a version of material 
embodiment that questions, even effectively denies, the existence of a separate and non-
material interiority, suggesting that individual identity is coextensive with material 
embodiment.  Latimer’s lack of sympathy has its foundation in his experience of his own 
body; further, it is through his material perception and experience of the world around 
him, as well as of his own body, that he comes to distrust the people who surround him.  
This tale emerges from Latimer’s complicated reading practices at the intersection of 
clairvoyance, close reading, and self-absorption, and it is this intersection that both 
generates and forestalls Latimer’s sympathy.  Framed by descriptions of his own 
experience of impaired bodily health, Latimer’s narrative explores implicitly the 
connections between and among his physicality, his heightened sensitivity, his experience 
of pain, his apparent ability to read minds, and the conditions of narrative and sympathy.  
By opening his tale with a prediction of the scene of his own death, and consequently by 
situating his tale within the experience of his own body, Latimer foregrounds and 
emphasizes the important mediating role that his body plays in the construction of his 





Representational Conflicts: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Materiality  
in D. G. Rossetti and A. C. Swinburne 
 
It is well known that Robert Buchanan’s famous review of Dante Gabriel 
Rossetti, “The Fleshly School of Poetry: Mr. D. G. Rossetti,” finds fault with Rossetti’s 
poems for being too invested in the experience of the body: “[T]he fleshly gentlemen,” 
Buchanan writes of Rossetti, Swinburne, and William Morris, “have bound themselves 
by solemn league and covenant to extol fleshliness as the distinct and supreme end of 
poetic and pictorial art; to aver that poetic expression is greater than poetic thought, and 
by inference that the body is greater than the soul, and sound superior to sense; and that 
the poet, properly to develop his poetic faculty, must be an intellectual hermaphrodite, to 
whom the very facts of day and night are lost in a whirl of aesthetic terminology” (FSP 
335).1  And again: “But the fleshly feeling is everywhere . . . [I]t is generally in the 
foreground, flushing the whole poem with unhealthy rose-colour, stifling the senses with 
overpowering sickliness, as of too much civet” (FSP 339).  In addition, however, and 
somewhat paradoxically, Buchanan’s review also criticizes Rossetti and the other Pre-
Raphaelites for being too picturesque, too painterly.  He calls “The Blessed Damozel” “a 
careful sketch for a picture, which, worked into actual colour by a master, might have 
been worth seeing” and identifies its “general effect” as “that of a queer old painting in a 
                                                
1 Thomas Maitland [Robert Buchanan], “The Fleshly School of Poetry: Mr. D. G. Rossetti” (The 
Contemporary Review 18 [August-November 1871], 334-350 [in Jerome J. McGann, ed., The Rossetti 
Archive: The Complete Writings and Pictures of Dante Gabriel Rossetti]; retrieved 22 February 2006 from 
<http://www.rossettiarchive.org/docs/ap4.c7.18.rad.html>.  All quotations from this essay are from the 
Web version and will be noted parenthetically in the text as FSP. 
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missal, very affected and very odd,” suggesting that it somehow lacks a clear sense of 
material embodiment (FSP 340).  “We hover uncertainly between picturesqueness and 
namby-pamby . . . The thing [“The Blessed Damozel”] would have been almost too much 
in the shape of a picture, though the workmanship might have made amends.  The truth is 
that literature, and more particularly poetry, is in a very bad way when one art gets hold 
of another, and imposes upon it its conditions and limitations.  In the first few verses of 
the Damozel we have the subject, or part of the subject, of a picture, and the inventor 
should either have painted it or left it alone altogether; and, had he done the latter, the 
world would have lost nothing.  Poetry is something more than painting; and an idea will 
not become a poem because it is too smudgy for a picture” (FSP 341).  Readers of 
Buchanan’s review tend to emphasize his indictment of Rossetti’s materialism, but what 
most interests me here is the complexity of the criticism.  Rossetti’s work is condemned 
both because it demonstrates too great an investment in the purely material aspects of 
human existence and because it lacks engagement with the realities of life: it is 
simultaneously too enmeshed in the grime of bodily existence and too distant from it.2   
In a sense, my argument parallels Buchanan’s.  Like Buchanan, I argue that the 
poetry of Rossetti and Swinburne demonstrates a complicated stance toward material 
embodiment, which is evident in the conflicting representations of bodies as iconic or 
abstracted and bodies as thoroughly and realistically material and individual.  Unlike 
Buchanan, however, I claim that the tension that results from these conflicting 
                                                
2 According to J. B. Bullen, The Pre-Raphaelite Body: Fear and Desire in Painting, Poetry, and Criticism 
(Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1998), objections to Pre-Raphaelite art and poetry on these grounds were not 
uncommon: “[T]he critic of the Builder complained that it [contemporary art] is devoid of ‘the true and 
normal forms of nature’ and ‘is alien to our real experience’” (150; quoted passages are from Builder 35 
[1872], 439-440; 439). 
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representations suggests a necessary, if uneasy, connection between embodiment and 
humane-ness.3  I am not trying here to recuperate either Swinburne or Rossetti into the 
tradition of Christian orthodoxy; nor am I suggesting that either poet aims even 
tangentially at the moral instruction of readers.  What I do suggest, however, is that the 
tension between iconic and realistic representations of bodies in the work of both writers 
suggests that material embodiment is a requisite for moral or ethical – that is, humane – 
behavior, particularly as that behavior is conceived of as sympathetic connection.  
Although the work of both writers demonstrates a similar tension related to the 
representation of bodies – particularly, as in the case of the poems I discuss in this 
chapter, the bodies of women – the methods each uses differ markedly, and the emphasis 
falls differently for each.  Rossetti’s poems suggest the enormous temptation to conceive 
of women (who are so often the subjects of his poems) as vaguely embodied abstractions, 
while Swinburne’s speakers fear that the women they address are so abstracted, so iconic 
and disembodied, that they are permanently beyond the reach of the speakers’ touch.  
Both poets insist on the necessity of material embodiment for any kind of sympathetic 
connection between the speaker and the object in the poem, but both poets problematize 
any ready alignment between connection and embodiment by insisting upon abstraction 
as well as upon materiality. 
Interestingly, both poets explicitly and strongly denied any association with 
materialism.  As Gowan Dawson has shown, materialism in the 1860s and 1870s meant 
not simply an appreciation of sensory experience of the material world but instead 
                                                
3 For these poets, physical connection forms the foundation for ethics: without somatic experience, and 
without material contact between individuals, no humane connection – that is, no sympathy – is possible. 
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strongly implied atheism.4  Robert Buchanan does not explicitly connect Rossetti’s 
poems to scientific (and consequently atheist) materialism, but the intellectual climate in 
which both Buchanan’s review and Rossetti’s (and Swinburne’s) poetry were published 
makes clear the connections between Buchanan’s fear of “fleshliness” and the 
condemnations of scientific materialism in the periodical press of the 1870s.  An 
anonymous letter to the Quarterly Review alleged of the “fleshly poets” that “Atheism, 
which is quietly avowed by one, is passionately professed by another, not as the 
supplanter of superstition, but as the rival of Christianity.”5  To William Michael 
Rossetti, it seemed clear that Swinburne was the one who “passionately professed” 
atheism, but he was deeply concerned to prove that his brother was not the one who 
“quietly avowed” it, suggesting that allegations of atheism were of much more significant 
concern than any imputations of immorality.  Dante Gabriel Rossetti takes careful issue 
in “The Stealthy School of Criticism” with what he clearly feels is the most important 
allegation of Buchanan’s “Fleshly School” attack, that Rossetti values the body more 
than the soul: “[H]ere all the passionate and just delights of the body are declared – 
somewhat figuratively, it is true, but unmistakably – to be as naught if not ennobled by 
the concurrence of the soul at all times” (SSC 793).6  He admits to treating his artistic 
                                                
4 Gowan Dawson, “Intrinsic Earthliness: Science, Materialism, and the Fleshly School of Poetry” 
(Victorian Poetry 41.1 [2003], 113-29), claims that “Rossetti’s critics meant not merely an artistic concern 
with the material aspects of objects, but the deliberate prioritization of the physical body over the spiritual 
soul, which could lead only to an atheistic unbelief” (114). 
5 [William John Courthope], “The Latest Development of Literary Poetry” (Quarterly Review 132 [1872], 
63; quoted in Dawson, “Intrinsic Earthliness,” 117). 
6 Dante Gabriel Rossetti, “The Stealthy School of Criticism” (The Athanaeum [July-December 1871], 792-
94 [in McGann, ed., The Rossetti Archive]; retrieved 7 Feb. 2007 from <http://www.rossettiarchive.org>.  
Subsequent references to this text will be noted parenthetically as SSC.  
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subjects with a broader view than some readers might; “But to state that I do so to the 
ignoring or overshadowing of spiritual beauty, is an absolute falsehood, impossible to be 
put forward except in the indulgence of prejudice or rancour” (SSC 793).   
Swinburne, in Notes on Poems and Reviews, discusses his poetry explicitly in 
terms of spirit rather than form: claiming that Catullus’s translation of Sappho’s Ode to 
Anactoria “is colourless and bloodless,” Swinburne says that, instead of repeating such a 
mistaken translation, he “tried instead to reproduce in a diluted and dilated form the spirit 
of a poem which could not be reproduced in the body” (SR 20).7  “I have striven,” 
Swinburne continues, “to cast my spirit into the mould of [Sappho’s], to express and 
represent not the poem but the poet” (SR 21).  Even more significantly, Swinburne’s 
strongest objection to Christianity was its inherent materialism:  in his review of Victor 
Hugo’s Religions et Religion, Swinburne praised it as “an impeachment of all mere 
materialism” and “the militant materialism of Papists and Positivists both.”  He calls 
Christianity “the worst . . . surviving form of materialism in the whole world,” saying that 
“it is implicitly impossible to be a Christian without being a materialist.”8  Explicitly, 
then, Swinburne appears oddly hostile to the kind of philosophical materialism one might 
expect, given the intensely material images of his poetry. 
Yet Swinburne’s own reputed sympathy with the material world provides an 
index to the importance with which he invested sensation and sensuous experience, often 
suggesting that intense sensation offered a means to transcendence.  Swinburne wrote 
                                                
7 Algernon Charles Swinburne, Notes on Poems and Reviews (in Clyde K. Hyder, Swinburne Replies: 
Notes on Poems and Review, Under the Microscope, and Dedicatory Epistle [Syracuse: Syracuse U P, 
1966]).  Subsequent references to this collection will be noted parenthetically as SR. 
8 Algernon Charles Swinburne, “Victor Hugo” (1875); quoted in Margot K. Louis, Swinburne and His 
Gods: The Roots and Growth of an Agnostic Poetry (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s U P, 1990), 43. 
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about his experience of swimming in the ocean as a boy in terms of intense sensory 
pleasure and the transcendence of individual boundaries:  
I ran like a boy, tore off my clothes, and hurled myself into the water.  And it 
was but for a few minutes – but I was in Heaven!  The whole sea was literally 
golden as well as green – it was liquid and living sunlight in which one lived 
and moved and had one’s being.  And to feel that in deep water is to feel – as 
long as one is swimming out, if only for a minute or two – as if one was in 
another world of life, and one far more glorious than even Dante ever 
dreamed of in his Paradise.9 
 
As Rikky Rooksby notes, “The references to Paradise and Heaven go beyond the mere 
expression of pleasure and enthusiasm.  For Swinburne, the encounter with the sea seems 
a recovery of a unity of being and connection with life.”10  To feel, for Swinburne, is an 
absolute good; to feel excessively is even better.  Swinburne’s desire for transcendence 
connects his deep sensual appreciation for the material world and its sensations with his 
simultaneous desire to exceed the bounds of the material.  Swinburne wrote of 
Tannhäuser’s choice of Venus in terms that suggest an inherent value in extremity: 
“Light loves and harmless errors must not touch the elect of heaven or hell” (SR 27).  
That one could be “elect” of hell in the same way one could be elect of heaven suggests 
that to be truly damned is as sublime as to be truly holy.  It is the crossing of accepted 
boundaries, the transgression of the most important laws, that allows the sublime 
transcendence Swinburne seems most to value.11  Robert Louis Stevenson appears to 
                                                
9 Cecil Y. Lang (ed.), The Swinburne Letters (6 vols.; New Haven: Yale U P, 1959-62), 5:275; quoted in 
Rikky Rooksby, “The Algernonicon, or Thirteen Ways of Looking at Tristram of Lyonesse” (Rikky 
Rooksby and Nicholas Shrimpton [eds.], The Whole Music of Passion: New Essays on Swinburne 
[Aldershot: Scolar P, 1993]), 76-77. 
10 Rooksby, “The Algernonicon,” 77. 
11 Swinburne seems implicitly to equate transgress – to cross boundaries or laws in ways that are dangerous 
or illicit – with transcend – to climb over hurdles.  The horizontal movement of transgression leads, for 
Swinburne, to the vertical movement of transcendence. 
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have come to this conclusion about Swinburne’s poetry when he asserted that, in 
Swinburne’s poems, the hypermaterial world exists to demonstrate and initiate its own 
transcendence.12 
As is clear just from Buchanan’s reviews of Swinburne’s and Rossetti’s poetry, 
issues of sensation and materiality and their proper relationship to cognition are central to 
questions of both aesthetics and morality.  Some contemporary reviewers explicitly 
appealed to the importance of reason in aesthetic experience as the foundation of their 
objections to the poetry.  For example, John Morley objected strongly to what he 
perceived as Swinburne’s attempt to “set up the pleasures of sense in the seat of the 
reason they have dethroned” (SCH 24),13 a reason that should be the final authority in 
matters moral and aesthetic.  Similarly, an unsigned review of Songs Before Sunrise 
claims that, because of its disdain for reason, this poetry has the potential “not only [to] 
overturn all existing order, but in the end prove fatal to art, literature, and civilization 
itself” (SCH 138).14  “Sensationalism, at least in its extremest developments” – by which 
the reviewer seems to intend the ideas of Swinburne in particular along with those of the 
Pre-Raphaelite poets more generally – “springs from the assumption that the senses and 
their impulses are our highest sources of light and guidance, that reason and conscience 
are of no authority, that the moral and rational principles they supply – the highest 
                                                
12 “To read Swinburne long would either make you mad or moral . . . Swinburne’s sensualism is too deep; 
it works its own cure.”  This 1868 statement by Stevenson is quoted in Clyde K. Hyder (ed.), Swinburne: 
The Critical Heritage (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 24, from George S. Helman, The True 
Stevenson (1925), 120.  The ellipsis is in Hyder.  Subsequent references to this collection will be noted 
parenthetically as SCH, 
13 Saturday Review xxii (4 August 1866), 145-7 (in Hyder, SCH). 
14 Edinburgh Review cxxxiv (July 1871), 94-99 (in Hyder, SCH). 
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regulative elements of our nature – may not only be disregarded with impunity, but are to 
be denounced as delusions, and rejected as mere hindrances to the life of nature.  On such 
a theory reason is, of course, subordinated to sense, will to desire, while appetite and 
impulse are enthroned as lords of all” (SCH 134).  Buchanan’s invocation of the “garish 
land beyond the region of pure thinking” (SCH 30)15 suggests that Swinburne’s poem is 
impure in at least two ways, both connected to thinking: first, that it involves a variety of 
thinking that is not in itself pure, wholesome, good, and moral; and second, that it 
combines thinking with other ways of knowing or judging, most noticeably through 
sensual bodily experience.  By juxtaposing this criticism with the “transcendent purity” 
he identifies as “the glory of our modern poetry” (SCH 30), Buchanan insists on the 
cognitive element in poetic production and, presumably, in aesthetic judgment.  The 
anxiety evident in these reviews suggests that aesthetic judgment, linked as these 
reviewers want to suggest it is to cognition and reflection, has tremendous social and 
moral implications. 
Even where critics do not explicitly refer to the importance of reason in their 
responses to the poetry of Rossetti and Swinburne, they tend to use the terms of morality, 
materiality, and sensation in implicit relation or opposition to reason.  In discussing 
Swinburne’s treatment of his poetic topics, one reviewer in the Spectator wrote that 
Swinburne “feasts on them [the overly sensual topics of his poems] with a greedy and 
cruel voracity, like a famished dog at raw meat” (SR 5).16  Another reviewer complained 
that “he lays on stroke after stroke of colour till the last obliterate the first, and we are 
                                                
15 Athanaeum, 4 August 1866 (in Hyder, SCH). 
16 “Mr. Swinburne on his Critics,” The Spectator (3 Nov. 1866), 1229 (in Hyder, SR).   
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bewildered among thick-coming sensations” (SCH 11).17  John Morley’s review is one of 
the most vivid and extreme in its hostility.  Morley calls Swinburne “firmly and 
avowedly fixed in an attitude of revolt against the current notions of decency and dignity 
and social duty” (SCH 22); additionally, he says that Swinburne “grovel[s] down among 
the nameless shameless abominations which inspire him with such frenzied delight,” 
“attempt[s] to glorify all the bestial delights that the subtleness of Greek depravity was 
able to contrive,” and exhibits “mixed vileness and childishness” in “depicting the 
spurious passion of a putrescent imagination, the unnamed lusts of sated wantons, as if 
they were the crown of character and their enjoyment the great glory of human life” 
(SCH 23-24).  Cruel, voracious, shameless, bestial, depraved, vile, putrescent, wanton: all 
of these terms insist upon the immorality associated with bodily and material existence, 
while some highlight the degeneracy and rot associated with sensuality and sensuousness.  
Based on these reviews, the best that can be said of Swinburne and the other 
“sensationalists” is that, where they fail to repulse, they “bewilder” the reader through 
excessive and misplaced sensation.  Clearly, then, Buchanan’s “Fleshly School” is far 
from unusual in the associations it makes between the emphasis on sensation within 
Rossetti’s poems and a failure of both aesthetic and moral content; most reviews of these 
poems suggest a continuing alignment between aesthetic value and an emphasis on 
reflection and idea over sensation or poetic form.18 
                                                
17 Unsigned review, Saturday Review xix (6 May 1865), 540-42 (in Hyder, SCH). 
18 Isobel Armstrong, Victorian Poetry: Poetry, Poetics, Politics (London: Routledge, 1993), discusses at 
length the responses of Buchanan and others to Pre-Raphaelite poetry, noting that Buchanan “adopted one 
of the tactics of reactionary rage, describing as immoral what is politically complex and unsettling” (386).  
“Buchanan’s complaint is simple: these poets are prurient, erotic poets exposing their morbid and self-
indulgent sexuality and preaching an adolescent transgressiveness which is ultimately trivial because it is 
out to sensationalise and shock. . . . Effeminacy, schoolboy snickers and tumidly ineffectual blasphemy, 
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I want to use the terms of this debate to discuss the poetry of Rossetti and 
Swinburne, but I want to do so neither to confirm that these poets seek to overthrow 
reason and morality by enthroning an all-encompassing sensation, nor to refute these 
charges by proving that the poets actually prefer morality and reason to materiality and 
sensation.  Instead, as I noted at the beginning of this chapter, I argue that Rossetti and 
Swinburne make use of far more complicated versions of both materiality and morality 
than can be contained either in a simple opposition of morality and reason against 
debasement and materiality or in a smooth and easy integration of the two sets of terms.  
Both poets saturate their poems with images that depict the sensations of the poetic 
subjects within the poems; in addition, through the images they contain as well as by 
means of their formal characteristics such as meter, rhyme, and textuality, they encourage 
within the reader sometimes acute somatic responses as well as an unavoidable awareness 
of his or her own embodiedness.  At the same time, though, both poets present images 
that suggest iconicity rather than specificity, which both enacts and encourages distance 
rather than immediacy between poem and reader.  In this section, I want to look closely at 
four poems, all of which were accused by contemporary critics of debasement and 
degeneracy along with too great an investment in what could be termed variously 
sensation, sensuality, materiality, embodiment, and poetic form.  The tension inherent in 
these poems between specificity (by which I mean to include issues of individuality, 
embodiment, materiality, and proximity) and iconicity (by which I mean to include 
disembodiment, spirituality, reason, and distance) reveals the uneasy but necessary 
                                                                                                                                            
these defensive attempts to emasculate and trivialise the poetry suggest that the offensiveness of these poets 
is radically threatening, and genuinely ‘dangerous to society’.  Dangerous because of the clear imputation 
of homosexuality, dangerous because of political radicalism” (386). 
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connection each poet makes between materiality and morality.  I do not attempt here any 
systematic, much less exhaustive, reading of individual works (or, obviously, the 
complete oeuvre of either writer); rather, I want only to gesture toward instances in which 
the conflict in representation suggests a larger philosophical conflict, between 
embodiment and disembodiment.  To that end, I consider two poems by Rossetti and two 
by Swinburne – “The Blessed Damozel,” “Jenny,”19 “Laus Veneris,” and “Anactoria”20 – 
as test cases for a different kind of sympathy predicated on material embodiment rather 
than imagination and on touch rather than vision. 
 
Rossetti and Swinburne, Poetry and Materiality 
Begun in 1847, revised repeatedly, and published several times21 over the next 34 
years until its last publication in 1881, “The Blessed Damozel” was written as a sort of 
contemporary response to Dante’s Vita Nuova, which addresses, among other things, the 
relationship Beatrice, who is in heaven, has to her beloved on earth and to the creatures in 
heaven.  Like several other poems, it is also connected to Rossetti’s wife, Elizabeth 
Siddal, who died from an overdose of laudanum in 1862 and with whom Rossetti buried a 
number of poems, retrieving them in 1869 by disinterring her grave in order to include 
                                                
19 Dante Gabriel Rossetti, “The Blessed Damozel” and “Jenny” (in Jerome McGann [ed.], Dante Gabriel 
Rossetti: Collected Poetry and Prose [New Haven: Yale U P, 2003]).  All references to Rossetti’s poems 
are to this edition, and line numbers for both poems will be cited parenthetically. 
20 Algernon Charles Swinburne, “Laus Veneris” and “Anactoria” (in Jerome McGann and Charles L. Sligh 
[eds.],  Swinburne: Major Poems and Selected Prose [New Haven: Yale U P, 2004]).  All references to 
Swinburne’s poems are to this edition, and line numbers for both poems will be cited parenthetically. 
21 Jerome McGann identifies five versions of the poem: the first, composed between 1846 and 1847 and 
never published, which has been lost; one published in Germ in 1850; another revision from 1855; a 
version printed in Oxford and Cambridge Magazine in 1856; and the version published in 1870 in Poems, 
although this version was revised slightly for republication in the new edition of Poems in 1881.  See 
McGann’s “Notes to the Text” in his Dante Gabriel Rossetti: Collected Poetry and Prose, 377. 
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them in 1870’s Poems.  It is perhaps not surprising, then, that “The Blessed Damozel” 
both contains and embodies a series of unresolved conflicts related to love, desire, 
embodiment, and spirituality, rapidly oscillating between images of the beloved as 
abstracted, iconic figure and images of her as thoroughly individual woman.   
The damozel’s namelessness establishes her status as abstraction, a status that is 
reinforced by her other iconic characteristics.  Her eyes are “deeper than the depths / Of 
waters stilled at even” (ll. 3-4), a depth that is echoed four stanzas later in the description 
of the gulf lying under the ramparts of heaven, “By God built over the sheer depth / The 
which is Space begun” (ll. 27-28).  Her eyes are deeper, less fathomable than still water; 
likewise, the depth by which heaven is separated from the created world cannot be 
measured because it exceeds any available terms of spatiality.  Instead, both depths come 
to signify ultimate rather than literal distance, unbridgeable separation in kind rather than 
relative farness or nearness.  The three lilies that she carries and the seven stars in her hair 
(ll. 5-6) reinforce her impersonal, iconic power.  The numbers three and seven 
traditionally signify completeness as well as otherworldly power; further, the lilies 
connect her to the resurrection of Christ, while the seven stars suggest both Joseph’s 
dream about his brothers and the infinity of the universe (both of which, consequently, 
connect this poem to conceptions of completeness that are both religious/traditional and 
scientific/contemporary).  Finally, through these items she is connected iconically both to 
the earth (through the lilies) and to the sky (through the stars), suggesting a diffused and 
ideal presence rather than any sense of actual locatedness.  When she speaks, it is “as 
when / The stars sang in their spheres” (ll. 53-54), with a voice “like the voice the stars / 
Had when they sang together” (ll. 59-60).  These references to the music of the spheres 
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invoke the concept of perfect harmony and balance within the universe and among its 
various parts,22 suggesting again that the damozel speaks with a voice that is perfection 
itself. 
Further, she is surrounded by stasis: her look (l. 16), her position leaning against 
the bar (l. 44), the weather (l. 58) are all unchanging and still; Heaven, too, is a “fixed 
place” (l. 49), peopled by other abstractions.  She is only one of many of “God’s 
choristers” (l. 14), and in the presence of God she sees “the clear-ranged unnumbered 
heads” (l. 123) of the souls kneeling in worship, suggesting a generalized presence rather 
than individuality.  The “five handmaidens, whose names / Are five sweet symphonies” 
(ll. 105-106), sit “Circlewise” (l. 109); the circle, an image of a closed circuit of 
fixedness, stability, and absence of change, is repeated in the garlands the handmaidens 
wear around their foreheads (l. 110) and in the “circling charm” of heaven itself (l. 44), as 
well as in the figure of the spheres that the stars make.  Images from Christian 
iconography underscore both the abstraction and the stasis of the damozel’s heaven.  She 
imagines lying with her lover, when he joins her in heaven, beneath “that living mystic 
tree” (l. 86), within which “the Dove” (l. 87) is imagined to dwell.  The dove is a 
traditional symbol for the Holy Spirit, while the tree suggests multiple possibilities from 
Jewish and Christian iconography: the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the tree of 
                                                
22 The concept of the “music of the spheres” originated with the Pythagoreans, who imagined the universe 
to be constructed according to the same principles that governed music; the individual components of the 
solar system each produced a unique sound which, when combined, produced perfectly harmonized music.  
Later, Kepler wrote in Harmonice Munde (1619) of his wish “to erect the magnificent edifice of the 
harmonic system of the musical scale . . . as God, the Creator Himself, has expressed it in harmonizing the 
heavenly motions” (Johannes Kepler, Harmonice Munde [quoted in Paul Calter, Squaring the Circle: 
Geometry in Art and Architecture (Dartmouth: Key College Publishing, 2006; 
<http://math.dartmouth.edu/~matc/eBookshelf/art/SquaringCircle.html>)]).   
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life, the human genealogy of Jesus, the cross.23  Together, they will approach “the deep 
wells of light” (l. 76) in the presence of God, and see the “shrine / Occult, withheld, 
untrod” (ll. 79-80).  In both cases, it is the hiddenness and unknowability that is 
emphasized;24 like the gulf between heaven and earth, the “deep wells” that emit the light 
cannot be measured, and the shrine is hidden from the uninitiated. 
In the midst of this relentless deindividualization, though, other images creep in 
that establish a competing sense of the damozel as a particular individual: her hair is 
“yellow like ripe corn” (l. 12) rather than the gold it could be, and in the speaker’s 
imagination it “fell all about [his] face” (l. 22) when she leaned over him.  As has been 
remarked repeatedly, she warms the bar she leans on, in spite of the fact that she 
presumably lacks a living, material body.  For a spirit, she is decidedly material, and it is 
in those material terms that her lover experiences her, even in his imagination, as well:  
(Ah sweet!  Even now, in that bird’s song, 
Strove not her accents there, 
Fain to be harkened?  When those bells 
Possessed the mid-day air, 
Strove not her steps to reach my side 
Down all the echoing stair?) (ll. 61-66) 
 
The bird’s song and the echoing stair suggest actual sounds one might hear in moving 
through any particular day in one’s life.  In addition, these sounds suggest not only 
                                                
23 Interestingly, the Book of Jeremiah includes multiple references to an unfaithful Israel lying beneath a 
tree’s spreading branches as a prostitute: “‘Long ago you broke off your yoke and tore off your bonds; you 
said, “I will not serve you!”  Indeed, on every high hill and under every spreading tree you lay down as a 
prostitute’” (Jeremiah 2:20); “During the reign of King Josiah, the LORD said to me, ‘Have you seen what 
faithless Israel has done?  She has gone up on every high hill and under every spreading tree and has 
committed adultery there’” (Jeremiah 3:6); “‘Only acknowledge your guilt – you have rebelled against the 
LORD your God, you have scattered your favors to foreign gods under every spreading tree, and have not 
obeyed me,’ declares the LORD” (Jeremiah 3:13). 
24 In addition to meaning generally hidden or mysterious, “occult” also suggests that something is beyond 




specificity and particularity but physical contact: bells ring when the tongue strikes the 
inside of the bell, and footsteps echo through the contact of a foot with a stair.  Sound 
itself produces and is produced through contact with the eardrum of the listener.  Not 
only, then, do these sounds suggest actual presence; they also insist upon materiality and 
contact. 
Both the poem’s speaker and the damozel imagine their reunion in Heaven to 
include physical contact.  She will “take his hand and go with him” (l. 75); they will lie 
together in the shade (l. 85); she will comfort him when he is afraid by “lay[ing] my 
cheek / To his” (ll. 116-17); Mary herself will lead them “hand in hand” (l. 121) into the 
presence of God.  Even more significantly, both imagine their earthly love as relevant to 
an eternity in heaven.  The damozel will “tell about our love, / Not once abashed or weak: 
/ And the dear Mother will approve / My pride, and let me speak” (ll. 117-20); and she 
will ask Christ himself to allow them pleasure in each other: “Only to live as once on 
earth / With Love, -- only to be, / As then awhile, for ever now / Together, I and he” (ll. 
129-32).  Her lover, meanwhile, imagines their love as his only chance to experience 
heaven: “Yea, one wast thou with me / That once of old.  But shall God lift / To endless 
unity / The soul whose likeness with thy soul / Was but its love for thee?” (ll. 98-102).  
This doubt suggests both that he believes his heaven has passed because she has died and 
that if he were to experience heaven after death it would only be because his love for her 
during their lives had made him enough like her to justify paradise.  This is echoed 
implicitly by the damozel’s apparent inability to enter the presence of God without her 
earthly lover: she waits on the outer edge of heaven, watching spirits move past her as 
they enter, and prays continually for him to join her so that they can go together and 
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“bathe there in God’s sight” (l. 78).  Love, capitalized as it is for the damozel, is a 
powerful force both material and spiritual, but it is invoked in this poem exclusively as an 
experience dependent on, and evocative of, embodiment. 
Barriers and boundaries stand among the most significant categories of material 
existence in this poem.  There is “the gold bar of Heaven” (l. 2), “the rampart of God’s 
house” (l. 25), the “void” or “gulf” (ll. 35, 52), and the “golden barriers” (l. 142), all of 
which separate heaven from earth and the damozel from heaven.  People are bounded as 
well: the handmaidens’ locks are “bound” and the garlands around their foreheads, which 
are indeed beautiful adornments, are simultaneously a kind of binding.  Even the 
“circling charm” of heaven acts as a boundary, albeit a nonmaterial one that seems to act 
subtly (through a charm, perhaps a kind of enchantment) rather than overtly.  These 
bounds seem meant to be breached, generally through particularly distinct material 
means.  The changing light of day and night materially affect the vacuum of space 
outside of heaven: “Beneath, the tides of day and night / With flame and darkness ridge / 
The void” (ll. 33-34).  In this conception, light and darkness extend beyond the purely 
visual to give tactility and texture to emptiness.  Similarly, when the damozel’s “gaze . . . 
strove / Within the gulf to pierce / Its path” (ll. 51-53) and when her voice “spoke through 
the still weather” (l. 58), these non-material attributes (gaze and voice) penetrate and 
disrupt the stasis, as well as the material boundaries, that surrounds her. 
What interests me most in this poem, however, are those images that can 
comfortably be relegated to neither category but rather present inherent conflicts between 
specificity and iconicity.  The first, and arguably the most complex, is the image of the 
damozel’s robe, “ungirt from clasp to hem” (l. 7).  Functioning as a material covering that 
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nonetheless reveals as much as it conceals, the robe can also be read as a figure for the 
materiality of the body that both conceals and reveals the non-material soul.25  In this 
reading, the robe is both a material object in itself (a piece of clothing) and a textual 
symbol that stands in for a different material object (the damozel’s body), which itself is 
the visible representation of a non-material essence (her soul).  Materiality in this reading 
is always suggestive of something other than itself (as Hegel argues sensuous objects 
should always be), ultimately a non-material or spiritual essence.  It is also always 
indefinite and incomplete, not quite satisfactory in its work.  The robe is “ungirt,” 
suggesting that it neither fully covers nor fully reveals the thing it stands for but only 
partially represents it; a viewer might catch glimpses of her body under the robe, but she 
is clearly neither fully nude nor even particularly exposed.  Consequently, though, her 
body is only incompletely removed from sight, which means that the robe’s 
representative function is as partial as is its concealing function.  If a symbol works only 
insofar as it replaces the object or concept it is supposed to represent, the incompletely 
replaced body of the damozel compromises the representational efficacy of this particular 
symbol.  This very material image seems to suggest as much about the inutility of 
symbolic representation as it does about the imagined materiality of human relationships 
and of the afterlife.   
Other images present a less complicated but nonetheless shifting conception of 
materiality that works effectively to disrupt the opposition between material and 
nonmaterial.  When the damozel and her lover approach the “Occult, withheld, untrod” 
                                                
25 Armstrong, Victorian Poetry, makes this point extraordinarily clearly, and ultimately finds that 
materiality for Rossetti is unfulfilling and unsatisfactory. 
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shrine, they will “see” their “old prayers, granted, melt / Each like a little cloud” (ll. 80, 
82-3).  In this conception, a prayer, which at its most material exists only as spoken 
language and might just as often exist only in thought, takes visible form; it is as if vapor, 
by definition invisible, were to condense into a cloud and become visible.  Yet this 
visible embodiment of a non-material substance – prayer – dissipates as soon as it is 
granted, at the very moment it might seem to gain material existence.  The poem’s end 
similarly associates prayer with embodiment and disembodiment simultaneously: 
She gazed and listened and then said, 
 Less sad of speech than mild, -- 
‘All this is when he comes.’  She ceased. 
 The light thrilled towards her, fill’d 
With angels in strong level flight. 
 Her eyes prayed, and she smil’d. 
 
(I saw her smile.)  But soon their path 
 Was vague in distant spheres: 
And then she cast her arms along 
 The golden barriers, 
And laid her face between her hands, 
 And wept.  (I heard her tears.)  (ll. 133-144) 
 
Prayer here is silent, accomplished through her eyes rather than through uttered words or 
even verbal thoughts.  Her hopeful prayer seems both to be prompted by and to provoke 
movement: the light that “thrilled towards her” and the “angels in strong level flight.”  
These phrases suggest both movement and materiality, as well as a version of the barrier 
breaching I noted above.  The light has substance and agency, and the angels, presumably 
the spirits of the newly dead moving toward heaven, are “strong” and “level” in their 
approach.  When the angels pass by, however, without her lover in their midst, specificity 
and material substance are replaced by distance and “vague” generality: we return here to 
the “distant spheres” of earlier, more iconic passages.   
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The poem’s formal attributes echo the representations of materiality and non-
materiality, and they also underscore the tensions between the two modes.  Written in 
lines of alternating tetrameter and trimeter, with the second, fourth, and sixth line of each 
stanza rhyming, the poem is in many ways an example of traditional ballad form.  The 
fact that each stanza is comprised of six rather than either four or eight lines means that 
the stanzas do not entirely conform to the ballad form but instead either extend the ballad 
stanza an extra seven beats or end it seven beats early.  As is typical with ballads, 
phrasing tends to coincide with line length, with most line pairs ending in periods, semi-
colons, or other similar punctuation indicators.  Stanza seven is typical of this form:  
Around her, lovers, newly met  
 ‘Mid deathless love’s acclaims, 
Spoke evermore among themselves 
 Their heart-remembered names; 
And the souls mounting up to God 
 Went by her like thin flames.  (ll. 37-42). 
 
The rhymes on the b lines are clean, and the phrases neatly and naturally coincide with 
the lines, so that the lines pair easily.  The iambic meter is regular and unstrained, with 
the possible exception of a stress on “the” in line 41.26   
The metrical regularity of this stanza reinforces its content, which rests cleanly in 
the register of disembodiment and iconicity.27  The formal regularity of this stanza 
                                                
26 Although the line can be read without stressing “the,” it is stressed if the line is read with strict iambic 
stressing: “And thé souls móunting úp to Gód.” 
27 George Saintsbury, A History of English Prosody, from the Twelfth Century to the Present Day (3 vols.; 
New York: Russell and Russell, 1961), claims that “There is nothing schematically very singular in the 
metre of this great poem, which is merely common measure prolonged to a six with an extra couplet, the 
eights being not rhymed at all, the sixes rhymed together . . . But I do not know that it can be said, merely 
as a metre, to carry with it, or even to suggest, much other definite property or endowment” (3:310).  While 
Saintsbury accurately notes the apparent simplicity of Rossetti’s stanza structure, I suggest that the more 
subtle variations in individual stanzas coincide with thematic intrusions of materiality in such a way as to 
reinforce the disruption that materiality poses for the poem and for Rossetti. 
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contrasts sharply with other stanzas that present images of specificity or materiality, both 
suggesting and instantiating the potential for disruption that materiality seems to 
encompass.  When the damozel’s lover first speaks,28 he does so using strongly tactile 
images presented in phrases that disrupt the regularity of the poem’s usual stanza 
structure.   
(To one, it is ten years of years. 
 . . . Yet now, and in this place, 
Surely she leaned o’er me – her hair 
Fell all about my face. . . . 
Nothing: the autumn-fall of leaves. 
The whole year sets apace.)  (ll. 19-24) 
 
The first two lines seem regular enough in meter and rhyme, although the period ending 
the first line interrupts what is usually a de facto heptasyllabic phrase and emphasizes 
instead separation rather than connection between the lines.  However, even that 
compromised regularity disintegrates with the third line.  Instead of running the length of 
the third and fourth lines, this phrase is broken in the middle of the third line, causing the 
subsequent semantic unit to run unequally over the two lines.  The semantic and 
grammatical break in line three also effectively reverses the syllabic order, breaking the 
iambic heptameter into two segments of three and four stressed beats respectively instead 
of four and three.  The ellipses similarly break up the stanzaic structure, even though they 
do not replace missing syllables or directly alter the meter.  They, like the dash and the 
colon, both suggest fragmentation in the subject matter and enact fragmentation on the 
level of textuality.  Instead of three smoothly running phrases of seven syllables each, this 
                                                
28 Each of these parenthetical reflections by the damozel’s lover is marked by similar disruptions in poetic 
form.  I have chosen to discuss this first instance at some length, but similar attention to stanzas 11 and 17 
would reveal equivalent changes to meter, line, and phrasing. 
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stanza presents six distinct phrases, each of which demands separation from the others.  
And line 23 is comprised of two dependent clauses rather than a complete sentence: 
comprised of a rejection (“Nothing.”) and a sad recognition of truth (“The autumn-fall of 
leaves.”), the line both resists syntactic integration and insists upon the actual materiality 
of falling leaves in place of the dreamed of contact with the damozel’s hair. 
Line enjambment functions similarly in other stanzas to highlight the specificity 
and materiality of particular images against the otherwise orderly metrical regularity.  
The crossing of barriers seems particularly connected to disruptions in metrical or 
grammatical regularity: 
From the fixed place of Heaven she saw 
 Time like a pulse shake fierce 
Through all the worlds.  Her gaze still strove  
 Within the gulf to pierce 
Its path; and now she spoke as when 
 The stars sang in their spheres.  (ll. 49-54) 
 
In this case, the enjambment takes place between multiple lines: the second and third, the 
third and fourth, and the fourth and fifth.  The effect is to embed two lines of unrhymed 
iambic pentameter (i.e., blank verse) in the middle of the stanza: “Time like a pulse shake 
fierce through all the worlds” and “Her gaze still strove within the gulf to pierce.”  The 
longer semantic units – “From the fixed place of Heaven she saw / Time like a pulse 
shake fierce / Through all the worlds” and “Her gaze still strove / Within the gulf to 
pierce / Its path” – have the effect of turning a comfortable, song-like poem into 
something far more serious.  If the ballad form is associated with collectivity, tradition, 
and simplicity, blank verse is suggestive of a Romantic poetics that emphasizes the 
introspective and the individual.  The next stanza, in which the damozel’s voice pierces 
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the “still weather” of heaven, contains similar instances of extended phrasing that 
disrupts the easiness and regularity of the ballad stanza; because of their very irregularity, 
these lines and stanzas call attention to themselves, thereby giving textual form to 
specificity in the midst of generality, and calling attention to the value – conflicted as it 
clearly is – that this poem places on the individual and particular in place of the generic.29 
In “The Blessed Damozel,” we get multiple perspectives on the situation and the 
issues at stake, which serves to highlight the tensions between materiality and 
nonmateriality, between specificity and generality.  In “Jenny,” the only perspective 
presented is that of the “young and thoughtful man of the world,” as Rossetti describes 
the speaker.  The object of particularly vehement critical objection, “Jenny” is Rossetti’s 
prime example of the “inner standing point” (SSC 793), an artistic principle he uses to 
avoid objectivity and to achieve a closeness of perspective – a kind of sympathy, if you 
will – with his poetic characters: “Nor did I omit to consider how far a treatment from 
without [i.e., from a disinterested, neutral perspective] might here be possible.  But the 
motive powers of art reverse the requirement of science, and demand first of all an inner 
standing-point.  The heart of such a mystery as this must be plucked from the very world 
in which it beats or bleeds; and the beauty and pity, the self-questionings and all-
                                                
29 While Rossetti’s poem suggests a deep uneasiness about the efficacy (and even, perhaps, the ultimate 
desirability) of the specific and the material, I argue that it depicts a world in which human connection – 
sympathy – is possible only through materiality.  Materiality and somatic sensation may not always lead to 
sympathetic, human connection, but without them such connection is simply impossible.  Thus materiality 
forms the basis of the poem’s ethical system, even if that ethical system is presented as ultimately (in this 
case) ineffectual.  Isobel Armstrong’s immensely useful reading of the poem identifies the tensions and 
unexpected reversals of material and idea that Rossetti presents: “Rossetti’s poem rests on a simple yet bold 
reversal.  Sensuous longing and physical desire are placed in heaven, itself a physical barrier, a golden bar 
or rampart, a bar which the bosom of the Damozel can make warm with her flesh . . . [It] meditates the 
notion of presence and the symbol which takes the transcendent mystical body to be represented by the 
outward sign. . . . The poem is asking in what way we perceive the mystical body through the physical 
body and how we invest the material with significance” (Armstrong, Victorian Poetry, 246-47).   
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questionings which it brings with it, can come with full force only from the mouth of one 
alive to its whole appeal, such as the speaker put forward in the poem . . .” (SSC 793).  In 
representing only the young man’s view point, “Jenny” highlights the speaker’s internal 
conflicts, all of which center on the tension between seeing Jenny as a generic prostitute 
and seeing her as a particular, individual person.  If “The Blessed Damozel” insists upon 
materiality and specificity as means of connection and communion, but ultimately deems 
both impossible, “Jenny” highlights the temptation of the speaker (and of ourselves as 
readers by implication) to operate exclusively in the register of iconicity and concept 
instead of particularity.  Like “The Blessed Damozel,” “Jenny” presents this ethical 
tension through repeated movement between images that suggest abstraction and those 
that suggest specificity. 
At first, these competing representations can be disentangled.  For example, the 
speaker recognizes her weariness, that she “seem[s] too tired to get to bed” (l. 36), and he 
believes her, probably accurately, to be “thankful for a little rest” (l. 67).  As she rests her 
head on his knee, he notices her “wealth of loosened hair, / Your silk ungirdled and 
unlac’d” (ll. 47-48); when he notices that she has fallen asleep, he seems to see her as she 
really is:  
Why, Jenny, you’re asleep at last! – 
Asleep, poor Jenny, hard and fast, –  
So young and soft and tired; so fair, 
With chin thus nestled in your hair, 
Mouth quiet, eyelids almost blue . . . (ll. 171-175) 
 
In this passage, Jenny exists for him simply as a young woman, “So young and soft and 
tired.”  The “eyelids almost blue” are startlingly real, here, perhaps the most real and least 
iconic detail of her appearance, even though the reason for the blueness remains unclear: 
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it could be just the blueness of a vein visible through the thin skin, or it could be mark of 
exhaustion, the equivalent of dark circles under her eyes.   
However, these images of Jenny as an individual are outnumbered and 
outweighed by other, more frequent images of a generic prostitute.  The first image, for 
example, is a thoroughly iconic one, of “Lazy laughing languid Jenny” (l. 1), the 
prostitute who is happy in her profession and enjoys the company of her customers, who 
is “Fond of a kiss and fond of a guinea” (l. 2): equally fond, that is, of what she does and 
of what she earns, and consistently able to play her part as a superficial, disingenuous 
actress, one who is always ready for a good time.  This Jenny is “fair Jenny mine, the 
thoughtless queen / Of kisses” (ll. 7-8), “Whose eyes are as blue skies, whose hair / Is 
countless gold incomparable” (ll. 10-11).  The speaker imagines her first as a “Fresh 
flower, scarce touched with signs that tell / Of Love’s exuberant hotbed” (ll. 12-13), 
suggesting that she is a vivacious young woman who remains untainted by her work, for 
whom he need feel no particular compassion since (being both “laughing” and “languid”) 
she “exuberant[ly]” enjoys what she does; she is also “Poor flower left torn since 
yesterday / Until to-morrow leave you bare” (ll. 14-15), identifying her as a fallen woman 
who has been irreparably degraded.  In both cases, she is representative rather than 
individual, and the images are iconic rather than particular.  Further, the construction of 
the images themselves suggests distance from immediate material reality: whether 
phrased as metaphors (Jenny is “the thoughtless queen / Of kisses”) or as similes (her 
eyes “are as blue skies”), the descriptions of Jenny actually point to something that she is 
not, rather than provide particular and material descriptions of what she is.  These 
descriptions work through comparison to something outside Jenny, suggesting by their 
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very structure (as well as by their content) that the speaker is invested from the beginning 
in seeing Jenny as representative rather than individual.    
While the initial stanzas present images that seem either iconic or particular, as 
the poem progresses images of Jenny oscillate wildly between iconic abstraction and 
individualized materiality, until the representations pile up in tangled chains.  While 
observing Jenny as she sleeps, the speaker imagines Jenny in a series of images that shift 
her from iconic to individual and back again in a whirl of representations:  
Fair shines the gilded aureole 
In which our highest painters place 
Some living woman’s simple face. 
And the stilled features thus descried 
As Jenny’s long throat droops aside, -- 
The shadows where the cheeks are thin, 
And pure wide curve from ear to chin, -- 
With Raffael’s or De Vinci’s hand 
To show them to men’s souls, might stand, 
Whole ages long, the whole world through, 
For preachings of what God can do.  (ll. 230-240) 
 
In this rapid series of descriptions, Jenny’s blond hair becomes a “gilded aureole,” a 
golden halo, a stylized frame for “Some living woman’s simple face,” making her both 
the iconic halo and the “simple face” it surrounds; Jenny’s cheeks are thin enough to be 
in shadow, while her face as a whole is shaped with the “pure wide curve” of a 
Renaissance artist’s rendition; taken altogether, her face stands as evidence of the 
perfection of God’s creation.  She is the model for the painting; she is also the painting 
itself, as well as its frame.  She is the image, and she frames and contains the image.  She 
is also, in this set of images, an art object waiting for the interpretive gaze of a critic. 
This pattern of comparison highlights Jenny’s role in the poem, and for the young 
man, as the emptied object waiting for interpretation, a role that is underscored by the 
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speaker’s repeated likening of Jenny to a book.  Although he has left his room of books 
behind in order to have some fun – “I vowed that since my brain / And eyes of dancing 
seemed so fain, / My feet should have some dancing too” (ll. 30-32) – it is clear from his 
first description of books that they and Jenny are interchangeable.  For the speaker, books 
“hold fast, forsooth, / So many captive hours of youth, -- / The hours they thieve from 
day and night / To make one’s cherished work come right, / And leave it wrong for all 
their theft” (ll. 24-28).  Jenny clearly represents an escape for the speaker from that world 
of books, but, like those books, the temptations Jenny provides “thieve [hours] from night 
and day” and leave nothing but dissatisfaction after they end.  The comparison soon 
becomes explicit: “You know not what a book you seem, / Half-read by lightning in a 
dream!” (ll. 51-52).  Her mind, unused to reflection or intellectual activity, is like “a 
volume seldom read” which “Being opened halfway shuts again” (l. 138-39): “So might 
the pages of her brain / be parted at such words, and thence / Close back upon the dusty 
sense” (ll. 140-142), which seems reason enough for the speaker not to speak his thoughts 
of her aloud.  Finally, she is a flower pressed between pages, “a rose shut in a book / In 
which pure women may not look, / For its base pages claim control / To crush the flower 
within the soul” (ll. 253-56).  The book in which she is contained, by which she is 
trapped and crushed, is one off-limits to pure women: it is “base” and “vile” (l. 259), and 
the rose between its pages is “Puddled with shameful knowledge” (l. 265).   
This last image highlights the increasing levels of abstraction within the poem, a 
process which begins with the speaker’s initial identification of Jenny as a generalized 
prostitute and which continues through her comparisons with a book.  The increasing 
abstraction coincides paradoxically with an increasing degree of objectification: Jenny 
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becomes more of a thing and less of a person with every comparison.  Like “The Blessed 
Damozel,” “Jenny” is also a poem about representations and layers.  As the rose pressed 
between the pages of the book, Jenny is imagined as a non-sentient object, a flower, 
which stands for her now-faded virtue, and contained within text.  Jenny as a complicated 
human individual is reduced to one characteristic, her virtue; that virtue is further 
abstracted by being imagined as something it is not, a rose; the rose is literally 
transformed – crushed – in order to contain the “shameful knowledge” the 
rose/virtue/Jenny possesses; the containing object, as a book, is the embodiment of 
representation, text.  The speaker is conscious of his growing abstraction:  
Yet, Jenny, looking long at you, 
The woman almost fades from view. 
A cipher of man’s changeless sum 
Of lust, past, present, and to come, 
Is left.  A riddle that one shrinks 
To challenge from the scornful sphinx.  (ll. 276-81) 
 
As the speaker recognizes, Jenny is no longer a woman but only the evacuated shell that 
reflects the lust of the men who pay her, and finally simply a riddle.  The sense of woman 
as mirror echoes the speaker’s earlier concern that, if Jenny thinks about him at all, she 
does so only in order to lure him to her (“Or inly is each grace revolved / To fit me with a 
lure?” [ll. 62-63]).  Even this level of attention to Jenny fades in the next stanza, however, 
when the speaker, spurred by his thoughts about the role of lust, imagines lust as the 
mythical toad within a stone, which remains motionless within its “charmed” (l. 288) 
circle, “deaf, blind, alone” (l. 291).  In these stanzas, the poem, guided by the speaker’s 
attention, moves from a) attention to Jenny, to her simultaneous abstraction and 
objectification as b) a rose closed in a book, to her reduction first to c) a shell filled with 
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the desires of men and then to d) a riddle, to a reflection about e) the place of lust in the 
world, represented by f) a toad enclosed within g) a stone.  We are now fully seven layers 
away from Jenny, the ostensible subject of the poem.  Other aspects of Jenny spur similar 
flights: her “lazy lily hand” (l. 97) leads to thoughts of “the lilies of the field” (l. 100), 
which in turn suggests death (a garden in winter, perhaps the lilies of a funeral) (ll. 111-
13).   
Even when the speaker does not entirely replace Jenny with either a symbolic 
representation or an abstract concept, his language and mode of address to her suggest 
anxiety and discomfort.  The rapid shifts in both tone and imagery from kindness and 
specificity to cruelty and generality mirror the representations of her as an individual or 
as a prostitute.  For example, the image of Jenny’s head on his knee is both tactile and 
material, and it also suggests kindness on his part and awareness of her as an individual; 
immediately, however, he returns her to the status of prostitute by wondering “Whose 
person or whose purse may be / The lodestar of your reverie?” (ll. 20-21).  The 
implication here is that, as a prostitute, she will be thinking only of a customer, either in 
terms of his person or in terms of profit.  Again, when he wonders what she thinks of 
him, he first considers that she might be curious about his personal story but then 
dismisses that notion deciding instead that she would focus only on constructing herself 
as a lure to him (ll. 59-63).  Each time he begins to recognize his own complicity in 
Jenny’s situation, he reinforces her status as purchased thing rather than as human being.  
He imagines her wanting rest from “the hatefulness of man” (l. 83), “Who, having used 
you at his will, / Thrusts you aside, as when I dine / I serve the dishes and the wine” (ll. 
86-88), but then immediately and dramatically changes both his tone and his focus: 
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“Well, handsome Jenny mine, sit up, / I’ve filled our glasses, let us sup, / And do not let 
me think of you, / Lest shame of yours suffice for two” (ll. 89-92).  He imagines her 
dreaming of comfort, of a world in which “There roll no streets in glare and rain, / Nor 
flagrant man-swine whets his tusk; / But delicately sighs in musk / The homage of the 
dim boudoir” (ll. 348-51): a world, that is, that offers her respite from the dirt and 
degradation of her current life.  He immediately undercuts this almost sympathetic 
imagination, though, by reminding her and himself that a highly paid courtesan is still a 
whore: “in the discounted dark / Her functions there are here are one” (ll. 359-60).  When 
he leaves her in the morning, he puts a cushion under her head, as if concerned for her 
comfort as she sleeps, but then drops “golden coins” in her hair, suggesting that they 
might be “the subject of your dreams” (ll. 342, 341).   
As the speaker leaves Jenny where she sleeps, he seems to consider his own 
mental representations of her:  
And must I mock you to the last,  
Ashamed of my own shame, -- aghast  
Because some thoughts not born amiss  
Rose at a poor fair face like this?” (ll. 380-383)  
 
His reflection suggests that she fits most comfortably for him in the register of iconic 
representation: it does not seem to matter much whether she is “the thoughtless queen of 
kisses” or a streetwalker on whom “coach-wheels splash rebuke” (l. 147) as long as she 
stands in for something else besides herself, a young woman whose past is unknown and 
whose present and future are probably grim and largely impersonal.30  Just as certainly, 
                                                
30 Rossetti’s young man of the world attempts to hold Jenny at a distance, avoiding the kind of ethical 
awareness of her individuality that I have discussed throughout this project.  Jenny’s individuality is 
presented most clearly in depictions of her material specificity; the poetic speaker’s refusal to maintain his 
attention on the material details of her individuality underlies his ethical failure.  As with “The Blessed 
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though, Jenny does not remain neatly contained within the bounds of such abstracted and 
iconic representation.31 
If Rossetti invests his women with iconic significance, Swinburne brings his to 
the level of material individuality.  Both “Laus Veneris” and “Anactoria” present a lover 
who wants desperately to maintain or to renew a relationship with a distant beloved.  
Among other similarities, both poems insist upon the violence of sexual attraction, and 
the pleasure of pain; both also equate life with materiality, and relationality with bodily 
marks and bodily sensation.  Tannhäuser and Sappho desire to make their lovers feel, and 
to see their marks on their lovers’ bodies, but they fear that such bodily inscription, 
representative of the materiality and the significance of their desire, will be denied them.  
Through images of intense physiological pain, Swinburne suggests that such contact 
between material bodies is the necessary foundation for all relationality; this emphasis on 
the materiality of human life and interaction connects him to the kind of corporeal 
morality I presented at the beginning of this chapter.  Swinburne’s morality is certainly 
unconventional – it is predicated, after all, on the pleasurable pain of sadomasochism – 
but it nevertheless depends upon and springs from an understanding of humans as 
fundamentally (and materially) connected.    
“Laus Veneris” is based on the story of Tannhäuser, a medieval knight and poet.  
                                                                                                                                            
Damozel,” somatic sensitivity and sensory experience in this poem do not necessarily lead to ethical 
sympathy, but without them sympathy, and consequently  ethical behavior, is not possible. 
31 I read “Jenny” as deeply conflicted about the relative status of material embodiment and soul or mind, 
but some other readers see it as unabashedly in favor of bodies.  See, for example, Lise Rodgers, “The 
Book and the Flower: Rationality and Sensuality in ‘Jenny’ (in Harold Bloom [ed.], Pre-Raphaelite Poets 
[New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1986], 21-35), who claims of “Jenny” that “In this poem, fleshly 
sensuality – the sensuality of the harlot – is a natural and desirable thing.  Here the body is, in fact, greater 
than the soul: with all its fleshly needs and desires, it is the prime moral standard within the world of the 
poem.  This is what Ruskin and Buchanan sensed, and what Rossetti knew” (33). 
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According to legend, he is ensnared by Venus but escapes and makes a pilgrimage to 
Rome, where he asks for a papal blessing.  The Pope refuses absolution until such time as 
his staff grows blossoms, which will indicate that the period of Tannhäuser’s penance is 
over; after hearing this verdict, Tannhäuser leaves Rome to begin his period of penance.  
Swinburne’s poem takes place after the pilgrimage, when Tannhäuser returns to Venus’s 
Hörselberg.  Swinburne described his vision of the poem in Notes on Poems and 
Reviews: “To me it seemed that the tragedy began with the knight’s return to Venus – 
began at the point where hitherto it had seemed to leave off.  The immortal agony of a 
man lost after all repentance – cast down from fearful hope into fearless despair – 
believing in Christ and bound to Venus – desirous of penitential pain, and damned to 
joyless pleasure . . . The tragic touch of the story is this: that the knight who has 
renounced Christ believes in him; the lover who has embraced Venus disbelieves in her.  
Vainly and in despair would he make the best of that which is the worst – vainly 
remonstrate with God, and argue on the side he would fain desert” (SR 26).  This 
irreconcilable conflict is evident not only in Tannhäuser’s final decision to remain with 
Venus rather than attempt to return to the God he believes in, but also in the images of 
materiality that saturate the poem.  
Tannhäuser yearns to leave a bodily mark on Venus to match the marks he knows 
she has inflicted on him.  The poem opens with a sense of the impossibility of such 
material effect: 
Asleep or waking is it?  For her neck, 
Kissed over close, wears yet a purple speck 
Wherein the pained blood falters and goes out; 




At first, it appears that Tannhäuser has bruised her, left a “purple speck” on her neck, 
“kissed over close.”  Immediately, however, he realizes that he cannot leave a bruise 
because, “though my lips shut sucking on the place, / There is no vein at work upon her 
face” (ll. 5-6).  The suggestion here seems to be that she is unmoved by his attention, 
static in much the same sort of abstracted way that the damozel’s companions, the five 
handmaidens, appear insulated from any worldly sensations; the imagery, however, is of 
death.  She is not simply unresponsive; she is lifeless, without blood or veins (although 
the literalness of the image of death is undercut shortly after: “Deep sleep has warmed 
her blood through all its ways” [l. 8]).  Later, after chronicling the pain she can inflict 
upon him, he acknowledges again her impenetrability and his own inability to affect her, 
literally to scratch her surface: “Below her bosom, where a crushed grape stains / The 
white and blue, there my lips caught and clove / An hour since, and what mark of me 
remains?” (ll. 166-168).  Like her neck, which “wears yet a purple speck,” her skin here 
is marked; he has had a material effect on her.  Yet he knows that this mark, left only “An 
hour since,” is already disappearing.  No wonder then that when he sees a “purple speck” 
still marking her throat, he wonders if he is awake or dreaming.  Try as he might to mark 
his lover, whatever mark he makes will disappear almost immediately. 
Venus suffers no such inability to mark her lovers, however.  Her torture of the 
men who adore her is presented in inescapably physical images of pain:  
Their blood runs round the roots of time like rain: 
She casts them forth and gathers them again; 
With nerve and bone she weaves and multiplies 
Exceeding pleasure out of extreme pain.  
 
Her little chambers drip with flower-like red, 
Her girdles, and the chaplets of her head, 
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 Her armlets and her anklets; with her feet 
She tramples all that winepress of the dead. 
 
. . . .  
 
There is the knight Adonis that was slain; 
With flesh and blood she chains him for a chain; 
The body and the spirit in her ears 
Cry, for her lips divide him vein by vein.  (ll. 117-124, 133-136) 
 
The men who are her lovers here are “the souls that were / Slain in the old time, having 
found her fair” (ll. 113-14): the ancient Greeks and Romans who lived before the advent 
of Christianity and so lived and died in her power.  Nerve and bone are separated, and 
Adonis is divided “vein by vein” in a way that suggests the maximization of pain in terms 
of both duration and depth.  The “roots of time” around which the lovers’ blood runs 
suggest an eternal cycle of torturous pleasure, bleeding, and return.  Their blood is her 
adornment and decoration.  She, like the “Love” in lines 36-48, is a weaver; her materials 
are the “nerve and bone” of the men themselves, and from them she “weaves and 
multiplies exceeding pleasure from extreme pain.”  This image of Venus as a weaver 
echoes the earlier image of Love, “Crowned with gilt thorns and clothed with flesh like 
fire, / . . . wan as foam blown up the salt burnt sands” (ll. 34-36), who stands “like one 
labouring at a loom” (l. 40):  
The warp holds fast across; and every thread 
That makes the woof up has dry specks of red;  
 Always the shuttle cleaves clean through, and he 
Weaves with the hair of many a ruined head.  (ll. 41-44) 
 
Love, who seems in this description to be a sort of hybrid between Christ (the crown of 
“gilt thorns”) and Venus herself (given the reference to seafoam), weaves with the bloody 
hair of the dead; the shuttle itself acts like an executioner’s sword, “cleav[ing] clean 
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through” the loom as if it were one of the ruined heads whose hair he uses.   
Tannhäuser alone of all her lovers remains alive: “Yea, all she slayeth; yea, every 
man save me; / Me, love, thy lover that must cleave to thee / Till the ending of the days 
and ways of earth . . .” (ll. 137-39).  In spite of his recurrent prayers for death, he remains 
alive and will be so until time ends because of his rejection of Christ and his return to 
Venus.  Yet his lament – “Yea, all she slayeth; yea, every man save me” – reads both as 
an acknowledgement of his chosen position, outside of the laws of nature that govern 
times of life and death, and as a desperate plea to Venus to do with him what she has 
done with past lovers.  That is, Tannhäuser seems as tormented here by Venus’s lack of 
torture as he is by his inability to die, to leave existence behind.  It is Tannhäuser who 
describes the “exceeding pleasure” that Venus weaves for those she tortures with her 
attentions; and Tannhäuser, not being tortured, may feel himself excluded from her love 
after he has sacrificed his soul for her.  Although she “tramples all that winepress of the 
dead” (l. 124), extracting her victims’ blood and dividing them nerve from bone and vein 
from vein, she will not do this to him, and he keenly mourns that absence. 
This is not to say that Venus has abandoned him; rather, it simply underscores the 
extent to which material, bodily contact – the paradigmatic essence of which, in this 
poem at least, is pain – is a necessary feature of relationality, of human connection.  
Tannhäuser is marked by his love for Venus, although in ways far less extreme – and 
consequently far less satisfying – than are the dead men in the passage above.  Kissing 
her can “Leave [his] lips charred” (l. 170), which he counts as “a little bliss, / Brief bitter 
bliss . . . / . . . how sweet a thing it is” (ll. 170-72).  Her proximity “make[s] / The very 
soul in all my senses ache” (ll. 89-90), and when “with blind lips” (l. 317) he reaches for 
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Venus, he finds himself strangled by her attentions: “ . . . I . .. found / About my neck 
your hands and hair enwound, / The hands that stifle and the hair that stings, / I felt them 
fasten sharply without sound” (ll. 317-20).  When he returns to Venus, after leaving 
behind the Pope’s call to penitence, he experiences her attentions as painful pleasure that 
models his future torments in hell: 
Yea, she laid hold upon me, and her mouth 
Clove unto mine as soul to body doth, 
 And, laughing, made her lips luxurious; 
. . .  
 
And I forgot fear and all weary things, 
All ended prayers and perished thanksgivings,  
 Feeling her face with all her eager hair 
Cleave to me, clinging as a fire that clings  
 
To the body and to the raiment, burning them; 
As after death I know that such-like flame 
 Shall cleave to me for ever; yea, what care, 
Albeit I burn then, having felt the same?  (ll. 393-95, 401-408) 
 
The pleasurable pains Venus offers make the torments of hell pale in comparison, and 
Tannhäuser is willing to endure them later for the sake of the painful pleasure she gives 
him now.  This is the heart of Tannhäuser’s – and the poem’s – conflict: is it better to 
choose the temporary but exquisite pleasure afforded by devotion to Venus in return for 
eternal damnation, or to choose the “bitter love” that “is sorrow in all lands” (ll. 253-54) 
– the faded, passionless love of Christianity – in exchange for eternity “High up in barren 
heaven” (l. 413)?  Tannhäuser chooses Venus and their love, saying that “there is no 
better life than this”:  
To have known love, how bitter a thing it is, 
 And afterward be cast out of God’s sight; 




High up in barren heaven before his face 
As we twain in the heavy-hearted place, 
 Remembering love and all the dead delight, 
And all that time was sweet with for a space? (ll. 409-16) 
 
It is better, in Tannhäuser’s estimation, to choose the torments of Venus’s love than the 
“bitter love” of Christianity, brought to the world by “one that hath a plague-mark on his 
brows; / Dust and spilt blood do track him to his house / Down under earth; sweet smells 
of lip and cheek, / Like a sweet snake’s breath made more poisonous / With chewing of 
some perfumed deadly grass, / Are shed all round his passage if he pass, / And their 
quenched savour leaves the whole soul weak” (ll. 257-63).  The life promised by 
Christianity seems to Tannhäuser more like a living death, a gray and passionless life that 
makes “the whole soul weak.” 
Swinburne’s own characterization of the poem – that its tragedy depends on the 
choice Tannhäuser makes with the full knowledge of its consequences, and that his 
despair stems from his allegiance to Venus in spite of his belief in Christ, thereby 
knowingly damning himself – suggests that Tannhäuser’s praise of Venus is thoroughly 
ironic, and it is in this sense that a number of critics have read the poem.32  Other critics 
read the poem as a direct challenge to orthodox Christianity, as an anti-moral poem.  
Antony H. Harrison, for example, notes that “it is an erotically and aesthetically 
gratifying hell, rich with sensation . . . Tannhäuser’s monologue thus serves what is, for 
Swinburne, a moral function: it initiates the reader into the ideal realm of erotic 
                                                
32 See for example Jerome McGann’s notes to the poem in McGann and Sligh (eds.), Swinburne: Major 
Poems and Selected Prose, 476. 
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aestheticism and thus liberates him from repressive moral and religious values . . .”33  I 
want to suggest, however, that Swinburne’s comment, and his poem, can be read 
otherwise.  It is true that Tannhäuser recognizes the ultimate futility of his choosing 
Venus over Christ, and there is something of the tragic in this recognition.  But his choice 
also insists upon the value (for Tannhäuser, for the poem, for Swinburne) of materiality 
and immediacy, of somatic experience, not simply in terms of pleasure but in terms of the 
potential for connection.  I want to argue, that is, that Tannhäuser’s choice of intense 
sensation reveals the relationship of the body to morality – to the possibility for 
connection and communion – as much as it reveals an immediate desire for hedonistic 
pleasure.34 
Similarly, in “Anactoria,” Sappho wants to regain the kind of connection to 
Anactoria that she once had, represented here, in instance after instance, as the bodily 
marks left by torture: 
I feel thy blood against my blood: my pain 
Pains thee, and lips bruise lips, and vein stings vein.  (ll. 11-12) 
 
Sappho’s bodily sensation (“my pain”) extends beyond her bodily boundaries and affects 
the body of her beloved (“Pains thee”).  Further, the material composition of Sappho’s 
                                                
33 Antony H. Harrison, Swinburne’s Medievalism: A Study in Victorian Love Poetry (Baton Rouge: U 
Louisiana P, 1979), 68. 
34 This is true in spite of the clear symbolic opposition between an investment in bodily experience and 
adherence to Christian morality, because, for Swinburne, Christianity is not morally viable.  That is, while 
the tragic futility of Tannhäuser’s dedication to Venus might appear to initiate an opposition between 
materiality and morality (“an erotically and aesthetically gratifying hell, rich with sensation”), I read “Laus 
Veneris” not as anti-Christian and consequently anti-moral, but rather moral precisely because it rejects the 
Christian rejection of the body and its experiences.  For Swinburne, that is, ethical connections between 
individuals are always effected by means of the body, and so ethical sympathy – perhaps difficult to 
recognize in Swinburne’s poetry because it so clearly opposes traditional conceptions of disembodied 
spirituality, and because it insists on the transcendent value of intense sensory sensuous experience – 
always relies on bodily experience.    
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body (her blood and her veins) leaks out of her, mingling with that of Anactoria, a 
mingling that is echoed later when Sappho fantasizes herself “Mixed with thy blood and 
molten into thee!” (l. 132).  This sort of corporeal mingling is also figured as eating and 
drinking, of bodily incorporation as a means of both merging and ordering: 
I would my love could kill thee; I am satiated  
With seeing thee live, and fain would have thee dead. 
I would earth had thy body as fruit to eat, 
And no mouth but some serpent’s found thee sweet.  (ll. 23-26) 
 
Sappho, “satiated” (suggesting “satisfied” as well as “saturated”) with having Anactoria 
alive, now wills the earth to eat Anactoria’s body and the serpent to find her “sweet” to 
consume.  If Sappho no longer has access to Anactoria, access which is figured as bodily 
mingling and incorporation, then she wants “no mouth but some serpent’s” to have access 
to her.   
Such literal bodily incorporation is also associated in the poem with sexual desire 
and the physical disintegration of sadomasochistic pleasure: 
I would find grievous ways to have thee slain. 
Intense device, and superflux of pain; 
Vex thee with amorous agonies, and shake 
Life at thy lips, and leave it there to ache; 
Strain out thy soul with pangs too soft to kill, 
Intolerable interludes, and infinite ill; 
Relapse and reluctation of the breath, 
Dumb tunes and shuddering semitones of death. (ll. 27-34) 
 
The intensity of the sensation Sappho wishes to inflict is directly contrasted with softness 
in a way that serves to highlight the desirability of sensation: the “pangs too soft to kill” 
that nonetheless “Strain out thy soul”; the “interludes” that are “intolerable” rather than 
offering respite from pain; the “Dumb tunes and shuddering semitones of death” that 
suggest both quiet and escape, as well as shuddering torment.  The unexpected 
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oppositions also pair terms that form paradoxes: sound that is “dumb,” unspoken, mute; a 
soul that can be “strain[ed] out,” presumably from the body.  Sappho wants to tease out 
an audible silence from Anactoria; this audible silence takes the form not of simple sound 
but of the “tunes and . . . semitones” that suggest music and, by extension, poetry.  
Silence, the absence of sound, takes the increasingly substantial forms of music and 
poetry, suggesting the possibility both of transformation from non-material to material 
and of access to the non-material through the body.  This sound, whether of music or 
poetry, is imagined as if it had material shape and substance: it shudders, suggesting not 
only the vibration of sound or the wavering of a string but also the shivering of a body.  
Later, Sappho makes the association between bodies, in particular Anactoria’s, and 
poetry explicit:  “but thou – thy body is the song, / Thy mouth the music” (ll. 74-75).  In 
both cases, the effect is to heighten the intensity of Sappho’s intention as well as to 
underscore the degree to which the material and the non-material are interpermeable: one 
might equally reach silence by means of music, or poetry by means of silence.   
This association between musical or poetic production and the tortured body 
continues throughout “Anactoria,” making music itself into a material body at the same 
time that the literal body is imagined as beyond Sappho’s reach.  Sappho would “Strike 
pang from pang as note is struck from note, / Catch the sob’s middle music in thy throat, / 
Take thy limbs living, and new-mould with these / A lyre of many faultless agonies” (ll. 
137-40), make Anactoria into both the song and the instrument through the infliction of 
perfect pain.  The construction of music is figured here as a process of separation as 
much as of synthesis: to “Strike pang from pang as note is struck from note” suggests the 
atomization of sound and echoes Venus’s separation of nerve, bone, and vein in the 
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creation of exquisitely pleasurable pain for the dead men who adore her.  That is, musical 
notes might be built from (“struck from”) other notes, but the image also suggests a 
division, notes separated from other notes.35  Like Swinburne’s often-used word, 
“cleave,” this image of notes and pangs being struck from others suggests both melding 
and division; and both “strike” and “cleave” also suggest the violence inherent in 
creation.36  Anactoria’s living limbs would be remade into an instrument capable of 
inflicting – and produced by means of – “many faultless agonies.”  Every part of musical 
production is imagined as both intensely physical and intensely painful in a way that 
suggests the inseparability of the three concepts.   
By imagining Anactoria’s body both as the source of Sappho’s poetic inspiration 
and as the embodiment of poetry’s form, Swinburne multiplies the substitutions between 
and among body, soul, inspiration, desire, poetry, song, poet, and poem:  
Ah that my lips were tuneless lips, but pressed 
To the bruised blossom of thy scourged white breast! 
                                                
35 Yopie Prins, Victorian Sappho (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999), argues persuasively for the 
fragmentation of Anactoria’s body as a literalization of the fragmentation of Sappho’s poetic corpus, 
suggesting that for Swinburne, and for Sappho, the body and the poem become interchangeable, so that one 
can substitute for the other as an equal exchange: “What makes Sappho sublime is the mutilation of the 
Sapphic fragments, allowing her to be simultaneously dismembered and remembered, in a complex 
mediation between corpse and corpus: the body of the poet is sacrificed to the body of her song, and this 
body of song is sacrificed to posterity, which recollects the scattered fragments in order to recall Sappho 
herself as the long-lost origin of lyric poetry” (115-16).  Prins goes on to note that the title of the poem 
(named for Anactoria rather than for Sappho, as might be expected) “identif[ies] Anactoria as the proper 
name for a Sapphic rhythm that is allegorized in Swinburne’s poem . .. . [T]he title names ‘Anactoria’ as 
the rhythmicized body produced by the poem: a silent, absent body made present through Sappho’s verse, 
much as (on another level of representation) Sappho is also presented by Swinburne in the rhythmic form 
of this own verse” (128). 
36 Several critics have commented on Swinburne’s frequent use of “cleave” as a word that suggests two 
opposing meanings simultaneously.  Prins, Victorian Sappho, offers one of the most cogent assessments: 
“Divided into many parts, separate but also together, different but also the same, Sappho and Anactoria 
embody the paradox of ‘flesh that cleaves;’ here, as so often in Swinburne’s verse, the verb ‘to cleave’ is 
used antithetically – meaning both ‘to join’ and ‘to separate’ – in order to describe a body held together 




Ah that my mouth for Muses’ milk were fed 
On the sweet blood thy sweet small wounds had bled! 
That with my tongue I felt them, and could taste 
The faint flakes from thy bosom to thy waist! 
That I could drink thy veins as wine, and eat 
Thy breasts like honey! that from face to feet 
Thy body were abolished and consumed, 
And in my flesh thy very flesh entombed! (ll. 105-14) 
 
In wishing away her gift of poetry, Sappho substitutes her desire for Anactoria in place of 
her desire for poetic inspiration.  Anactoria’s bruised body makes visible Anactoria’s 
pain, upon both of which Sappho would feed, first simply as an end in itself but almost 
immediately as a source of a substitute “Muses’ milk.”  Anactoria’s “sweet” blood feeds 
Sappho’s erotic desire and her need for poetic inspiration, both of which are figured as 
intense bodily sensations nearly painful in their intensity.  But Sappho’s desire is not 
simply to “taste / the faint flakes” of “sweet” blood that have come from “thy sweet small 
wounds.”  Instead, Sappho wishes to devour Anactoria, body and blood: “That I could 
drink thy veins as wine, and eat / Thy breasts like honey!”  Not content with simply the 
“Muses’ milk” of Anactoria’s blood, seeping from wounds inflicted by a jealous 
Aphrodite, Sappho wants to incorporate and obliterate Anactoria’s physical being.  
Anactoria will suffuse Sappho: she will not only be inside Sappho, but will be 
coextensive with her: “in my flesh thy very flesh entombed!”  Anactoria’s flesh will now 
be (and be in) Sappho’s, and vice versa, suggesting possession and identity as much as 
containment.  Yet this obliteration through consumption is in the service of creation as 
much as of destruction.  Yopie Prins notes Swinburne’s “pun on feet,” suggesting “the 
embodiment of Sapphic meter in Anactoria, as she reincarnates the metrical limbs of 
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Sappho’s song.”37  Anactoria, metonymized here as “The paces and pauses of thy feet” (l. 
117), becomes literally the embodiment of metrics, of poetry.38  Her body is further 
atomized in Sappho’s appreciation of Anactoria’s “fragrant” (l. 120) hair, her “shoulders 
whiter than a fleece of white” (l. 123), and her “flower-sweet fingers” (l. 124) with their 
“almond-shaped and roseleaf-coloured shells” (l. 126).  In the midst of her consumption 
of Anactoria, Sappho is the object of oral attack as well: “Ah, ah, thy beauty! like a beast 
it bites, / Stings like an adder, like an arrow smites” (ll. 115-16).  Anactoria’s beauty 
stings Sappho in terms remarkably similar to Swinburne’s description of the effect of 
poetry.  In describing “Anactoria,” he writes in Notes on Poems and Reviews that, “more 
than any other’s, [Sappho’s] verses strike and sting the memory in lonely places, or at 
sea, among all loftier sights and sounds . . . they seem akin to fire and air, being 
themselves ‘all air and fire’; other element there is none in them” (SR 21).  In his 
unfinished novel Lesbia Brandon, Lady Wariston describes poetry in similar terms:  
“Things in verse hurt one, don’t they?  hit and sting like a cut.  They wouldn’t hurt us if 
we had no blood, and no nerves.  Verse hurts horribly . . . It’s odd that words should 
change so just by being put into rhyme.  They get teeth and bite; they take fire and burn.  
I wonder who first thought of tying words up and twisting them back to make verses, and 
hurt and delight all the people in the world for ever . . . one can’t tell where the pain or 
                                                
37 Prins, Victorian Sappho, 131. 
38 The Christian God against whom Swinburne-as-Sappho rails is also likened to poetry, but his is 
composed of “iron feet” (l. 172) that “threaten and trample all things” (l. 174).  This God insists, according 
to Swinburne’s conception, on the separation of body from soul rather than the endless substitutions and 
replacements possible in Swinburne’s poetics; consequently, “the mute melancholy lust of heaven” (l. 170) 
replaces the song of tortured inspiration that Sappho sings.  See Prins, Victorian Sappho, for her discussion 
of the many references to poetic feet in “Anactoria” (131). 
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the pleasure ends or begins.”39  Paradoxically both embodied and disembodied, Anactoria 
is simultaneously poetry, the subject of this poem, the embodiment of a kind of poetics, 
and the inspiration for Sappho’s poetic creation.  
Yet in spite of this consumption and re-figuring of Anactoria as Sapphic poetics, 
Sappho’s monologue remains an impossible fantasy, not a plan.  That is to say, the 
conditional tense in which Sappho addresses Anactoria both articulates Sappho’s desires 
and admits their impossibility.  Sappho may want to render Anactoria’s body into poetry 
by disarticulating and consuming it, may desire to mark Anactoria’s body in a way that 
speaks undeniably of Sappho’s access and Anactoria’s receptivity, but she either cannot 
or dares not do so.   
. . . O that I  
Durst crush thee out of life with love, and die, 
Die of thy pain and my delight, and be 
Mixed with thy blood and molten into thee!   
Would I not plague thee dying overmuch? 
Would I not hurt thee perfectly? not touch 
Thy pores of sense with torture, and make bright 
Thine eyes with bloodlike tears and grievous light? 
Strike pang from pang as note is struck from note, 
Catch the sob’s middle music in thy throat, 
Take thy limbs living, and new-mould with these 
A lyre of many faultless agonies? 
Feed thee with fever and famine and fine drouth, 
With perfect pangs convulse thy perfect mouth, 
Make thy life shudder in thee and burn afresh,  
And wring thy very spirit through the flesh?  (ll. 129-144) 
 
Spoken as ineffectual prayer rather than intention, these lines speak of Sappho’s sense of 
the unbridgeable distance between her and Anactoria as much as they reveal the intensity 
of her desire or the paradoxical unity and separation of material and spirit.  “O that I 
                                                
39 Algernon Charles Swinburne, Lesbia Brandon (excerpted in McGann and Sligh [eds.], Swinburne: Major 
Poems and Selected Prose, 452-66), 460. 
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/Durst,” laments Sappho; given the opportunity, she asks rhetorically, “Would I not 
plague thee,” “hurt thee,” “touch / Thy pores of sense with torture,” elicit “bloodlike 
tears,” “wring thy very spirit through the flesh”?  These are not Sappho’s detailed plans, 
or even simple statements of desire; instead, they are the lament of one who cannot reach 
her beloved, to whom access is denied absolutely.  The unspoken “if” is implicit in each 
conditional phrase: If I had access to you, if I could touch you, if you were available to 
me, if I could make you listen, if you had not left, if you still loved me.  While the 
extremity of these images of physical and sexual violence does something to camouflage 
the conditional tense, the unspoken end result of each phrase is Sappho’s inability to do 
the thing she wishes.   
It is her desperation to reach Anactoria, to mark her literally or metaphorically, 
rather than the kinds of pain that she would inflict that resonate most insistently here, and 
the impossibility of her desperation structures the entire poem.  While Anactoria has a 
material effect on Sappho, Sappho can only wish she had the same degree of effect on 
Anactoria.   
I pray thee sigh not, speak not, draw not breath;  
. . .  
I would the sea had hidden us . . . 
. . .  
I would my love could kill thee . . . 
. . . and fain would have thee dead. 
I would earth had thy body as fruit to eat,  
. . .  
I would find grievous ways to have thee slain . . .  
. . .  
Ah that my lips were tuneless lips, but pressed  
To the bruised blossom of thy scourged white breast! 
. . .  
That I could drink thy veins as wine . .  
. . . that from face to feet 
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Thy body were abolished and consumed . . . (ll. 5, 7, 23-25, 27, 105-106, 
111-13) 
 
There is no “will” in Sappho’s address to the absent and unresponsive Anactoria; there is 
only “would.”  In each case, the conditional “would” removes the action from the realm 
of intention, emphasizing instead its impossibility and, by extension, Sappho’s lack of 
access to Anactoria. 
“Anactoria” is saturated with such images of violence, the infliction of pain, and 
the incorporation of (parts of) the lover’s body, and these images render conspicuous the 
importance of materiality in Swinburne’s conception of relationality.  Yet in the midst of 
these dense images of materiality and of the specificity of individual experience, the 
impossibility of Sappho’s desires suggests both the necessity and the difficulty of human 
connection.  Further, as in Rossetti’s poems, the tension between materiality and 
disembodiment, between particular and iconic representations, problematizes any ready 
alignment between either materiality or spirituality and humane-ness or morality.  On the 
most obvious level, the interaction between individuals in these poems is scripted in 
legend and history, determined long before Swinburne wrote his own versions of their 
stories.40  In one sense, then, these are purely iconic characters – Venus, Sappho, 
Anactoria, Tannhäuser – rather than fully realized individuals.  Unlike Rossetti’s 
                                                
40 Swinburne accentuates this characteristic of his poems by creating literary or mythological antecedents 
even where none exist.  William Michael Rossetti, in his 1866 defense of Swinburne, Swinburne’s Poems 
and Ballads (reprinted in Hyder, SCH), notes that “The ‘Laus Veneris’, itself sufficiently independent of 
models, is prefaced by a paragraph in old French purporting to be extracted from a ‘Livre des Grandes 
Merveilles d’Amour, escript en Latin et en Françoys par Maistre Antoine Gaget, 1530’, but which we 
confidently father upon Mr. Swinburne himself” (SCH 69-70).  Similarly, Catherine Maxwell, Swinburne 
(Devon: Northcote, 2006), notes Swinburne’s use of art and literature as models for several of his poems, 
identifying three poems that “directly allude to art works:” “A Christmas Carol” and D. G. Rossetti’s 
painting of the same name; “Before the Mirror” and Whistler’s The Little White Girl/Symphony in White 
No. 2; and “Hermaphroditus” and the Louvre statue.  “Erotion,” while not exactly modeled on art, was a 
comment on Simeon Solomon’s Damon and Aglae.  Maxwell links Swinburne’s creation of a so-called 
source text for “Laus Veneris” to his interest in the dialogue between works of art (25). 
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characterizations, which oscillate between the extremes of iconic and realistic, 
Swinburne’s exist simultaneously at both poles: Venus, for example, is both the 
abstracted embodiment of love and erotic desire, who exists beyond the boundary of 
human interaction, and a fully embodied character.41  Likewise, Sappho is both a woman 
who wants desperately to renew her relationship with her beloved and, simultaneously, 
“simply nothing less . . . than the greatest poet who ever was at all.”42 
 
Ethics and Materiality 
In his 1866 defense of Swinburne, William Michael Rossetti both praised 
Swinburne for his ability to enter sympathetically into the mind and imagination of his 
poetic models and identified Swinburne’s greatest fault as his lack of sympathy for 
people of his own time and place.  “Mr. Swinburne, being truly a poet, a man of 
imagination, penetrates, by the force of imagination as well as of studentship, into the 
imaginative identity of poetic models of past time, and thence into their embodying forms 
. . . [T]he determined set of his intellect towards art, and consequently towards literary 
art, possesses him with so sharp a sympathy for the literary or poetic models of highest 
style that, as the mood varies, he can pitch his mind into true harmonic concert with 
Chaucer now, now with Dante, Sophocles, Keats, or Hugo, and sing, as it were, new 
vocal music to the accompaniment of these most definite, dominant, and unperishing 
melodies” (SCH 71).  At the same time, though, Rossetti identifies the “main source of 
                                                
41 Harrison, Swinburne’s Medievalism, notes that Venus “is at once, in the poem, a real woman, an ideal, 
and a myth” (60). 
42 Lang (ed.), Letters, 4:124. 
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shortcomings in our poet – the deficiency of broad frank sympathies, or (to use the 
common and here very apposite term) of ‘fellow-feeling’” (SCH 84).  In this conception, 
Swinburne fails to sympathize with his public while creating verse that demonstrates 
almost unaccountable sympathy with the minds of the artists who are his models.   
If Swinburne’s (and Rossetti’s) contemporaries found these poets lacking in their 
ability to sympathize with them and their attitudes, current readers have found 
particularly Swinburne far more sympathetic, usually in terms of the response his verse 
elicits from them.  Catherine Maxwell notes that “Swinburne’s readers are meant to 
experience themselves as physical as well as intellectual beings as the verse 
communicates simultaneously to the mind and senses, predominantly through that 
psychologically-charged bodily element: the nerves,” a process she likens to “a parodic 
version of sympathy.”43  They do this by eliciting somatic responses from their readers in 
much the way Buchanan and others criticized them for; but they also encourage 
sympathy by putting their readers inside the poem rather than outside.  Rossetti’s “inner 
standing point” in this sense refers not only to the poet’s relationship to the subjects of his 
poems but also to the readers, who are encouraged (or forced) to assume the perspective 
of the poems’ speakers.  For readers of “Jenny” in particular, this sympathetic 
identification between reader and speaker is uncomfortable, since it makes readers 
complicit in the morally questionable stance the speaker has toward Jenny.  In other 
poems, the sympathetic identification between reader and poem (or speaker) is more 
                                                
43 Catherine Maxwell, “Swinburne: Style, Sympathy, and Sadomasochism” (The Journal of Pre-Raphaelite 
Studies 12 [Fall 2003], 86-94), 88, 90.   
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positive if equally disquieting.  In Swinburne’s “Pasiphaë,”44 for example, Daedalus 
demonstrates his sympathy with Pasiphaë’s agony of desire for the bull both by crafting 
the wooden cow for her and by describing her sensations in terms that suggest he 
understands them, even that he has experienced them himself.  Further, Daedalus’s 
careful description both of Pasiphaë’s predicament and of his solution draws the reader 
into Pasiphaë’s situation, making that reader not only complicit (as Rossetti’s reader of 
“Jenny” might be) but also sympathetic toward Pasiphaë.45  Swinburne’s earliest and 
most hostile critics attacked Swinburne for the immorality of his poetry, often in terms of 
the immorality it encouraged in his readers, and the moral contagion Robert Buchanan 
attributed to Rossetti and the Fleshly School is in essence simply a dangerous version of 
sympathetic communication.  Had Swinburne and Rossetti encouraged less physiological 
responses from their readers, or had their poems contained less supposedly immoral 
material, their ability to elicit sympathetic feeling would likely not have been questioned. 
I have argued that both Rossetti and Swinburne articulate a kind of sympathy 
within their poems that is predicated on immediacy, sensation, and embodiment rather 
than on distance and imagination.  If sympathy is the main requisite for Victorian 
morality, I suggest that we see Swinburne’s and Rossetti’s version of sympathy as at least 
                                                
44 “Pasiphaë” has never been included in any collections of Swinburne’s poetry.  Catherine Maxwell’s 
inclusion of the poem as an appendix to her Swinburne marks the first time it has been “reprinted . . . for a 
general audience” (49).  The poem exists in a British Library manuscript (MS Ashley 5097, fos. 47-41) and 
in limited-issue printings such as Randolph Hughes (ed.), Pasiphaë: A Poem (London: Golden Cockerell P, 
1950), which was printed privately and limited to 500 copies.  Hughes’s edition, which states that the poem 
is “now correctly printed for the first time,” includes a number of copper engravings of various episodes 
from the poem.  Hughes’s introduction lists only one other printing of the poem, in T. J. Wise (ed.), Lady 
Maisie’s Bairn and Other Poems, of which only twenty copies were printed for private circulation and 
which included a number of textual errors (5). 
45 Catherine Maxwell, Swinburne, discusses the sympathetic relationships between poet, poem, characters, 
and reader in “Pasiphaë” at some length (49-54). 
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potentially moral.  Both poets envision communion between individuals as a constituent 
feature of humanity, possible to varying degrees within the existing structure of the 
world.  Rossetti questions the possibility of establishing, and certainly of maintaining, the 
detailed and thorough awareness of the other as a particular individual that is necessary 
for this version of sympathy to work morally: the young man of the world finds it 
ultimately impossible to resist the temptation to imagine Jenny as a generic prostitute 
rather than as an individual, while the damozel and her lover are finally unable to bridge 
the distance between the abstract and the material.  Swinburne’s Tannhäuser and Sappho 
believe in the necessity of seeking communion with the beloved through the body; the 
inaccessibility of each body suggests not that materiality is divorced from morality but 
rather that each speaker doubts the ultimate possibility of human connection.  In both 
cases, however, any possibility of moral – humane, fully human – connection is possible 
only through materiality; disembodied spirituality for both poets suggests only absence 
and inaccessibility. 
Some recent critics have made explicit the transcendence they find in this poetry, 
particularly in Swinburne’s poems, while noting that the poetry remains firmly embedded 
in the material world.46  Other readers claim that the poems depict a new kind of 
materiality.  For example, Harold Bloom argues that Rossetti, “a convinced sensualist, 
                                                
46 For example, Rooksby, “The Algernonicon,” notes that although some critics have recently “been ready 
to praise Swinburne for the un-Victorian willingness with which he jettisons anything that might resemble 
belief in a transcendent dimension, and extolls instead a naturalistic vision of humanity’s place as material 
creatures in a material cosmos,” Rooksby recognizes that “Swinburne’s language admits of the possibility 
of a reading that sees another dimension to the world that goes beyond physical realities alone” (78).  Judith 
Stoddart, “The Morality of Poems and Ballads: Swinburne and Ruskin” (Rooksby and Shrimpton [eds.], 
The Whole Music of Passion, 92-106), identifies a similar insistence “on its [the soul’s] identification with 
the mortal body,” and claims that the poetry praises “not an aesthetic divorced from morality, but an 
alternative moral aesthetic, one which naturally embraces both sides of human nature” (97).   
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writes a naturalistic poetry that yet rejects natural forms,” and that his “lyrics and sonnets 
are set in a world that is at once phantasmagoria and nature, giving the effect of an 
artificial nature . . . It is impossible . . . to decide whether we stand in the remembered 
natural world, or in some purgatorial realm heavier and more naturally luxurious than 
nature could ever have been.”47  On the other hand, Lise Rodgers writes of “Jenny” that 
“the truth is that the passions – or the flesh – are morally supreme within the world of 
Jenny and her young man” and that “[t]his truth involves the realization not only that the 
sensual, as opposed to the rational, is more conducive to compassion, but that it is the 
most ‘natural’ state of man, the most preferable, and above all, the most moral.”48  Like 
Rodgers, I argue that the material does form the basis of the sense of morality present in 
Rossetti’s and Swinburne’s poems; however, Rodgers’s formulation does not address the 
fascinating conflict in representation that is at the heart of my analysis, nor does it 
acknowledge the uneasiness with which both poets approach both materiality and 
spirituality.  The constantly shifting emphasis in representation from conventionalized, 
iconic, and abstracted images to far more individualized and material depictions suggests 
an almost irreconcilable tension between the material and the ephemeral or spiritual, and 
to insist solely upon the material is to reduce the poems’ complexity.   
The tension between iconic and individual bodies in Swinburne and Rossetti 
might also be figured as a conflict between vision and touch.  The iconic bodies in these 
poems – the damozel as emparadised beloved, Jenny as generalized prostitute, Anactoria 
                                                
47 Harold Bloom, “Introduction” (in Harold Bloom [ed.], Pre-Raphaelite Poets [New York: Chelsea House 
Publishers, 1986], 1-6), 3. 
48 Rodgers, “The Book and the Flower,” 22, 23; italics in original. 
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as unavailable lover, Venus as non-responsive goddess – are available to the speakers 
only, or primarily, through vision (or, in the case of the damozel, a form of visual 
imagination).  In each case, as the woman at the center of the poem becomes more 
material, more individualized, the speaker experiences her increasingly through (literal or 
imagined) touch.  In Rossetti’s poems, this tactility takes the form of specific material 
details, such as the way the damozel’s hair brushes the speaker’s cheek.  In Swinburne’s 
poems, tactility is generally presented as an impossibility, one that takes the form of a 
fantasy of sexualized violence.  In both cases, when the desired woman is available only 
in the register of the visual, no connection appears possible; it is only as she approaches 
the register of the tactile that connection becomes more possible: the fact that Anactoria 
and Venus elude the speaker’s touch simply underscores the impossibility of connecting 
to them.   
The association between tactility and connection suggests materiality and 
embodiment as important elements of humanity, human-ness, humane-ness.  
Interestingly, however, especially given the association these poets seem to have with 
materialism, with the “fleshly school of poetry,” which purportedly gives precedence to 
the body over the soul, neither poet presents embodiment as fully successful and 
straightforward.  Such embodiment, and the consequent human connection it would 
enable, is ultimately impossible in Swinburne’s poems, while Rossetti presents it as not 
wholly desired; Swinburne’s speakers seem able to achieve contact with the women they 
address only through the fantasy of violent eros, while Rossetti’s speakers, who have (or 
had) access to the real, material women they describe, prefer instead the disembodied 
creations of their imaginations; Swinburne’s speakers want to touch, but can only look, 
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while Rossetti’s speakers are (or were) able to touch, but prefer to look and imagine.  Far 
from presenting a clean and total alignment with materiality, these poems simultaneously 
insist on and refuse corporeality.  As readers, we experience these poems in an analogous 
way, shifting from the visual (and distant) to the tactile (and immediate).  The immediacy 
of these poems touches the reader physically, demanding a physiological as well as an 
affective response.  Like the sometimes-iconic, sometimes-individualistic characters that 
people these poems, we as readers shift between affective engagement with the texts and 
self-contained evaluative distance; also like the characters, we make connections with the 
text most successfully when we experience these poems somatically and physiologically 
rather than cognitively, when we allow ourselves to be, in the words of Jerome McGann, 
“percipient creature[s]”49 within the world each poem produces.  It is this sense of full 
material engagement that underlies the moral system predicated on corporeal sympathy, a 
version of materiality both Rossetti and Swinburne insist upon, although uneasily, in their 
poetry. 
                                                
49 Jerome McGann, “Introduction” (in McGann and Sligh [eds.], Swinburne: Major Poems and Selected 





Corporeal Sympathy and Divine Amorality in  
Gerard Manley Hopkins’s ‘Terrible’ Sonnets and  
H. G. Wells’s The Island of Dr. Moreau  
 
In an 1879 sermon on Christ as hero, Gerard Manley Hopkins describes Christ as 
a warrior, king, and statesman; he is a thinker and an orator; he is “all the world’s hero, 
the desire of nations” and “the truelove and bridegroom of men’s souls.”  Hopkins’s text 
for the sermon, “The child’s father and mother marveled at what was said about him” 
(Luke 2:33), establishes humanness as the guiding structure for the sermon, and his 
depiction presents the heroic perfection of Christ in exclusively human terms: 
There met in Jesus Christ all things that can make man lovely and loveable.  
In his body he was most beautiful. . . . [A]ccounts of him written in early 
times . . . tell us that he was moderately tall, well built and slender in frame, 
his features straight and beautiful, his hair inclining to auburn, parted in the 
midst, curling and clustering about the ears and neck . . . I come to his mind . 
. . You must not say, Christ needed no such thing as genius; his wisdom came 
from heaven, for he was God.  To say so is to speak like the heretic 
Apollinaris1 . . . No, but Christ was perfect man and must have mind as well 
as body and that mind was, no question, of the rarest excellence and beauty; 
it was genius.  As Christ lived and breathed and moved in a true and not a 
phantom human body . . . so he reasoned and made and planned and invented 
by acts of his own human genius, genius made perfect by wisdom of its own, 
not the divine wisdom only. . . Now in the third place, far higher than beauty 
of the body, higher than genius and wisdom the beauty of the mind, comes 
the beauty of his character, his character as man.2 
 
Hopkins is making implicit use here of orthodox Christian theology that insists upon the 
                                                
1 Apollinarianism is a heresy that claims that the logos, the Word of God, replaces in Christ the human 
mind, so that Christ is said to have no human intellect or reason.  Apollinaris lived in the late fourth century 
C.E.; his teaching was declared heretical by Pope Damasus at the Council of Rome in 381.  See 
“Apollinarianism,” Catholic Encyclopedia. 
2 Gerard Manley Hopkins, Sermon delivered 23 November 1879 at Bedford Leigh (in Catherine Phillips 
[ed.], Gerard Manley Hopkins: The Major Works [Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 2002], 275-78), 276-78. 
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simultaneous full humanity and full divinity of Christ articulated in the doctrine of the 
hypostatic union, a doctrine recently reasserted by the First Vatican Council in 1869-
1870.3  What interests me here, though, is less the doctrinal context in which Hopkins 
composed this sermon and more his insistence on representing the humanity of Christ in 
particularly material terms, evidenced by the care he takes in representing the materiality 
of Christ’s humanity.  Hopkins’s Christ is not only fully human in theory; he is materially 
an individual man, complete with describable features and hairstyle.  Hopkins’s 
insistence on embodiment and materiality as coextensive with the divinity of Christ 
implies a definition of the human that challenges the traditional conception of the 
irreconcilable duality of the human condition: comprised of both body and spirit, animal 
and god, in constant zero-sum conflict with each other.4  In Hopkins’s model, Christ’s 
nature is also dual – both human and divine – but the two aspects are mutually 
constitutive rather than oppositional.  Indeed, Hopkins’s emphasis on the loveliness and 
loveableness of Christ’s material humanity suggests not only that materiality need not be 
opposed to spirituality but that bodily presence is a constituent feature of moral humanity. 
In clear opposition to the usual conception of Christian morality that gives 
precedence to spirituality and imaginative sympathy, Hopkins’s sermon indicates the 
presence of an alternative version of morality in which material embodiment is its 
foundation rather than its antagonist.  That alternative depends upon material 
embodiment, proximity, and touch, a version of corporeal sympathy that connects 
                                                
3 In addition to Apollinaris, his implicit doctrinal opponents in this sermon seem to be the advocates of the 
monophysite heresy, which claimed that Christ was fully divine rather than human.  See Chapter 1 above 
for more detail on these ideas. 
4 I discuss this traditional concept of the human at greater length in the Introduction. 
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morality to the body and to sensory perception.  While the concerns of Gerard Manley 
Hopkins’s poetry initially seem a world away from those of H. G. Wells’s nightmarish 
science fiction novel The Island of Dr. Moreau, the texts are connected by their insistence 
on the relationship between bodily sensation and humanity; more specifically, these texts 
rely on pain as a marker of the human, and on sensitivity to pain in others – that is, 
sympathy – as a necessary foundation of morality.  In analyzing these two authors’ texts 
in connection to each other, I argue that pain paradoxically connects and distinguishes 
between the human and the non-human, and that it simultaneously insists on and denies a 
spiritual essence of humanity.  However, rather than suggest that this paradox undermines 
the ideological or aesthetic effectiveness of either author’s texts, I argue that this 
paradoxical use of pain indicates that both authors identify material embodiment as a 
necessary condition of morality.  This argument claims a reversal of the relationship 
between body and spirit originating in the Cartesian hierarchy that ranks the spirit as 
more valuable and important than the body.  This Cartesian opposition understands the 
body as the mortal husk that hampers and weighs down the immortal soul, the material 
baggage that leads the soul into temptation and sin.  In direct opposition to this traditional 
conception, these texts insist upon material embodiment as a prerequisite for humane-
ness and morality and link noncorporeality not to perfection but to amorality. 
In this chapter, I examine the ways in which Hopkins and Wells establish the 
limits and constitutive elements of humanity.  I begin with a brief discussion of the ways 
in which Hopkins’s conversion to Catholicism both shaped and reflected his 
understanding of the value of materiality, and then discuss that version of materiality in 
the context of two poems.  From there, I turn to Hopkins’s so-called “terrible sonnets” 
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and examine the consequences of the removal of materiality from human experience.  
Having established the role of materiality and embodiment in Hopkins’s conception of 
humaneness and morality, I consider The Island of Dr. Moreau and its use of pain as a 
technology of transformation and evaluation.  Finally, I consider the consequences of 
disembodiment in the moral and social hierarchy the novel has established. 
 
Hopkins, Catholicism, and Embodiment 
While Hopkins’s poems, written between the 1860s and the 1880s, do not engage 
directly or explicitly in the debate about materialism, they do so implicitly and indirectly 
through their vivid representations of material embodiment, and in particular through 
images of intense physiological sensation.  As several critics have noted, Hopkins’s belief 
in the importance of material embodiment has deep connections to his conversion to 
Catholicism;5 in an early letter to his father concerning his conversion at Oxford, Hopkins 
states that it is the Catholic doctrine of Incarnation that is foundational to his attraction to 
Catholicism and that stands as his central article of faith.6  More than twenty years after 
                                                
5 See, for example, J. Hillis Miller, The Disappearance of God: Five Nineteenth-Century Writers (1963; 
rpt. New York: Schocken Books, 1965), and Daniel A. Harris, Inspirations Unbidden: The “Terrible 
Sonnets” of Gerard Manley Hopkins (Berkeley: U California Press, 1982). 
6 “I shall hold as a Catholic what I have long held as an Anglican, that literal truth of our Lord’s words by 
which I learn that the least fragment of the consecrated elements in the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar is 
the whole Body of Christ born of the Blessed Virgin, before which the whole host of saints and angels as it 
lies on the altar trembles with adoration.  This belief once got is the life of the soul and when I doubted it I 
shd. become an atheist the next day.  But, as monsignor Eyre says, it is a gross superstition unless 
guaranteed by infallibility.  I cannot hold this doctrine confessedly except as a Tractarian or a Catholic: the 
Tractarian ground I have seen broken to pieces under my feet.”  Gerard Manley Hopkins, letter to his 
father, 16 October 1866 (in Phillips [ed.], Gerard Manley Hopkins,  224).  Later in the same letter, after 
concluding this discussion of his stance toward transubstantiation, Hopkins asks his father to “approach 
Christ in a new way,” in the way Hopkins himself does, “that is, not vaguely, but casting yourselves into 
His sacred broken heart and His five adorable Wounds.”  Importantly for Hopkins, Christ must be 
approached through these marks of his material humanity or not at all: “Those who do not pray to Him in 
His Passion pray to God but scarcely to Christ” (225). 
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his conversion, in a set of retreat notes from 1889, Hopkins maintained the importance of 
the Incarnation to his religious belief: “But our lives and in particular those of religious, 
as mine, are in their whole direction, not only inwardly but most visibly and outwardly, 
shaped by Christ’s.  Without that even outwardly the world could be so different that we 
cannot even guess it.  And my life is determined by the Incarnation down to most of the 
details of the day.”7  Hilary Fraser claims that Hopkins’s sense of the importance of the 
Incarnation extended beyond the person of Christ to the material presence of God in the 
world more generally: “Hopkins’ contribution to the sacramental tradition was to 
consider nature as expressive of Christ incarnate as well as of God the creator, of the 
‘redemptive strain’ as well as the ‘creative strain’.  Christ incarnate, the physical 
manifestation of God, represented for Hopkins, in His selfhood, the pattern, the inscape, 
to which all created forms aspire. . . . Hopkins’ awareness of Christ as the divine 
archetype of created beauty . . . enabled him to merge his love of beauty and poetic 
creativity with his religious commitment.”8  The doctrine of the Incarnation provides 
Hopkins with a model for understanding the value of material embodiment, which he 
extends to include not only humans but the natural world. 
Hopkins’s idea of inscape appears connected both ethically and aesthetically to 
his understanding of the Incarnation.  Fraser calls the concept of inscape a “highly 
sophisticated and unique religio-aesthetic theory,” noting that “inscape became the 
common denominator of religious, aesthetic, and poetic experience alike.  Christ 
                                                
7 Gerard Manley Hopkins, Retreat Notes, 1 January 1889, Tullabeg (in Phillips [ed.], Gerard Manley 
Hopkins, 302). 
8 Hilary Fraser, Beauty and Belief: Aesthetics and Religion in Victorian Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
U P, 1986), 70. 
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represented the ultimate inscape, and through His Incarnation the principles of perfect 
physical and moral beauty, love, and sacrifice become manifest in the created world.”9  It 
seems, in fact, as if the insistence upon the material presence of God in Christ makes 
possible, for Hopkins and perhaps for Christianity in general, a sense of inherent value in 
matter.  I will discuss the concept of inscape at more length below, but at this point want 
simply to note that inscape depends upon materiality: if inscape is the essence, either 
generic or individual, of a particular thing, that inscape can only be demonstrated, acted 
upon, through the mediation of materiality and bodies.   
The Incarnation is not the only doctrinal aspect of Catholicism that reinforces 
Hopkins’s valuing of the material world.  The doctrine of transubstantiation appears 
equally important both to Hopkins’s Catholicism and to his poetry.  Literally the doctrine 
that the substance of the bread and wine of communion is converted through the priest’s 
words into the substance of Christ’s body and blood, with all outward characteristics of 
bread and wine remaining, transubstantiation is a process by which one material 
substance becomes another totally different material substance (although the difference is 
imperceptible to human senses) through a mysterious and entirely spiritual process in 
which a priest acts as medium or intermediary.  Not only does the bread become the body 
of Christ, but it (and the wine) contains the whole being of Christ in each particle; it is a 
material incarnation of God that is to be consumed, taken into the body: “the least 
fragment of the consecrated elements in the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar is the whole 
Body of Christ born of the Blessed Virgin, before which the whole host of saints and 
                                                
9 Fraser, Beauty and Belief, 70. 
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angels as it lies on the altar trembles with adoration.”10  Not symbolic presence, through 
the doctrine of transubstantiation the Real Presence of Christ is taken into the material 
bodies of communicants.11  
 
Poetics and Sensation 
The centrality of incarnation, of the immanence of God in human form as well as 
in the rest of the world, of the conception of Christ as simultaneously fully human and 
fully divine, is also visible in Hopkins’s poems and their various representations of 
embodiment.  In this section, I look closely at two poems, “The Habit of Perfection” and 
“As kingfishers catch fire,” in order to examine the function of materiality and 
embodiment.  In doing so, I argue that these two poems insist upon the necessity of 
material presence, and in fact imagine God to be accessible only through the mediation of 
the material. 
“The Habit of Perfection”12 presents clear images of bodily sensation, touch, and 
incorporation, and in doing so establishes sensory and somatic experience as the 
necessary foundation for human access to God.   
Elected Silence, sing to me 
And beat upon my whorlèd ear, 
Pipe me to pastures still and be 
                                                
10 Gerard Manley Hopkins, letter to his father, 16 October 1866 (in Phillips [ed.], Gerard Manley Hopkins, 
224). 
11 For detailed information on the history and development of both the theology and practice surrounding 
the doctrine of transubstantiation, see entries for “Transubstantiation,” “consubstantiation,” Real Presence,” 
and “Hypostatic Union” in the Catholic Encyclopedia. 
12 Gerard Manley Hopkins, “The Habit of Perfection.”  This and all other Hopkins poems discussed in this 




The music that I care to hear. 
 
Shape nothing, lips; be lovely-dumb:  
It is the shut, the curfew sent 
From there where all surrenders come 
Which only makes you eloquent. 
 
Be shellèd, eyes, with double dark 
And find the uncreated light: 
This ruck and reel which you remark 
Coils, keeps, and teases simple sight. 
 
Palate, the hutch of tasty lust, 
Desire not to be rinsed with wine: 
The can must be so sweet, the crust 
So fresh that come in fasts divine! 
 
Nostrils, your careless breath that spend  
Upon the stir and keep of pride, 
What relish shall the censers send 
Along the sanctuary side! 
 
O feel-of-primrose hands, O feet 
That want the yield of plushy sward, 
But you shall walk the golden street 
And you unhouse and house the Lord. 
 
And, Poverty, be thou the bride 
And now the marriage feast begun, 
And lily-coloured clothes provide 
Your spouse not laboured-at nor spun. 
 
The body is alternately anatomized into its constituent parts (lips, eyes, palate, nostrils, 
hands, feet) and imagined as the passive object of sensory experience (the ear, for 
example, is “beat[en]” upon), with the ultimate effect of highlighting the materiality of 
the body (rather than its agency) and the force of somatic and sensory experience (rather 
than its consequence).  Sounds “beat upon” eardrums (l. 2), mouths taste and consume, 
nostrils inhale, and hands and feet touch.  Comprised of seven stanzas, the poem opens 
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and closes with invocations to personages exterior to the speaker’s own body while the 
central five stanzas each address a particular body part associated with sensory 
experience.  The first and last stanzas are addressed to personified absences – “Elected 
Silence” (l. 1) and “Poverty” (l. 25) – both capitalized, suggesting that they are proper 
nouns to be used as means of address, but evacuated of any material substance because of 
the negation inherent in each concept.  (Silence, of course, is the absence of sound, while 
poverty is the absence of wealth; taken together, then, “Elected Silence” and “Poverty” 
represent the presence of personified absence.)  Throughout the poem, Hopkins’s speaker 
celebrates the paradoxically sensory intensity of each variety of absence: the “whorlèd 
ear” that hears best the music of “Elected Silence” (ll. 2, 1); the mute lips whose silent 
surrender is most “eloquent” (l. 8); the closed eyes that see “the uncreated light” (l. 10); 
the “palate” that takes most delight in the taste of “fasts divine” (ll. 13, 16); the nostrils 
devoted solely to the scent of incense; hands whose sole purpose is to open and close the 
tabernacle and feet that walk only on the golden streets of heaven.  The poem suggests 
that the “Perfection” of the title lies in complete disembodiment, paradoxically depicted 
in the poem itself as physiological sensation.   
Throughout the poem, the presumed instantiation of perfection – God – exists as 
absence: addressed as “Elected Silence” (l. 1), God is figured as perfect absence 
(suggestively, the absence of sound and communication), while the “fasts divine” (l. 16) 
suggest a sort of holy absence of material sustenance.  The poem invokes absence in 
every stanza: Hopkins’s speaker longs to hear only silent music, while “Elected Silence” 
suggests both the evacuated absence of the voice of God and the still, small voice of the 
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conscience,13 the internal, noncorporeal remnant of divinity housed within each human 
being.  The silent surrenders tendered by the lips that are “lovely-dumb” (l. 5) are 
evocative of both the speaker’s assumed surrender to the will of God and the always-
possible surrender to the temptation presented by desires of the body; the eloquence of 
silence ensures that the surrender be forever ambiguous.  The eyes of stanza three exist in 
the “double dark” (l. 9) of lowered eyelids and mortal ignorance and (presumably) sin; 
yet another negation is present in the “uncreated light” (l. 10), which is visible only when 
actual sight is prevented.  This stanza presents then a double negation: closed eyes and 
the darkness of human existence combined with the presence of the uncreated light 
(which, because it is “uncreated,” lies outside the control of the omnipotent creator God 
of Genesis, who created light and dark through the spoken word).  The “hutch of tasty 
lust” (l. 13) is called on to reject desire for the sweetness of wine and instead to savor the 
fresh sweetness of “fasts divine” (l. 16).  Nostrils that might ordinarily flare with 
misplaced and sinful pride are called on to transfer their attention to sacramental incense.  
These are also statements of renunciation, of ascesis: the (attempted) refusal of sensation 
suggests the speaker’s desire to be rid of his/her material body.  That the desire for 
renunciation is articulated so precisely in terms of somatic experience only highlights the 
importance of materiality, however, ultimately calling even greater attention to the 
mediating role of the bodily senses. 
Hands and feet that have hitherto reveled in the material pleasures of the created 
                                                
13 1 Kings 19:11-12: “And he [the Lord] said, Go forth, and stand upon the mount before the Lord.  And, 
behold, the Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks 
before the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind: and after the wind an earthquake; but the Lord was not 
in the earthquake: And after the earthquake a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire: and after the fire a still 
small voice” (KJV). 
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world – primroses and soft turf – are to turn their attention toward experiencing the 
presence of God in decidedly uncreated and non-human ways: the golden streets of 
heaven replace the “plushy sward” for the feet, while the speaker calls upon his hands to 
open and close the tabernacle (“unhouse and house the Lord” [l. 24]), to cover and 
uncover, retrieve and replace the physical manifestation of God, the word made flesh, the 
Bible that displaces the incarnated body of Christ as the material word of God, and the 
communion Host.  That the human corporeality of Christ is replaced in this poem by the 
material book and bread reinforces the abstraction and noncorporeality present, 
paradoxically, throughout the poem in images of bodily sensation.  Finally, the last stanza 
also invokes a personified absence (Poverty) who will provide her spouse with “lily-
coloured clothes” “not laboured-at nor spun” (ll. 27, 28).  This personified absence 
provides garments defined by what they are not rather than by what they are, invoking in 
the process the lilies of the field dressed in finer glory than King Solomon.  In short, in 
this poem, sensory perception mediates the speaker’s encounter with divinity. 
In defining life as “a continuous adjustment of internal relations to external 
relations,”14 Herbert Spencer highlighted the mediating role of the senses in the constant 
interaction between organism and medium.  Sensory perception similarly mediates 
between human and divinity in “The Habit of Perfection.”  In spite of the poem’s explicit 
emphasis on lack and absence, the language insists upon embodiment and sensation, 
suggesting that even renunciation and ascesis, as well as spirituality more generally, 
depend on somatic experience.  The speaker in this poem seems to derive pleasure (even 
                                                




sensory pleasure) from the contemplation of the lack of sensation; this is reminiscent of 
the descriptions of the pleasure Dorothea took in thinking about renouncing horseback 
riding.  Like Dorothea, who derives physiological pleasure through the sensations evoked 
in ascesis, this poem’s speaker returns always to the presence of the body and its 
sensations.  The ascesis, the sensory renunciation, is attempted in service of a turning 
inward, of spiritual contemplation.  This poem presents that inward contemplation – the 
desire to leave behind the things of the material world in an attempt to focus on the world 
of the spirit and of God – as inescapably material and sensory, yet there appears to be no 
anxiety about the insistence of sensory experience.  The poem’s insistence on the 
inescapability of bodily sensation, coupled with the absence of anxiety, suggests that 
sense experience remains fundamental to Hopkins’s conception of both mediation and 
access to the divine. 
By making material embodiment a necessary factor in self-articulation, Hopkins’s 
often-cited concept of inscape, evident with particular explicitness in “As kingfishers 
catch fire,” further connects his spirituality to material existence and sensation:  
As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame; 
As tumbled over rim in roundy wells 
Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell’s 
Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name; 
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same: 
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells; 
Selves – goes its self; myself it speaks and spells, 
Crying What I do is me: for that I came.  (ll. 1-8) 
 
Hopkins’s inscape – the generic essence of each type of creature or object – depends on 
the materiality of the thing.  In this poem, it is “each mortal thing” (l. 5), rather than God, 
that “Deals out” (l. 6) itself, expresses its essence; it unfolds itself, apparently under its 
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own volition.  Since the objects in the first stanza include nonliving objects such as stones 
and bells in addition to sentient creatures, it would appear that it is not only “mortal 
thing[s]” (l. 5) that possess or express inscape; rather, objects seem as capable as 
creatures of such self-expression.  In his interpretation of Italian philosopher Giordano 
Bruno, John Tyndall writes that Bruno “came to the conclusion that nature in her 
productions does not imitate the technic of man.  Her process is one of unravelling and 
unfolding.  The infinity of forms under which matter appears were not imposed upon it 
by an external artificer; by its own intrinsic force and virtue it brings these forms forth.”15  
The “selving” of Hopkins’s poem echoes the “unravelling and unfolding” of nature, and 
suggests the necessity of materiality for such a project of becoming.  In this poem, the 
sounds of stones and plucked strings and rung bells depend entirely on their materiality 
and so, consequently, does their generic essence, their inscape.  A stone is a stone 
because – and insofar as – it sounds like a stone, behaves like a stone, has the physical 
materiality of a stone.  This is true even though Hopkins’s concept of inscape appears to 
depend just as much on the presence of the “being indoors each one” (l. 6), the essential 
being dwelling inside each material form; that is, this “being” insists that material 
existence is not the sum total of any given object or creature, but insists equally that such 
material existence is necessary for the “selving” of the process of inscape.  Indeed, the 
idea that the interior “being” must reveal itself through this “selving” process rather than 
being automatically and constantly accessible necessitates an external component: the 
non-material essence requires an external material corollary.   
                                                
15 John Tyndall, “Address Delivered Before the British Association Assembled at Belfast, With Additions” 
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1874), 19. 
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“Kingfishers” also provides a vivid example of the importance of bodily 
materiality in Hopkins’s conception of Christ, which includes not only the incarnation of 
the singular person of Jesus but also the incarnation of Christ in the world, particularly, 
although not exclusively, in humans.   
I say more: the just man justices; 
Keeps grace: that keeps all his goings graces; 
Acts in God’s eye what in God’s eye he is – 
Christ.  For Christ plays in ten thousand places, 
Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his 
To the Father through the features of men’s faces. (ll. 9-14) 
 
That Hopkins calls Christ “lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes” (l. 13) underscores the full 
embodiment of God: Hopkins’s Christ is not simply analogous to humans but is rather 
fully and materially human while simultaneously remaining fully divine.  Further, people 
are made lovely to God through the presence of Christ in them, but Christ is also made 
lovely (to “the Father” but also, presumably, to humans) through the bodies he 
metaphorically, and yet somehow literally, slips into.16  The concept of physical beauty 
may capture the complexity of Hopkins’s image of Christ specifically and of human 
embodiment more generally.17  Hopkins’s Christ is “lovely,” a word that rings with other 
                                                
16 The doubling of literal and metaphorical incorporation again echoes the doctrine of transubstantiation, as 
well as the sacrament of the eucharist more generally. 
17 Of the importance of beauty, Hopkins wrote in an October 25, 1879 letter to Bridges, “I think then no 
one can admire beauty of the body more than I do, and it is of course a comfort to find beauty in a friend or 
a friend in beauty.  But this kind of beauty is dangerous.  Then comes the beauty of the mind, such as 
genius, and this is greater than the beauty of the body and not to call dangerous.  And more beautiful than 
the beauty of the mind is beauty of character, the ‘handsome heart’.  Now every beauty is not a wit or 
genius nor has every wit or genius character.  For though even bodily beauty, even the beauty of blooming 
health, is from the soul, in the sense, as we Aristotelian Catholics say, that the soul is the form of the body, 
yet the soul may have no other beauty, so to speak, than that which it expresses in the symmetry of the 
body” (Philips [ed.], Gerard Manley Hopkins, 240).  Here he asserts a hierarchy of value, with the beauty 
of the body superceded by that of the intellect, both of which are of less value than the beauty of character.  
Yet he also acknowledges the inseparability of the soul’s beauty from the body: the body is a necessary 




near homophones: loving (toward the world generally, toward individual persons 
specifically); loved; filled with love; lovable (in the sense of being worthy of love, which 
introduces an opposition to the invocation of grace – undeserved love – from earlier in 
the stanza).  Hopkins’s “loveliness” and its cognates combine the adoration of a deity 
with the erotic charge of literal physical bodies: the limbs and eyes of Christ’s constantly 
recurring, constantly shifting incarnation.18   
The loveliness of Christ’s incarnation underscores a structural characteristic of the 
sonnet as well.  Although corporeality and material existence fill the poem from 
beginning to end, the poem moves from non-human (and often non-sentient) materiality 
to full human embodiment at the stanza break, suggesting not a progression from material 
to spiritual but rather the loveliness and necessity of human embodiment to the process of 
“Keep[ing] grace” (l. 10) and “Act[ing] in God’s eye what in God’s eye he is – / Christ” 
(ll. 11-12).  In other words, the stanza structure suggests an emphasis on the necessary 
connection between materiality and inscape for human identity and for the immanence of 
God.  Humans, that is, act as Christ only through their material bodies, through the 
actions they perform: “The just man justices.”  It is not possible, in Hopkins’s conception 
either of Christian obligation or of inscape, for the essential being inside each person 
fully to exist without the mediation of the body.  What it means to “justice” may not be 
entirely clear, but it is certainly as active and as material as the stones ringing in wells.  
                                                
18 Joseph Bristow, “‘Churlsgrace’: Gerard Manley Hopkins and Working-Class Masculinity” (ELH 59.3 
[1992], 693-711), discusses Hopkins’s representations of Christ’s masculinity, particularly in terms of 
physical strength and spiritual submission in relation to John the Baptist.  Bristow’s main concern in the 
article is “Hopkins's unswerving attention to the embodiment of divine power in differing types of laboring 
men, and the problems he must confront when these idealized figures fall short of their biblical archetype in 
the mighty winnower heroized by John” (694). 
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Hopkins’s inscape ties identity to action, makes the two synonymous, which means that 
identity can no longer be simply a matter of private interiority.  What it is to be human is 
only evidenced through actions done by and with the physical body.  The repeated 
incarnation of Christ in humanity is possible only through the materiality of the body.  
The shift from the first stanza, in which animals and objects express their inscape through 
the generic actions associated with their group, to the second stanza, in which God 
becomes incarnate through the infinitely variable instances of human identity, suggests 
two things: first, that material embodiment is always necessary for a thing to act fully as 
itself; and second, that it is human embodiment that allows the immanence of God in the 
world, and consequently the possibility of humane (ethical) existence. 
Hopkins’s prose also demonstrates his view of the senses and bodily sensation as 
epistemological and hermeneutic tools.  In his notes on Ignatius Loyola’s Spiritual 
Exercises, Hopkins describes his experience of self-recognition, both as a human being 
and as a particular individual, in extraordinarily sensory terms:  
. . . I consider my selfbeing, my consciousness and feeling of myself, that taste 
of myself, of I and me above and in all things, which is more distinctive than 
the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf or 
camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man (as when I was 
a child I used to ask myself: What must it be to be someone else?).  Nothing 
else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness, and 
selving, this selfbeing of my own.  Nothing explains it or resembles it, except 
so far as this, that other men to themselves have the same feeling. . . . But to 
me there is no resemblance: searching nature I taste self but at one tankard, that 
of my own being.  The development, refinement, condensation of nothing 
shews any sign of being able to match this to me or give me another taste of it, 
a taste even resembling it.  (282) 
 
Deeply evocative of the awareness of existence, this passage highlights the sensory 
foundation of the experience of oneself; like the stone that rings because it is a stone, 
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one’s human essence is verifiable (only) through material sense.  Of course, human 
nature to Hopkins is different from that of a stone, but it is perceptible and demonstrable 
through similar means.  Further, as the passage from his notes suggests, his sense of 
individuality – his self taste – isolates him not only from the rest of creation but also from 
other people: his individual composition is different from that of any other individual.  In 
both cases – of self-recognition and of isolation from others – Hopkins’s experience of 
his own identity comes through material sensory perception.   
Hopkins’s insistence on sensory perception as both epistemological and 
hermeneutic corresponds to his insistence on the immanence of God in the world, and it 
does so by correlating materiality (and the sensation and somatic experience that come 
with it) with morality.  That is, if identity, both individual and collective, is only 
discoverable through material embodiment – the “selving” behaviors from “Kingfishers” 
– then recognition of the humanity of others is also evidenced only through shared 
material existence.  The immanence of God in Hopkins’s world is instantiated most fully 
in the person of Christ, but all humans (and, as I discuss above, all created things) exist in 
bodies that, ideally, provide avenues of Christ-like incarnation.  Because in Hopkins’s 
conception God can be known best – or perhaps only – through material incarnation 
(primarily of Christ but also, analogously, through human incarnation more broadly), 
materiality itself forms the basis of an ethics predicated on sympathetic connection.  
Humans approach the divine through the incarnated person of Christ, and they approach 




Absence in the “Terrible Sonnets” 
 The texts that I have discussed so far make clear the extent to which materiality 
and embodiment are necessary for full humanity as well as their connection to the 
immanence of God in the world.  Having established this, I turn now to a handful of 
sonnets written around 1885, often referred to as the “terrible” sonnets or the “dark” 
sonnets, in which general bodily sensation and sensory perception give way to pain.  This 
shift to pain coincides with a shift in tone from one celebrating the immanence of Christ 
in the world to one horrified by the lack of divine presence.  Although at least four poems 
have been put into this category, I focus on two that provide particularly vivid instances 
of physical pain and alienation.   
The first, “I wake and feel,” relies upon images of pain to present the speaker as 
isolated from Christ, whom he has repeatedly addressed with no response:  
I wake and feel the fell of dark, not day.  
What hours, O what black hours we have spent  
This night! what sights you, heart, saw, ways you went! 
And more must, in yet longer light’s delay. 
 
With witness I speak this.  But where I say  
Hours I mean years, mean life.  And my lament 
Is cries countless, cries like dead letters sent 
To dearest him that lives alas! away. (ll. 1-8) 
 
The speaker’s “lament / Is cries countless,” none of which receive either a response or 
even acknowledgement.  The dead letters are undeliverable, following the metaphor to its 
conclusion, perhaps because of inadequate addressing or perhaps because of total absence 
of the intended recipient.  In any case, that the letters are “dead” both suggests implicitly 
that they were once alive but are no longer and underscores the inadequacy and 
impoverishment of mortality; that they are letters rather than vocal cries indicates the 
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increasing corporeality (and simultaneous depersonalization) of the speaker’s attempts to 
reach the “dearest him” he is addressing.  In this formulation, the speaker’s voice 
becomes text much as the text stands in for the body in “The Habit of Perfection.”  Both 
more material and less affective than the human voice, the “dead letters” fail to reach the 
intended recipient, and communication fails.   
The opening line establishes the physical misery of the poem: the “fell of dark” (l. 
1) suggests both the absence of light in contrast to the day the speaker expects upon 
waking as well as danger and the heaviness, weight, and pressure of a burden that has 
fallen on one’s body.  The physical discomfort implicit in the opening line is mirrored in 
the psychological distress of the rest of the stanza: “What hours, O what black hours we 
have spent / This night!  What sights you, heart, saw, ways you went!”  The “cries 
countless” echo the “unspeakable stress of pitch” from Hopkins’s notes on Loyola; both 
phrases suggest the innumerability of the speaker’s sensations, the impossibility of 
articulating the extent of the distress.  Such incalculable distress evokes the concept of 
the sublime, particularly as articulated by Edmund Burke, who suggested the root of the 
sublime in the experience of pain and fear.  Like the sublime, which combines the 
physiological sensations attendant upon pain and fear with the psychological experience 
of awe, Hopkins’s poem presents vivid images of physiological distress tied inseparably 
to spiritual anguish.  The speaker’s characterization of himself – “I am gall, I am 
heartburn” (l. 9) – returns to the images of selftaste from Hopkins’s retreat notes, but 
shifts that sense of taste from one of simple recognition of individuality to an image of 
his own putrescent body, rotting and souring from the inside out.  Further, the experience 
of his selftaste is painful: he burns himself, inflicts pain on himself through his own body.  
 
249 
The speaker’s self-characterization also reduces his existence to his body and its 
sensations: the heart addressed in line three returns here as heartburn (l. 9).   
Pain in this poem is inescapable because it is the sum and substance of the 
speaker’s identity: 
I am gall, I am heartburn.  God’s most deep decree 
Bitter would have me taste: my taste was me; 
Bones built in me, flesh filled, blood brimmed the curse. 
 
Selfyeast of spirit a dull dough sours.  I see 
The lost are like this, and their scourge to be 
As I am mine, their sweating selves; but worse. (ll. 9-14) 
 
The speaker’s “scourge” is himself, his own “sweating” body: his self is inescapable, 
suggesting a sort of perversion of the inscape present in the selving of “Kingfishers.”  If 
“each mortal thing does one thing and the same; / / Selves – goes itself; myself it speaks 
and spells,” that selving is bitter and horrifying in “I wake and feel.”  Rather than being 
the vehicle for self-recognition and realization, selving here involves the sour sweat of 
fear and pain, uncontrollable bodily secretions, the inescapability of self.  No 
transcendence is possible in this model of selving, but immanence is also denied through 
the absolute absence of God.  Not only, though, is this taste of bitterness coextensive with 
the speaker; further, this selftaste of bitterness is “God’s most deep decree.”  The poem’s 
speaker might be his own scourge, his own corporeal “curse,” but that curse is also God’s 
curse toward him.  In tasting himself, the poem’s speaker wallows in the rotten 
materiality wished on him by a God who has absented himself from the world: “Bones 
built in me, flesh filled, blood brimmed the curse.”  If the burning pain of his selftaste 
springs from his own body, it is decreed by a God who, though previously incarnated, is 
now simply absent.   
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Broken into four stanzas, “I wake and feel” breaks down the typical sonnet form 
by dividing the octet and the sestet into two parts each, establishing through its form the 
fragmentation and collapse presented in the text.  At the same time, the poem enacts a 
movement from psychological misery to physical distress.  The first two stanzas present 
images of alienation, isolation, fear, and anxiety, while the third and fourth stanzas 
translate that psychological distress into the sensations and media of physical pain: gall, 
heartburn, bones, flesh, blood, sweat.  This movement from psychological to somatic 
suggests an increasing objectification of both the pain and of the speaker at the same time 
that it suggests the inescapability of pain.  In one sense, the increasing materialization of 
the pain suggests a reduction, a dehumanization: the speaker has become coextensive 
with his painful experience of his own cursed body.  Communication, even the failed 
communication of dead letters, is no longer possible.  The loss of the means of 
communication, combined with the sense of being reduced to a soured, sweating shell, 
insists on the fragmentation of the speaker’s identity and his fundamental isolation.  In 
this poem, the increasing materiality of pain comes to be constitutive of identity and 
evidence of one’s abandonment by God. 
This dual sense of pain is present even more markedly in “No worst.”  Here 
Hopkins presents the infinitude of suffering that builds upon previous pain in an ever-
increasing spiral: 
No worst, there is none.  Pitched past pitch of grief, 
More pangs will, schooled at forepangs, wilder wring. 
Comforter, where, where is your comforting? 
Mary, mother of us, where is your relief? 
My cries heave, herds-long; huddle in a main, a chief- 
Woe, wórld-sorrow; on an áge-old ánvil wínce and síng –  
Then lull, then leave off.  Fury had shrieked ‘No ling- 
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Ering!  Let me be fell: force I must be brief.’ 
O the mind, mind has mountains; cliffs of fall 
Frightful, sheer, no-man-fathomed.  Hold them cheap 
May who ne’er hung there.  Nor does long our small 
Durance deal with that steep or deep.  Here! creep, 
Wretch, under a comfort serves in a whirlwind: all 
Life death does end and each day dies with sleep. 
 
There is no limit, no absolute to the suffering possible in this conception.  In this poem, 
as the severity of the anguish increases, its bodily specificity fades; gone are the gall and 
heartburn of “I wake and feel,” replaced instead by “pangs” that “wilder wring.”  The 
localized pain of heartburn has been replaced by generalized agony that “wring[s]” 
constantly.  “Wring” seems an apt description for the kind of generalized, dehumanizing, 
strangling pain the poem depicts.  Strangulation provides an apt figure for the 
inarticulate, even prelinguistic sounds that replace the speaker’s words: “My cries heave, 
herds-long . . . / . . . on an age-old anvil wince and sing –.”  Attempts at communication 
with God are replaced here not with letters (not even with dead letters) but with nearly 
inhuman and inarticulate sounds; the cries form herds, suggesting sheep or cattle, 
degenerating from human to barely even animal.  Even so, these cries “heave,” 
suggesting the physicality of the cries, of language itself.  God himself is entirely absent 
from this poem; addressed solely as “Comforter” (l. 3), this is a depersonalized divinity 
rather than a human Christ.  This impersonal “Comforter” offers no comfort, and neither 
does the thoroughly human Mary.  Mary is the only named non-abstraction in the poem: 
the inaptly named “Comforter,” the abstraction of personified “Fury,” and the 
presumably human “Wretch” all lack even a semblance of humanity or individual 
identity. 
In both of these poems, spiritual pain is clearly present.  Yet the stark images of 
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physical pain – of blows struck against an anvil, of the heaving of cries for mercy and 
relief, of the bone and flesh and blood filled to the brim with gall and heartburn – argue 
against a simply spiritual interpretation of these poems.  These images of intense bodily 
suffering suggest far more than simply an accidental, or even an incidental, choice of 
metaphor.  Rather, they suggest that Hopkins understood bodily experience and bodily 
sensation to be the most fundamental characteristics of human existence: such corporeal 
experience defines the boundaries of the human much as Christ’s “sacred broken heart” 
and five wounds define him.19  Even more importantly, in spite of the extremity of the 
physical suffering represented in the “terrible” sonnets, the speakers’ suffering intensifies 
even further as disembodiment progresses.  That is, as poems like “No worst” enact a 
shift from physical suffering to psychological trauma, they firmly associate horror 
(depicted vividly in lines 9 through 14) with the noncorporeal rather than with the 
material: far from leading to spiritual perfection, the disembodiment both represented and 
enacted in this sonnet suggests that such disembodiment leads directly to horror and 
alienation. 
In fact, the poem’s grammar reinforces this lack through the absence of a subject 
noun: “O the mind, mind has mountains; cliffs of fall / Frightful, sheer, no-man-
fathomed.  Hold them cheap / May who ne’er hung there.”  While the subject pronoun 
“he” may be implied and understood – “Hold them cheap / May [he] who ne’er hung 
there” – the absence is significant both because it further removes traces of human 
existence from the world of the poem and because it raises the stress already tightened 
                                                
19 See note 6, above, regarding Hopkins’s description of Christ’s “sacred broken heart and His five adorable 
Wounds” as the means by which his father ought to approach prayer. 
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almost unbearably on the sonnet’s syntax, rhyme scheme, and rhythmic structure.  Unlike 
the poems discussed earlier, this sonnet has no stanza breaks, although conceptually it 
divides into an octet and sestet.  Reversing the stanza order of “I wake and feel,” the first 
eight lines here present images of excruciating bodily pain and the absence of God, while 
the last six lines depict the psychological horror that results.  The pain is severe enough 
(especially when coupled with the complete absence of God) to drive the speaker literally 
over the edge, over the sheer cliffs of the mind’s mountains, and his only comfort (since 
the comfort of a comforter God and of Mary is absent) is the idea that death, the ultimate 
dissolution of material human existence, will come.  The shift in focus from body to mind 
at the invisible stanza break is underscored by the doubled invocation of the 
psychological perils ahead: “O the mind, mind has mountains” (l. 9).  A similar doubling 
in the rhyme at the break of line seven (“ling- / Ering”) emphasizes the speaker’s state of 
fragmentation by breaking the word, doubles the stress on the sonnet’s structure, and 
prolongs the “unspeakable stress of pitch” under which the speaker is laboring.  
 
Hopkins’s Poetics of Ascesis 
“No worst” presents an extreme example of Hopkins’s use of tortured form in his 
poems, but it is not categorically different from many of his other works.  A number of 
critics have connected the intense linguistic and formal discipline of Hopkins’s poems to 
his desire for ascesis, suggesting that Hopkins approaches the disciplined body as a 
means to spiritual growth rather than as a legitimate source of sensory pleasure or beauty 
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in itself.20  Hopkins’s descriptions of his own poetic practices suggest his constant 
attempt to create more and more finely tuned poetic structures.  In an 1877 letter to 
Robert Bridges, Hopkins describes his poetic practices in terms of law, suggesting the 
severity of the discipline with which he approached his practice of poetics: “Only remark, 
as you say that there is no conceivable licence I shd. not be able to justify, that with all 
my licences, or rather laws, I am stricter than you and I might say than anybody I know.  
With the exception of the Bremen stanza . . . my rhymes are rigidly good – to the ear – 
and such rhymes as love and prove I scout utterly. . . . So that I may say my apparent 
licences are counter-balanced, and more, by my strictness.  In fact all English verse, 
except Milton’s, almost, offends me as ‘licentious’” (227-28).  By equating “licence” 
with “law,” Hopkins suggests a paradoxical freedom available only through severe 
discipline.  As an ascetic spiritual practice, Hopkins’s poetry reinforces the connection 
between the “unspeakable stress of pitch” of an individual body (or poem) in its selving 
or turning outward. 
In addition to the discipline apparent in the writing of these poems, a similar 
disciplinary experience takes place in the reading of them.  If as a writer Hopkins was 
aware of the chastening practices he exerted over the language that was his medium, 
readers – particularly readers-aloud – are also necessarily aware of the material 
constraints of both the language and their own speaking bodies.  Hopkins’s poems are 
often difficult to read, even if one is not worried about matching the scansion indicated 
on many of them through the diacritical marks; his poems include sound sequences that 
                                                
20 See for example Julia F. Saville, A Queer Chivalry: The Homoerotic Asceticism of Gerard Manley 
Hopkins (Charlottesville: U Press of Virginia, 2000) 
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turn some lines nearly into tongue-twisters.  Consider the tightly packed repetition of 
initial and middle sounds of “Kingfishers”: “As tumbled over rim in roundy wells / 
Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell’s / Bow swung finds tongue to 
fling out broad its name” (ll. 2-4).  Syntax aside, the sounds themselves in this poem 
cause one to stumble, even when reading silently, and that stumbling increases when 
reading aloud.  The irregular but frequent repetition of the short vowel sound in “tucked” 
– tucked, hung, swung, tongue – increases the awkwardness of pronouncing several of 
the consonant clusters in the lines: “Stones ring” (“s” followed immediately by “r”), 
“each tucked” (“ch” followed by “t,” an inversion of the usual order), “tucked string” 
(final “t” sound followed by “s,” which is in turn complicated by being part of an “str” 
consonant cluster of its own).  Additionally, the frequency of single-syllable words, each 
of which seems stressed to one degree or another rather than falling neatly into a binary 
pattern of stressed/unstressed,21 raises the tension associated with reading the poem 
aloud: lines three and four consist solely of monosyllabic words, most of which carry 
enough semantic stress to justify strong articulation; no words slip by unnoticed in these 
                                                
21 Hopkins was aware of the ability of sprung rhythm to avoid – or at least seriously complicate – the binary 
of stressed/unstressed syllables.  In a December 22, 1880 letter to R. W. Dixon, Hopkins describes the 
pacing possibilities of sprung rhythm: “Its principle is that all rhythm and all verse consists of feet and each 
foot must contain one stress or verse-accent: so far is common to it and Common Rhythm; to this it adds 
that the stress alone is essential to a foot and that therefore even one stressed syllable may make a foot and 
consequently two or more stresses may come running, which in common rhythm can, regularly speaking, 
never happen.  But there may and mostly there does belong to a foot an unaccented portion or ‘slack’: now 
in common rhythm in which less is made of stress, in which less stress is laid, the slack must be always one 
or else two syllables, never less than one and never more than two, and in most measures fixedly one or 
fixedly two, but in sprung rhythm, the stressing being more of a stress, being more important, allows of 
greater variation in the slack and this latter may range from three syllables to none at all”  (Philips, Gerard 
Manley Hopkins, 242).  Hopkins goes on in this same letter to describe the practices of rising and falling 
rhythm, which allow even more variation between strongly stressed and completely unstressed syllables.  
The variation allowed by Hopkins’s sprung rhythm breaks down the binary system of stressed and 
unstressed poetic syllables in a manner that echoes the way his poems themselves break down the opposing 
binary between corporeality and noncorporeality. 
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lines, and readers must be careful to follow the (not immediately clear) grammatical 
pattern in order to allow pronunciation to further meaning.22  As a reader, one must roll 
the occasionally awkward sounds carefully and deliberately around one’s mouth, feeling 
one’s way through the pronunciation; as a result, the spoken language comes to take on a 
material quality and one experiences the immediacy and the sensation of the spoken 
words, the tactility of speech.   
In this way, Hopkins’s poetic practices allow the words to become corporeal, not 
only suggesting the connection between the poetic form and particular poems’ content 
but insisting on the irreducibly physical experience – the embodiedness, if you will – of 
the poems themselves.  Hopkins shares this characteristic in common with Swinburne; as 
Yopie Prins argues about Swinburne’s poetics, the intensity of his devotion to metrical 
laws, particularly the laws of meter, gives his poems the corporeality of physical bodies.  
Through complete submission to the laws of poetic rhythm, Prins argues, the body of the 
poet becomes “rhythmicized” at the same time that the rhythm of the poem becomes 
embodied.23  Similarly, Isobel Armstrong notes that both Hopkins and Swinburne are 
“obsessed with power and the law, the ‘mastering me/God’” and that “both are 
hypersensitively aware of the breakdown of language which they express in terms of the 
collapse of form and content, the breaking apart of sign and referent.  Both are left with a 
                                                
22 Again, Hopkins appears to have been highly conscious of his own poetic practices: in a letter of February 
15, 1879 to Robert Bridges, Hopkins wrote, “But as air, melody, is what strikes me most of all in music and 
design in painting, so design, pattern or what I am in the habit of calling ‘inscape’ is what I above all aim at 
in poetry.  Now it is the virtue of design, pattern, or inscape to be distinctive and it is the vice of 
distinctiveness to become queer.  This vice I cannot have escaped” (Philips, Gerard Manley Hopkins, 235). 
23 Yopie Prins, Victorian Sappho (Princeton: Princeton U P, 1999), 137.  See Chapter 3 more generally for 
a discussion of Swinburne’s poetics of ascesis.  Prins also notes the degree to which Coventry Patmore’s 
argument that rhythm was the corporeal element in poetry influenced the poetics of late Victorian poets. 
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fevered sense of the brute materiality of language: for Hopkins this means a world bereft 
of the organising spiritual form incarnate in matter, the materialism which rejects 
godhead.”24  Hopkins’s poetics of ascesis, of disciplinary control, heightens the 
corporeality of his poems.  When combined with the images of stark physical pain in the 
“terrible” sonnets, this poetics suggests that Hopkins understood bodily experience and 
bodily sensation as the irreducible characteristics of human existence.   
 
Wells’s Technologies of Pain 
Like Hopkins, H. G. Wells presents images of the inescapability of bodily pain in 
The Island of Dr. Moreau, although its function in the novel is less consistent than it is in 
Hopkins’s poems.  In addition to being the paradigmatic sense experience, it is also both 
the marker of insufficient evolution and a humanizing technology.25  Nevertheless, the 
ability to experience pain, whether directly or at second-hand, figured in the novel as 
somatic sensitivity more generally, marks the threshold of humanity.  As in Hopkins’s 
poems, materiality in this novel provides the foundation for sensory experience, and 
consequently for morality; also as in Hopkins’s poems, connection between individuals, 
which in the form of sympathy is the basis of the novel’s ethical system, depends on 
                                                
24 Isobel Armstrong, Victorian Poetry: Poetry, Poetics, Politics (London: Routledge, 1993), 403-404. 
25 Martin Willis, Mesmerists, Monsters, and Machines: Science Fiction and the Cultures of Science in the 
Nineteenth Century (Kent: Kent State U P, 2006), reads The Island of Dr. Moreau as an anti-vivisection 
novel, but one that is more partial to the concerns of scientists than of anti-vivisection activists.  According 
to Willis, Wells’s critique of vivisection stems far more from a desire to make scientific institutions 
transparent and available to the non-scientific public than from anti-vivisection ideological convictions: “In 
Montgomery and Prendick, the scientific community has two men whose scientific interests and 
sympathetic understanding of animal suffering, coupled with thoughtful defenses of its applicability, 
defend the correct methodologies of vivisection and provide a useful antidote to the sensationalism of the 
opposition” (219).  See especially chapter 7 for an extended discussion of The Island of Dr. Moreau as a 
critique of vivisection. 
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somatic experience and full embodiment.  Dr. Moreau is a vivisectionist who has been 
living for some years on an isolated island, conducting experiments in which he attempts 
to turn animals into humans.  It is the agony produced through Moreau’s transformative 
surgeries that lies at the thematic center of this novel, saturating the novel with images of 
pain as a universal sensory experience. 
The narrative begins when Edward Prendick, the narrator, is shipwrecked and 
eventually picked up by another ship that takes him to an exotic island.  Montgomery, the 
man who rescues Prendick and brings him aboard the ship, is an assistant of Dr. Moreau, 
and both Moreau and Montgomery live on the island to which Prendick is taken.  While 
recuperating on the mysterious island, Prendick hears and sees what he comes to believe 
are humans who have been tortured and mutilated to resemble animals.  After confronting 
Moreau, Prendick learns that Moreau is a vivisectionist, a physiologist, who has been 
engaging for some years in a project to transform animals into human beings through 
surgery.  The creatures Prendick had thought were mutilated humans are actually animals 
Moreau has transformed, with greater or lesser success, into humans.  Incompletely 
satisfied with his success on each creature, Moreau releases them to live freely on the 
island after his surgery on them is complete, and they live together in a society of sorts 
which they have built upon what they call “the Law”: a series of maxims, taught by a 
Kanaka missionary,26 that includes prohibitions against such things as walking on all 
fours, drinking directly from pools of water or streams, eating flesh, scratching trees, and 
                                                
26 Dr. Moreau tells Prendick that the law the beast-people recite “follow[s] in the line the Kanaka 
missionary marked out,” which gives them “a kind of mockery of a rational life.”  In spite of this assertion, 
however, much of the novel connects the law to Moreau himself, and the beast-people clearly identify him 
as the law-giver, regardless of its original source.  H. G. Wells, The Island of Dr. Moreau (New York: 
Penguin, 1988), 121.  All references to this novel are to this edition and will be cited parenthetically in the 
text as M. 
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chasing other creatures.  The creatures live in fear of Moreau, saying “His is the House of 
Pain,” “His is the Hand that makes,” “His is the Hand that wounds,” and “His is the Hand 
that heals” (92).  Eventually, one of Moreau’s unfinished creatures, a puma, escapes from 
the laboratory, and Moreau is killed trying to recapture it; his death leads to the end of the 
law and consequently to the disintegration of the beast-people’s social organization.  
Montgomery is also killed by one of the Beast People, while Prendick co-exists with 
them as one of their equals for some time before managing to escape from the island.  
Eventually, while drifting without direction in his dinghy, he is picked up by a passing 
ship and returned to England, where he now lives in a state of anxiety and isolation, 
fearing that he sees in the middle-class people around him echoes of the Beast People he 
left behind.   
As a vivisectionist, Dr. Moreau inflicts pain on the creatures as he transforms 
them surgically into humans; more specifically, he explores the boundaries of human-
ness through the use of pain as both humanizing technology and evolutionary measure.  
According to Moreau, since pain’s actual purpose is to warn of danger and injury to the 
body, advanced evolution of an organism would render such a warning system obsolete 
because an individual’s intelligence would provide a more effective warning ahead of 
time than would a bodily reaction to injury already inflicted.  Consequently, pain, even 
where it exists, is of no consequence to Moreau: “‘This pain,’” he says, explaining his 
position to a skeptical Prendick, “‘Oh! but it is such a little thing.  A mind truly open to 
what science has to teach must see that it is a little thing’” (M 113). After calling 
Prendick a materialist, Moreau explains that “‘so long as visible or audible pain turns you 
sick, so long as your own pain drives you, so long as pain underlies your propositions 
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about sin, so long, I tell you, you are an animal, thinking a little less obscurely what an 
animal feels’” (M 113).  Moreau’s dismissal of pain marks his own evolutionary 
superiority, as he demonstrates for Prendick when he stabs himself in the thigh with a 
penknife, claiming to feel no pain.  “‘The capacity for pain is not needed in the muscle, 
and it is not placed there . . . Pain is simply our intrinsic medical adviser to warn us and 
stimulate us . . . [W]ith men, the more intelligent they become the more intelligently they 
will see after their own welfare, and the less they will need the goad to keep them out of 
danger.  I never yet heard of a useless thing that was not ground out of existence by 
evolution sooner or later’” (M 114).  Within Moreau’s system of evolutionary logic, the 
inability to feel pain corresponds to a higher degree of evolution.  Yet Moreau also 
associates a lack of pain with lower organisms: “Plants do not feel pain; the lower 
animals – it’s possible that such animals as the starfish and crayfish do not feel pain’” (M 
114).27  While this inconsistency over the implications of sensitivity to pain may make 
Moreau’s position less reliable scientifically, the narrative effect of both statements is 
nevertheless to focus on the experience of pain as a meaningful measure of evolutionary 
progress.   
Moreover, Moreau insists that humans who respond to pain are not only 
insufficiently evolved but are also morally questionable: “‘This store men and women set 
on pleasure and pain, Prendick, is the mark of the beast upon them, the mark of the beast 
                                                
27 This position regarding the lack of sensitivity to pain among less developed organisms was a common 
one during the nineteenth century.  G. H. Lewes argued, as did many others, that animals like frogs felt 
little or no pain during vivisection.  In testimony he gave to a “Royal Commission on the Practice of 
Subjecting Live Animals to Experiments for Scientific Purposes,” Lewes gave as his reason for believing in 
the absence of pain the idea that “‘We know that among human beings, especially when you descend to the 
savages, the sensibility to pain becomes less and less.’”  Quoted in Richard Menke, “Fiction as Vivisection: 
G. H. Lewes and George Eliot” (ELH 67 [2000], 617-53), 625-26. 
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from which they came.  Pain!  Pain and pleasure – they are for us, only so long as we 
wriggle in the dust . . .’” (M 115).  Moreau’s “mark of the beast” refers explicitly to the 
taint of animality conferred by responsiveness to material sensation, but it carries 
connotations of immorality as well.28  According to Moreau, it is only selfishness and 
self-interestedness that makes people subject to the demands of pain and pleasure; 
without fear of pain or desire for pleasure, people would act rationally and would 
consequently, in Moreau’s formulation, become more human.  Although pain and 
pleasure need not be strictly material experiences, which Moreau acknowledges, he 
insists that the fear and desire he associates with pain and pleasure are always at root a 
concern for material being: “‘So long as visible or audible pain turns you sick, so long as 
your own pain drives you, so long as pain underlies your propositions about sin . . .’”  
Whether pain is something one experiences directly in one’s own body, indirectly 
through witnessing the pain of another, or metaphorically through fear of punishment, 
pain for Moreau is always a fundamentally material experience and, consequently, an 
experience of animality.   
And yet, in spite of the fact that Moreau associates responsiveness to pain with 
animality and immunity to pain with fully evolved humanity, he uses pain as a 
humanizing technology on his vivisected beast-people.  Some of that pain is inflicted 
simply as a necessary consequence of surgery without anesthesia.29  Some, however, is 
                                                
28 In terms of Christian prophesy, the “mark of the beast” is a mark on the hand or forehead that signifies 
submission to the beast that will rule the earth before the battle of Armageddon.  Wells’s image draws 
explicitly on the evolutionary narrative he has told, but the phrase clearly recalls the passages from the 
Book of Revelation. 
29 Lucy Bending, The Representation of Bodily Pain in Late-Nineteenth-Century English Culture (Oxford: 
Oxford U P, 2000), discusses at length the history of pain control, including the development of anesthesia 
for surgery.  In addition, Richard Menke, “Fiction as Vivisection,” discusses both the first use of sulfuric 
 
262 
intentional, and Moreau explicitly identifies his use of pain as a means of humanizing the 
animals: “‘Each time I dip a living creature into the bath of burning pain, I say, This time 
I will burn out all the animal, this time I will make a rational creature of my own’” (M 
120).  The pain Moreau inflicts is the consequence of the vivisection; it is also evidence 
of the creatures’ inherent animality; and, in this latest articulation, it is a technology 
whereby animals may become people.   
However, Moreau’s argument here is circular: the application of pain will “burn 
out . . . the animal” and make the creature rational; but, once the creature is rational, it 
will be immune to pain and consequently beyond the reach of Moreau’s influence.  The 
Law upon which Moreau relies is a similarly circular mechanism: it is designed to make 
them rational, human creatures whose behavior is guided by a disinterested social 
impulse rather than the desire for personal gratification that giving into instincts would 
allow; yet it is only effective because the Beast People fear pain at Moreau’s hands if 
they violate any of the prohibitions.  When Moreau pays a visit to the Beast People’s 
community after some rabbits are killed, the Beast People begin a recitation of the Law, 
including the prohibition on eating meat.  Moreau tells them that this prohibition has been 
broken, and the Sayer of the Law responds, “‘None escape’,” only to be echoed by the 
rest of the Beast People.  “‘Who breaks the Law –’ said Moreau . . . ‘ – goes back to the 
House of Pain,’ they all clamored; ‘goes back to the House of Pain, O Master!’” (M 142-
43).  While Moreau has told Prendick that he did not institute the Law, he makes full use 
of it as a mechanism of social control.  Yet his manipulation of it may be too effective: 
                                                                                                                                            
ether as an anesthetic during surgery in 1846 and G. H. Lewes’s enthusiastic response to the use of 




the fear of the pain Moreau inflicts in “humanizing” the animals is so intense that it 
outweighs all other concerns and actually drives some of the Beast People to rebel 
completely.  The Leopard Man does this, attacking Moreau the instant Moreau has turned 
away:  “[T]he Leopard Man, released from Moreau’s eye, had risen straight from his 
knees, and now, with eyes aflame and his huge feline tusks flashing out from under his 
curling lips, leapt towards his tormentor.  I am convinced that only the madness of 
unendurable fear could have prompted this attack” (M 143).  Thus, the humanizing 
“Law” only works so long as the Beast People are not fully human; if they were to 
become human and consequently to become immune to either the desire for pleasure or 
the fear of pain, the Law would no longer be effective because the pain that comes from 
breaking the law would be no deterrent.   
If the Leopard Man’s intense fear of pain would mark him, in Moreau’s 
estimation, as irrational and inhuman, Prendick comes to a different judgment.  As 
Prendick runs with Moreau, Montgomery, and the Beast People in the hunt to recapture 
the Leopard Man, he comes to see the Leopard Man as simultaneously more animal and 
more human than he had appeared previously.  When Prendick first catches a glimpse of 
him during the hunt, he notices that the Leopard Man “was still clothed, and, at a 
distance, its face still seemed human, but the carriage of its four limbs was feline, and the 
furtive droop of its shoulder was distinctly that of a hunted animal” (M 145).  Soon, 
though, the Leopard Man is trapped in some bushes, and Prendick sees him in an entirely 
different, if more confusing, way: “I saw the creature we were hunting.  I halted.  He was 
crouched together into the smallest possible compass, his luminous green eyes turned 
over his shoulder regarding me.  It may seem a strange contradiction in me – I cannot 
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explain the fact – but now, seeing the creature there in a perfectly animal attitude, with 
the light gleaming in its eyes, and its imperfectly human face distorted with terror, I 
realized again the fact of its humanity” (M 147).  For Prendick, it is the creature’s terror, 
its ability to anticipate and fear the coming pain, that makes it human.   
By the time he helps to hunt the Leopard Man, the novel has already established 
Prendick’s sensitivity to pain.  Soon after arriving on the island, Prendick hears “a sharp, 
hoarse cry of animal pain” (M 57) that quickly escalates in intensity until it becomes 
intolerable: 
I found myself that the cries were singularly irritating, and they grew in depth 
and intensity as the afternoon wore on.  They were painful at first, but their 
constant resurgence at last altogether upset my balance.  I flung aside a crib 
of Horace I had been reading and began to clench my fist, to bite my lips, and 
pace the room.  Presently I got to stopping my ears with my fingers.  The 
emotional appeal of those yells grew upon me steadily, grew at last to such an 
exquisite expression of suffering that I could stand it in that confined room no 
longer . . . The crying sounded even louder out of doors.  It was as if all the 
pain in the world had found a voice. (M 58-59) 
 
Prendick’s sensitivity is what prompts Moreau to label him a materialist, saying that he is 
motivated by fear of pain and desire for pleasure.  And in Moreau’s estimation, this 
suggests that Prendick is incompletely evolved, not fully human.  Yet it is Prendick’s 
sensitivity to pain, both his own and that of others, that marks him for the reader as 
humane.  Prendick’s sensitivity to material sensations underlies his ability to empathize 
with the vivisected puma, and it is what allows him to see the Leopard Man as human 
when he was most fully animal: hunted, helpless, terrified.  Prendick explicitly identifies 
the basis of his sympathy in sensation: “Yet had I known such pain was in the next room, 
and had it been dumb, I believe – I have thought since – I could have stood it well 
enough.  It is when suffering finds a voice and sets our nerves quivering that this pity 
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comes troubling us” (M 59).  For Moreau, the ability of one’s nerves to be set quivering 
signifies only one’s own irrationality and, consequently, incomplete humanity; for 
Prendick (and, I suspect, for us as readers), such somatic sensitivity is the foundation for 
humane-ness itself. 
  
Disembodiment, Divine Absence, and Humane Bodies 
Pain permeates Wells’s novel, from the creation of the Beast People at Moreau’s 
hands, to their control by Moreau’s and Montgomery’s whips, to the Law they repeat.  In 
rising above pain, Moreau insists, the beasts will come human.  Becoming inured to pain 
altogether is, in Moreau’s view, to advance up the evolutionary hierarchy, progressing 
through the various stages of human-ness and eventually (at least in theory) to the 
disembodied, completely non-sensory perfection of divinity.  These pervasive 
representations of bodily sensation in general, and of pain more specifically, highlight 
some of the consequences of material embodiment.  When material embodiment 
vanishes, as it does in both Wells’s novel and Hopkins’s terrible sonnets, the result is a 
sense of abandonment and terror as well as, most importantly, the disappearance of the 
basis of morality. 
As in Hopkins’s terrible sonnets, pain exists in this novel as the paradigmatic 
sense experience: the creatures’ transformation into humans is excruciating, and fear of 
that pain underlies the law they recite.  While other physiological sensations exist in the 
poems and in the novel, representations of physical pain bear much of the ideological 
weight and carry a large portion of the affective charge of each text.  This emphasis 
within the text resonates with a more general sense that pain is the most physical of 
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sensations and the most difficult to ignore.30  When one feels physical pain, one may be 
rendered incapable of maintaining awareness of anything except one’s own pained body; 
when one experiences emotional or psychological pain, that emotional pain may also be 
experienced simultaneously as physiological distress.  Even when the sonnets’ use of 
images of pain does not reflect literal bodily pain, the choice of metaphors evocative of 
physical pain suggest that such physical pain is the most basic of human experiences, and 
certainly the most fundamental of senses.  That Wells’s novel is similarly saturated with 
representations of bodily pain suggests a similar belief in pain as the most basic and 
inescapable sensory experience. 
After his death, Moreau becomes a distant, invisible god, the lawgiver who sees 
all and punishes all but remains unseen: Prendick tells the beast people who find 
Moreau’s dead body, “‘He has changed his shape – he has changed his body  . . for a time 
you will not see him.  He is . .  . there’ – I pointed upward – ‘where he can watch you.  
You cannot see him.  But he can see you.  Fear the Law’” (M 163).  Moreau’s death, in 
which bodily presence is replaced by an unverifiable panoptic surveillance that threatens 
punishment for any infraction against the Beast People’s law code, finalizes a process 
begun earlier in the novel, in which Moreau asserts his immunity to pain as well as his 
immunity to sympathetic suffering.  After stabbing himself in the thigh to demonstrate 
the unimportance of pain, Moreau describes his own approach to his animal experiments: 
“The thing before you is no longer an animal, a fellow-creature, but a problem.  
                                                
30 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford U P, 1985), 
argues that pain, for the one who experiences it, is more real and undeniable than any other experience; at 
the same time, she notes that when one is not in pain, reports of others’ pain seem equally unbelievable, 
even unreal.   
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Sympathetic pain – all I know of it I remember as a thing I used to suffer from years ago.  
I wanted – it was the only thing I wanted – to find out the extreme limit of plasticity in a 
living shape” (M 115).31  In other words, the real, material animal becomes a theoretical, 
nonmaterial concept.  The correlation between Moreau’s lack of sympathy and his lack of 
ability to experience pain is not coincidental.  Rather, even in life, Moreau’s denigration 
of material life and bodily sensation suggests not his advanced progression up the 
evolutionary ladder but rather his inhumaneness.  To state this more directly: Moreau’s 
refusal of materiality signifies not his closeness to perfection but his complete amorality.  
Moreau’s post-mortem transition (made, admittedly, without his consent or agency) from 
doctor to god-figure, simply literalizes the inhumaneness and amorality he demonstrated 
throughout the novel.   
In this capacity, Moreau bears striking resemblance to the angry God, by turns 
violent and absent, of Hopkins’s terrible sonnets, the Christ who refuses to answer 
prayers, Hopkins’s “cries like dead letters sent / to dearest him that lives alas! away” (“I 
wake and feel” ll. 7-8).  In Hopkins’s sonnets, dis-Incarnation – whether of God or of 
humans – is accompanied by isolation and utter alienation.  When either humans or 
Christ loses material embodiment in Hopkins’s poems, communication fails utterly as 
does the speaker’s humanity itself, and isolation, alienation, and terror result.  Daniel 
Harris, writing about Hopkins’s terrible sonnets, notes that “No worst” suggests through a 
                                                
31 Richard Menke, “Fiction as Vivisection,” cites the position of experimental physiologist Claude Bernard 
on vivisection: “Bernard claimed that ‘[a] physiologist is not a man of fashion, he is a man of science: he 
no longer hears the cry of animals, he no longer sees the blood that flows, he sees only his idea and 
perceives only organisms concealing problems which he intends to solve.’  With a phrase that would please 
Foucault, he observed that often ‘vivisection is only anatomical dissection of the living” (652, footnote 66; 
quoted material is from Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, trans. 
Henry Copley Greene [1865; rpt. New York: Dover, 1957], 103, 104).   
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heretical pun a nightmare of dis-Incarnation: “The phrase [no-man-fathomed] hints that 
the ‘no-man’ who did fathom the ‘cliffs of fall’ was Christ.  Once accepted, the pun 
shows Hopkins’s speaker toying with the Monophysite heresy . . . by denying Christ’s 
humanity; and in rejecting His [Christ’s] dual nature, he [Hopkins’s speaker] 
simultaneously loses the divine Presence who, incarnate in mundane things, substantiates 
their form and being.”32  To paraphrase Harris, if the “no-man” of the poem – the one 
who is not man, not human – is Christ, then Hopkins’s speaker flirts with the 
Monophysite heresy, recently revived by Newman, which denies the human-ness of 
Christ, claiming instead that Christ was only divine.  If, Harris continues, Christ’s 
humanity is eliminated, then so is the foundational principle of the material existence of 
the world.  That is, by denying the material embodiment – the complete humanity – of 
Christ, Hopkins’s poem eliminates the structure necessary for the very world to exist: 
“Hopkins’s imagery thus renders, in the most intimate terms possible, his experience of 
dis-Incarnation.”33  Consequent to Christ’s dis-incarnation, the world itself becomes a 
place of complete and utter alienation and isolation.  Hopkins’s speakers, in these poems, 
have no access to God, no access to other humans.  Consequently, with the removal of 
the possibility of human connection, humanity itself becomes unsustainable.  Because 
these poems so clearly equate humane-ness with material embodiment through the image 
of the incarnated Christ, the absence of material embodiment signifies, and enacts, 
fundamental alienation and inhumanity.  While Moreau’s disappearance from the novel is 
not equivalent to Christ’s disappearance from Hopkins’s poems, it does suggest an 
                                                
32 Harris, Inspirations Unbidden, 52. 
33 Harris, Inspirations Unbidden, 55. 
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ultimate alignment between Moreau’s amoral unconcern for suffering and his eventual 
transformation into disembodied and insensate Law.  Never humane even when he was 
alive, Moreau-as-Law is a model of the equation of disembodiedness with amorality. 
If Moreau’s insensitivity to pain suggests his inhumaneness, Prendick’s sensitivity 
to it indicates its importance to the system of morality the novel seems to support.  After 
describing his response to the puma’s cries of pain during Moreau’s vivisection of it, 
Prendick suggests the importance of sensory perception in his experience of sympathy for 
the creature.  Although there is a certain amount of imaginative identification in 
Prendick’s response, it is primarily a physiological reaction to perceived bodily pain that 
prompts his reaction.34  Moreau – without sensitivity to the suffering evidenced by the 
animal screams around him – operates outside of any system of morality, becoming a 
disembodied, distant, temporarily fear-inspiring god to the Beast People.  Hopkins’s 
Christ – “lovely in limbs” and present in the material world in most of the poems, but 
turned into a terrifying tyrant in the terrible sonnets in which all hints of materiality and 
embodiment are stripped from him – evidences the terror, danger, and amorality attendant 
upon dis-Incarnation.   
I began by suggesting that I was going to argue for a reversal of the generally 
accepted Cartesian duality of body and spirit.  The use made by Hopkins and Wells of 
vivid images of bodies and materiality, and especially of sensation in general and pain in 
                                                
34 Prendick’s apparent sympathy for the suffering creature behind the door changes when he discovers that 
it is a vivisected animal rather than a tortured human being.  I would argue that, although Prendick’s 
immediate self-interest is less threatened by the tortured animal than it was by the idea of a tortured person, 
the fact remains that Prendick feels within his own body and through his own senses a version of the pain 
whose evidence he hears.  Prendick may not carry the full moral weight of the novel – certainly some of his 
actions seem questionable, and it seems unlikely that he speaks with Wells’s voice for much of the novel – 
but in this instance his ability to feel pain makes him the only character to approach the version of moral 
positioning I believe the novel wants to enact. 
 
270 
particular, provides convincing evidence of the importance of the body to both writers.  
Further, by noting the instances in which embodiment fails, I hope to have made clear the 
terrifying consequences of such disembodied, non-humane spirituality.  In the system of 
morality that I suggest is implicit in these texts, the material corresponds to the moral and 
to the humane, while the non-material corresponds to the amoral, which is not necessarily 
evil but is certainly not bound to concern for suffering.  Hopkins, a devout Jesuit whose 
poetry alternately celebrates the presence and mourns the absence of Christ, and Wells, a 
one-time science teacher who studied under T. H. Huxley before turning to writing the 
so-called “scientific romances” firmly grounded in contemporary scientific discovery, 
appear at first to have little in common, and I do not want to suggest that there are not 
important differences between them.  Were the two men to have a conversation together 
concerning the topics I discuss here, it seems unlikely that they would share many, if any, 
conclusions, particularly concerning the ultimate benevolence of God.  I imagine that 
Hopkins would steadily maintain the perfection of God, while Wells (at least the Wells 
who wrote Moreau) might express some skepticism regarding either the benevolence or 
the omnipotence of God.  Given these important differences, however, equally important 
points of contact exist between and among the texts I have discussed here.  Neither 
Hopkins nor Wells makes an explicit statement concerning the conclusion I draw from 
their texts – that the entirely spiritual and perfectly dis-Incarnated God is inhumane and 
amoral.  The blasphemy potential (if not fully realized) in that statement may make it 
nearly unspeakable for both Hopkins and Wells.  And yet, if one follows each text’s 
argument to its extreme, yet logical, conclusion, the result is an insistence on the 
connection between materiality and humane-ness: Wells’s novel and Hopkins’s poems 
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insist that when God dis-incarnates, grace is transformed into abandonment; when 
humans disincarnate, physical pain turns into horror.  While one may or may not be 
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